Luke Gosling (Solomon, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

At the outset, I want to acknowledge and thank all the members of not only the Australian Defence Force but all our intelligence and security organisations throughout the country. For all those Australians, men and women, who are every day countering threats, we want to make sure that they've got the best possible framework within which to do that incredibly important work in our national interest.

As all honourable members know, espionage and foreign interference are now our country's principal national security threat. The scale of this challenge is unprecedented, and threats to our way of life increasingly demand that we shift our focus, with espionage and foreign interference now more prominent threats than ever. The threat from hostile foreign powers and their proxies is pervasive and multifaceted and has the potential to cause serious harm to our sovereignty, values and national interest.

The interplay of existing challenges with new and emerging ones has changed how we think about these threats. A foreign power can be simultaneously interfering, spying and using cyber to put themselves in a position for sabotage, as an example. These threats originate from multiple countries, not just those that might be considered traditional adversaries. In his 2023 threat assessment, the director-general of ASIO, Mike Burgess, warned of 'the "hive" of spies' targeting Australians in unprecedented numbers and with growing sophistication.

Foreign intelligence services have used cash to try to corrupt business people, officials and anyone they could try and influence to work for them. They target journalists, commentators, veterans and even judges. They hack into any database giving them access to the sensitive personal information of Australians. They attempt to compromise our journalists by luring them with lucrative study tours overseas to gain privileged information, only to be introduced, whether they know it or not, to spies of another country. These spies then use these opportunities to ingratiate themselves with the reporters, try to elicit insights on political, economic, defence and other issues and identify any vulnerabilities that could be leveraged at a later time.

We have seen disturbing reports of former ADF members travelling overseas to sell their training and expertise to foreign governments for hundreds of thousands of dollars and other significant perks. We have read reports of Australia's defence industry being increasingly targeted since September 2021, when US president Joe Biden, then British prime minister Boris Johnson and then Australian prime minister Scott Morrison announced the AUKUS agreement to provide Australia with nuclear powered, conventionally armed submarines. We have seen evidence of foreign governments intervening in our diaspora communities to choke community's ability to protest and to express their views freely and democratically, as is their right as Australians.

Foreign interference and espionage are a big threat to our national security, and it's ASIO that's working around the clock with other agencies to protect Australians from it. This threat is deliberately designed to undermine our democracy and our values, and it's why we must remain vigilant—because it goes on every day of the week. It's important that the Australian community understand the significance of the threat and the persistence of this threat. To quote Mike Burgess:

Based on what ASIO is seeing, more Australians are being targeted for espionage and foreign interference than at any time in Australia's history—more hostile foreign intelligence services, more spies, more targeting, more harm, more ASIO investigations, more ASIO disruptions. From where I sit, it feels like hand to hand combat.

He went on:

This means ASIO is busier than ever before. Busier than any time in our 74 year history. Busier than the Cold War; busier than 9/11; busier than the height of the caliphate.

This is a chilling assessment that is worth all of us reflecting on. Australians are now targeted in greater numbers by foreign intelligence services and other threat actors than they were even at the height of the Cold War, after 9/11 and in the fight against ISIS.

ASIO's annual report for 2021-22 said that the threat from hostile foreign powers was now the No. 1 concern, overtaking the threat of religiously motivated extremists, nationalists and racist extremists. That is simply extraordinary: to think back not that far into our past, when those other threats were massive, and realise they're now at unprecedented levels. But what's even more extraordinary is that some Australians appear not to take the threat seriously enough. Mike Burgess noted in his annual update that he had been counselled by individuals in business, academia and the Public Service that ASIO should 'ease up its operational responses to avoid upsetting foreign regimes'. Of course people are entitled to their views, but the reasons they offered ranged from, 'All countries spy on each other,' to, 'We were going to make the information public anyway,' to, 'The foreign government might make things difficult for us.' These are incredibly disappointing things to hear from some individuals in business, academia and even the Public Service. The Treasurer, Jim Chalmers, said it was concerning that those Australians in positions of influence were not taking the threat of foreign interference seriously. The threat of espionage and foreign interference is real and growing, and it is capable of ruining people's lives as well as undermining Australia's national interests.

Understanding and degrading the espionage and foreign interference activities of Australia's adversaries are among the most challenging types of intelligence work. ASIO works with all government agencies and the private sector to increase awareness of the threat and to implement effective mitigation strategies by focusing on two key areas. ASIO discovers espionage and foreign interference and degrades their impact, and it hardens the Australian government's defences against clandestine espionage and foreign interference. As it pursues both, the Albanese government is taking decisive action to ensure that our national secrets, our most sensitive information, and our capabilities are protected. We are ensuring our intelligence community can recruit the people they need—people we can trust—to protect our nation's secrets for years and years to come.

That is what this bill, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2023, is all about. The bill will harden our security environment by establishing the new national TOP SECRET-Privileged Access Authority for TS-PA clearance within ASIO. The TS-PA Authority will be centrally responsible for issuing Australia's new highest level of security clearance, the TS-PA clearance. This will replace the existing top secret positive vetting clearance over time. The new clearance is underpinned by a new TS-PA standard, which establishes stronger mandatory minimum security clearance requirements. The standard reflects contemporary psychological and insider threat research.

Under the Australian government Protective Security Policy Framework, the PSPF, persons who require access to security classified information or resources must hold a security clearance at the appropriate level. The purpose of the security vetting process is to determine whether an individual is suitable to hold that security clearance. It involves an assessment of whether a person has the demonstrated integrity and loyalty to be trusted to protect Australia's classified information and resources. Currently, there are several vetting agencies who issue TSPV clearances, including AGSVA, ASIO, the ONI and ASIS. This creates inefficiencies with the recognition of clearances and for mobility of staff and causes duplication of resources. This bill will help to fix these inefficiencies. Over time, ASIO-issued TS-PA security clearances will replace positive vetting security clearances. The PV operations of those vetting agencies presently authorised under the Commonwealth's Protective Security Policy Framework will be transitioned to ASIO.

The reforms will drive shared initiatives and investments that improve interoperability and burden sharing as the Australian government delivers critical national security capabilities—including AUKUS submarines, but many other capabilities as well. It will also improve the mobility and agility of our highest cleared workforce, allowing the Australian government to flexibly direct resources to its highest priority. Centralising Australia's highest level clearance in ASIO will also harden our security environment, meaning that ASIO can leverage its security expertise and existing holdings to assess a person's suitability for a security clearance, having regard to the most current and accurate information about the security threats confronting Australia. This helps us to put a stop to those who seek to do us harm. If a foreign government is trying to steal our secrets by planting foreign spies among our intel community or recruiting those from within ASIO, ASIO is the agency equipped to deal with those insider and other threats.

Oversight and accountability of the intelligence community remains essential under the Labor government. This bill will create a consistent, stronger review framework for security clearance decisions and assessments. This will mean that those who are affected by adverse decisions will have clear rights of review, including internal and external merits review. It will also enable the operations of the Quality Assurance Office, the QAO, in the Office of National Intelligence. The QAO will be established to independently assure the quality and consistency of clearances being issued by ASIO. ASIO will continue to be overseen by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security who has powers akin to a royal commission.

This reform shows how seriously Labor takes national security, because we are listening to the experts and taking their advice. We heard the Director-General of Security when he said:

… more Australians are being targeted for espionage and foreign interference than at any time in Australia's history.

That is what we are seeing and hearing not just from ASIO but from a range of government agencies. It's critically important that in this context we ensure the Commonwealth's most privileged information, capabilities and secrets are protected.

It's commonly said by many—indeed, by this government, and by anyone across this chamber with a strategic bone in their body—that we live in the most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War. It is commonly said that we sometimes forget exactly what this means in reality, in practice, on the ground. It means that even the Cold War, with all the peril of nuclear war that hung over the whole world, did not represent as direct a threat to Australia's sovereignty as the present circumstances do. The only worse time within living memory for Australian security was the carnage of the last world war, which was fought over and around our sea lanes and approaches.

Some of us in public life acknowledge this sobering fact. I hope most of us in public life acknowledge this sobering fact. What it means is that we should also pay tribute to the intelligence community, whose job it is to help Australia navigate the storms around us, to give the leaders of our country warning and foresight of dangers.

As I started, so I'll finish. We rightly honour the military in our country, whose job it is to always be ready to defend Australia when our strategic circumstances go from uncertain to cataclysmic. We should also honour the highly capable men and women of our intelligence services and thank them for the work that they do.

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