Tania Lawrence (Hasluck, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

Security is the priority of government, and defence is at the pointy end of that duty. To this end, I am honoured to have Lieutenant Bijan Shekibi in my office as part of the defence parliamentary program to really get a great sense of appreciation of the type of work, the skills and the capacity that he brings to the defence forces and also to his colleagues, peers and, importantly, their families. The defence parliamentary program is a signature achievement, and I'm very proud to be part of it in terms of hosting defence personnel, and also to be part of the exercise program. Being part of Exercise Pitch Black in Darwin was an extraordinary highlight, so far, of my parliamentary career.

In terms of the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025, early in our first term the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade was asked to inquire into how Australia makes decisions to send our service personnel and their families abroad and, specifically, to send service personnel into armed conflict. That committee also regularly reviews the annual reports of the Department of Defence—although we already have parliamentary oversight via debates and estimates, and the committee's existing remit. That committee concluded, in the course of bringing down that report, that those processes are not sufficient.

In its report, the committee—then chaired by my friend the member for Bruce—recommended, in recommendation 6, that we establish a dedicated statutory committee focused on defence, to be called the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence, encapsulated by this bill and the virtually identical bill that lapsed in the last parliament. The coalition members of that committee in the last parliament supported that recommendation then but failed to support the bill—failed, notwithstanding that the same suggestion was made back in 2018 by the committee, then chaired by the late senator Jim Molan, who called it 'a sensible and critically important reform'. I concur.

I understand that the coalition will now support the bill, and I thank them for that, notwithstanding that their support is years late in an area of policy where delay, as the member for Hume suggested in his speech, is ill-advised. This bill complements the government's overarching work in defence, which finds its basis in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review by Professor Stephen Smith and Air Chief Marshall (Ret'd) Sir Angus Houston. From that flowed the 2024 National Defence Strategy, which directs that the Australian Defence Force shift from a balanced force to a focused force—more capable, more lethal, more integrated. It aligns with a denial framework for defence, to defend Australia and our region—to deter by denial—to protect our trade and economic lifelines, to invest in regional relationships, and to uphold the rules based order. This bill sits within that framework as does the excellent work done by the Prime Minister in his recent trip to the US and the generational treaty signed with Papua New Guinea earlier this month.

Looking at the bill before us, proposed clause 110ABB sets out the functions of this new defence committee. These are broader than the mandate of the current Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee; for example, proposed subparagraph 110ABB(1)(e) authorises the committee 'to examine and be appraised of war or warlike operations, including ongoing conflicts'. Decisions to commit our ADF to conflict will not shift from the government to a parliamentary committee—that remains a Constitutional prerogative of the executive. But this committee provides enhanced scrutiny, a mechanism by which this parliament can examine the decisions of the day, ask the hard questions and further ensure public confidence.

Members will note that the commitment of Australian forces to Afghanistan in 2001 and to Iraq in 2003 were contested decisions. Scrutiny might have produced better decisions in retrospect. This is not about second-guessing. It's about transparency and accountability in a democratic society. The committee will have other important functions: reviewing defence agencies and their budgets, scrutinising strategy documents and capability developments and acquisitions. On acquisitions, the defence minister has noted that defence contracting is the space where the government has the greatest private sector exposure. Defence contracts are large, high value and often span years in duration. They are, by their nature, high risk. Parliamentary oversight must match that reality. The committee will contribute to a more robust process and better public confidence.

When the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit reported on defence major projects from 2021 to 2023, including the Hunter Class Frigate Project, its recommendations emphasised the need for greater scrutiny and timely reporting. But that committee lacks the special access to classified information that this new defence focused committee will have. The proposed committee would have been a useful body to have in place when the coalition were trying and failing to make proper acquisition decisions during their decade in office. I've spoken previously in this place of the Battle of Rabaul in 1942 and more than once, and why? Because it is a largely forgotten defeat, yet a necessary precursor to the attack on Darwin. The lessons from Rabaul should shape the way we think about our forward posture today. Our interests extend beyond our borders and mingle with those of our neighbours. Preparedness for conflict is built on cooperation and with care, well north of Australia. The new defence committee will help ensure that we better understand these long-term imperatives.

The bill also provides functions in relation to personnel and veterans, because our preparedness always depends on our people. Our enlisted personnel must have the best support to fulfil their duty and love their career. Including veterans in the remit is vital. This includes the way in which we care for defence personnel and veterans' families. I was deeply privileged today to attend the veteran family support event—and listen to the stories of, particularly, women experiencing life as they support defence personnel. The truth of the matter is families are part of the service. I think the more we can think in that frame to ensure that they get the support that they need to support their partners in service is vital—both during and post service, might I add. We have a responsibility for this.

Under subclause (g) the committee may examine reports of any relevant royal commission, and it's all appropriate. Given all this, the bill does deserve passage. It was initially, as I said, supported by the coalition members of the committee. It was disappointing, in the previous parliament, to hear their late opposition and their misdirected amendments targeting a particular political party or Independents. A democracy cannot embed party labels in legislation about oversight nor are parties recognised under the Constitution. The safeguards in this bill mirror those of the intelligence and security committee and are robust, and this is a committee of which I'm a member. I can see how the process works so optimally. The member for Canning knew this in the last term and the member for Hume appears to know better now, and they should have treated the former identical bill, and the safeguards we place around the defence of our nation, with the seriousness it demanded.

It is in fact a travesty that Australians have had to wait so long for this committee to be created. The coalition failed to do so when their own committee recommended it in 2018. They then failed to support our bill in 2024. These are years—six years—over which time such a committee could have been doing extremely useful work. The member for Canning, when he was the opposition's defence spokesperson was bullish in his public support for this very reform. He told the Australian Defence Magazine in 2024:

There is no independent Joint Defence Committee where tough questions can be asked in a classified, protected space.

He was right. He said that such a committee would bring 'rigorous parliamentary oversight' to defence policies and the ADF. Too true. But, when the opportunity came to make these words a reality, when the bill came before the House in 2024, what did he do? He voted against it. He failed to support the very thing he demanded; so did the member for Hume, their current spokesperson, and other members opposite. That is the difference between conviction and convenience, between leadership and lip-service. The then shadow minister for defence stood at podiums and spoke of transparency and accountability, yet, when the time came to cast a vote, he sided with the same obstruction that had kept this reform shelved since 2018—even after his own colleagues, including Senator Molan, had called it sensible and critical reform. So let's be clear. This isn't about partisanship; it's about integrity. If you stand before the Australian people and declare that defence needs stronger oversight and then you vote against it, you are not defending the national interest. You are failing the Australian community, failing the defence community and failing your duty in this place.

It's true that real oversight is sometimes uncomfortable—that it shines light in places and at times that may be inconvenient. This is precisely why we need it.

The Liberals cannot posture about patriotism—something that the member for Canning bangs on about all the time—and yet then vote against transparency. You cannot talk about defending Australia while refusing to defend accountability. There is no point talking a big game on defence and security, and then delaying important reforms like this one. The coalition might want to choose better where it plays its politics.

I refer to the 2024 strategy: shifting to an integrated, focused force; acknowledging that conflict is now more complex than ever. Integration means that war is no longer just the province of the military; it touches every domain, and so greater scrutiny is needed. Today that need is greater than ever. Since the original review and strategy were set out, our strategic environment has continued to intensify. The national strategic review remains the cornerstone. It affirms that Australia faces its most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War. The government 's 2025-29 Defence Corporate Plan underscores the transformation of the ADF into an integrated, focused force, across maritime, land, air, space and cyber domains, and this new committee will have a role in seeing that those aims are met.

In the 2025-26 budget, the consolidated defence budget was approximately $59 billion, an increase reflecting the government's response to the deteriorating strategic environment. The Chief of the Defence Force, Admiral David Johnston, has reinforced that we must be ready for the possibility of launching combat operations from our own soil—a paradigm shift from our traditional posture.

Australia is accelerating moves in key capability areas. The government has committed to domestic production of guided missiles, long-range strike systems and enhanced undersea maritime and space capabilities. In my own state, a $12 billion investment into the Henderson Defence Precinct has been announced, directed towards ongoing naval shipbuilding and submarine support.

Given all of this—the shifting strategic environment, the technological leaps, the build-up of regional tension—now is not the time for half measures. Oversight reforms, like the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence, become even more essential. Without them, we risk having capability upgrades which are unseen, unexamined and unaccountable. Our democracy deserves better, and our Defence Force will be better off for the scrutiny.

One of the most compelling reasons for this reform is that our present system of scrutiny is, frankly, fragmented. The Department of Defence's own annual report lists an extraordinary array of committees that review one or another aspect of Defence: public accounts and audit; foreign affairs, defence and trade; treaties; intelligence and security; and the various estimates hearings across a dozen portfolios. Each does valuable work, but, as Defence itself acknowledges, the oversight is dispersed. No single committee holds the mandate, the expertise or the continuity to examine a whole system of strategy, capability, procurement, expenditure and operational readiness. That means parliament's focus can be episodic and reactive, not strategic and sustained.

Defence planning and investment operate on decades-long timelines, and billions are committed before the first hull is laid or the first system commissioned. A single, dedicated committee, armed with security clearances, cross-chamber membership and a clear statutory remit, will provide the continuity and depth that are missed today. We know that committees of this nature exist around the world, particularly with our partners and allies. Our allies have this oversight. Our experts have long recommended it. Our times demand it. I hope that, at last, this parliament, with this bill, will finally deliver it. I commend the bill to the House.

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