Luke Gosling (Solomon, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak in strong support of the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025. I do so mindful of the gravity of decisions that we entrust to our defence organisation and the Australian Defence Force, and respectful of the responsibility the parliament bears to provide both oversight and confidence on behalf of the Australian people.

A democracy must balance transparency and secrecy, and it must provide information security. Some of the contributions yesterday went to the genesis or the idea of this Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence, and, of course, success has many fathers. There were many names mentioned yesterday, but I acknowledge all those who worked in a bipartisan way to get this idea of a Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence to where we are today. I hope that bipartisan action, which is characterised in the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security continues on into this committee on defence. In a Westminster-style democracy such as ours, one of the foundational principles is that those who wield power must also be subject to scrutiny and accountability. As the government's second reading speech on the predecessor bill noted:

… parliament plays a crucial role … by scrutinising and debating the decisions by executive government and the implementation of them by departments and agencies.

At the same time, the very nature of defence work demands that certain information remains protected—operational details, intelligence methods, capability vulnerabilities and the like. These cannot always be publicly aired, for good reasons. The explanatory memorandum tells us that the existing oversight and accountability mechanisms for the Defence portfolio were found to be 'inadequate in balancing accountability and transparency and national security considerations'. That was from the inquiry of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. This standing committee called for the implementation of a new joint statutory committee to request and receive classified information and briefings. Thus, our challenge now: to strike the right balance between transparency, oversight, accountability and secrecy, sensitivity, and security. This bill addresses that challenge. Our federal Labor government takes both transparency and security seriously, and we've done the work to draft legislation to achieve that balance between these two competing demands.

We must adopt a methodological, census based, non-partisan, deliberative process for the mature and responsible management of Defence matters. It is not enough for Defence decisions to be made in haste—do not make hasty decisions—nor behind closed doors, alone. In a democracy, prudent defence decision-making must be conducted in a deliberative, orderly and methodical way supporting multipartisanship, bipartisan confidence and sound parliamentary oversight.

This bill legislates for the establishment of a joint statutory committee, the new Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence, to review, monitor and report on the administration, operations and expenditure of Defence agencies. In doing so, it draws explicit model from the proven arrangements of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, PJCIS, under the Intelligence Services Act 2001. I referred to that act earlier and the strong convention of bipartisan operation within that act and within that committee.

This bill stipulates that the defence committee will consist of up to 13 members, drawn from both houses, government and non-government, and the appointments will be made by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.

In short, this is not a cosmetic tweak; it is significant institutional reform to embed multipartisan parliamentary oversight of Defence capability, strategy and operations. In a democracy there exists a social contract between the people and their defenders. In this bill, of course, we're talking about the Australian Defence Organisation and the ADF. At the heart of this reform is what I believe is the deeper principle of democracy: the social contract between our guardian and defenders and the people and nation that they defend. We entrust our defence forces and institutions and agencies with extraordinary powers: the power to use force, the power to deploy capability and the power to make decisions that may risk life, liberty and national interests. In exchange, the people and parliament must have the opportunity and the means to verify the application of those powers.

This bill is a recognition of that social contract. It acknowledges that, while our defence forces and agencies operate in a demanding and often, importantly, secret environment, their work must nonetheless be subject to democratic legitimacy and oversight. The explanatory memorandum provides that the committee's functions will include reviewing white papers, reviews and other strategic planning documents, scrutinising capability development and sustainment, examining war or warlike operations and monitoring significant non-conflict operations domestically and overseas. By doing so the bill strengthens the link between the people's elected representatives and the guardians of Defence. Thereby it helps reinforce trust, legitimacy and that social contract.

The committee will have the ability to inquire into matters on referral by a minister or either house of parliament as well as, importantly, more inquisitorial powers that will enable it to act on its own initiative in the form of an 'own motion' power.

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence will be modelled on a proven committee. We know the model works, the PJCIS that I previously had the privilege of serving on, has demonstrated that a statutory parliamentary committee with the capacity to receive classified information, conduct secure hearings that hold the executive to account can function effectively. The explanatory memorandum explicitly states that the new committee will be 'modelled on the PJCIS,' to ensure that it can request and receive classified information and briefings. This committee fills a gap in the current oversight framework by enabling scrutiny of classified matters in a secure setting. That is, of course, vital, because defence oversight cannot meaningfully occur only in public, unclassified settings. Some of the most consequential decisions—capability acquisitions, strategic deployments, operational commitments—will always involve sensitive intelligence, classified data and operational detail.

The bill provides for powers of the committee to obtain information and documents, to require persons to appear before it and to request briefings from heads of defence agencies, the IGADF and the Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator. By aligning with the proven PJCIS model, this bill improves parliamentary capability without reinventing the wheel.

The increased scale and gravity of defence investment that we have at the moment demands greater oversight. We know that Australia faces increasingly complex and evolving strategic challenges. We live in an era where Australia is undertaking what our government describes as the biggest peacetime increase in defence spending in our history: $70 billion for defence capability. The scale of investment, the complexity of capability procurement and the global geostrategic environment all compel us to ensure that our oversight is commensurate with that expenditure and that investment. As one commentator stated, some of the gravest matters are the decisions to commit our service persons to conflict. As the scale of investment increases, so too must the extent and effectiveness of parliamentary oversight. The more resources at stake, the greater the need for deliberation, transparency, methodical process and multipartisan input.

Parliament cannot outsource our accountability to the executive alone. The bill recognises this by giving the new committee the function of scrutinising major capability investments, including the Integrated Investment Program, the IIP, and acquisitions. Defence decisions are often among the most consequential a government makes—the resources committed, the lives affected and the strategic risks that must necessarily be taken. This bill ensures that our oversight architecture is up to the task.

While I have emphasised that the committee will oversee operations and strategy, it must be noted that the committee's oversight also extends to portfolio agencies like DVA, the Department of Veterans' Affairs, which will have a key role in implementing the recommendations from the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide; the ASA, the Australian Submarine Agency, which will lead us along the optimal pathway in delivery of nuclear powered submarines; and Defence Housing Australia, DHA, which houses our service men and women and their families, but also, due to previous legislation, our allies.

This will support and enable a biennial battle rhythm and adaptable policy settings. Another key merit of this reform is that it will support the government's move to a biennial battle rhythm of national defence strategies and refreshes of the IIP, the Integrated Investment Program. The second reading speech on the 2024 bill explicitly referenced that the new committee—that is, the defence committee we're discussing—would 'complement' existing oversight by enabling this deeper scrutiny in a classified setting.

By embedding the defence committee with standing functions to review defence strategies, capability development, sustainment and operations, the bill enables our defence policy settings to be more responsive, more adaptable and more aligned with a more frequent refresh cycle—that two-yearly cycle I mentioned. In a rapidly evolving geostrategic environment, the capacity to refresh strategy and investment on that biennial, two-yearly, rhythm is vital. This committee will provide parliament with the means to engage with that two-yearly rhythmic cycle—not simply in the traditional five- or 10-year cycle, but more dynamically. This committee will deliver trust, oversight and effectiveness during that two-year rotational process.

In summary, the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025 offers a considered reform, grounded in the needs of our democracy, the demands of defence oversight and the responsibility of parliament. It reaffirms the following. We balance transparency and the imperatives of secrecy and security. Defence business must be conducted in an orderly, mature, methodical, multipartisan and deliberative way. The social contract between our defenders—the ADF—the defence organisation and our nation must be acknowledged. We give them the means to act. We expect there is accountability in return, and we do have a proven model on which to base this in the PJCIS. This bill to focus on defence builds upon that, with the scale of investment increasing and the stakes rising in our geostrategic time. We must ensure oversight matches the gravity of the decisions made. This reform will support our move to a biannual defence strategy and investment, and support that rhythm to help our policy settings be more adaptable and responsive.

I encourage all members to support this bill. In doing so, they will be strengthening the connective tissue between our parliament, the defence of Australia, the ADF and the Australian people.

Tim Wilson (Goldstein, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Small Business) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am proud to stand up and speak on this Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025. I want to start by acknowledging the previous speaker and the speaker before them, who was speaking on a different matter. Because when we are talking about the defence of our country we are talking about a social contract. We are talking about how we keep our country united, about how we keep our country focused and about how we lean into the future to make sure every Australian feels a sense of investment about the future of our nation, an equal sense of confidence about who we are as a people and that everyone feels an equal share of responsibility in whatever capacity it is to be able to stand up for the future of our country.

Whether we're talking about Racial Discrimination Act or any other piece of legislation, or of course in the context of the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025, we're talking how do we enliven that sense of responsibility for every Australian. One of the principles that sits behind a lot of the legislation like the Racial Discrimination Act is making sure all citizens are equal. All people should be treated equally before the law. This is one of the most fundamental principles that I believe in, not just as a Liberal but as an Australian. I fundamentally believe that nobody should get any legal privileges or rights based on their ethnicity, their racial background, their sexuality, their gender or anything else. All Australians are equal. Let's start with that proposition: all Australians are equal. I will never retreat from that position. I am proud stand for that; it is very important. When we have laws that give some people some coverage and the same is not extended to others, I will always have an issue. There is no protection like 18C in the Racial Discrimination Act that extend to the context—

Ben Small (Forrest, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Order! Is the member seeking to ask a question?

Julian Hill (Bruce, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Minister for Citizenship, Customs and Multicultural Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

On relevance, the member was—

Ben Small (Forrest, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Resume your seat. There is no point of order because I have not yet asked the member if he accepts the intervention. Does the member—

Julian Hill (Bruce, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Minister for Citizenship, Customs and Multicultural Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is not an intervention; it is a point of order. They are two different things under the standing orders. I am not being smart; that is actually true.

Ben Small (Forrest, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I will hear the point of order.

Julian Hill (Bruce, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Minister for Citizenship, Customs and Multicultural Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The point of order is on relevance. I understand the speech he wishes to make on 18C but he was in the chamber and chose not to speak on the previous motion. I'm sure we could reschedule it if he wants a chance to speak on that, but I suggest he speaks to the bill.

Ben Small (Forrest, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

There is no point of order. The member explicitly made reference to the title of the bill in the first 50 seconds of his contribution. I'm sure in the remaining 12 minutes and 45 seconds of this contribution we will of course be hearing a lot about the relevance of the defence amendment bill, and with that the member for Goldstein has the call.

Tim Wilson (Goldstein, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Small Business) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Deputy Speaker Small. I'd like to thank the member for Bruce as well because the social contract goes to the heart of how we defend our country, whether every Australian feels an equal investment because they have equal rights and responsibilities. That was exactly what the former member who was speaking on the bill was enunciating, and neither I nor the member for Bruce sought to interrupt him when he was making this point, and I'm quite happy to do so as well. I simply say that I believe that every Australian should have equal rights, and, when we have other pieces of legislation which give different laws in different contexts, we believe that all people should have equal rights, and I will not resile from that debate. So, if special rights or special legal parameters are given to one section of the community, I believe it should be extended. If we don't, then how can every person have an equal investment in our community sufficient that everybody can have an equal interest in defending the future of Australia?

It's a principle of equality. It's one I believe in very deeply. I fundamentally believe in equality for all citizens because it goes to the heart of whether people feel an equal investment to defend the country, among other things. I understand this is a foreign concept to the member for Bruce, but it actually is central to our governing philosophy and actually what makes this country very important. We've seen too many times in previous debates where unfortunately the Labor Party has not risen to this occasion, from whether people have an equal right to be able to get married all the way through to, of course, other debates. But, when we come to this piece of legislation, we seem to continue to enliven it, because we also have a responsibility to make sure there is proper governance and oversight of how public money is spent.

Having served on the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and having looked at the challenges of oversight of our intelligence agencies, often dealing with the issues of security, secrecy and the national interest, it remains of absolute importance that, whatever agency sits within the artifice of government, it has parliamentary oversight, because that's central to whether the public has confidence in the parliament itself in terms of making sure there's proper and bureaucratic oversight, but, in addition to that, they have confidence in the political process and the institutions of this building. Of course, in the intelligence and security space, it has been of paramount importance that the PJCIS does its work, particularly when there are topics or issues that can't be discussed in the public square, but we cannot let our intelligence agencies off without any oversight or accountability. The PJCIS, broadly speaking, does that well in a relatively bipartisan way, but it also, of course, does things like have closed hearings to receive information as is appropriate.

The same is also now emerging as one of the most critical issues in Defence—the volume of Defence expenditure, whether it's set by the coalition or by a Labor government or any other future government of any other stripe. It's important to understand that there is proper oversight to make sure that Defence and the ADF have that accountability about their expenditure, because the spending of billions of dollars, whether it's on submarine programs, long-range missile programs or any other type of technology which naturally has a certain veil of secrecy around it because of intellectual property and our relationships and treaties with other countries, must be done in an environment where there is still oversight and good use of public money.

This is about making sure that our defence organisations have accountability but also that they're kept in check so that they can get the maximum value for the taxpayers' money that they have, because they should be motivated—and I'm not contesting that they are—to do things in the best interest of defending Australia. There should be accountability, focus and attention on their work to make sure that there's a driving down of needless cost and to ensure there isn't waste, and they also need the backstop to say, 'We are going to have to report this to parliament.' That is just as important for them and for fulfilling their function as it is for the role of parliamentarians to be able to go out and hold hand over heart and tell the Australian public, if you want to have an equal investment in this country enough to want to defend it—which is a central pillar of a liberal democracy, despite the objections of the member for Bruce—that they need to be confident that there are proper processes in place.

Of course, this is the evolution of a long legacy of propositions put forward by the coalition from the late great senator Jim Molan, Linda Reynolds and David Fawcett, who all championed different forms of parliamentary scrutiny and oversight in their different capacities in these roles. That's important. As Jim Molan said in the 2018 Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade report Contestability and consensus: a bipartisan approach to more effective parliamentary engagement with Defence:

Defence is one of the most important priorities of any national government. Greater bipartisanship on defence, reached through debate and contest on this new committee, will help to produce better policy outcomes to develop the capability Australia needs to defend ourselves into the future.

I think that's a worthy and just contribution and shows that this has been a longstanding discussion—to get to a point where the ADF is brought within the fold of the parliamentary system to mutual benefit. I think it really is incredibly important that we also have continuity around oversight that builds up institutional capacity within the ADF as well as within the parliament, because electoral fortunes mean that, at any given time, some of us may or may not be here. The carriage of programs across parliaments, both on the ADF side and on the parliamentary side, is an important part of the institutional memory of both institutions—to build public confidence as well.

One of the most important things we need to make sure of is that this committee is focused on the core purpose, which is lifting the standard of the expenditure of public money and lifting the standard of the output of the ADF. That's why it's very important that those who are on the committee are focused on governance, not on grandstanding. We know, in the context of the PJCIS, that there has been a generally longstanding principle that there are representatives from the government and the opposition, because those are broadly the alternative choices for those who take responsibility of the Treasury benches. That has worked very well. I know there are always other members of parliament from minor or independently minded—hopefully temporarily—communities who like to find their way into close proximity into power, but never want to take any responsibility associated with it, to grandstand. Needless to say, I have a lot of views on that subject matter, but I'll reserve them for another day.

Now, all of a sudden, the member for Bruce wants me to go off topic!

I've been given an invitation to move off topic! However, the point is that great power comes with great responsibility. That's actually never lost. This is one of the things, genuinely, that I think is harder sometimes to communicate to the public: whatever the limitations of the parties of government, we understand and have our own institutional structures in place—even when we don't always agree on what we have on each side—to govern the country when our time or responsibility comes, if it is given to us by the good stewardship and judgement of the Australian people. It doesn't mean, of course, that we always sanction what the other does.

Whereas, when individuals or minor parties come along whose primary objective is to draw attention to themselves or to justify their relevance or continuation in office—because that's all, ultimately, they can do—that does not exist, because they don't have the institutional memory, the collective wisdom and the input and feedback loops necessary. So there is a proportion of 'rights without responsibilities' that takes over. That's why I think that these committees have a responsibility between the opposition and the government to be measured and to focus on people who are going to take those great leaps of responsibility in higher office and that it makes logical sense to have people from the alternative parties of government. Of course if any crossbenchers wish to become part of future governments, they have that choice in the future.

I do see this as a fundamental test. We shouldn't be having people who, on issues like national defence, don't sign up to the belief that Australia should have a defence force that, if necessary, has to act in Australia's national interest in a capacity which is sometimes challenging to project. We need to be very clear eyed about what Australia's national interest is and that some of us accept office because we pursue responsibility. Sometimes that's responsibility we don't want to exercise but must in the interest of our country and for its long-term conservation, even if it comes to personal cost. Again, I come back to it. That is what I think a lot of the people in this parliament do seek to do and, unfortunately, in previous parliaments have been called to do.

It is one of the most challenging things about this office from different times—coming to terms with the fact that we are in the most dangerous time since the Second World War for Australia. We've never had a time where the fear of contest is so clearly within our region. That brings out many challenges for us as members of parliament—those who may be key decision-makers, obviously, presently those members of the Labor Party. The decisions we make today will have a material long-term consequence about the world that our children grow up in and also the safety and security that every Australian will feel into the future.

We have to be clear eyed and mindful. We need to make sure that defence is investing in the technology we need for tomorrow. We have to make sure we have the technology, working with our allies, for this nation to be able to stand on its own two feet. That means a component of sovereign capability, from building out missiles, drones, cyber and undersea systems and sustaining our domestic capacity to building out the capacity of our allies and working through it.

It's also about understanding the broader strategic context in which we operate. Some of our competitors in the region and internationally operate increasingly in grey-zone activity, where they're neither in a permanent state of peace nor conflict. This is one of the greatest challenges because the traditional that we think of strategic rivalry is that we're in a state of war or peace, but, increasingly, through cyber conflict and other nefarious forms of activity, we have certain nations and non-state actors seeking to actively engage in methods of undermining and assault on our national institutions—financial institutions, payment systems, technology infrastructure. As we pass national security laws around securing institutions, we need to make sure that we get the best value for our buck because our resources will increasingly be stretched as we are required to engage further and further in a security premium as a country.

Having oversight of large programs like AUKUS will be an important part of our country's long-term capacity to defend itself and to, more importantly, integrate with our allies as appropriate. Whatever the issue is, we need parliamentarians who hold the ADF accountable. We need to make sure we're building up our own institutional capacity to do that, but the ADF needs to do that in sync with us. The future security of this country is of paramount importance to this parliament, and it must be for parliaments to come, and the role of this committee is to make sure there is a permanent state of affairs.

Julian Hill (Bruce, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Minister for Citizenship, Customs and Multicultural Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'll put on the record that I agree with bits of the previous speaker’s contribution, and I thank him for bits of that contribution. I'm fairly sure that, having listened to the speech, he's suggesting that he may support the bill or that the opposition supports the bill this term. I didn't hear an unequivocal statement that they will vote for this bill this term, because they voted against it last term.

I will remain reasonably optimistic. It is a bit hard to know. You missed the point of order on relevance. I did invite him to take a detour into irrelevance, when he wanted to have an extended go at the crossbench. I thought that might be nice to have on the record. But there were some useful bits in the second half that I could agree with. That's the third speech in the last two days that I've endured from the member for Goldstein. We're a few months into this parliament, and it seems that we're seeing a pattern where he wants to speak on everything as part of his ongoing leadership campaign. I suggest that he provide a little more structure and purpose to the contributions. It might stand him in better stead. The first six minutes yesterday, as with today and as with the day before, were completely irrelevant. Yesterday, after 4½ minutes, he called relevance on himself before the deputy speaker pulled him up. But here we are.

I spoke very strongly in support of this bill on 24 July, and I do so again today. It's something that's very dear to my heart because, when I was chair of the defence committee, I did the work to put this forward. It builds, as I will acknowledge in a moment, on a legacy of many coalition members, including Senator Fawcett, the late Senator Molan and Senator Reynolds, who have advocated for this reform. The irony for poor Senator Reynolds, of course, was that, as chair of the subcommittee, she advocated for the reform and then they made her defence minister. Then she wasn't allowed to implement her own bill because the government wouldn't actually support it. But, anyway, here we are.

There is a clear and urgent need for this. It should have passed in the last parliament. We ended up in a very weird set of circumstances where the then shadow minister, who was strongly in favour—I read the quotes from media interviews where he was in favour into the Hansard when I spoke on the bill last term, and, to his credit, it was a principled view and a well-articulated view—got rolled at the last minute in the shadow cabinet, when the then leader, Peter Dutton, ambushed him. It was pretty shocking. That's a matter of public record now, all the entrails of the campaign. Peter Dutton also seemed to criticised the member for Canning for not doing the work as the shadow minister for defence, but that's their civil war that's ongoing in the bin fire that is the opposition. But I really pay tribute to those who've advocated in a principled way for this reform to have a standalone statutory joint committee on defence. The then shadow minister for defence then got appointed shadow minister for home affairs. Now he's the immediate past previous shadow minister for home affairs, if you don't count the interim shadow minister for home affairs, who was in the job for a week or two during Senate estimates after the member for Canning quit. He cut and ran from his post just before Senate estimates and he now makes car fetish videos—but, anyway, perhaps he will return to greater things one day.

The committee here is modelled on the longstanding Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, which has stood the test of time. This is a really important thing, and I'll draw the analogy. The PJCIS—I served on that committee for some years—has been critical to building the social licence for intelligence agencies and also to enhancing the parliament's ability to do its job. Inherently, necessarily, most of the work of the intelligence agencies is classified. That's the nature of their work. But it is still important, in a parliamentary democracy, that parliamentarians, not just the executive, can do two critical things: (1) hold executive government to account for their use and control of these agencies—the same parallel operates for defence—and (2) have appropriate forums in the parliament to interrogate and hold the agencies to account. The parliament's role, of course, as we know, is distinct from the executive. Having served on that committee, I think it does well.

There's an inherent tension in the security domain in particular—a little bit in defence but not so much. There's this inherent tension in a liberal democracy between our collective security as a society and notions of individual liberty. And, when the parliament considers natural security laws, in my view, that's actually the tension, the eternal tension, which we're reconciling and making judgements on. If the security agencies have more powers, they can be used covertly. That does impinge on individual liberty. If they have fewer powers, it can diminish our collective security. The ability of parliamentarians to interrogate legislation, to understand the need for it, to see the classified intelligence through the PJCIS, has been well established.

I pay tribute to the Hawke government, particularly to former prime minister Bob Hawke, for the creation of the then parliamentary joint committee on ASIO, as it was, which later morphed into the PJCIS. That was an act of courage, because those who've studied the history of this would know about the two Hope royal commissions—in the late 1970s and, I think, the early eighties. There were two royal commissions headed by Justice Hope to examine the intelligence agencies. The second of those Hope royal commissions explicitly recommended to the Hawke government that there be no such committee. The royal commission said to the government, 'Do not set up a parliamentary committee to oversight the intelligence agencies.' Prime Minister Bob Hawke and his cabinet made the right call—to reject that recommendation and say: 'No. Parliamentary oversight of this part of our national enterprise is important. It does matter.' It was legislated into being and, as I said, I think it's stood the test of time. This prime minister, Albanese, with the support and stewardship of the Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister for Defence, will, I think, in future years and decades to come, be seen to have made the right leadership call, finally, in doing what has long been called for, including by numerous Liberal MPs—yet their own leadership was too spineless to stand up to those in the defence establishment.

This is not a universally loved proposition, but it does have a lot of supporters in the defence establishment, once they've thought it through, because this committee has the potential to do a lot of good: to transform the institutional relationship between Defence and the parliament over time; to support our Westminster system; and to prepare, as the former speaker rightly said, the alternative government—because there are changes of government—to actually move straightaway into their critically important job in defence, because they will have had classified briefings. They will understand the threats that we face. They will understand the capability acquisitions and the rationale for them. They'll understand which projects are on track and off track, and they'll understand the job that they're walking into. That's been a function of the PJCIS for decades—senior members of the opposition serve on that committee and are better prepared to take on their roles if there is a change of government. Obviously, I hope, that's a long time away, but, of course, it will happen, in a Westminster system, one day in the future.

I acknowledge the point the member for Goldstein rightly made. He defined the core purpose as being 'to scrutinise public expenditure and raise the standard of the ADF'. He said that's the core purpose of the committee. I don't fully agree with that. I think that's part of the purpose, but there is more. There's another, broader purpose, which was actually the genesis for this piece of legislation. It was an inquiry that the member for Macquarie, here, and I served on—that I chaired—which was the first serious examination for decades of war powers, of how Australia goes to war. I think there is no graver decision which executive government could make than to take our nation to war, to commit to armed conflict, to enter into armed conflict and to put the lives of the men and women of the ADF and their service personnel at risk, and indeed, if the worst happened, to risk the future and survival of the nation. That is the gravest responsibility any government bears. There are legitimate questions, and there have been in the committee for a long time, about how those decisions are made and the transparency of them. Part of the point of this committee is to improve the transparency and accountability of how those decisions are made to provide a statutory, classified forum where parliamentarians from both sides—the backbench and non-executive members—can be briefed in order to understand the rationale of the intelligence and, importantly, to then have better oversight of a government's conduct of armed conflict operations in war.

There are appropriate restrictions and protections in the legislation for the secrecy of the information which would be provided to this committee, including criminal offences and jail terms for members who may choose to try and leak or misuse the classified information. Those provisions are built into the bill. I want to put on the record that the importance and the significance of this change for the relationship between the parliament and our democracy and the defence establishment shouldn't be underestimated. As the former government said and as this government has rightly continued to say in our statements but also the official documents—the Defence Strategic Review and our national defence strategies—we do face the worst strategic circumstances which our country has seen since the Second World War, and they're deteriorating. In response the government has sensibly and rightly increased significantly the investment in defence. That will continue at record levels and is set to grow.

I noted some of the backhanders of the previous speaker about the government's management of defence and their suggestion that it all had to be held to account. Of course it does. The audit office does its job; the new defence committee will be able to do its job. I would point out that it was not our government but the coalition that saw 28 projects run a collective 97 years late. It was the previous prime minister in particular who was all about announcing but never actually delivering on the capability. We'd all remember the press releases. You'd run out of Australian flags, often, for the announcement, but then, when you'd go and look in the budget papers, there'd be no money or it'd be underbudgeted. They'd announce the capability but they wouldn't put the order in. How many submarines did they announce? We had the Japanese, then we had the French and then they ripped them up—literally billions of dollars. You could have the ATMs whirring, flowing the cash right through the wind, out on the oval and out on the forecourt of parliament and everyone could pick up their money. Billions of dollars were completely wasted. They never placed an order for a submarine. They're the kinds of things that can and should be explored in a classified forum.

Then, of course, the former shadow minister for home affairs and former defence shadow minister the member for Canning—as I said, he makes car fetish videos now, but, when he wasn't doing that, he was putting out the one policy he was allowed to release at the last election, which was their genius idea to order another squadron of F-35s. You can argue the case for that capability. It hasn't been identified as a priority through the proper, thoughtful work, but that was their election platform: fighter pilots. Actually it wasn't fighter pilots; it was some planes. Because they hadn't budgeted for the fighter pilots, they hadn't budgeted for the sustainment and they hadn't budgeted for the petrol, so their genius idea was to order another squadron of planes that would sit on the tarmac and, I don't know, scare the enemy, knowing they couldn't fly. It was as clever as the press releases. They thought the ADF could run onto the battlefield waving press releases of capability that never actually came.

I'm just going to finish on the sticking point, if you like, which is the hand grenade that was thrown in at the last minute by the Leader of the Opposition for the shadow minister for defence's aspirations to support this bill last term. It was their venal, political outrage that their political enemies on the crossbench could ever be appointed to such a thing as the statutory committee of defence. The points that I've made in private—then, before then and since then, as this matter has continued to be talked about around the halls—I've said publicly, and I'll say them again. The composition of this committee is modelled on the tried and tested model of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. The composition of committees is a matter for the parliament of the day, rightly, and we put that in legislation here. This committee has an extra provision that the Prime Minister has to appoint them for obvious reasons, for extra safeguards so that they're appropriate to serve on the committee in terms of handling the kind of information that they handle.

The idea that we should write into legislation forevermore a requirement that large proportions of the parliament be deemed unsuitable or locked out from ever engaging in our national defence is offensive and ridiculous, but I'll finish on the point that it's also incredibly naive. The fact is that about a quarter of Australians now don't vote for the major parties. I'm a big defender of the party system. I know you. We were elected together. We've had this chat. We have different views on this. I think, in a Westminster democracy, political parties perform an essential public good. They bring together people of similar values, not always the same ideas, and they do the hard work of actually putting forward a platform for government, because you change the country for the better through being in government, not through sanctimonious press releases, nice speeches and media stunts. That's my belief. Others can have a different belief. I don't believe overwhelmingly in Independents in the parliament. I don't think they do the work of an opposition, and I don't think they do the work of a government. I respect the individuals and the nature of their service. But Australians have every right to make their own choices, and we need to respect the choices that are made.

If we're serious about arguing for greater defence expenditure, if we're serious about persuading that quarter—perhaps larger in some places—of the Australian people who don't vote for the major parties, then we shouldn't be terrified of the idea of having one appropriate crossbencher on the committee. I'm not speculating about the government's intentions; I don't know what the government's intentions are. It's not my portfolio. I'd just make the principled point that I can imagine multiple scenarios where it would be an enormous advantage for the parliament, for the government and for the defence establishment to have a skilled, experienced crossbencher on the committee who is able to talk persuasively, having been briefed in, to that part of the Australian polity to speak up for the need for defence or a contingency or an armed conflict. Those things do and can and will divide societies in the future. I just think the idea that was put forward and that some are still playing footsie with in the opposition, that somehow their political enemies have to be locked out, is actually not good for our national defence, and it's not respective of our parliamentary democracy. I make those points on a very principled basis. I believe in parties of government. That's where I choose to put my energy. But the idea that it should be rejected again for the same reason is frankly ridiculous.

Kate Chaney (Curtin, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The government's Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025 is a welcome step towards meaningful parliamentary oversight of our defence. But, unless the committee guarantees crossbench representation, it risks becoming an echo chamber rather than an opportunity for scrutiny and oversight.

Defence decisions are among the most consequential decisions we make. They shape our security, our economy and our sovereignty for decades. When stakes are that high, Australians expect rigorous scrutiny. They expect evidence based decision-making and clear accountability. But, often when it comes to defence, we see the major parties unwilling to probe and much more likely to go along with the other side without asking questions. Why? No-one wants to be labelled weak on defence. This bipartisan alignment minimises sensible debate. AUKUS is a case in point—a multidecade $300 billion undertaking that will define our defence strategy for decades to come. That kind of commitment deserves rigorous testing of assumptions, trade-offs and alternatives, not silence. AUKUS may well be the best defence strategy for Australia to pursue, but the only way we can test those assumptions is through investigation and oversight.

The bill amends the Defence Act to establish a parliamentary joint committee on defence with powers to: review administration and expenditure of Australian defence agencies; scrutinise capability development and acquisitions; consider strategy and planning documents; examine operations in war and significant non-conflict operations; request briefings from the heads of defence agencies, the Inspector-General of the ADF and the Director-General of the Office of National Intelligence; inquire into other matters relating to Australia's defence agencies under the committee's own initiatives; and report to the minister and to both houses.

Let's start with the good things about these changes. This provides a secure statutory forum so the parliament can see classified material on capability, schedules and risks, something that Senate estimates cannot reliably provide. It provides an end-to-end remit across strategy, capability, acquisition and operation so the committee can trace decisions from concept to delivery. It provides continuity across parliaments for multidecade programs, like AUKUS and shipbuilding, with safeguards against inappropriate disclosure. It provides oversight of independent regulators, such as the Inspector-General of the ADF, so integrity and safety can't be sidelined.

There is a strong argument that this bill doesn't go far enough on transparency. Let's set that aside for now; it is at minimum a step in the right direction.

The bill has one serious problem. It has no guaranteed crossbench representation. The bill sets up a committee with 13 members, seven from the government and six non-government members, but there's no guarantee of crossbench participation amongst the non-government members. The nomination process also requires consultation with 'recognised political parties' but no obligation to consult independents. So, in practice, membership can be stitched up between the two major parties.

If parliament is serious about independent oversight, it must include independents in its membership. Let's remember that in the last election independents and minor parties received 34 per cent of the national primary vote—more than the coalition, on 32 per cent, and just slightly below Labor, on 35 per cent—so it's vital that our committees, which play a crucial role in scrutiny and oversight, reflect the composition of the parliament and the will of the Australian people.

The bipartisan bind on AUKUS is the perfect sample of why crossbench scrutiny of Defence decisions is necessary. Let's remember that when AUKUS was unveiled in September 2021 Labor's shadow cabinet backed it within 24 hours of the initial briefing. That is classic evidence of both sides rushing to avoid a political wedge rather than inviting open national debate. I have no problem with the major parties deciding to agreed when it's based on substance, but this was bipartisan support for political reasons not necessarily because AUKUS was the best way to go. Neither major party wants to ask hard questions on costs, delivery, feasibility, conditions attached by allies or opportunity costs—

A division having been called in the House of Representatives—

Sitting suspended from 11:51 to 12:03

Neither major party wants to ask hard questions on costs, delivery feasibility, conditions attached by allies, or opportunity costs. Crossbenchers are often willing to ask the hard questions and do the work. AUKUS may well be a good thing, but, to build public trust, rigorous review is needed. Your average citizen doesn't want or need to know everything about our defence strategy, but they do want and need to know that people acting in the public interest have made the best decisions they can based on the best information available—the right people making the right decisions for the right reasons. They need to know that people who are acting for them, not for political benefit or career progression, are having a good, hard look at it.

The Prime Minister's recent White House meeting secured a verbal confirmation from President Trump that it's full steam ahead on AUKUS. That reassurance matters. It lowers near-term sovereign risk and signals allied resolve, but it's not a reason to suspend scrutiny. Even at that meeting, the US Navy secretary said that there were some ambiguities in the deal. Let's consider how many uncertainties remain in the AUKUS Pillar I agreement that Australia is spending $300 billion on. These demonstrate why scrutiny is required.

Firstly, will the Virginia class submarines actually be effective? There are advantages in being much harder to detect than traditional submarines, but the detection technology will improve significantly by the time we start receiving these subs in the 2030s. How do we know the summaries will be effective if and when they eventually arrive? Some have argued that a larger fleet of traditional submarines may be as, if not more, effective.

Secondly, will the US have the capability to deliver the submarines? US Virginia class production is below target. Independent reporting confirms actual output at about 1.2 boats per year since 2022, with the plan not yet achieved to lift to 2.0 and then 2.3 to cover US needs and AUKUS transfers. That gap is material to our timelines. If the US does not meet its own capability, it does not have an obligation to provide us with our subs. There is a real risk that the US will not even meet its own targets let alone build the summaries for us.

Thirdly, even if the US has the capability to double its submarine production, will it deliver the subs to us? It feels really risky to have all our defence eggs in a single basket, especially when the basket is currently controlled by Donald Trump. We need to ask and answer these questions to have confidence that our $300 billion is actually being directed into a project that will support the defence of our borders. The major parties will not ask questions for fear of exposing their political party, but the crossbench will.

Beyond AUKUS, the Australian National Audit Office has found a range of concerning features in defence agencies and expenditure. That demonstrates why real oversight and questions are required. The ANAO has found persistent schedule risk. The 2023-24 NPR reports a 25-month average slippage across major projects. Slippage reduces capability availability and increases cost risk. It has also found procurement governance and probity gaps. The 2025 munitions audit found important governance weaknesses and probity gaps. Defence formally accepted the findings and recommendations. The ANAO has also found that domestic industry participation has not been maximised. The '25 audit concluded that Defence's arrangements were only partly fit for purpose and did not effectively implement or monitor industry participation commitments in sampled contracts, and Defence agreed to nine recommendations around this.

The ANAO also found that public reporting on the Integrated Investment Program was only partly effective. It found that gaps in the framework guiding public reporting on the Integrated Investment Program were a real problem and recommended stronger governance and transparency. These are not isolated blips; they are consistent weaknesses in one of the Commonwealth government's most important functions. This is why parliamentary oversight is a good thing and why this oversight needs to involve a genuine and constructive examination of the issues, something the major parties may not deliver for fear of being labelled weak on defence.

The opposition has proposed a second reading amendment of this bill requiring that membership of the committee be dependent on holding particular beliefs about spending threats and AUKUS. Even if I happened to hold these beliefs, I see this as being deeply problematic and really quite ridiculous—so much for the separation of powers! The parliament and parliamentary processes are meant to hold the executive to account. The questions that can be asked in these committees should be able to cover and express any range of views. Our big spending in this area should be able to stand up to rigorous examination, so I find this deeply, deeply problematic.

This is part of the broader political shenanigans that are going on in this place at the moment about committee roles. It makes a farce of the separation of powers and the accountability checks that we are meant to have in our democracy. Committee positions should not be used as treats or weapons for domestic political purposes but as a really important part of our system to ensure we are making good decisions. I would encourage the opposition and also the government to stop their silliness and take on their roles, and recognise that committees play an important and serious accountability role.

In closing, I support the creation of a parliamentary joint committee on defence. It is a necessary accountability measure. But who sits on it will determine what it actually does and the scope of its inquiries. So I think the government should guarantee crossbench representation and mandate consultation with Independents, when nominating members, not just recognised political parties. Our defence deserves proper scrutiny and examination. And this isn't a radical ask. There are other committees that specify that the crossbench should be represented on those committees. Putting Independents in the room would certainly be a step in the right direction to ensure genuine engagement—open-minded and fearless engagement—with the issues, and also honour the purpose of committees as an accountability measure in our democracy.

Susan Templeman (Macquarie, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm very pleased to speak on this bill, the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025, which is coming before the parliament. It's very similar to a bill that we put forward in the last parliament, and I'm pleased that it's coming to the parliament again.

This bill is about establishing the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence, the PJCD. People who come in halfway through this will have little idea what we're talking about, I suspect, in these debates. But it's modelled on a committee we already have, which is the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. This one will provide a mechanism for classified parliamentary oversight of defence, and I want to talk about why it's needed before I get to exactly what it is.

We know that Australia faces an increasingly complex and constantly evolving strategic set of circumstances, and they're challenges. The new Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence will allow an enhanced transparency, an enhanced accountability, and a better oversight of defence decisions, capability, development and strategic planning. It really fills a gap in the current committee structure and oversight framework that we have, by allowing scrutiny of classified matters in a really secure setting. This is something that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security already does for those matters.

I want to go into some of the journey I've had for the government to get to this point. It's been really worthwhile, being part of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, and the Defence Subcommittee, which did an inquiry, in our last term of government, into a range of matters relating to accountability and transparency, which were triggered by a desire to really look at war powers and what war powers—what the processes were; how they could work differently. In the course of that, one of the things that became clear was that there were some gaps that could be dealt with. I really want to pay tribute to the member for Bruce, who was the chair of that inquiry and thought very carefully about the recommendations that our committee put together as a result of the evidence that we took.

Things we learned led us to recommend that this sort of committee be established. We looked at the existing committees that were there: the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade; the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade; plus the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Intelligence and Security. They all have different functions, but none of those committees were specifically empowered to examine matters relating to major armed conflicts or war, or warlike operations, and neither of the two defence-portfolio-related committees were empowered or equipped to receive classified information. Instead, those committees are currently confined to examinations of the Defence portfolio via inquiries or consideration of the department's annual report, and, of course, via Senate estimates. So that was where we found ourselves.

We looked at the model that the PJCIS provides, which really is: how to ensure a balance of providing oversight and accountability while maintaining appropriate controls on sensitive material. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security has a particular composition and functions that are laid out in legislation, just as this committee's will be, and it establishes limits to the committee's roles and powers. For instance, unlike most parliamentary committees, the PJCIS's enabling legislation does permit the release of classified information to its members in order to fulfil its legislated mandate, but it does place restrictions on members and secretariat staff regarding disclosure or publication of that information. Breaches of those restrictions are liable to attract a penalty of up to two years of imprisonment. That's the level of detail it has, and you'll see that it provides a model for how the government is moving forward with this this new Defence committee.

During the inquiry, a range of advantages and benefits which would flow from having something similar for the defence space were highlighted to us in the evidence that we took: improving parliamentary oversight of Defence related matters, which was a key benefit; providing a venue for Defence to provide and give classified briefings to the parliament, where it was required and appropriate; and an increasingly informed accountability and scrutiny by the parliament over Defence related matters, particularly by committee members, through the ability to interrogate issues which are otherwise difficult due to classification issues.

The subcommittee report put forward took this as a proposal and noted the importance of Defence oversight by parliamentary committees. One of the things we need to keep in mind is that, when the community is confident that there is deep scrutiny and transparency, it actually provides much greater support for the work that that agency or organisation is doing—so we see this as a really positive thing for the important work that our Defence Force does. There are things already that I learn in committee—which I obviously can't share with people—that give me confidence, and there are things that I want to ask more about, but there is only a certain layer that we can go to. All round, from the more transparency and the greater accountability we have comes greater confidence from not only parliamentarians but the constituents who we represent.

I should say that during our inquiry we absolutely recognised, respected and accepted that there are certain Defence operational, intelligence and security matters that should be classified and should have very reduced public disclosure. There is embedded into the way this committee has been designed an absolute recognition of that, for a whole lot of reasons, there are things that cannot be publicly aired.

This new committee we're putting forward, which I really hope will have the support of the parliament in this term of government—unlike the last time we put forward the proposal—creates a committee which will oversee the Australian Defence Force, the Department of Defence, the Department of Veterans' Affairs and key Defence portfolio agencies including the Australian Submarine Agency, Defence Housing Australia and the Australian War Memorial. In terms of the functions of the committee, it includes the oversight of administration and expenditure; strategy; planning; capability development and personnel; war, warlike or major non-conflict operations; responses to royal commissions relating to Defence; and the performance of key statutory roles including the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force and the Australian Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator. The committee will not have oversight on certain things. It will not have oversight of intelligence agencies in the Defence portfolio, which already full under the functions of the PJCIS.

It's also important to think about what the committee will be able to do. What does all that mean? What will the committee be able to do? It will be able to consider publicly released documents dealing with Australian Defence tragedies, and planning and contingencies such as the biennial national defence strategy. It will be able to scrutinise Australia's defence capability—that includes acquisitions and sustainment—on things like the Integrated Investment Program. It will be able to examine and be apprised of war or warlike operations and ongoing conflicts in the event of a decision by the executive to enter into armed conflict. It will also be able to monitor the involvement of Australian defence agencies in significant non-conflict operations both at home and abroad.

Obviously receiving access to classified information is crucial to carrying out these new functions and these oversight functions. Along with the opportunity to access information obviously come huge responsibilities for the members of that committee. Similar to the PJCIS, the Prime Minister, in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition, will appoint 13 members to the committee. That will be seven government members and six non-government numbers from both the House and the Senate. This gives the government the flexibility to appoint crossbenchers should it wish to do so. That was certainly a sticking point for the opposition in the last parliament, when this legislation last came to the parliament. I hope that they have moved on from their opposition to that, because that's what we would like to see in this bill.

As I mentioned, there will be strong protections on the information that parliamentarians receive, as it should be. The bill includes strict criminal offences for unauthorised disclosure of protected information, including operationally sensitive material and information that could prejudice national security or Defence operations. These provisions apply to committee members, their staff and any other individuals involved in the committee's work. Disclosure of such information—even for it be disclosed to the PJCD—will require ministerial authorisation, and the minister may issue binding certificates to prevent its release during committee proceedings. To uphold confidentiality and integrity, the bill introduces criminal offences for unauthorised use or disclosure of protected information. That applies to committee members, staff and attending members of parliament. These provisions will be modelled on the Intelligence Services Act 2001.

This is a really significant piece of legislation. Some people might go, 'Oh, it's just a committee,' but in fact the way our committees work in parliament is that we work across the parliament, often in an absolutely bipartisan or multipartisan way, as we're exploring issues and trying to understand what is really happening. You don't see in these committees what you see on the floor of the parliament in question time. These are not performance spaces; these are spaces where we diligently work through—

Opposition Members:

Opposition members interjecting—

Susan Templeman (Macquarie, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The opposition is surprised that I would describe question time as a performance. It is a performance for us all, and we have a press gallery watching us very closely. The committee space is one where we work alongside each other rather than in an oppositional way. We don't always end up exactly on the same page, but we work closely together, collegiately, wherever that is possible. That applies equally to Independents and the minor parties.

As I said, when this bill was put forward last year, it was rejected by the Senate because of disagreement over committee membership. We were very disappointed to see that the Liberals—who were keen to support the concept of the committee—chose to vote against the legislation. I really urge them to not fall down that hole again.

I think this is something that will be significant. It builds on the work that Bob Hawke's government did in the 1980s—I think it came in just after I left the press gallery in Canberra back in the 1980s—to oversee ASIO. That was the first version of this we had. It was then worked on in the early 2000s, and the PJCIS became closer to what it is today. I think this is a really natural evolution that provides not only greater scrutiny but also greater confidence to the people of Australia that our defence organisations are transparent and accountable so that we know they are doing the very best for our communities. At that point, I would really like to commend particularly my Richmond and Glenbrook RAAF personnel and the other defence personnel who live in the electorate of Macquarie, and thank them for the work they do every single day to keep Australians safe.

Darren Chester (Gippsland, National Party, Shadow Minister for Veterans’ Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I do thank the opportunity to rise on the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025. In accordance with the previous speaker, I acknowledge this is a very important bill, particularly as Australia faces the most dangerous strategic environment since the Second World War. That's an opinion shared by the Prime Minister, the defence minister and those on this side of the House. You only need to open the newspaper on a daily basis to see reports of conflict in Ukraine, the Middle East, and other activities including grey zone activities in the Taiwan Strait and recent events closer to home on our shores involving the Chinese defence activities in the Tasman Sea, the circumnavigation of Australia, the release of flares near the P-8 Poseidon and sonar activities impacting Australian divers. I recently returned from a bipartisan delegation to Taiwan, where we were given some further insights into the types of coercive activity being experienced in Taiwan from mainland China. So there is no question the strategic environment is uncertain, and the coalition does support the principle of this bill to strengthen the parliamentary oversight of defence, provided the government remains both bipartisan and serious in its intent. We are quite unique here in Australia by not having an oversight committee of this nature for defence among our AUKUS partners, so I think it is time for such an approach. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence must build confidence in defence and not become another platform for political games.

There's a lot to be gained by increasing understanding in this place of our Australian Defence Force and how it operates. I really do need to note that this week we have the privilege of 47 Australian Defence Force personnel in the parliament as part of the Australian Defence Force Parliamentary Program. The genesis of that program was in 2001 when it was acknowledged there were not many members of parliament with direct defence experience. Coming out of World War II, members of parliament were likely to have served or had immediate family members who had served. But by 2001 it was not the case and the decision was made to establish the Australian Defence Force Parliamentary Program. That program allows members of parliament to spend some time embedded with our Australian Defence Force. It could be on patrol, it could be on exercises, back in the base or it could be internationally. That allowed members of parliament to have those experiences to increase their understanding of how the Australian Defence Force works on the ground.

The reciprocal of that is the opportunity for Defence Force personnel to spend a week in parliament. I think they get the rough end of the deal. We get out and about and have some time in incredible locations where they are based and they get to spend a week in Canberra. But nevertheless, from the conversations I have had with many of the participants this week, I have gained some additional knowledge. They have shared their insights into their jobs and what they are doing in the defence of our nation, and I want to thank them for that. I want to thank them for being so forthright but also thank them for their service to the country. The men and women who put on the uniform and sign up to place themselves in harm's way if required are doing that to secure the freedoms we enjoy today. I think this defence joint committee has the potential to add to that mutual understanding and to strengthen those links between this building, the Parliament of Australia, and the men and women who serve in uniform. But this new committee must not add to bureaucracy; it must enhance it. It must provide a trusted forum to scrutinise programs and delivery without undermining Australia's national security or strategic objectives.

I would hasten to suggest that if this joint committee was in existence already, we would have saved ourselves—we certainly would have saved the Minister for Veterans' Affairs and Defence Personnel—from quite an unseemly debacle which is unfolding in relation to his changes to the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal. What we've seen with this bill could have been avoided if there were a committee in place to provide full and frank advice to government members before it got to the point of legislation being on the floor of the chamber.

Yesterday, the Minister for Veterans' Affairs suggested that my blood pressure was increasing and that I was particularly agitated about the issue. I want to assure the Minister for Veterans' Affairs that my blood pressure is the least of his worries. The people in our veterans' community and Australian Defence Force personnel are furious about the changes he's proposing through the legislation. If he had actually engaged with the veterans' community, ex-service organisations or current serving Australian Defence Force members, he would have known within a minute or two that this bill is unloved because it takes away the rights of veterans and ADF personnel to seek a review of Department of Defence decisions.

Yesterday, in the chamber, the minister accused me of creating anxiety and uncertainty. He thinks—I appreciate the flattery, Minister—that I have the power to concoct the action which is coming his way from the organisations which are opposed to his legislation. He flatters me enormously to think that I have that capacity, because there were 63 submissions to the Senate inquiry into the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal changes, and 62 of those submissions were against it. If the minister seriously thinks that I have enough time to write 62 submissions and send them out to different organisations to sign and send them back in, he has a much higher view of my capacity than anyone in my office does. There were 63 submissions; 62 were against it. The only organisation that wrote in favour of the legislation was the Department of Defence. The Department of Defence wrote the legislation, so, thankfully, they still back their own legislation.

What we've seen in the context of the need for additional oversight of defence is that this legislation came to the chamber with no consultation, a complete lack of respect for current serving personnel and our veterans community and their families, and there is no support in the broader community. When the legislation made it before the chamber, the minister spoke and introduced the bill and those on our side spoke. How many of the 93 backbenchers for the Australian Labor Party in the House of Representatives were coming in, charging behind the minister and backing him up on this most important legislation? Was it 20, 30, 40? One—one member spoke in favour of the bill. The first term member for Sturt must have copped the talking points and was dragged in there to speak in support of the bill. But when it came time to vote, they all turned up. They all voted for it. I fear that they didn't really know what they were voting for. Because if they knew what they were voting for, they wouldn't have supported it.

Again, the minister suggests that I have the capacity to create anxiety and uncertainty in relation to this bill, but evidence to the tribunal from independent sources suggests that it's not just me who is frustrated and angry by the government's approach to this issue. The Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal, the independent statutory agency established by the Gillard-Rudd government, by the Labor Party, in 2011, submitted to the inquiry that these changes would—and I quote:

… abolish and curtail current and significant rights of ADF members, veterans and families and others to seek external and independent merits review of Defence decisions …

That's the independent statutory agency saying that rights are being stripped from current ADF members, veterans and their families.

RSL NSW said the bill is 'disgraceful' and gave evidence to the inquiry saying:

We feel this Bill [is] detrimental, not only to veterans' mental and physical health when seeking reviews, but also to the value placed on their service …

It goes on. I could read quotes to you all day. The tribunal made an important point in its submission in terms of the context of the bill about defence oversight. The tribunal highlighted defence overreach in relation to this issue. It said:

The Tribunal believes that the purpose of defence honours and awards is not just to make ADF members and veterans feel good about their service, or to provide solace to the families of deceased members and veterans, but to signify the nation's respect and appreciation of those who have served on its behalf—and especially those who have served with gallantry or distinction or conspicuously. Abolishing appeal rights against the refusal of defence honours in the manner proposed in the Bill would, in the view of the Tribunal, undermine that purpose and thereby detract significantly from the integrity of the defence honours and awards system.

This is the independent agency. The minister says that I'm capable of creating uncertainty and anxiety, but his own statutory agency is saying that the legislation before the House would detract significantly from the integrity of the Defence honours and awards system.

Instead of just pulling the bill in the wake of the Senate inquiry, in the wake of the submissions, where 62 out of 63 are against it, now the minister is doubling down. He's delaying the reporting date to 21 November. The Senate inquiry is meant to report today, but the minister, in what could only be seen as an act of complete arrogance, believes he's going to be able to convince people on the crossbench that he can polish this enough that it won't stink quite as much. We're saying to the minister to just bin this disgraceful bill.

His own backbench have started distancing themselves from the legislation because it is a solution looking for a problem. The reason I know his backbenchers are distancing themselves from it is that yesterday I asked the minister to name just one veteran who supported the legislation. As I sat down, I thought, 'Clearly, he's just going to name his own backbenchers,' but he couldn't even do that. He couldn't name the member for Spence or the member for Solomon, because I don't think they support the bill either. So the minister stood up and failed to name a single veteran in Australia who supports his bill.

The untruths are starting to catch up with this minister, because he also said yesterday that Teddy Sheean would still be able to get a VC under this legislation, which is not true. Under the legislation that went through the House of Reps and will get to the Senate at some point, there is no pathway for Sheean or Richard Norton or Harry Smith's troops at Long Tan to receive their medals for conspicuous gallantry.

Tony Zappia (Makin, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm seeking the call to make a point of order. I very much appreciate the comments being made by the member for Gippsland, but I fail to understand how they are relevant to the bill that is currently before us, so perhaps he could advise the House as to what the relevance of that is to the bill before us. I would ask you to bring him back to the bill that's before us.

Meryl Swanson (Paterson, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Are you making a point of order on relevance, Member for Makin?

Tony Zappia (Makin, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Yes.

Meryl Swanson (Paterson, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you.

Darren Chester (Gippsland, National Party, Shadow Minister for Veterans’ Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The point of order from the member opposite shows a misunderstanding of how this committee would work to provide oversight and prevent the Defence overreach which has occurred with this legislation. This legislation before the chamber and expected to go to the Senate is all about the Department of Defence overreaching into an area without consideration of how that bill would be accepted or denied across the chamber. Almost inevitably in this place, issues around defence and veterans receive bipartisan support. This bill is not receiving bipartisan support, because it was given no consideration by the coalition before it got to the chamber. If this defence committee had been in place, we could have saved the minister from this debacle.

The minister has to admit that there is now no pathway under his legislation for Teddy Sheean to receive the Victoria Cross, for Richard Norton to receive the Victoria Cross or for Harry Smith's troops at Long Tan to receive individual Medals for Gallantry. The reason there's no pathway is that they would be timed out by the 20-year rule that the minister is imposing on the Defence Honours and Awards Appeals Tribunal for reviewable actions. They would also fall foul of the legislation because family members are not allowed to initiate a review. The only ones who can initiate a review under the minister's legislation are people who are eyewitnesses or in the chain of command of the individual who committed the gallant act. The minister has stretched the truth to a point where I think his colleagues on the backbench realise now that he is selling them something that is completely unsellable to the general public. That is why, without any consultation, the veterans community is furious. The independent tribunal is scathing of the minister and his claimed consultation because they simply were not asked.

I want to end with four words: we will remember them. They're simple words: we will remember them. It's from the ode of remembrance. It's not 'we will remember them when it's in a convenient timeframe', it's not 'we will remember them when it suits us'. This minister has placed a use-by date on 'we will remember them'. On this side of the House, we will always remember them. The formation of this joint committee would allow this disgraceful bill to be eliminated from the parliament in first place. I urge the minister to come to his senses and act in a bipartisan way.

Tania Lawrence (Hasluck, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Security is the priority of government, and defence is at the pointy end of that duty. To this end, I am honoured to have Lieutenant Bijan Shekibi in my office as part of the defence parliamentary program to really get a great sense of appreciation of the type of work, the skills and the capacity that he brings to the defence forces and also to his colleagues, peers and, importantly, their families. The defence parliamentary program is a signature achievement, and I'm very proud to be part of it in terms of hosting defence personnel, and also to be part of the exercise program. Being part of Exercise Pitch Black in Darwin was an extraordinary highlight, so far, of my parliamentary career.

In terms of the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025, early in our first term the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade was asked to inquire into how Australia makes decisions to send our service personnel and their families abroad and, specifically, to send service personnel into armed conflict. That committee also regularly reviews the annual reports of the Department of Defence—although we already have parliamentary oversight via debates and estimates, and the committee's existing remit. That committee concluded, in the course of bringing down that report, that those processes are not sufficient.

In its report, the committee—then chaired by my friend the member for Bruce—recommended, in recommendation 6, that we establish a dedicated statutory committee focused on defence, to be called the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence, encapsulated by this bill and the virtually identical bill that lapsed in the last parliament. The coalition members of that committee in the last parliament supported that recommendation then but failed to support the bill—failed, notwithstanding that the same suggestion was made back in 2018 by the committee, then chaired by the late senator Jim Molan, who called it 'a sensible and critically important reform'. I concur.

I understand that the coalition will now support the bill, and I thank them for that, notwithstanding that their support is years late in an area of policy where delay, as the member for Hume suggested in his speech, is ill-advised. This bill complements the government's overarching work in defence, which finds its basis in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review by Professor Stephen Smith and Air Chief Marshall (Ret'd) Sir Angus Houston. From that flowed the 2024 National Defence Strategy, which directs that the Australian Defence Force shift from a balanced force to a focused force—more capable, more lethal, more integrated. It aligns with a denial framework for defence, to defend Australia and our region—to deter by denial—to protect our trade and economic lifelines, to invest in regional relationships, and to uphold the rules based order. This bill sits within that framework as does the excellent work done by the Prime Minister in his recent trip to the US and the generational treaty signed with Papua New Guinea earlier this month.

Looking at the bill before us, proposed clause 110ABB sets out the functions of this new defence committee. These are broader than the mandate of the current Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee; for example, proposed subparagraph 110ABB(1)(e) authorises the committee 'to examine and be appraised of war or warlike operations, including ongoing conflicts'. Decisions to commit our ADF to conflict will not shift from the government to a parliamentary committee—that remains a Constitutional prerogative of the executive. But this committee provides enhanced scrutiny, a mechanism by which this parliament can examine the decisions of the day, ask the hard questions and further ensure public confidence.

Members will note that the commitment of Australian forces to Afghanistan in 2001 and to Iraq in 2003 were contested decisions. Scrutiny might have produced better decisions in retrospect. This is not about second-guessing. It's about transparency and accountability in a democratic society. The committee will have other important functions: reviewing defence agencies and their budgets, scrutinising strategy documents and capability developments and acquisitions. On acquisitions, the defence minister has noted that defence contracting is the space where the government has the greatest private sector exposure. Defence contracts are large, high value and often span years in duration. They are, by their nature, high risk. Parliamentary oversight must match that reality. The committee will contribute to a more robust process and better public confidence.

When the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit reported on defence major projects from 2021 to 2023, including the Hunter Class Frigate Project, its recommendations emphasised the need for greater scrutiny and timely reporting. But that committee lacks the special access to classified information that this new defence focused committee will have. The proposed committee would have been a useful body to have in place when the coalition were trying and failing to make proper acquisition decisions during their decade in office. I've spoken previously in this place of the Battle of Rabaul in 1942 and more than once, and why? Because it is a largely forgotten defeat, yet a necessary precursor to the attack on Darwin. The lessons from Rabaul should shape the way we think about our forward posture today. Our interests extend beyond our borders and mingle with those of our neighbours. Preparedness for conflict is built on cooperation and with care, well north of Australia. The new defence committee will help ensure that we better understand these long-term imperatives.

The bill also provides functions in relation to personnel and veterans, because our preparedness always depends on our people. Our enlisted personnel must have the best support to fulfil their duty and love their career. Including veterans in the remit is vital. This includes the way in which we care for defence personnel and veterans' families. I was deeply privileged today to attend the veteran family support event—and listen to the stories of, particularly, women experiencing life as they support defence personnel. The truth of the matter is families are part of the service. I think the more we can think in that frame to ensure that they get the support that they need to support their partners in service is vital—both during and post service, might I add. We have a responsibility for this.

Under subclause (g) the committee may examine reports of any relevant royal commission, and it's all appropriate. Given all this, the bill does deserve passage. It was initially, as I said, supported by the coalition members of the committee. It was disappointing, in the previous parliament, to hear their late opposition and their misdirected amendments targeting a particular political party or Independents. A democracy cannot embed party labels in legislation about oversight nor are parties recognised under the Constitution. The safeguards in this bill mirror those of the intelligence and security committee and are robust, and this is a committee of which I'm a member. I can see how the process works so optimally. The member for Canning knew this in the last term and the member for Hume appears to know better now, and they should have treated the former identical bill, and the safeguards we place around the defence of our nation, with the seriousness it demanded.

It is in fact a travesty that Australians have had to wait so long for this committee to be created. The coalition failed to do so when their own committee recommended it in 2018. They then failed to support our bill in 2024. These are years—six years—over which time such a committee could have been doing extremely useful work. The member for Canning, when he was the opposition's defence spokesperson was bullish in his public support for this very reform. He told the Australian Defence Magazine in 2024:

There is no independent Joint Defence Committee where tough questions can be asked in a classified, protected space.

He was right. He said that such a committee would bring 'rigorous parliamentary oversight' to defence policies and the ADF. Too true. But, when the opportunity came to make these words a reality, when the bill came before the House in 2024, what did he do? He voted against it. He failed to support the very thing he demanded; so did the member for Hume, their current spokesperson, and other members opposite. That is the difference between conviction and convenience, between leadership and lip-service. The then shadow minister for defence stood at podiums and spoke of transparency and accountability, yet, when the time came to cast a vote, he sided with the same obstruction that had kept this reform shelved since 2018—even after his own colleagues, including Senator Molan, had called it sensible and critical reform. So let's be clear. This isn't about partisanship; it's about integrity. If you stand before the Australian people and declare that defence needs stronger oversight and then you vote against it, you are not defending the national interest. You are failing the Australian community, failing the defence community and failing your duty in this place.

It's true that real oversight is sometimes uncomfortable—that it shines light in places and at times that may be inconvenient. This is precisely why we need it.

The Liberals cannot posture about patriotism—something that the member for Canning bangs on about all the time—and yet then vote against transparency. You cannot talk about defending Australia while refusing to defend accountability. There is no point talking a big game on defence and security, and then delaying important reforms like this one. The coalition might want to choose better where it plays its politics.

I refer to the 2024 strategy: shifting to an integrated, focused force; acknowledging that conflict is now more complex than ever. Integration means that war is no longer just the province of the military; it touches every domain, and so greater scrutiny is needed. Today that need is greater than ever. Since the original review and strategy were set out, our strategic environment has continued to intensify. The national strategic review remains the cornerstone. It affirms that Australia faces its most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War. The government 's 2025-29 Defence Corporate Plan underscores the transformation of the ADF into an integrated, focused force, across maritime, land, air, space and cyber domains, and this new committee will have a role in seeing that those aims are met.

In the 2025-26 budget, the consolidated defence budget was approximately $59 billion, an increase reflecting the government's response to the deteriorating strategic environment. The Chief of the Defence Force, Admiral David Johnston, has reinforced that we must be ready for the possibility of launching combat operations from our own soil—a paradigm shift from our traditional posture.

Australia is accelerating moves in key capability areas. The government has committed to domestic production of guided missiles, long-range strike systems and enhanced undersea maritime and space capabilities. In my own state, a $12 billion investment into the Henderson Defence Precinct has been announced, directed towards ongoing naval shipbuilding and submarine support.

Given all of this—the shifting strategic environment, the technological leaps, the build-up of regional tension—now is not the time for half measures. Oversight reforms, like the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence, become even more essential. Without them, we risk having capability upgrades which are unseen, unexamined and unaccountable. Our democracy deserves better, and our Defence Force will be better off for the scrutiny.

One of the most compelling reasons for this reform is that our present system of scrutiny is, frankly, fragmented. The Department of Defence's own annual report lists an extraordinary array of committees that review one or another aspect of Defence: public accounts and audit; foreign affairs, defence and trade; treaties; intelligence and security; and the various estimates hearings across a dozen portfolios. Each does valuable work, but, as Defence itself acknowledges, the oversight is dispersed. No single committee holds the mandate, the expertise or the continuity to examine a whole system of strategy, capability, procurement, expenditure and operational readiness. That means parliament's focus can be episodic and reactive, not strategic and sustained.

Defence planning and investment operate on decades-long timelines, and billions are committed before the first hull is laid or the first system commissioned. A single, dedicated committee, armed with security clearances, cross-chamber membership and a clear statutory remit, will provide the continuity and depth that are missed today. We know that committees of this nature exist around the world, particularly with our partners and allies. Our allies have this oversight. Our experts have long recommended it. Our times demand it. I hope that, at last, this parliament, with this bill, will finally deliver it. I commend the bill to the House.

Allegra Spender (Wentworth, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise in support of the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025, which will establish the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence. I think this is a really important move, and it's one that I wholeheartedly support. Let's look at why. We look at our strategic environment, and defence is only more important now, and it's only a more important consideration for this parliament and future parliaments than it has been before. We do live in uncertain times, and our defence community and our defence forces are absolutely integral to maintaining our security.

I must say that I was really surprised to see that defence was actually covered in the joint committee with foreign affairs and trade, and then foreign affairs and aid. I sought to actually join the defence subcommittee this term and have joined the bigger committee because I thought it was such an important area. But, again, I was very surprised, because defence is such an important part of our country and our security. It is such an important part of our budget. I'd just assumed that the parliament would have a standing standalone defence committee as partners such as the US and the UK have. So I think it's a very commonsense recommendation from the former committee that this be established, and I think it's very commonsense to actually establish it in this parliament. We need accountability and transparency, and we need a depth of examination of Defence because of the incredibly important role that it plays. I think we also need to recognise that to have proper scrutiny of Defence will, on occasion, require a different level of security clearance and different level of security disclosure than in the normal case of committees.

I want to then talk briefly to the composition, and I support the composition that has been outlined in the papers, but I'd like to make a few comments to it. It's going to be seven government members and six non-government members. I'd like to urge the government and future governments to reflect on the composition of the parliament and the composition of the votes in the country and make sure that the defence committee reflects that, because around a third of Australians did not vote for the major parties in the last election, and that's a similar level to the previous election. In important areas such as defence, if there are no voices to represent that third of the country that did not vote for the major parties, then I think that actually reduces trust in the system for all those people who were seeking to be represented by alternative members of the community. I think that the government should bear that in mind in relation to who it puts forward and who goes onto this committee.

I'd also like to note the opposition's concern that there could be crossbench members of this committee. I would like to note, from a security point of view, there have been various slurs, I would say, made of crossbenchers. 'Slurs' is probably a bit of a harsh term—'imputation'.

Dan Tehan (Wannon, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Energy and Emissions Reduction) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is a little bit harsh. It's 'constructive engagement'.

Allegra Spender (Wentworth, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Sorry, I'll withdraw that. There's been constructive rejection of crossbench contribution here. I would like to make the observation that I'm on the economics committee. Last term, we actually had a breach of confidentiality on the economics committee, and the only person who couldn't have done it is a member of the crossbench, because I wasn't present for that meeting. Members of both the major parties were. So, in that particular meeting—it was the RBA meeting. I'm saying this to a fellow member of that committee—oh, you weren't, actually, sorry; I'm confused, Gordon. But I think the point is made that, with the right selection of people, you can have a degree of confidence.

One final comment that I would like to make is actually about a broader issue on transparency. I note that in some of our partners, like the US, the committee for defence is a very public body as well as one that deals with matters of high security. I think we should consider that in this parliament, because defence should be more of a national conversation than it is, particularly in the times that we find ourselves. I think that the committee could act, in terms of how its hearings are developed and how it's held, as a way of opening the conversation with the Australian people about the needs and the priorities of our defence forces and how that affects and reflects the priorities and needs of the rest of our country. I think that is something that we should consider, because defence is not something in isolation; the country, including, particularly, businesses and also communities, are at the heart of national security. Therefore, they need to be engaged in this question of how we keep our country safe. I think they need to be aware, appropriately, of some of the challenges currently facing our country from a defence point of view.

Rebekha Sharkie (Mayo, Centre Alliance) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It now being 1 pm, the member is interrupted and the debate is adjourned. Resumption of the debate will be made an order of the day for the next sitting.