Luke Gosling (Solomon, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to speak in strong support of the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025. I do so mindful of the gravity of decisions that we entrust to our defence organisation and the Australian Defence Force, and respectful of the responsibility the parliament bears to provide both oversight and confidence on behalf of the Australian people.

A democracy must balance transparency and secrecy, and it must provide information security. Some of the contributions yesterday went to the genesis or the idea of this Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence, and, of course, success has many fathers. There were many names mentioned yesterday, but I acknowledge all those who worked in a bipartisan way to get this idea of a Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence to where we are today. I hope that bipartisan action, which is characterised in the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security continues on into this committee on defence. In a Westminster-style democracy such as ours, one of the foundational principles is that those who wield power must also be subject to scrutiny and accountability. As the government's second reading speech on the predecessor bill noted:

… parliament plays a crucial role … by scrutinising and debating the decisions by executive government and the implementation of them by departments and agencies.

At the same time, the very nature of defence work demands that certain information remains protected—operational details, intelligence methods, capability vulnerabilities and the like. These cannot always be publicly aired, for good reasons. The explanatory memorandum tells us that the existing oversight and accountability mechanisms for the Defence portfolio were found to be 'inadequate in balancing accountability and transparency and national security considerations'. That was from the inquiry of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. This standing committee called for the implementation of a new joint statutory committee to request and receive classified information and briefings. Thus, our challenge now: to strike the right balance between transparency, oversight, accountability and secrecy, sensitivity, and security. This bill addresses that challenge. Our federal Labor government takes both transparency and security seriously, and we've done the work to draft legislation to achieve that balance between these two competing demands.

We must adopt a methodological, census based, non-partisan, deliberative process for the mature and responsible management of Defence matters. It is not enough for Defence decisions to be made in haste—do not make hasty decisions—nor behind closed doors, alone. In a democracy, prudent defence decision-making must be conducted in a deliberative, orderly and methodical way supporting multipartisanship, bipartisan confidence and sound parliamentary oversight.

This bill legislates for the establishment of a joint statutory committee, the new Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence, to review, monitor and report on the administration, operations and expenditure of Defence agencies. In doing so, it draws explicit model from the proven arrangements of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, PJCIS, under the Intelligence Services Act 2001. I referred to that act earlier and the strong convention of bipartisan operation within that act and within that committee.

This bill stipulates that the defence committee will consist of up to 13 members, drawn from both houses, government and non-government, and the appointments will be made by the Prime Minister in consultation with the Leader of the Opposition.

In short, this is not a cosmetic tweak; it is significant institutional reform to embed multipartisan parliamentary oversight of Defence capability, strategy and operations. In a democracy there exists a social contract between the people and their defenders. In this bill, of course, we're talking about the Australian Defence Organisation and the ADF. At the heart of this reform is what I believe is the deeper principle of democracy: the social contract between our guardian and defenders and the people and nation that they defend. We entrust our defence forces and institutions and agencies with extraordinary powers: the power to use force, the power to deploy capability and the power to make decisions that may risk life, liberty and national interests. In exchange, the people and parliament must have the opportunity and the means to verify the application of those powers.

This bill is a recognition of that social contract. It acknowledges that, while our defence forces and agencies operate in a demanding and often, importantly, secret environment, their work must nonetheless be subject to democratic legitimacy and oversight. The explanatory memorandum provides that the committee's functions will include reviewing white papers, reviews and other strategic planning documents, scrutinising capability development and sustainment, examining war or warlike operations and monitoring significant non-conflict operations domestically and overseas. By doing so the bill strengthens the link between the people's elected representatives and the guardians of Defence. Thereby it helps reinforce trust, legitimacy and that social contract.

The committee will have the ability to inquire into matters on referral by a minister or either house of parliament as well as, importantly, more inquisitorial powers that will enable it to act on its own initiative in the form of an 'own motion' power.

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence will be modelled on a proven committee. We know the model works, the PJCIS that I previously had the privilege of serving on, has demonstrated that a statutory parliamentary committee with the capacity to receive classified information, conduct secure hearings that hold the executive to account can function effectively. The explanatory memorandum explicitly states that the new committee will be 'modelled on the PJCIS,' to ensure that it can request and receive classified information and briefings. This committee fills a gap in the current oversight framework by enabling scrutiny of classified matters in a secure setting. That is, of course, vital, because defence oversight cannot meaningfully occur only in public, unclassified settings. Some of the most consequential decisions—capability acquisitions, strategic deployments, operational commitments—will always involve sensitive intelligence, classified data and operational detail.

The bill provides for powers of the committee to obtain information and documents, to require persons to appear before it and to request briefings from heads of defence agencies, the IGADF and the Naval Nuclear Power Safety Regulator. By aligning with the proven PJCIS model, this bill improves parliamentary capability without reinventing the wheel.

The increased scale and gravity of defence investment that we have at the moment demands greater oversight. We know that Australia faces increasingly complex and evolving strategic challenges. We live in an era where Australia is undertaking what our government describes as the biggest peacetime increase in defence spending in our history: $70 billion for defence capability. The scale of investment, the complexity of capability procurement and the global geostrategic environment all compel us to ensure that our oversight is commensurate with that expenditure and that investment. As one commentator stated, some of the gravest matters are the decisions to commit our service persons to conflict. As the scale of investment increases, so too must the extent and effectiveness of parliamentary oversight. The more resources at stake, the greater the need for deliberation, transparency, methodical process and multipartisan input.

Parliament cannot outsource our accountability to the executive alone. The bill recognises this by giving the new committee the function of scrutinising major capability investments, including the Integrated Investment Program, the IIP, and acquisitions. Defence decisions are often among the most consequential a government makes—the resources committed, the lives affected and the strategic risks that must necessarily be taken. This bill ensures that our oversight architecture is up to the task.

While I have emphasised that the committee will oversee operations and strategy, it must be noted that the committee's oversight also extends to portfolio agencies like DVA, the Department of Veterans' Affairs, which will have a key role in implementing the recommendations from the Royal Commission into Defence and Veteran Suicide; the ASA, the Australian Submarine Agency, which will lead us along the optimal pathway in delivery of nuclear powered submarines; and Defence Housing Australia, DHA, which houses our service men and women and their families, but also, due to previous legislation, our allies.

This will support and enable a biennial battle rhythm and adaptable policy settings. Another key merit of this reform is that it will support the government's move to a biennial battle rhythm of national defence strategies and refreshes of the IIP, the Integrated Investment Program. The second reading speech on the 2024 bill explicitly referenced that the new committee—that is, the defence committee we're discussing—would 'complement' existing oversight by enabling this deeper scrutiny in a classified setting.

By embedding the defence committee with standing functions to review defence strategies, capability development, sustainment and operations, the bill enables our defence policy settings to be more responsive, more adaptable and more aligned with a more frequent refresh cycle—that two-yearly cycle I mentioned. In a rapidly evolving geostrategic environment, the capacity to refresh strategy and investment on that biennial, two-yearly, rhythm is vital. This committee will provide parliament with the means to engage with that two-yearly rhythmic cycle—not simply in the traditional five- or 10-year cycle, but more dynamically. This committee will deliver trust, oversight and effectiveness during that two-year rotational process.

In summary, the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2025 offers a considered reform, grounded in the needs of our democracy, the demands of defence oversight and the responsibility of parliament. It reaffirms the following. We balance transparency and the imperatives of secrecy and security. Defence business must be conducted in an orderly, mature, methodical, multipartisan and deliberative way. The social contract between our defenders—the ADF—the defence organisation and our nation must be acknowledged. We give them the means to act. We expect there is accountability in return, and we do have a proven model on which to base this in the PJCIS. This bill to focus on defence builds upon that, with the scale of investment increasing and the stakes rising in our geostrategic time. We must ensure oversight matches the gravity of the decisions made. This reform will support our move to a biannual defence strategy and investment, and support that rhythm to help our policy settings be more adaptable and responsive.

I encourage all members to support this bill. In doing so, they will be strengthening the connective tissue between our parliament, the defence of Australia, the ADF and the Australian people.

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