James Stevens (Sturt, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to join my coalition colleagues in speaking in favour of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill 2023. I welcome the opportunity to progress it through this parliament because it is indeed an important opportunity for us to enhance the way in which the government undertakes the important responsibilities of vetting security and issuing security clearances for a wide variety of Commonwealth and industry personnel that are working on, and in possession of, some of the most vitally important information and, indeed, secrets that are in the possession of our government. Keeping protections in place for those secrets has never been more important, particularly, of course, in the environment of the AUKUS opportunity. Again, I take every opportunity to commend the former Prime Minister Morrison and the former Morrison government for that unbelievable, epochal moment that that treaty has created. It is a quantum leap forward for our nation in so many areas of capability.

While I welcome the most significant and eye-catching part of AUKUS—the acquisition of nuclear propulsion technology and, therefore, nuclear powered submarines as a capability for the Royal Australian Navy, which will be completely transformative—it's important to remember that AUKUS is way beyond that unbelievable acquisition of technology. It is a framework for our country, the United States and the United Kingdom to collaborate and to share technology and other important, sensitive information within a framework that means so many of the previous pathways to individual capability acquisition and other information-sharing is suddenly standardised. Suddenly, we have such a preferential status, as an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom, to partner with them and acquire their great capability.

Let's also always take the opportunity to talk about the unbelievable capability that is developed in our nation, which we're very proud of. We want to see our defence industry and other national security industries and apparatus continue to grow and have greater opportunity for the economic dividend of sharing that technology in a safe and responsible way with our allies, such as the United States and the United Kingdom. That framework dramatically changes our access to the best capability and the best information for our government to keep our nation safe and to ensure the interests of our nation, which, of course, is the first responsibility of any government.

That equally means that we need to make sure that we have the highest level of confidence in how we issue security clearances. I think this is a very opportune moment for this legislation to make the changes, have centralisation and ensure that ASIO is the pre-eminent agency within government for managing and overseeing the process of assessing and issuing these security clearances. So we very much welcome how the bill creates that legislative framework for ASIO going forward.

I commend the member for Canning's point about the resourcing of ASIO, which is going to be so necessary in this area and in so many other areas of the vitally important work they do. We want to make sure that, with ASIO having these enhanced responsibilities, they get whatever financial and workforce resourcing they need to make sure that they can do every element of the new responsibilities that are being given to them through this legislation.

That is an opportunity for me to make a point that I have made in the past, in other contributions in this chamber, about security clearances. Of course, it's absolutely important that we have the most robust framework in place to ensure that every appropriate process, check, interview and corroboration of data is undertaken and that we don't in any way have any form of lack of confidence in the robustness of our system of undertaking those processes to issue a security clearance. Something that is not as well appreciated as I would like it to be is that it's also quite important to see this happen in a timely way and that it's not ideal to have a circumstance where, at times, there is an unnecessarily long waiting period for someone to receive their security clearance assessment. Sometimes I say in debates that I'm sure all members have had similar experiences with constituents, but that's probably not the case on this topic. I'm from Adelaide, where we have a very significant and growing defence industry sector, particularly around naval shipbuilding, and I'm sure that not all members have the constituent matters that I have when it comes to the issuance of security clearances. Indeed, I've had quite a few experiences of people in defence industry contacting me to get assistance in progressing a security clearance.

I'm not critical of the waiting periods in the past. You never really know whether there are unique reasons in some of these circumstances. For example, when someone comes from the United Kingdom, where they hold a security clearance, to work on the Type 26 program for a company that's equally operating in our country to build a frigate that is based on the Type 26 program, it is a surprise to me that it is a difficulty and a long wait for said person to get a security clearance when they have a security clearance from a Five Eyes partner, the original possessor of the technology that they're coming to our country to transfer to us. Then they have to wait more than 12 months to get their security clearance to give us the technology we are acquiring in a multibillion dollar program. I'm not suggesting that we shouldn't have proper robust processes, but I'm sure the waiting times, in particular, in cases like that are related to resourcing. I would urge the government to look at opportunities to make sure that we're resourcing the processing of security clearances.

This would be the greatest saving available to government of anything that we could possibly do in any program. Delaying human capital into defence procurement can have multi, multi, multibillion dollar consequences. If programs run late because people from the UK or the United States are delayed from participating in the program because they're waiting on a security clearance, the impact on a multibillion dollar program can be truly significant. The uniqueness of some of the capabilities of the type of personnel we're talking about means that, until that one person is cleared to work on a program, a whole range of things come to a complete standstill. For example, very complex design elements and a whole range of decision-making are choked at that one single point. As those delays flow through the system, they can potentially have multibillion dollar consequences.

I speak up all the time from a defence industry point of view on these types of bills because, whilst the other issues are important, that's one that really needs to have a spotlight shone upon it. There is a very consistent amount of feedback from a whole range of defence industry businesses that are having these challenges of bringing, at times, the only person in the world that can do a specific unique job on a program and having very significant delays in getting that person a security clearance. With the greatest of respect, if that person is coming from an AUKUS nation to work on the same program and technology they've been cleared to work on in the United States or the United Kingdom, it surprises me that they have significant delays in getting the same clearance to do the exact same work on technology they're not getting access to that they're bringing to us.

We could perhaps work on a mind shift in the processing of these things to consider whether or not they're being prioritised to the right extent. At times, there is a need to choose an order to prioritise these things. You can't just join the back of a queue and slowly move through. There needs to be an ability for defence industry security clearances to be looked at and considered as to how we give significant weight to the fact they have an existing security clearance at the same level for a role they're performing in another AUKUS nation. That's a goodwill suggestion. I'm not criticising anyone; I just think it's an opportunity. As these programs become more complex, that is something I would like us to look at. We are talking about tens of thousands of people in my home state who will need some form of security clearance to work on all the great opportunities and programs, and they are not going to be in uniform; they are going to be in industry.

My final point actually is on the uniform side. One of the great employment opportunities for veterans is in the fact that, generally speaking, they hold a security clearance, and a security clearance of significant value in the defence industry for the reasons I've just outlined. In my home state I've never visited a defence industry company that doesn't have a veteran employment program providing pathways for veterans to work in those businesses. That is fantastic. They're an unbelievable asset to those businesses. Not only do they perform the task they're employed to do but they've got spectacular coalface experience, unbelievable networks and a real ability to bring a whole range of perspectives and experience, as former uniformed serving personnel, into the development of future capability for the forces.

The security clearances which are provided to service personnel are a great asset, and I'm interested in the concept of the government providing them to our veterans in a more enduring way so that our veterans have that asset to give them an advantage in seeking employment opportunities in defence industry roles, which will invariably require a form of security clearance. I'm all for veterans having an unfair advantage in their career prospects post serving our nation. I'm unashamedly of that view. I think that's an opportunity, on the topic of security clearances, that we should always look to maximise.

With those contributions, I commend the bill to the House.

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