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Senate debates Committees
Economics References Committee; Reference
Andrew Bragg NSW, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Housing and Homelessness
7:08 pm
I move:
That the following matter be referred to the Economics References Committee for inquiry and report by 18 November 2027:
Foreign currency loans (FCLs) issued by Australian banks, with particular reference to:
(a) the issuance of FCLs in the 1980s;
(b) the economic and consumer basis for FCLs;
(c) the governance of FCLs by Australian banks;
(d) responses to any complaints relating to FCLs;
(e) compensation arrangements;
(f) any outstanding claims for compensation;
(g) historical laws governing FCLs and their enforcement;
(h) law reform opportunities; and
(i) any other related matters.
Foreign currency loans were a significant issue in the 1980s, when they were issued to people, often farmers or small-business people, on a basis that they could never understand but also potentially on a basis upon which they could never actually win or benefit from the financial transaction that was undertaken. These loans were issued by banks all around Australia in the eighties, and this was done on a large scale. There were as many as 5,000 of these loans, ranging from a quarter of a million dollars to as much as $4 million. The point of these foreign currency loans is that they were pegged to other currencies, so the Australian dollar was linked to the Swiss franc or to the Japanese yen. What happened is that a lot of people were very badly damaged financially and psychologically. It was a very ugly chapter in the Australian financial services history.
It was the subject of a significant parliamentary inquiry which was established during the Hawke government but reported just at the end of the Hawke government, before the Keating government was to be consummated in December 1991. The House of Representatives committee which looked at these matters, the Martin inquiry, made effectively a number of structural recommendations to the financial sector. It didn't recommend compensation. It did recommend that there be mediation undertaken by the banks. But it made structural recommendations, and it made recommendations that were later adopted by the Wallis inquiry, including prudential regulation and stronger disclosure regimes and the like. For example, the Martin inquiry recommended that the RBA at the time, in 1991, be granted stronger authority over banking supervision, but it was the Wallis inquiry in 1997 which led to the creation of the twin-peaks framework in APRA and ASIC as we know it today and enhanced prudential supervision but also supposedly enhanced consumer protection rules.
That is where the Martin inquiry got to. It gave you structural recommendations but also a proposal that the banks should deal with mediation. It didn't really deal with the issue at hand in many of the cases, which is the reason I'm talking about it today, because the inquiries that went after the Martin inquiry were not parliamentary inquiries but were financial system inquiries. We had the Wallis inquiry and the David Murray inquiry, and we also had the Hayne royal commission into banking. All of these things which were related to foreign currency loans were not substantively considered in these bigger inquiries, so the Martin inquiry of 1990, reporting in 1991, was really the only serious attempt, from a parliamentary sense or from an executive sense, of investigating these matters.
What has happened in the years after the Martin inquiry has been the emergence of a lot of new evidence that there was significant wrongdoing inside the banks. We've all now lived through a lot of bank scandals. We've lived through the financial advice scandals. In recent months, we've lived through the failure of the banks to link mortgage offset accounts to mortgages. We've had a situation where people are not actually benefiting from those offsets that they have in their own name against their mortgage. So I think today is frankly a very different environment to what we saw in the early nineties, where we've seen a complete collapse in trust in the banks. The banks operate with extraordinary licence from this parliament and extraordinary protection, whether it be the four pillars or the deposit guarantee or all the other instruments which protect their market position—I would say unfairly. Ultimately, anyone who thinks that we owe the banks a favour needs to have their head read. We have a pretty sick and sclerotic economy, where the banks are a big part of this.
I make these points because, if you look back at the 1991 effort to investigate these things, it was to me not really a genuine and comprehensive attempt to try and address all the different elements of wrongdoing. Of course, the parliament and the system of committees is not a court. There were, through the judicial branch, many cases of the 5,000 foreign currency loans, many of which were progressed to the point where the people who were wronged were satisfied. There was the emergence of the Westpac letters, which led to the Westpac executives having to offer all sorts of different apologies and public statements. Different banks treated them differently. The fact is that there wasn't the Australian financial complaints tribunal that we have today, which has been established after years and years of bank wrongdoing being exposed. Today, for better or worse, there is at least a funnel and a pipeline where people who have been wronged by these institutions can go and have things properly dealt with as they would by an ombudsman. But back then we had a parliamentary inquiry say, 'Basically, you're on your own. We hope the banks might do some mediation. They may. We're just going to talk about some things that should change in the future.'
Now, that's not really good enough when up to 5,000 of these loans were issued, where the evidence I'd say that has emerged in the years since is that the people who were given these loans were in no position to understand their complexity. They may not have actually been on the hook themselves legally. It may have been the banks that were responsible for making up the differences in the payments that were due because of changes in the currency.
The point of this inquiry is to consider all of the new information that has come forward. Professor Evan Jones from the University of Sydney has published forms of correspondence from people who worked inside these banks in years gone by, including a John McLennan, who was an adviser to foreign currency borrowers, who said:
I have attended many of the cases heard before the court and frankly, I am disgusted at the tactics used by the Bank's counsel. It appears the whole circus is run for the benefit of the Legal profession with little or no interest in the real legal issues. I sat through one session in Spice -v- Westpac where the Bank's counsel … cross examined Mr Spice for four hours over the meaning of a pencil line drawn across a page in his diary.
There have been letters and correspondence from former Commonwealth Bank officials like Mr Hilton Wood that have exposed the internal culture of the banks in the eighties and the existence of documents and letters that were in some cases not made available in the judicial processes. It was also not possible for the parliamentary inquiry of 1990-91 to consider them.
I make the point again that I understand that the parliament is not a court. Again, I understand the parliamentary committees are not there to run a judicial process. I understand that. But I think it is a reasonable expectation that there's no time limit that can be put in place here. If people have been wrongly treated in a way where they have lost their financial health, their physical health, their psychological health, we should never give up on trying to get justice for them in a country where, if you undertake a business deal, you should be doing it on the basis that the other person is doing the right thing and acting in good faith.
As has now been made quite clear, there is a large treasure trove of documents which exist within these banks and have been made available since 1991, which does give cause for us to reconsider the fate of these foreign currency loans and the impact on the borrowers. I don't think we owe the banks a favour here. I think we need to look very carefully at their activities, and I don't think we should be prepared to give up on things just because of the passage of time. As I say, the Martin inquiry could have done more to look at the impacts on these people. Not all the court cases necessarily delivered a reasonable outcome for all of these people.
This is an opportunity now for this Senate to consider the new information that has come to light, to try and deliver justice for the people who were wronged. There may be up to 500 of them that were never properly compensated or dealt with out of the original 5,000 loans—so as many as 10 per cent. This is an opportunity to look at the historical culture of these institutions that still have great power in our society today. It's an opportunity for us to consider whether the past parliamentary inquiries actually did what they were supposed to do. It is an opportunity for us to again consider whether the regulatory arrangements, as put in place pretty much after the Wallis inquiry of 1997, are still fit for purpose in relation to these matters, and for us to try and give people the peace of mind that they deserve—that we live in a country where, if you are dealing with a major institution, where there is a major power imbalance, the country will take care of you and protect you if the wrong thing has happened. We don't want to have a country where people feel that they can get ripped off and there are no consequences. That's not the sort of country we've ever had.
I'm very much keen for the Senate to support this inquiry, so that we can properly investigate these matters and provide peace of mind in a thorough way, some 40 years after the fact. I'd make the point that it doesn't matter how much time has passed; we will never give up on getting the best possible outcome—and, indeed, justice—for people who have been done over by the strongest people in our society. After all, it's the mark of a good society that it is able to protect the people that are not strong, who can be vulnerable to being damaged by great power. That has always been the way that we've run this country, and I don't think that should change now in 2026.
Question agreed to.