Andrew Hastie (Canning, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Defence) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

From the top, we support the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2023. This bill does some important things. It seeks to centralise top-secret positive vetting within ASIO. It seeks to enable more persistent ongoing evaluations of an individual's suitability to hold a security clearance. It seeks to establish a framework for merits review of ASIO security clearance decisions. It provides ONI with a new function to drive uplift of insider threat capabilities across the Commonwealth, and to independently assure quality and consistency of top-secret positively vetted clearances.

I think we all know that there has been an issue across the Five Eyes countries with leaking of sensitive intelligence information, and we must always seek to modernise and adapt as the challenges and threats to our national interests change. It's a really timely reminder of the importance of information security just as we're seeing an unprecedented revolution in technology—particularly with artificial intelligence and access to information digitally. As the ASIO directors-general Duncan Lewis and now Mike Burgess have said numerous times on the record, we're facing unprecedented levels of espionage and foreign interference in this country. That's why this bill is a welcome adaptation to our current system of governance around security vetting.

This bill will bring security vetting responsibilities in line with the current security landscape, in which espionage and foreign interference are our principal security concerns. I think this bill recognises that ASIO is best placed to appropriately vet clearance holders, as the Commonwealth agency responsible for countering these threats. The government must ensure ASIO is properly resourced to take on this new responsibility so that the provision of new security clearances is not bottlenecked or delayed at a time when our cleared workforce must rapidly increase to deliver key initiatives: the $10 billion investment into ASD, which is called REDSPICE, and, of course, AUKUS. We're going to grow a workforce over the next decade and beyond of 20,000 additional people—not just the submariners, not just those involved in the nuclear industry but also those involved in industry. There's going to be a massive transfer of intellectual property and national secrets on a trilateral basis between the US, the UK and Australia. In order to demonstrate our reliability as a partner in AUKUS, particularly when we will be in receipt of very significant technology from the United States, in the form of their Virginia class submarines and all the attendant technology that enables those submarines, it's really important for our credibility that we have modernised our vetting processes and we can demonstrate to the US and the UK that we can be trusted with their secrets.

In July 2020, the former coalition government established a multi-agency Future Positive Vetting Capability Taskforce to modernise vetting standards to increase consistency, assurance and transferability across Australia's highest cleared workforce. The task force developed a suite of reforms to incrementally replace the current PV clearance, and we are supportive of the additional measures in the current bill that will reduce the risk of compromise of trusted insiders, maximise utility from shared services and improve the mobility and agility of Australia's highest cleared workforce. I think we're going to see more people moving around the Public Service into defence and into industry, and we need to be able to track those with PVs. We need to be able to move them quickly; that's really important.

As noted by the Department of Home Affairs, these reforms are not designed to accelerate the clearance process though. We should be prepared for a scenario where more stringent vetting for security clearance holders means more applicants are rejected at a time when the demand for a security cleared workforce is radically increasing to deliver projects such as AUKUS and REDSPICE. We call on the government to ramp up efforts to attract and retain a cleared workforce to ensure we don't fall behind on these commitments. We've got the Submarine Rotational Force-West that will be established in Perth in 2027, and from 2027 we will see a continued presence of up to four US and one UK nuclear submarines at HMAS Stirling. In order for that to happen, over the next four years we've got to grow HMAS Stirling; we've got to grow a supply chain; we've got to grow a workforce around it. A lot of those people involved will have to have top secret positive vetting security clearances, and that means that the government really has to ramp up its effort to clear as many people as possible without dropping the standards, importantly, given the risk of insider threats and other challenges to maintaining our secrets.

The government should also explain how it is going to properly resource ASIO to undertake these new responsibilities. ASIO, as the director-general has noted in his yearly updates, is working extremely hard round the clock. They are a 24/7 operation, and there are multiple threats that never stop. All you need is one significant threat to get through and we could have a crisis on our hands. So it's really important that we resource ASIO—that we send the signal to ASIO through funding and through manning that their work is important and it's a priority for government, because we can't afford bottlenecks or delays on these security clearances.

Under this bill, those affected by ASIO security clearances will be eligible for internal review under a new statutory framework as well as external merits review in either the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, for existing security clearance holders and Commonwealth employees; or by an independent review appointed by the Attorney-General, for other applicants. The government has announced that it will abolish the Administrative Appeals Tribunal and replace it with a new federal administrative review body. The government should explain what the abolition of the AAT will mean for the new statutory framework of external merits reviews, including the potential for delays that flow from the eventual transition to a new merits review body once it is established.

In sum, we support this bill. It's an important bill. It's about modernisation. It's about making sure that our agencies are fit for purpose, particularly ASIO, in guarding against insider threats and other risks to our own national security but also our relationships. Five Eyes is a longstanding partnership with Australia, the US, New Zealand and the UK, and it's really important that we do our part to make sure that we have the integrity in our system so that we can keep up that really important intelligence sharing. With that, I commend the bill to the House.

Luke Gosling (Solomon, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

At the outset, I want to acknowledge and thank all the members of not only the Australian Defence Force but all our intelligence and security organisations throughout the country. For all those Australians, men and women, who are every day countering threats, we want to make sure that they've got the best possible framework within which to do that incredibly important work in our national interest.

As all honourable members know, espionage and foreign interference are now our country's principal national security threat. The scale of this challenge is unprecedented, and threats to our way of life increasingly demand that we shift our focus, with espionage and foreign interference now more prominent threats than ever. The threat from hostile foreign powers and their proxies is pervasive and multifaceted and has the potential to cause serious harm to our sovereignty, values and national interest.

The interplay of existing challenges with new and emerging ones has changed how we think about these threats. A foreign power can be simultaneously interfering, spying and using cyber to put themselves in a position for sabotage, as an example. These threats originate from multiple countries, not just those that might be considered traditional adversaries. In his 2023 threat assessment, the director-general of ASIO, Mike Burgess, warned of 'the "hive" of spies' targeting Australians in unprecedented numbers and with growing sophistication.

Foreign intelligence services have used cash to try to corrupt business people, officials and anyone they could try and influence to work for them. They target journalists, commentators, veterans and even judges. They hack into any database giving them access to the sensitive personal information of Australians. They attempt to compromise our journalists by luring them with lucrative study tours overseas to gain privileged information, only to be introduced, whether they know it or not, to spies of another country. These spies then use these opportunities to ingratiate themselves with the reporters, try to elicit insights on political, economic, defence and other issues and identify any vulnerabilities that could be leveraged at a later time.

We have seen disturbing reports of former ADF members travelling overseas to sell their training and expertise to foreign governments for hundreds of thousands of dollars and other significant perks. We have read reports of Australia's defence industry being increasingly targeted since September 2021, when US president Joe Biden, then British prime minister Boris Johnson and then Australian prime minister Scott Morrison announced the AUKUS agreement to provide Australia with nuclear powered, conventionally armed submarines. We have seen evidence of foreign governments intervening in our diaspora communities to choke community's ability to protest and to express their views freely and democratically, as is their right as Australians.

Foreign interference and espionage are a big threat to our national security, and it's ASIO that's working around the clock with other agencies to protect Australians from it. This threat is deliberately designed to undermine our democracy and our values, and it's why we must remain vigilant—because it goes on every day of the week. It's important that the Australian community understand the significance of the threat and the persistence of this threat. To quote Mike Burgess:

Based on what ASIO is seeing, more Australians are being targeted for espionage and foreign interference than at any time in Australia's history—more hostile foreign intelligence services, more spies, more targeting, more harm, more ASIO investigations, more ASIO disruptions. From where I sit, it feels like hand to hand combat.

He went on:

This means ASIO is busier than ever before. Busier than any time in our 74 year history. Busier than the Cold War; busier than 9/11; busier than the height of the caliphate.

This is a chilling assessment that is worth all of us reflecting on. Australians are now targeted in greater numbers by foreign intelligence services and other threat actors than they were even at the height of the Cold War, after 9/11 and in the fight against ISIS.

ASIO's annual report for 2021-22 said that the threat from hostile foreign powers was now the No. 1 concern, overtaking the threat of religiously motivated extremists, nationalists and racist extremists. That is simply extraordinary: to think back not that far into our past, when those other threats were massive, and realise they're now at unprecedented levels. But what's even more extraordinary is that some Australians appear not to take the threat seriously enough. Mike Burgess noted in his annual update that he had been counselled by individuals in business, academia and the Public Service that ASIO should 'ease up its operational responses to avoid upsetting foreign regimes'. Of course people are entitled to their views, but the reasons they offered ranged from, 'All countries spy on each other,' to, 'We were going to make the information public anyway,' to, 'The foreign government might make things difficult for us.' These are incredibly disappointing things to hear from some individuals in business, academia and even the Public Service. The Treasurer, Jim Chalmers, said it was concerning that those Australians in positions of influence were not taking the threat of foreign interference seriously. The threat of espionage and foreign interference is real and growing, and it is capable of ruining people's lives as well as undermining Australia's national interests.

Understanding and degrading the espionage and foreign interference activities of Australia's adversaries are among the most challenging types of intelligence work. ASIO works with all government agencies and the private sector to increase awareness of the threat and to implement effective mitigation strategies by focusing on two key areas. ASIO discovers espionage and foreign interference and degrades their impact, and it hardens the Australian government's defences against clandestine espionage and foreign interference. As it pursues both, the Albanese government is taking decisive action to ensure that our national secrets, our most sensitive information, and our capabilities are protected. We are ensuring our intelligence community can recruit the people they need—people we can trust—to protect our nation's secrets for years and years to come.

That is what this bill, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2023, is all about. The bill will harden our security environment by establishing the new national TOP SECRET-Privileged Access Authority for TS-PA clearance within ASIO. The TS-PA Authority will be centrally responsible for issuing Australia's new highest level of security clearance, the TS-PA clearance. This will replace the existing top secret positive vetting clearance over time. The new clearance is underpinned by a new TS-PA standard, which establishes stronger mandatory minimum security clearance requirements. The standard reflects contemporary psychological and insider threat research.

Under the Australian government Protective Security Policy Framework, the PSPF, persons who require access to security classified information or resources must hold a security clearance at the appropriate level. The purpose of the security vetting process is to determine whether an individual is suitable to hold that security clearance. It involves an assessment of whether a person has the demonstrated integrity and loyalty to be trusted to protect Australia's classified information and resources. Currently, there are several vetting agencies who issue TSPV clearances, including AGSVA, ASIO, the ONI and ASIS. This creates inefficiencies with the recognition of clearances and for mobility of staff and causes duplication of resources. This bill will help to fix these inefficiencies. Over time, ASIO-issued TS-PA security clearances will replace positive vetting security clearances. The PV operations of those vetting agencies presently authorised under the Commonwealth's Protective Security Policy Framework will be transitioned to ASIO.

The reforms will drive shared initiatives and investments that improve interoperability and burden sharing as the Australian government delivers critical national security capabilities—including AUKUS submarines, but many other capabilities as well. It will also improve the mobility and agility of our highest cleared workforce, allowing the Australian government to flexibly direct resources to its highest priority. Centralising Australia's highest level clearance in ASIO will also harden our security environment, meaning that ASIO can leverage its security expertise and existing holdings to assess a person's suitability for a security clearance, having regard to the most current and accurate information about the security threats confronting Australia. This helps us to put a stop to those who seek to do us harm. If a foreign government is trying to steal our secrets by planting foreign spies among our intel community or recruiting those from within ASIO, ASIO is the agency equipped to deal with those insider and other threats.

Oversight and accountability of the intelligence community remains essential under the Labor government. This bill will create a consistent, stronger review framework for security clearance decisions and assessments. This will mean that those who are affected by adverse decisions will have clear rights of review, including internal and external merits review. It will also enable the operations of the Quality Assurance Office, the QAO, in the Office of National Intelligence. The QAO will be established to independently assure the quality and consistency of clearances being issued by ASIO. ASIO will continue to be overseen by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security who has powers akin to a royal commission.

This reform shows how seriously Labor takes national security, because we are listening to the experts and taking their advice. We heard the Director-General of Security when he said:

… more Australians are being targeted for espionage and foreign interference than at any time in Australia's history.

That is what we are seeing and hearing not just from ASIO but from a range of government agencies. It's critically important that in this context we ensure the Commonwealth's most privileged information, capabilities and secrets are protected.

It's commonly said by many—indeed, by this government, and by anyone across this chamber with a strategic bone in their body—that we live in the most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War. It is commonly said that we sometimes forget exactly what this means in reality, in practice, on the ground. It means that even the Cold War, with all the peril of nuclear war that hung over the whole world, did not represent as direct a threat to Australia's sovereignty as the present circumstances do. The only worse time within living memory for Australian security was the carnage of the last world war, which was fought over and around our sea lanes and approaches.

Some of us in public life acknowledge this sobering fact. I hope most of us in public life acknowledge this sobering fact. What it means is that we should also pay tribute to the intelligence community, whose job it is to help Australia navigate the storms around us, to give the leaders of our country warning and foresight of dangers.

As I started, so I'll finish. We rightly honour the military in our country, whose job it is to always be ready to defend Australia when our strategic circumstances go from uncertain to cataclysmic. We should also honour the highly capable men and women of our intelligence services and thank them for the work that they do.

James Stevens (Sturt, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to join my coalition colleagues in speaking in favour of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2023. I welcome the opportunity to progress it through this parliament because it is indeed an important opportunity for us to enhance the way in which the government undertakes the important responsibilities of vetting security and issuing security clearances for a wide variety of Commonwealth and industry personnel that are working on, and in possession of, some of the most vitally important information and, indeed, secrets that are in the possession of our government. Keeping protections in place for those secrets has never been more important, particularly, of course, in the environment of the AUKUS opportunity. Again, I take every opportunity to commend the former Prime Minister Morrison and the former Morrison government for that unbelievable, epochal moment that that treaty has created. It is a quantum leap forward for our nation in so many areas of capability.

While I welcome the most significant and eye-catching part of AUKUS—the acquisition of nuclear propulsion technology and, therefore, nuclear powered submarines as a capability for the Royal Australian Navy, which will be completely transformative—it's important to remember that AUKUS is way beyond that unbelievable acquisition of technology. It is a framework for our country, the United States and the United Kingdom to collaborate and to share technology and other important, sensitive information within a framework that means so many of the previous pathways to individual capability acquisition and other information-sharing is suddenly standardised. Suddenly, we have such a preferential status, as an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom, to partner with them and acquire their great capability.

Let's also always take the opportunity to talk about the unbelievable capability that is developed in our nation, which we're very proud of. We want to see our defence industry and other national security industries and apparatus continue to grow and have greater opportunity for the economic dividend of sharing that technology in a safe and responsible way with our allies, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. That framework dramatically changes our access to the best capability and the best information for our government to keep our nation safe and to ensure the interests of our nation, which, of course, is the first responsibility of any government.

That equally means that we need to make sure that we have the highest level of confidence in how we issue security clearances. I think this is a very opportune moment for this legislation to make the changes, have centralisation and ensure that ASIO is the pre-eminent agency within government for managing and overseeing the process of assessing and issuing these security clearances. So we very much welcome how the bill creates that legislative framework for ASIO going forward.

I commend the member for Canning's point about the resourcing of ASIO, which is going to be so necessary in this area and in so many other areas of the vitally important work they do. We want to make sure that, with ASIO having these enhanced responsibilities, they get whatever financial and workforce resourcing they need to make sure that they can do every element of the new responsibilities that are being given to them through this legislation.

That is an opportunity for me to make a point that I have made in the past, in other contributions in this chamber, about security clearances. Of course, it's absolutely important that we have the most robust framework in place to ensure that every appropriate process, check, interview and corroboration of data is undertaken and that we don't in any way have any form of lack of confidence in the robustness of our system of undertaking those processes to issue a security clearance. Something that is not as well appreciated as I would like it to be is that it's also quite important to see this happen in a timely way and that it's not ideal to have a circumstance where, at times, there is an unnecessarily long waiting period for someone to receive their security clearance assessment. Sometimes I say in debates that I'm sure all members have had similar experiences with constituents, but that's probably not the case on this topic. I'm from Adelaide, where we have a very significant and growing defence industry sector, particularly around naval shipbuilding, and I'm sure that not all members have the constituent matters that I have when it comes to the issuance of security clearances. Indeed, I've had quite a few experiences of people in defence industry contacting me to get assistance in progressing a security clearance.

I'm not critical of the waiting periods in the past. You never really know whether there are unique reasons in some of these circumstances. For example, when someone comes from the United Kingdom, where they hold a security clearance, to work on the Type 26 program for a company that's equally operating in our country to build a frigate that is based on the Type 26 program, it is a surprise to me that it is a difficulty and a long wait for said person to get a security clearance when they have a security clearance from a Five Eyes partner, the original possessor of the technology that they're coming to our country to transfer to us. Then they have to wait more than 12 months to get their security clearance to give us the technology we are acquiring in a multibillion dollar program. I'm not suggesting that we shouldn't have proper robust processes, but I'm sure the waiting times, in particular, in cases like that are related to resourcing. I would urge the government to look at opportunities to make sure that we're resourcing the processing of security clearances.

This would be the greatest saving available to government of anything that we could possibly do in any program. Delaying human capital into defence procurement can have multi, multi, multibillion dollar consequences. If programs run late because people from the UK or the United States are delayed from participating in the program because they're waiting on a security clearance, the impact on a multibillion dollar program can be truly significant. The uniqueness of some of the capabilities of the type of personnel we're talking about means that, until that one person is cleared to work on a program, a whole range of things come to a complete standstill. For example, very complex design elements and a whole range of decision-making are choked at that one single point. As those delays flow through the system, they can potentially have multibillion dollar consequences.

I speak up all the time from a defence industry point of view on these types of bills because, whilst the other issues are important, that's one that really needs to have a spotlight shone upon it. There is a very consistent amount of feedback from a whole range of defence industry businesses that are having these challenges of bringing, at times, the only person in the world that can do a specific unique job on a program and having very significant delays in getting that person a security clearance. With the greatest of respect, if that person is coming from an AUKUS nation to work on the same program and technology they've been cleared to work on in the United States or the United Kingdom, it surprises me that they have significant delays in getting the same clearance to do the exact same work on technology they're not getting access to that they're bringing to us.

We could perhaps work on a mind shift in the processing of these things to consider whether or not they're being prioritised to the right extent. At times, there is a need to choose an order to prioritise these things. You can't just join the back of a queue and slowly move through. There needs to be an ability for defence industry security clearances to be looked at and considered as to how we give significant weight to the fact they have an existing security clearance at the same level for a role they're performing in another AUKUS nation. That's a goodwill suggestion. I'm not criticising anyone; I just think it's an opportunity. As these programs become more complex, that is something I would like us to look at. We are talking about tens of thousands of people in my home state who will need some form of security clearance to work on all the great opportunities and programs, and they are not going to be in uniform; they are going to be in industry.

My final point actually is on the uniform side. One of the great employment opportunities for veterans is in the fact that, generally speaking, they hold a security clearance, and a security clearance of significant value in the defence industry for the reasons I've just outlined. In my home state I've never visited a defence industry company that doesn't have a veteran employment program providing pathways for veterans to work in those businesses. That is fantastic. They're an unbelievable asset to those businesses. Not only do they perform the task they're employed to do but they've got spectacular coalface experience, unbelievable networks and a real ability to bring a whole range of perspectives and experience, as former uniformed serving personnel, into the development of future capability for the forces.

The security clearances which are provided to service personnel are a great asset, and I'm interested in the concept of the government providing them to our veterans in a more enduring way so that our veterans have that asset to give them an advantage in seeking employment opportunities in defence industry roles, which will invariably require a form of security clearance. I'm all for veterans having an unfair advantage in their career prospects post serving our nation. I'm unashamedly of that view. I think that's an opportunity, on the topic of security clearances, that we should always look to maximise.

With those contributions, I commend the bill to the House.

Matt Thistlethwaite (Kingsford Smith, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Minister for Defence) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Innovation has delivered much progress for society, particularly information, communications and technological innovation. Access to information has been liberated for many groups within our community because of technological advancements associated with the internet, with cloud computing, with artificial intelligence and with the development of microprocessors. But it has also shown up vulnerabilities in government systems, and potentially provided access to information for the wrong people.

The other thing to note about innovation is that the amount of data and information being captured, stored by governments and transmitted between government departments and, indeed, between governments internationally has increased as well. That, of course, has brought with it the risk of unprecedented threats from espionage and foreign interference. That's why the Albanese government takes this issue so seriously. That is why we are legislating this change to the system of ensuring the integrity of Australia's most sensitive intelligence information at a number of levels of government. We're taking these assertive steps to safeguard our nation's most sensitive information and our capabilities—basically, the government's top-secret information. We're fortifying our environment against foreign interference and ensuring that our intelligence community has the capacity to recruit individuals that we know we can trust to protect our nation's secrets into the future.

The Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2023 extends and solidifies our security environment by establishing a new national TOP SECRET-Privileged Access Authority within the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. The TOP SECRET-Privileged Access Authority will be the central body that has responsibility for issuing Australia's new highest level of security clearance, the TS-PA clearance. This will supplant the existing top secret positive vetting clearance. The new TS-PA clearance is founded on the new TS-PA standard, which enforces a stricter minimum standard when it comes to security clearance requirements. The TS-PA standard incorporates contemporary psychological and insider threat research. It will be the most extensive examination of a person's credentials to ensure that they can be trusted to deal with the nation's most sensitive information.

Under the Australian government's Protective Security Policy Framework, individuals that require access to security classified information or resources must possess a security clearance at the appropriate level. The goal of the security vetting process is to evaluate an individual's suitability to hold that clearance and to continue to hold that clearance into the future. There is also a regular process of continuing to verify whether or not that person is appropriate to continue to hold that clearance into the future, and that includes whether a person demonstrates the required integrity and loyalty to protect Australia's classified information and resources.

Currently, there are multiple vetting agencies that issue top secret positive vetting clearances, including the Australian Government Security Vetting Agency, ASIO, the Office of National Intelligence and ASIS. This system results in inefficiencies concerning clearance recognition, staff mobility and, unfortunately, resource duplication. This bill is designed to remedy those inefficiencies. Gradually, ASIO-issued TS-PA clearance will replace the positive vetting clearance. The positive vetting operations of vetting agencies currently authorised under the Commonwealth Protective Security Policy Framework will shift to ASIO. The reforms will encourage shared initiatives and investments, improving interoperability and resource-sharing as the Australian government provides crucial national security capabilities. It will also enhance the mobility and flexibility of our highest-cleared workforce, allowing the Australian government to allocate resources optimally to its highest priorities.

Centralising Australia's highest-level clearance within ASIO will fortify our nation's security environment further. It will enable ASIO to utilise its security expertise in its existing holdings in assessing an individual's suitability for a security clearance, taking into account the most current and accurate information about the security threats facing Australia. This measure is an aid in thwarting those intending to do our nation harm. If a foreign government tries to pilfer our secrets by implanting a foreign operative within our intelligence community or by recruiting insiders, ASIO will be well equipped to handle it.

Under a Labor government, oversight and accountability for the intelligence community remain a priority and are indispensable. This bill aims to establish a more consistent and robust review framework for security clearance decisions and assessments. This will ensure that individuals affected by adverse decisions have a clear right to review, encompassing internal and external merits review. It will also facilitate the operations of the Quality Assurance Office within the Office of National Intelligence. The QAO will be created to independently assure the quality and consistency of clearances that are issues by ASIO. ASIO's operations will continue to be overseen by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security and will possess powers similar to a royal commission. It's critically important that we ensure that the Commonwealth's most privileged information, capabilities and secrets are protected, and that is what this new system will allow us to do.

We've seen in recent times that the Australian government has moved to an online security vetting program called myClearance. That was introduced by the previous government and is currently being rolled out. The myClearance program is a digital system for sponsors, applicants, assessors, decision-makers and clearance holders. Unfortunately there have been some issues with the rollout of this particular program. It was due to go live last November. When it did, there were some issues with the system. There were problems that applicants were having with inputting data into the system and general fields not accepting certain data. Therefore applications were delayed or rejected by the system. Seven years of planning went into this scheme under the former government, and there was a $307 million price tag, but so far there have been problems with it. Several thousand lower-level clearances have been successfully granted through myClearance, but issues have emerged with the processing of the more complex, top-level security clearances.

It's my view that there has been insufficient oversight of this project from the beginning and that it was probably in some respects too ambitious in terms of the time line that was put in place. Unfortunately, it reflected badly on the previous government, in that a number of defence policies and intelligence and security policies were announced by the previous government without the requisite oversight and investment to ensure that the programs were delivered before they were launched. We all know that the former government were good at announcements and not so good at oversight and following up. Unfortunately this is one of those projects. It was approved in 2018, and final approval was given in 2020. Nonetheless, despite the system being plagued by data issues and not connecting to the dependent systems of government that ASIO needed to process clearances, we are now working on a remediation project for the scheme.

I'm receiving regular updates from the team within the Australian Government Security Vetting Agency and Defence to ensure that we get this project back on track as quickly as possible. With the Defence strategic review having been recently released and the AUKUS partnership having been announced, we know that there is going to be a greater need for Defence and our intelligence agencies to partner with industry to deliver those important capabilities into the future. An important part of that partnership is ensuring that people that work in defence industry have the appropriate security clearances to do the work that they're engaged to do. If there are delays with people getting those clearances, there can be delays in government delivering that capability into the future, and we want to avoid that at all costs, particularly given that AUKUS is going to create 20,000 jobs in the Australian economy over the coming decades. Having a properly functioning system with integrity around security clearances is going to be vitally important to ensuring that Australia can deliver that capability into the future, so we've put in place a remediation plan to get this project back on track as quickly as possible.

The Albanese government takes these issues very seriously. We're acting to drive oversight and action to fix this system and address the growing backlog of clearances. We're heeding the Director-General of Security's warning that more Australians have been targeted for espionage and foreign interference than at any time in Australia's history. That is why getting that myClearance system fixed as quickly as possible is so important, but it's also the reason for a reform such as this to ensure the integrity of Australia's most sensitive data is maintained. That is what this new system of top secret classification and security vetting will deliver, and that is why this bill is so important for our nation.

Keith Wolahan (Menzies, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

AN () (): Thank you to all of the speakers, from both sides, who have spoken about this. There is no more important task than to protect our nation's secrets. It's about keeping people alive. It's about protecting our national interest. The damage that can be done when our most sensitive secrets are leaked just can't be calculated. It is one of the most severe risks that we must address in this place and through the executive.

This Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2023 seeks to do a number of things that we support. It seeks, in the first instance, to modernise the top secret positive vet clearance with a stricter system, going from a TSPV to a TS-PA. This area is full of acronyms. For those who work in this area, they will no doubt have to come to grips with many more. For those who work in ASIO, I could think of no more important or suitable agency to coordinate this than the officers and members of ASIO. They do incredible work for our nation. Most of it goes unrecognised. Most of their work is evidenced in the fact that we are safe, day by day, and they do it, often, when often we are asleep. So we thank them for that.

I myself went through the process for a top secret positive vet clearance. It's a very intensive, long process. It's expensive. What struck me when I went through it was the professionalism of all the people who were involved in it—people who are psychologists, people who look into every aspect of your life, as they should, because, in the end, when we're talking about protecting our nation's secrets, we're dealing with humans, and humans are fallible. We may be perfect and suitable at a particular point in time, but that doesn't mean that that applies all of the time. So it's appropriate that this bill allows for a constant review of someone's suitability. If someone is suitable today, it doesn't mean they will be suitable in two years or five years or 10 years.

It was made quite clear by a previous speaker that one of our most important assets in defence is our people. It's true. Our people are at the core of our Defence Force. It's easy to get focused on the ships, planes, tanks and weapons, but all of those are operated by people. Our people are being asked to do extraordinary things and they're going to be asked to do very sensitive things, including all of the things that are required to deliver AUKUS. When I think of AUKUS, that is probably one of the best examples of where tightly-held secrets were controlled in a way that reinforced the national interest.

I remember the press release that went out saying there'd be an urgent announcement the next day. I tuned in to see what it was. Some people thought it might have been that there's evidence aliens have landed on earth, but it wasn't. It was a significant agreement, AUKUS, between three nations. What struck me was that the negotiation of that agreement was so tightly held. There wasn't one leak, and that was a credit to everyone involved.

In order to keep secrets like that tightly held, there are two limbs to that that are important. The first is the need-to-know principle. The need-to-know principle means that even if you have the required security clearance, if you don't need to know that secret then you shouldn't be told it. It's an important principle. The second limb is whether you have the proper security clearance, and that's what this is dealing with here. We must never forget that both of those limbs matter.

AUKUS was an incredible achievement in keeping our national secrets secure, and we are better for it. But the ongoing delivery of AUKUS is going to require that same level of discipline and appropriate sharing of information with people who need to know and are appropriately cleared. But it's not just in Defence and in our agencies. We also have a new agency that's about to launch in a few weeks, the National Anti-Corruption Commission. That National Anti-Corruption Commission will have extraordinary powers, as it should, and we fully support the NACC. But creating this agency, which will have many hundreds of staff, will require some of its members to have the highest levels of security clearances. We want those people to be ready and able to go to work straightaway.

So it's important that, if we are pushing so many people through this system to be cleared, we make sure that ASIO is properly resourced to do that task, because we don't want to have a situation where a year from now we are saying that elements of AUKUS are being held up because the security clearances are subject to delay. We don't want to see a situation a year from now where crucial NACC investigations are being held up because key staff are not able to be hired because they've been held up or delayed.

One of the things we know through the economy at the moment is that finding staff and talent is really hard. It's very competitive. So this is a challenging task for ASIO, and it's an important one that means they need to be properly resourced. That will require, I'm sure, a lot of hard work by the people of ASIO. A lot of it will be done in overtime and on weekends.

The other thing I would note here, which the member for Sturt pointed out, is that for those who already have a security clearance it's a very valuable thing, particularly for veterans in our community who seek employment in either a defence contracting company or another agency. That's a valuable ticket that they have that elevates them in the competitive recruitment process, and we must never forget that. Those employers who are doing defence contracting or any of the other agency work can't really look past veterans. They have proven themselves to be trustworthy, loyal and people of integrity, and it also saves a lot of time in the form filling that goes on with these security clearances.

The other thing I'd like to point out is that, whilst the people subject to these security clearances are human, so are the people making the assessments. When you go through someone's life history—all of their travel, all of their partners, all of their financial affairs and every secret of their life—sometimes something's taken out of context, and someone might be unfairly refused a security clearance. That might be someone who's devoted their whole life to working in an agency or in Defence, and their career prospects have the door slammed shut, and it may be because of a misunderstanding.

So it's very important that there's a merits review process here, because, again, the people making those decisions are human, and sometimes through a merits review process more context gets to be considered. I won't give the details of a particular person, but I know someone—in fact, more than one person—who went through a similar process, and on a merits review, on a further review, the context was shown to allow them to get their security clearance. So I'm pleased to see that that's a key element of this process here, because often the decision-makers aren't perfect or the decision-making process is not perfect. There must always be a right for review, because these are people's careers we're talking about, and it can be devastating for a person if that door is shut for them.

We are seeing the greatest increase in foreign interference threats and espionage. It is right and proper that we make sure that the process is fit for purpose, it is right and proper that we make sure it's coordinated through one agency, and it should be right and proper that we make sure that they are properly resourced to do that.

The member for Kingsford Smith also made the very good point that, as we see the development of AI and supercomputers and massive increases in availability of data, more than ever we require people who are appropriately cleared—people of trust, integrity and loyalty. They're easy words to say, but to actually find out if someone is a person of trust, integrity and loyalty, in the end, there has to be some risk taken with that person. For those who have engaged in recruitment of people in any walk of life, the best assessment of someone's future actions is their past actions. It's not perfect, but it's the best assessment. So that's what this security clearance process does. It takes a deep dive into someone's history. Through technology, that can be done online. Everyone leaves a footprint; we all accept that these days.

It is important and proper that we do that. Agencies require it, our Defence Force requires it, and that includes the upcoming National Anti-Corruption Commission. So we do support this bill. It has an important role to play as we deliver AUKUS. It's not an easy thing to do to make sure that AUKUS is ready to be delivered; it's going to be something that could be held up by many instances of delay. There's an old saying that often it's middle management that holds something up, and that can happen in defence. Very senior officers or senior politicians can agree that, yes, this is something that needs to occur, but when we wonder why something is 12 or 18 months late, it's often because of things like this—the person who was supposed to sign off on that report is six or 12 months behind getting their security clearance done, and that cascades through our executive government and causes enormous delay. So there's an imperative that we get this right. If we don't properly resource ASIO and it leads to delay, as the member for Sturt pointed out, it could cost us billions of dollars. But it's more than that. It's also about keeping people safe and alive. That is the duty we have in protecting our secrets.

Again I reflect on the time when I first applied to do this. I had been to Afghanistan twice, and I thought that was it, I was done, but there was an opportunity for a third tour, but it required a top secret positive vetting clearance. It happened with lightning speed, and I was very grateful for all of the staff who did that in such quick time. I can see why, because when I deployed in that particular task force it was a United States task force, and in order to work with our allies it is important that we have a security clearance that is recognised and appreciated by them, and that it's a comparable process. That's what these clearances seek to do. We have seen the recent footage of breaches of national security, and that can happen in any country. But it is important that we maintain best practice standards in making sure we are ready to face any threat, and that we are doing the best by our people who have been asked to protect our most secure secrets.

Peter Khalil (Wills, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Espionage and foreign interference are the principal national security threats to Australia. These types of threats to our country are unprecedented. We're going through a very, very difficult period. The Albanese government is ensuring we are taking the right steps to protect our nation's secrets as well as our national interests. This is what the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2023 is about—to ensure we are taking action to protect our most sensitive information and our capabilities. We're also ensuring our intelligence community is supported to recruit the people that they need, the people that we can trust to do the important intelligence and security work to ensure the long-term protection of Australia's interests. These are the principals like human rights, freedom of speech and equality before the law that make our democracy strong.

Unfortunately, state actors and non-state actors try to influence and diminish these principles and these democratic processes. They try to diminish our democracy through corrosive and harmful narratives and attempts to undermine what we hold dear. This is sometimes done through the use of social media, and sometimes in more underhanded ways. Ultimately what they are trying to do, in summary, is seek to sow division, stoke hatred and spread fear. It is relentless and it is insidious. It can be quite hard to spot and even harder to stamp out. That is why it is critical to ensure we can protect Australia from foreign interference, espionage and sabotage, because these types of efforts are aimed solely at undermining our democratic processes and, effectively, our values.

This year, as part of his annual threat assessment, the director-general of ASIO, the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation, said that 'more Australians are being targeted by espionage and foreign interference than ever before'. The government is very alive to this threat, as I know are other members of this place, and I appreciate the bipartisan support on a bill such as this. The government is taking action and proposing reforms to ensure that we can remain protected. The ASIO Amendment Bill will enable ASIO to issue, maintain and revoke Australia's highest level security clearances with more consistency and ensure that we continue to protect Australia's most sensitive information, capabilities and secrets.

Earlier this year, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, the PJCIS, which I chair, commenced a review of this bill. Just this past week, in my capacity as Chair of the PJCIS, I tabled the committee's advisory report on this bill, and I note the presence of the deputy chair in this place and the bipartisan support for those recommendations. Speaking now as the member for Wills and a member of the government in this place, I support this bill because I do really think it gets the balance right. It will protect Australia's national security interests while also upholding the rights and privacy of individuals, and that's a very hard balance to strike.

Specifically, the bill contains amendments that uplift our highest level security clearance in response to the unprecedented threat from espionage and foreign interference. It will also drive shared initiatives and investments that improve interoperability and burden sharing as the government delivers critical national security capabilities. The bill provides ASIO with new security vetting and security clearance functions, enabling ASIO to make security clearance decisions for ASIO and non-ASIO personnel in the intelligence and security space. These security vetting processes are critical in determining the suitability of an individual to hold a security clearance. Before a clearance is provided, an assessment is performed to determine whether an individual has the necessary loyalty and integrity and can be trusted to protect Australia's classified information and resources. At the moment, we have several vetting agencies in Australia and each of them can issue top secret positive vetting, or what are called TSPV, clearances—the highest level clearances. These agencies include the Australian Government Security Vetting Agency; the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, ASIO; ONI; and the Australian Secret Intelligence Service, ASIS. Having multiple agencies conducting our security vetting processes leads to some inefficiencies, and this bill will really help us to conduct security vetting processes in a much more efficient way.

The amendments will strengthen our security environment by establishing—and this is the significant change—a new national TOP SECRET-Privileged Access Authority within ASIO, the TS-PA Authority. This TS-PA Authority and the TS-PA security clearances issued by ASIO will begin to start replacing the pre-existing positive vetting security clearances. The TS-PA Authority will be responsible for issuing Australia's new highest level of security clearance, which will be known as TS-PA, TOP SECRET-Privileged Access, clearance. As I said, it will replace TSPV over time as people drop off. Or, when they get to a point where they need to renew their clearances, they'll go through the new process. New members of the intelligence and security community coming in will go through the new processes.

The TS-PA establishes stronger mandatory minimum security clearance requirements, as it is underpinned by the new TS-PA standard. That new standard reflects contemporary psychological and insider threat research, which is quite important. There's been significant change, particularly over the last decade, in this space.

I think the other point to make is that the centralisation of the highest level of clearance in ASIO not only strengthens our security environment but also enables ASIO to leverage its expertise and existing holdings to thoroughly assess an individual's suitability when conducting those clearance checks, because ASIO does have access to the most current information about the security threats that Australia is facing. That's its job. If people are seeking to cause harm in Australia, to Australia or to our interests, or if a foreign government or foreign intelligence service is attempting to steal our secrets, plant foreign spies or recruit from within, ASIO is best placed to manage these threats and does so. There's a tie-in there, obviously, to a better understanding about how important those clearances are and the processes of providing someone with a clearance.

The reforms will also enable ASIO and security clearance sponsors to share information about whether someone is suitable to hold a security clearance. That information sharing breaks down silos and is a very important element of these reforms. As I mentioned, this all does lead to creating greater efficiency because you'll have this single repository of information about security clearance holders, you'll remove duplication and you'll have a much more effective process. It means that sponsors can focus on responsibly managing their clearance holders as well. The reforms allow interoperability and burden sharing, because we do need fewer barriers as we deliver critical national security capabilities during this period.

The bill also includes elements to improve accountability and oversight, and these are really important elements of due process that we place a high degree of importance on. I said earlier that this is about getting the balance right between individuals' rights and public security. This bill creates a stronger review framework related to security clearance decisions and assessments that individuals face. It means that if someone is impacted by an adverse or prejudicial decision, in their view, they will have rights of review, including access to internal and external merits review processes. This is really important to ensure procedural fairness and the right to challenge adverse findings.

It should also be noted that a quality assurance office will be based in the Office of National Intelligence, and it will be established as another layer of quality assurance and ensure consistency of clearances issued by ASIO. Of course, ASIO will continue to be overseen in the work that it does with respect to the TS-PA authority by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, adding another layer of oversight and ensuring accountability and transparency where possible.

This bill, I think, is emblematic of the fact that the Labor government takes national security very seriously and is doing the real work to ensure that we protect our national interests. This bill ensures that security clearance processes are robust, fair and going to be effective. It ensures that the national security interests of Australia are continually upheld. But it also, and importantly, as I've mentioned, continues to protect the rights and privacy of individuals who are undergoing those processes as well, and I think it gets that balance right. This is the perennial challenge in lawmaking, as we all know in this place—getting that balance right between an individual's rights, when it comes to certain legislation, and the importance of public security. Getting that balance right is often a very difficult challenge, but I think that the reforms of this bill do get that balance right, and they ensure that we remain committed to protecting our most privileged information, our capabilities and our secrets.

Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise in support of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2023 and join with my colleague the chair of the PJCIS. National security is one of those things where it doesn't matter what side of the aisle you sit on; anybody and everybody in this place should be working together for the national security. Whilst we will have differences of opinions on things at times, I think that the Australian public should draw some comfort from the fact that there's an unwritten rule on the Intelligence and Security Joint Committee, that we leave our figurative guns at the door—that we leave our political guns at the door. I think I can speak safely for all current members of the committee that those members keep in the forefront of their minds the protection and security of Australians. That's very important, because government has no greater responsibility than the protection of its citizens. My short time on this committee of around 12 months—although I've worked with the Defence Subcommittee for a number of years—has really opened my eyes to the threat that Australia and Australians face from unprecedented attacks from foreign interference and espionage.

If I were sitting up in the gallery right now, I'd be thinking, 'What's this bloke on about?' When you come into this place, you're given—entrusted with—certain information. My time on the PJCIS has certainly opened my eyes to the risk and threat levels we face from espionage and foreign interference. In fact, in his national security threat assessment only in February, the director-general of security, Mike Burgess, said that the amount of espionage and threats from foreign interference exceeds today what we had at the height of the Cold War. We live in dangerous times: Europe has a full-scale kinetic war underway as we speak. Without justification and without any moral imperative, Russia has invaded a sovereign country, Ukraine, and the world is suddenly a dangerous place.

But we saw this coming. We have seen the level of foreign interference steadily rising in this country, particularly over the last five to seven years. That's something that this parliament, Australia, its previous government and this government are taking very seriously—as they should. We saw the previous government enter into a very important arrangement—a turning point arrangement—through AUKUS. That's a security arrangement between Australia, the UK and the US which, effectively, will see Australia equipped with conventionally-armed nuclear-powered submarines. This will change the dial around the national security of Australia from a kinetic perspective. It's very important that we recognise this is the first time since the 1950s that the US has shared its crown jewel technology—that is, nuclear propelled submarines—with another country. The only other time it has done that was in the 1950s, and it was with the United Kingdom.

As we enter into this new world of nuclear powered submarines, quantum computing, artificial intelligence and new weaponry, Australia has to increase significantly its own ability to manage its own defence materiel and to manage the secrets of our allies. To do that, we need a better security vetting system than what we have. The current security vetting system's highest level is top secret, TSPV.

I will. Top secret positive vetting. But there are five different agencies that are able to provide those TSPV clearances, and we have seen in the past that some of our intelligence agencies don't even recognise a TSPV issued by another agency. We have seen, particularly over the last couple of years, a fairly significant migration of people working for one agency moving to another, and this clunkiness of the current system prevents a seamless movement of personnel, as it does a seamless movement of personnel from our allies.

At the end of the day, in order for us to be able to take advantage of the weaponry and secrets that are being provided to us by the Brits and by the US, we will need to rely heavily upon experts from those countries to come to Australia. With the AUKUS submarines and, in fact, under the AUKUS arrangement, it's estimated that some 20,000 jobs will arise out of that. They won't all be local jobs. We will need to rely on experts coming from other countries, and we need to have a better streamlined approach to our top-secret vetting classification. It will now be called TOP SECRET-Privileged Access.

It's not just a change of name. Under the old TSPV system, those assessments were done at a point in time, when someone applies or when someone renews their application for a clearance. Under this new scheme it is ongoing, as it should be, because people's circumstances can change, sometimes very rapidly, and it's important that our security agencies can have confidence that the systems that we provide for these top secret clearances can at the very least keep pace with people's changes in circumstances. ASIO is the best placed organisation to be able to assess these arrangements. ASIO will have the central responsibility for administering these new TOP SECRET-Privileged Access clearances. Other agencies, including AGSVA, will still have the opportunity or the ability to manage the lower clearances, and that's appropriate.

The deputy chair spoke earlier about the importance of managing our nation's secrets whilst retaining a degree of openness and transparency, and that's really important. That's a situation that we have to deal with regularly in this place. We don't live in a totalitarian state, and most of us in this place wouldn't want to see that happen. It's very important that we get that balance right and that, when decisions are made about these top secret clearances, people have appropriate opportunities for reviews if they are aggrieved by those decisions—for instance, in a circumstance where someone may get knocked back for a TS-Privileged Access clearance. If they are a Commonwealth public servant or they are already the holder of an equivalent—say, a top secret positive vetting clearance—then they will have the opportunity to go for an internal review and, failing that, they will have an opportunity to have that decision reviewed in the AAT.

That is distinct from someone who is a new applicant, someone who is not a Commonwealth public servant or someone who doesn't currently hold a clearance. If they have an adverse decision they will have a right of review, but it will not be to the AAT; it will be by way of an internal reviewer appointed by the Attorney-General. I have some concerns around that, which I have raised with the committee, and I'm happy to see how it goes. Where you have the Attorney-General appointing an internal reviewer, that could create some issues around independence. We'll wait and see how that goes.

It's appropriate that people who are new applicants don't necessarily have all the review rights that could clog up the AAT and ASIO. The last thing we want to do is have ASIO's efforts hampered by continuous applications for review. ASIO's role is a very important one, in this process, and we need to make sure that whilst we get the balance right we always have at the forefront of our minds that national security is paramount.

What I would say to the government is it's incredibly important that, with these new reforms, ASIO is given the appropriate financial assistance to conduct its work. This suite of reforms will add a significant workload to ASIO. We would expect somewhere in the order of around 30,000 applications a year, and that will grow significantly as AUKUS ramps up. So they have to be financed appropriately. It's incumbent upon this government to ensure that ASIO has the appropriate funding to do its job. The last thing we want to see is TS privileged access clearances being gummed up for longer periods than necessary. The government needs to be very much on top of appropriately funding ASIO for that role.

In closing, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation—in fact, all our security agencies—does an incredible job for the security of our nation. It's rare that Australians will hear about our security agencies, and that is a very good thing. The work that they do is often clandestine, and if you don't hear about them then the work that they are doing is successful. Unfortunately, our national security agencies, unlike our military—we hold our military in great regard and that's wonderful, as we should, but we very rarely lift up the men and women of our national intelligence and security agencies.

These agencies do wonderful work, both here and abroad, sometimes in very dangerous situations, away from family and friends for long periods of time. I would like to place on the record my appreciation, and the appreciation of those in this House, for the wonderful work they do in keeping Australians safe.

Jenny Ware (Hughes, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak in support of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2023. The coalition is fully supportive of this legislation. Governments have no greater responsibility than the protection of their citizens. This bill deals with the work that is done by our security organisations, most of which is, by necessity, done in secret. I will take this opportunity to thank all of those men and women who work within our intelligence organisations for the work that they do in protecting all of us. I'm very grateful that I was in the House for the speech from my friend the honourable member for Fisher, who serves on the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, and I commend his speech to the House.

We live in unprecedented times. It is unfortunate, but we face threats from foreign interference and espionage, and these threats must be taken seriously. This legislation is concerned primarily with streamlining and centralising the way that we provide top secret vetting processes within ASIO and other organisations.

The bill has a series of objectives. One of those is to enable more persistent, ongoing evaluations of an individual's suitability to hold a security clearance. In the times in which we live, we have recently signed the AUKUS arrangement that will provide nuclear powered submarines and really builds on our relationship with our very important allies the United States and Great Britain. The work that will need to be done on those submarines will necessitate us utilising skills from the US and also from Great Britain. So it is very important in that context that we as a country not only protect our own national secrets but also are confident that those who have access to the secrets of our allies are people suitable to hold those very important clearances.

The legislation also establishes a framework for a merits review of ASIO's security clearance decisions. This is important. It's a fundamental of our legal system that, where governments and government departments are able to make decisions about us, every individual should have an opportunity to be able to review those decisions if he or she is aggrieved. So that is an important part of this process.

The last stated objective of the legislation is to provide the Office of National Intelligence with a new function to drive the uplift of insider threat capabilities across the Commonwealth. That is also very important.

Just by way of background: there are currently five separate vetting agencies that are authorised to grant positive vetting security clearances. The committee and others have said that this model has resulted in different applications and standards of this policy aligned to individual missions and requirements. So the purpose of the legislation is to ensure that there is a more streamlined and singular process when considering whether or not an individual should be granted this very important level of clearance.

It has come about, overall, from a multiagency Future Positive Vetting Capability Taskforce that was established under the coalition government back in July 2020. Its stated purpose was to modernise the whole-of-government vetting standards to enable increased consistency, heightened assurance and transferability of Australia's highest cleared workforce. That task force has met and has come out with recommendations, and the government is seeking to put those recommendations into legislation.

To conclude, the bill is supported. It is a sensible piece of legislation; it is an important piece of legislation. The process by which security clearance is granted is important. As I said in my opening remarks, a government has no greater responsibility than the protection of its citizens and it needs to ensure that those citizens and those workers that have access to our national secrets are properly vetted and are of sound character. For all of those reasons, I commend this bill to the House.

Clare O'Neil (Hotham, Australian Labor Party, Minister for Home Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'd like to thank my colleagues for their contribution to this really important debate. We have come to government at a really distinctive time for Australia's national security. Our agencies are in agreement that, for the first time in many decades, espionage and foreign interference are the principal national security concerns that we face.

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill that is before the parliament is one of a wide range of measures that the Australian government is pursuing to make sure that we're responding appropriately to that changing circumstances of our national security. This bill contains a range of amendments that will lift and harden Australia's level of security clearance in response to these unprecedented threats. It will drive shared initiatives and investments to improve interoperability and burden sharing as the Australian government delivers critical national security capabilities.

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security has reviewed this bill. I acknowledge the chair of the committee, the member for Wills, who is here with us in the chamber. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security is, without question, one of the most important institutional features of the security conversation in our parliament. They work incredibly hard reviewing bills and policies of the Australian government to ensure that they are appropriately matched to the national security challenges we face. They've done really good work on this bill and provided an important suggestion for improvement, which we've adopted in the explanatory memorandum, which I'll come to in a moment.

The committee made two recommendations when it reviewed the draft bill. The first was that we pass the bill; that it was important for Australia's national security. The second was that we update the explanatory memorandum to clarify that ASIO will not engage human sources or agents to undertake security vetting. The government has implemented this recommendation by updating the explanatory memorandum. Accordingly, I present the replacement explanatory memorandum to the House.

In response to the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills report on the bill, the government has updated the explanatory memorandum also to clarify the exception to merits review for non-Australians or non-residents engaged for employment and duties outside Australia. This exception is necessary, reasonable and proportionate given the heightened risk that persons engaged in these circumstances may pose in relation to espionage and foreign interference, including that these persons may be exploited by foreign powers and their proxies.

The Prime Minister has said that Australia faces the most challenging geostrategic circumstances since the end of the Second World War. That's a very significant and accurate statement. The Director-General of Security has said that Australia's security environment is 'complex, challenging and changing' and that our goal as a country is to out-think and out-manoeuvre those who seek to harm our national interest. Part of that is expanding our capabilities and sharpening responses. That is exactly what this bill does. The choice that the Australian government makes about how it manages the geostrategic circumstances we face really matter, about how we engage with the global environment but also about what we do here in our own country to protect our national interest. The information that we have is valuable, and the protection of that information is becoming more important by the day.

One of the really important tenets of putting this bill together is that we fiercely believe that it is a privilege, not a right, to hold the highest level of Australian government security clearances. These clearances are not titles or rewards; they come with serious ongoing responsibilities, and we expect clearance holders to comply when they apply for those and to continue to comply with them. The reforms before the parliament will ensure that Australia's security clearance framework is uplifted and hardened in response to the threats we face. It includes providing for the ongoing monitoring of those highest levels of security clearances, rather than a 'set and forget', or what we might call a 'vet and forget', approach. Centralising Australia's highest-level security clearance vetting in ASIO leverages ASIO's specific security intelligence functions, holdings and capabilities, and it has regard to the most current and accurate information about the security threats confronting Australia. The reforms enabled by the bill will reduce the risk of compromise of trusted insiders, maximise utility derived from shared services to create efficiencies, improve the mobility and agility of our highest-cleared workforce and ensure the ongoing confidence of our most trusted allies.

In closing, I feel very privileged in the work I do as Minister for Home Affairs to work very directly with ASIO and the incredible people who serve their country through working for that organisation. Their job is very unique. It is stressful, it is difficult and, perhaps most relevantly, it is secret. It is a very important thing these people do for their country. Unlike we parliamentarians who sit here and can talk openly about the work we do and can speak with our constituents and our families, the people who work for our security agencies are in an entirely different scenario where they're not allowed to discuss the important work they do. It is very special because we know beyond a shadow of a doubt that the people who work for these organisations do it with one motivation in mind, and that is that they care passionately about their country. They are creative, intelligent, amazing people who work so hard to make sure that all the citizens that we represent in this chamber can live safely and go about their everyday lives. I want to put on record the government's gratitude for that work and the parliament's gratitude for that work. I commend the bill to the chamber.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.