This is a proof (draft) Hansard, not the final version.
The Parliament has not yet published the final text for this day, so the wording, who said what and the results of divisions may change.
Senate debates Bills
Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026; Second Reading
Michaelia Cash WA, Liberal Party, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate
10:02 am
I rise on behalf of the coalition to contribute to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026. The coalition will support the passage of this legislation, but that, of course, is following the amendments that were made to it in the House of Representatives.
Australia faces increasingly sophisticated threats from money laundering, organised crime, scams and terrorism financing. These threats, as we know, are evolving, but, more so, they are growing rapidly. Criminal organisations are becoming more technologically sophisticated, more internationally connected and more proficient at exploiting weaknesses in our financial systems. Our legislative and regulatory frameworks must therefore be capable and ever more capable of responding as effectively as possible to these mounting threats. Where there are gaps in those legislative and regulatory frameworks, the parliament therefore has a duty to act. In principle, that is why the coalition now supports the fundamental objectives of this bill.
However, supporting the objectives of legislation, such as this, did not mean that we were going to accept every element of the design of the original form of this particular piece of legislation, nor did it mean giving the government a blank cheque to expand regulatory powers without ensuring that those powers were appropriately targeted, proportionate and subject to proper safeguards. These were the most basic of the tenets that guided the coalition's approach when we were assessing this legislation, and they were also the reasons that we insisted that the bill before us should be subject to detailed examination before it came to the Senate.
One of the most significant challenges that the content of this bill seeks to address is the increasing exploitation of emerging financial technologies by criminal organisations. A particularly striking example of that trend has been the extraordinary proliferation of cryptocurrency ATMs across Australia. In 2019, there were just 23 cryptocurrency ATMs operating in Australia. Today, that number has grown to more than 2,000. Obviously, that is an extraordinary increase, especially over such a short timeframe. While cryptocurrency and other emerging financial technologies also have perfectly legitimate uses, there is growing evidence that certain facets of them are being exploited by criminals on a worryingly wide scale. AUSTRAC has identified that approximately 85 per cent of frequent cryptocurrency ATM transactions are actually associated with scams or money-mule activity. That is a finding that should represent a concern to all of us, not least because these transactions typically take the form of sophisticated criminal operations preying on innocent, unsuspecting, ordinary Australians. It is no exaggeration to say that they have many times ended in people actually losing their life savings or, at the very least, substantial sums of money.
These kinds of financial infrastructure can also make it easier for nefarious individuals to launder the proceeds of other serious offences. We know, for example, that Australian banks recently closed around 22,000 money-mule accounts in a single 12-month period. That figure alone provides an indication of the scale of the challenge facing our financial institutions and law enforcement agencies in this space. Indeed, the criminal exploitation of these new financial channels is not some marginal or theoretical issue. Instead, it is a significant and growing problem that demands an active and effective response. Accordingly, the coalition recognises the importance of providing AUSTRAC with appropriate powers to respond quickly to high-risk financial mechanisms. We will also support measures that genuinely and sensibly strengthen Australia's counterterrorism financing laws.
However, in our consideration of this bill, the question before us has not just been whether those additional kinds of powers are desirable. It has also been about how those powers are conceived and then implemented. In that context, our most fundamental concern in examining the original content of this bill was related to the new and sweeping set of powers that was going to be vested in the chief executive officer of AUSTRAC. Those powers had substantial potential impacts on businesses, financial services and other participants in the Australian economy. We were particularly uneasy about the delegation of those powers away from the minister, especially as concepts such as 'significant harm' and 'the public interest' were not defined, in our view, with sufficient clarity and precision. In short, there were accordingly a number of serious questions for us about how the powers would actually operate in practice. That included questions about the extent to which AUSTRAC would or would not need to consult with affected parties, especially as there were provisions enabling consultation to be bypassed in certain circumstances. There were also other provisions that meant that failures by AUSTRAC to comply with consultation requirements might not necessarily invalidate those decisions.
The coalition, of course, does not oppose the existence of strong powers to combat serious financial crime. We recognise that regulators and law enforcement agencies must have a range of tools at their disposal in order to respond to sophisticated and rapidly evolving criminal threats. But the fundamental point here is that these tools must be accompanied by commonsense application. Strong powers and strong safeguards are not competing objectives. They should actually be complementary features of effective legislation. In fact, it will almost always be the case that powers that are carefully defined and subject to appropriate oversight will better command public confidence and will operate more effectively over the longer term than powers that are devised in a more ad hoc form.
That is why the coalition considers it essential that the original legislation be examined through a parliamentary committee inquiry. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security provided an important forum for testing the government's proposals as well as examining their practical consequences. It also gave industry representatives, consumer groups and other stakeholders an opportunity to express their concerns directly to the parliament. That scrutiny was not an unnecessary impediment to reform. It was an essential part of getting the reform right.
To add to that, our concerns about the original bill needed to be understood against the broader background of the Albanese government's approach to anti-money-laundering legislation and regulation. That's because, sadly, the Albanese government has an atrocious record when it comes to introducing major regulatory changes. When it comes to this bill, the anti-money-laundering changes legislated in 2024—including the substantial expansion of the regime commonly referred to as tranche 2—provide a particularly important and relevant example. As the coalition warned repeatedly, even from the time those changes were in their infancy, they have subsequently come to impose new major obligations on thousands of Australian businesses—and, sadly, poorly designed and poorly implemented new obligations at that.
In particular, legal practices, accounting firms conveyancers and real estate businesses have all now faced the prospect of implementing incredibly complex compliance arrangements, often with little previous experience of operating under the anti-money-laundering framework. Overwhelmingly, the most affected entities have not been large corporations with extensive regulatory and compliance departments; they have been small and medium enterprises. They also typically operate in regional communities. And, like other enterprises right across the country, they already face a raft of stifling regulatory and administrative pressures. Yet they are now being expected to implement new risk assessment, anti-money-laundering programs, compliance arrangements, staff training, customer due diligence processes, suspicious-matter reporting systems and—wait for it; there's still more—additional record keeping obligations.
What wasn't recognised by the government, despite the fact that this was raised by businesses and by the coalition at the time, was that these new responsibilities have involved additional cost, additional administrative burdens and far-reaching legal complexity—not to mention, when you talk to these businesses that are now struggling under the burden of the additional regulatory compliance, considerable anxiety and annoyance. Indeed, the government's own impact analysis estimated the additional regulatory burden associated with its broader anti-money-laundering reforms at a staggering $13.9 billion over 10 years. Naturally nobody, other than the criminals themselves, would seriously dispute the need to prevent people from exploiting legitimate businesses and professional services. However, there is a Grand-Canyon-like gulf, or difference, between imposing necessary, proportionate safeguards and creating an excessively burdensome compliance regime that captures law-abiding businesses without sufficient regard for the practical consequences that these businesses are now feeling.
Those concerns are not confined to the financial cost. One of the most troubling aspects of the government's earlier reforms was the extent to which businesses were expected to prepare for substantial new obligations before much of the practical detail had been settled by the government. Since the passage of the 2024 changes, AUSTRAC has repeatedly amended and then had to clarify its guidance. As recently as August and September this year, further guidance was still being issued or updated on matters including real estate, professional services, customer due diligence and reporting timeframes. That is absolutely unacceptable. Businesses should not have been expected to make major investments in compliance systems while essential elements of the rules that they are required to follow were still being clarified, if not written, nor should they have been expected to absorb unnecessary costs because the government had failed to adequately sequence the implementation of what is a substantial regulatory change.
There is a fundamental principle here. It is a responsibility of government to make the rules clear, workable and proportionate before expecting people to comply. The coalition's concerns about this bill were therefore, sadly, informed in part by those earlier experiences. We do not want to see another round of significant regulatory changes in relation to anti money laundering introduced without adequate consideration of their practical consequences. Within that general setting, the scrutiny undertaken by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security was particularly valuable. The committee process reinforced the coalition's view that the original bill required amendments to at least two important aspects. The first concerned the proposed new powers of the AUSTRAC chief executive officer. The second major issue concerned the timing of the commencement of certain measures. The coalition therefore advocated amendments to address both sets of matters. I am pleased to say that the government listened to the coalition and addressed the legislation. That is why we are now in a position to support the legislation.
We need to get the balance right. The bill is rightly directed towards protecting Australians from scams, disrupting organised crime and strengthening our national security. However, its original composition, sadly, like so much that this government sloppily puts on the table, could have been better. The coalition is therefore pleased to have aired out what were our very legitimate concerns, insisted on appropriate scrutiny and advocated for changes to positively address those concerns. Ultimately, the measure of legislation like this is not simply the number of additional powers it creates. It is whether those powers actually help stop criminals, protect Australians and strengthen our national security, all without imposing unnecessary burdens on those who are doing the right thing. It is on that basis—that the government did accept the coalition's amendments to the legislation—that we are now in a position to support the bill. (Time expired)
Raff Ciccone Victoria, Australian Labor Party
10:17 am
I rise in support of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026 as chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, which reviewed this bill.
It starts with a phone call out of the blue—the caller says that they're from the bank, the police or the tax office—or it's a new friend online. The message is always the same: 'Your money is at risk. Act now. Withdraw cash. Go to the local service station down the road, go to the supermarket or go to your local tobacconist. Feed it into a machine in the corner. Scan the code, and everything will be fine.' But it won't be. It is not fine. Within minutes, that money is converted into cryptocurrency and sent to a criminal's wallet—sent offshore—and is rarely seen again. That machine is a crypto ATM. The Minister for Home Affairs has said:
Australia has the highest number of CATMs—
crypto ATMs—
in the region, and the third highest in the world.
Our committee heard deeply concerning evidence. Australians over 50 account for more than 70 per cent of crypto ATM transactions by value and people aged 60 to 70 for nearly 30 per cent. These are our parents and grandparents. When an AUSTRAC taskforce examined 90 of the 100 most prolific users, it estimated around 85 per cent of their transactions were the proceeds of scams or mule activity. Industry questions that finding, and the committee weighed its evidence. But the AFP warns that reported losses are only the tip of the iceberg because many victims are too ashamed to come forward.
This bill delivers on the commitment that the minister made in the National Press Club in October last year to crack down on money laundering through high-risk mechanisms, particularly crypto ATMs. Schedule 1 creates a power to restrict or prohibit reporting entities from using a high-risk mechanism, such as a product, service or delivery channel, where it is causing or likely to cause significant harm in action and where it is in the public interest. Restrictions can be targeted or, where warranted, a mechanism can be prohibited outright. Breaches carry civil penalties of up to $33 million for companies.
Such a power must be used carefully and accountably. Of the committee's 11 recommendations, three go to its design, and the government accepted all three, amending the bill in the other place. The power will now be exercised by the responsible minister on advice from the AUSTRAC CEO, so decisions are accountable to this parliament. The minister must set out the consultation undertaken, and, because businesses are already absorbing obligations that begin on 1 July, schedule 1 will commence on 1 July 2027.
Schedule 2 aligns the definition of financing of terrorism with the state sponsors of terrorism offences this parliament passed last year. Australia lists one state sponsor of terrorism, and that is Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Earlier this year, our committee reviewed that listing, and we received more than 180 submissions. Many were from Iranian Australians who showed extraordinary courage in coming forward. We proudly back that listing. As I said then, no Australian should accept foreign state directed terrorism on our streets. In fact, this government has sanctioned more than 200 Iranian individuals and entities, and more than 100 of them have been linked to the IRGC. These measures are not symbolic. This bill just adds another measure, which is following the money.
ASIO has assessed that the Iranian regime directed the firebombing of the Adas Israel Synagogue in my home city of Melbourne. As the minister said at the time, Australia was attacked and Australia was harmed. And the threat has not gone away. Last month, ASIO confirmed that Iranian intelligence operatives had targeted journalist Sharri Markson, a prominent Jewish journalist on News24. Over two months, they posed as a former US official, using a hijacked account to lure her to a fake meeting with researchers from a Washington think tank. It is alleged that they gained access to her personal files. ASIO says that she was targeted for her media profile, her support for Israel and her criticism of the Islamic regime.
Former Victorian Liberal president Michael Kroger was also on the same target list because of his support for the State of Israel and the Jewish community in Australia. ASIO detected the operation and warned him before his accounts were compromised. Broadcaster Erin Molan also told the media that ASIO had informed her that she was the third Australian targeted after she had clicked a fake meeting link from someone posing as a US think tank expert. In Melbourne, Dr Minoo Ghamari, a dentist and someone who I know and have known for a little while now and one of the regime's most outspoken critics, was branded as a traitor on a portal used by regime loyalists to monitor critics abroad. Her photo and workplace were published, and graphic death threats followed. What was her crime? It was organising rallies and lobbying for the IRGC to be listed as a terrorist organisation.
Other Iranian Australians have also been targeted in the same way, and it is very clear that this is transnational repression. It has no place in Australia or in our society. The Director-General of Security has warned that Iran sees Australia as a legitimate target for covertly directed acts of violence, including arson, vandalism and even assassination. Every one of these operations needs money to run, and financing that kind of terrorism must be treated as terrorism financing.
I want to thank my committee colleagues across the parliament for their bipartisan approach, thank the secretariat and thank everyone who gave evidence which resulted in the bill before the Senate today. Criminals will always look for the weakest point in our system, and this bill ensures that we have the tools to close it so that their next phone call doesn't end with someone's life savings disappearing into a machine at the local service station. I commend this bill to the Senate.
David Shoebridge NSW, Australian Greens
10:25 am
I rise on behalf of the Greens to speak to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026. In 2024, the Greens backed in tranche 2 laws to counterterrorism financing, and we backed them in on the assumption that they'd be implemented in good faith. We backed them in on the assumption that Australians' personal data would be protected, and we backed them in on the basis that the world needs to coordinate in this space to deal with, in particular, counterterrorism financing and money laundering. We remain committed to those projects. Bringing lawyers, real estate agents and accountants into the regime keeps dirty money out of housing, and the Greens will be consistent in doing that.
But, of course, it's being implemented by the Australian Labor Party, and you just can't trust them with anything, can you? Australians' data has been being supplied through to AUSTRAC since 1 July. Critical data about their personal lives, their finances and their real estate deals—some of the most important data—is being fed into AUSTRAC, as it should be, to test for money laundering and to test for whether or not it's been potentially diverted for terrorism. It's a good scheme. It's good legislation. What does Labor do? They tell AUSTRAC to enter into a contract with this US bottom feeder called Palantir, a notorious pro-fascist, far-right data-harvesting company owned by some of the nastiest people on the planet, to review that data. Every time you give this mob a chance, they'll sell out Australians' data, they'll sell out our sovereignty, and they'll sell it out to US interests like this. It is extraordinary. I'll speak a little more on that in a moment.
So of course we're going to closely review any further legislation put forward by Labor in this space. What do these changes propose to do? They put in place a new ban power. The minister, after getting advice from AUSTRAC, can restrict or ban any 'product, service, delivery channel or thing'—'thing' is a fairly broad term—used by a business that AUSTRAC regulates. Of course, the rationale for this legislation is crypto ATMs. Crypto ATMs are the most obvious target. They operate in plain sight, you can identify where they are, there are a couple thousand of them across the country, and they have really grown like mushrooms across the place. The clear need at the moment in the anti-money-laundering space is to actually ban crypto ATMs. Just legislate a national ban on crypto ATMs. But, instead, this government comes in with this broad, hard-to-understand power that may lead—may lead—to the banning or regulation of crypto ATMs. It is a restriction or a ban on any 'product, service, delivery channel or thing'. The Greens say that this legislation should have been clear and targeted and should expressly ban crypto ATMs.
The bill also has a wider definition of terrorism financing. The definition picks up last year's 'state sponsors of terrorism' offences, and we know that that's focused primarily on Iran. It also lets the government add sanctions offences by regulation without coming back to parliament. The Greens believe there should be parliamentary scrutiny. It's important, but we note the rationale for those amendments and the intent to have common terms across this part of Commonwealth regulation.
The legislation also puts in place changes to when banks and other businesses must recheck or review their customers. They currently do so only when issues are raised about a customer's information. Under this bill, however, there's a requirement to do so where there are reasonable grounds for suspicion. How that is intended to work in practice is not clear and hasn't been fully explained by the government, and I will touch on some of the very real concerns that members of the Australian community have been having about the way largely unregulated banks and financial institutions are debanking Australians without any fair review.
The Greens don't oppose this bill, but we want to make it absolutely clear that the government must to listen to the compelling evidence the committee received about the scam nature of crypto ATMs and about older Australians with less financial capacity being more vulnerable to online scams. It's older Australians who are being scammed by crypto ATMs. They're being targeted by international organisations that see weaknesses in regulation across the globe and go looking for countries where they can find weak governments, weak regulation and wealth. They've done that here in relation to crypto ATMs, with Australia's weak federal legislation, weak government and vulnerable Australians being targeted. Crypto ATMs are a scam pipeline that hurts mostly older Australians. We should just ban these crypto ATMs in the bill. Instead, this bill gives the minister an incredibly broad discretion that's less clear and less useful than what should be done here: a clear and direct ban.
We also have concerns that these measures, taken together, will lead to a risk of increasingly unfair debanking amongst members of the Australian community. This has been a particular problem for the Iranian-Australian community, but we know there are multiple communities that have faced this debanking problem without fair reviews, without rationale and without anywhere to go when they have an issue with the way a bank debanks them.
While we can see some rationale for the 'reasonable grounds' change, without clear regulatory oversight it risks increasing surveillance by banks of their customers without any clear review or consumer rights. It does seem a sensible reform to include a reasonable-grounds review, but we're concerned about how that will play out in practice with an absent regulator, without consumer protections and without clear review processes.
This would be a good moment to consider how Palantir has got its claws into yet another Commonwealth agency. Palantir has been contracted with AUSTRAC since 2017. In case anyone has forgotten who Palantir is, it is a hard-right, neofascist corporation from the US whose name actually comes from the all-seeing stones used by Sauron in The Lord of the Rings. They chose a particularly all-seeing power to name their company after and—surprise, surprise—it turns out they're an evil global company. They've said that their goal in the US culture wars is to help the US military and to always put US interests ahead of those of any other country on the planet. They've also said they have a hard-right political agenda that they want to implement globally with the cooperation and support of the US government and the US military wherever they can.
That's Palantir: a noxious US firm that has clearly stated that it wants to engage in a global culture war on behalf of the US and the US military. So what does the coalition government do? Enter into contracts with Palantir in 2017 through AUSTRAC, and the Labor government has continued it. Palantir is now AUSTRAC's biggest technology supplier. In April this year, under Labor, Palantir got another $5.06 million contract from AUSTRAC without even going to open tender. They just literally invited AUSTRAC in with a closed shop and no competitive tender.
Since 1 July, AUSTRAC has been receiving reports from real estate agents, lawyers, accountants and conveyancers about millions of Australians who are buying homes, setting up businesses and getting legal help, and that information is being fed into Palantir's platforms. Did I mention Palantir is a US far-right neo-fascist corporation who's openly said this? That's who this government is feeding Australia's data into. When we asked the government if this anti-money-laundering counterterrorism financing data was going to Palantir, they very clearly said yes. They said yes. They're proud of it.
This bill expands AUSTRAC powers and widens the terrorism net, which means more data flowing into Palantir systems. Did I mention they are a hard-right neo-fascist corporation owned by US billionaires who are putting US interests ahead of ours? Did I mention that, in case no-one's heard it? Another contract with Palantir from Labor—this substantially reduces trust and public buy-in into what are critically important reforms. We supported these reforms in 2024 because there's a need to crack down on money laundering and counterterrorism, and then Labor implement it with their mates in Palantir. You can't make this stuff up. Australians' financial data should sit on systems under Australian control and not depend upon a US bottom-feeder surveillance company owned by neo-fascists. That seems pretty simple, and our ask in this regard is simple: put every future AUSTRAC data contract to a genuinely open tender and get Palantir out of AUSTRAC and out of every single government agency. That's why I move the second reading amendment to this bill that's been circulated. I move:
At the end of the motion, add ", but the Senate:
(a) notes:
(i) that:
(A) the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) has relied on Palantir since 2017,
(B) Palantir is now AUSTRAC's largest technology supplier, and
(C) in April 2026 AUSTRAC awarded Palantir a further $5.06 million contract after inviting only Palantir to bid; and
(ii) community concern that the vast amount of personal information collected for anti-money laundering purposes (which since 1 July 2026 includes reports from real estate agents, lawyers, accountants and conveyancers) is being fed into Palantir's platforms; and
(b) calls on the Government to put any future AUSTRAC data contracts to genuinely open tender and to develop a plan to move AUSTRAC off Palantir and onto systems under full Australian control".
I commend that second reading amendment to the Senate.
I did indicate our concern for the way in which Australians—it's been particularly hard against Iranian Australians and Iranian Australian businesses—from across many multicultural communities have been being increasingly debanked by their financial institutions. I want to give particular credit to some of the work that was being done by SBS to pull together some of the stories about how Iranian Australians have been debanked simply because they've got a business that might involve some financial transactions with people or businesses in Iran. Of course, if there's any evidence that it's going towards the Iranian regime or going towards money laundering or in any way involved with the IRGC, there is clear legislation and clear intent to ban that kind of transaction. The Greens were the party who first called for sanctions against the IRGC, and, a couple of years later, the government came on board and did it. But what we are seeing across the Iranian Australian community is legitimate businesses that have been operating for years getting a message from their bank saying: 'We're shutting down your account. We're shutting down'—basically—'your business, because you've been flagged as being a risk or a commercial risk under anti-money-laundering laws.' When businesses are challenging it and saying, 'Hang on, what's the risk here? We've been operating for years. Tell us the customer that's a concern,' they just get a blank wall. When they then complain to the Australian Financial Complaints Authority, the Australian Financial Complaints Authority hears the complaint and then says:
What we are not able to look at is to go behind what are the commercial or business reasons … why a particular person may have been told the bank isn't going to offer them services anymore …
So the Australian Financial Complaints Authority says, 'Well, we can't challenge the bank's commercial decisions,' and people's businesses have been destroyed—at scale.
There needs to be an independent review in this space. There needs to be some government agency that can look behind these banks that are just arbitrarily debanking people and shutting people's businesses down. This needs to be joined-up policy. Let's be clear about this: if you have an issue—as the Greens do—with scam ATMs from cryptos, ban them. Let's get Palantir out of AUSTRAC, and let's give people with legitimate businesses a real remedy when they get debanked.
Richard Dowling Tasmania, Australian Labor Party
10:40 am
Just metres from the front door of my electorate office in Tasmania stands a cryptocurrency ATM, and most people walk straight past it. But, for someone being manipulated by a scammer, it could be the final stop before their life savings disappear. In September, Tasmania Police revealed that, over a three-month period earlier this year, Tasmanians lost more than $1.5 million through scams involving cryptocurrency ATMs. In 2021, Tasmania had just one of these cryptocurrency machines. By September this year, we had 28 of them—28 across a small state, up from just one.
Police also found that some victims were directed to these machines after their banks had questioned suspicious transfers. Think about that. A bank spots the warning signs. A criminal finds another way around these safeguards. A person is told their savings are at risk, that a loved one urgently needs help, that an investment opportunity will disappear if they hesitate, and they're pressured to withdraw cash and feed it into a machine. Money built up over decades can be gone in minutes. That is not stupidity; that is calculated exploitation, and the responsibility belongs to the criminal, not to the victim.
This is an issue that I care deeply about. In my first speech in this place, I spoke about financial literacy and why it needs to be treated as an essential life skill—because understanding money isn't a luxury. It shapes whether someone can pay their bills, manage debt, avoid exploitation, buy a home and retire with dignity. We expect Australians to navigate increasingly complex financial products, yet too often we expect them to learn by making mistakes they cannot afford. That is why I co-chair the Parliamentary Friends of Financial Capability group. We launched this non-partisan friendship group in August, bringing together parliamentarians, educators, researchers, community organisations, regulators and industry. Our purpose is straightforward: to turn good ideas and existing programs into better financial outcomes for Australians at every stage of life.
Financial literacy is knowing how money works. Financial capability is having the skills and confidence to put that knowledge into practice. It means understanding interest before signing a loan, knowing where your superannuation goes and recognising the signs of a scam—and feeling confident enough to stop, ask questions and seek advice. That starts in the classroom, but it cannot end when we leave school. Just this month, education ministers from across Australia agreed to strengthen financial literacy in our national curriculum. Changes to the early-years mathematics curriculum will build stronger foundations in consumer and financial literacy, with further work to extend this focus into years 3 to 6. This is significant progress, and I welcome it. But financial capability is bigger than what happens in the classroom. It is something we need to build throughout our lives, and it requires a shared effort from government, industry, educators and the community.
The evidence shows how far we have to go. Last year, the Ecstra Foundation surveyed 2,123 Australian students, parents and teachers. Just 20 per cent of students said they had learnt about scams in school. That's one in five who've learned about scams in school. That's not good enough. Only 12 per cent said they had learnt about digital financial products such as cryptocurrency, yet 70 per cent of students said they'd used social media to learn about money. Think about that. Young Australians are increasingly turning to social media for financial information, but many have not been taught the basics of how to assess what they are being told. These aren't obscure, specialist topics. They are basic survival skills in a digital economy. We teach road safety before young people start driving; we should teach financial safety before they begin making decisions that can affect their entire lives.
Education cannot carry this burden alone. Scammers are organised; they manipulate fear, love, trust and urgency. Even well-informed people can be caught by a convincing lie. Good financial education helps someone recognise the danger, good regulation makes it harder for the criminal to exploit it, and the national evidence demands action. AUSTRAC estimated that almost 150,000 cryptocurrency ATM transactions take place each year, moving around $275 million. When AUSTRAC and law enforcement examined 90 of the most frequent users, 85 per cent were scam victims or money mules who'd been tricked or coerced into moving money. People aged 50 to 70 accounted for almost 72 per cent of transaction values through these machines. Think about what is at stake for someone approaching retirement. The loss of their savings can mean selling a home, delaying retirement or depending on family for help. The financial loss is terrible; the loss of confidence and independence can last even longer.
Cryptocurrency ATMs are only just part of the picture. In 2025, Australians made more than 481,000 scam reports across major reporting organisations. Reported losses reached $2.18 billion That is an extraordinary amount of money, and behind every dollar is a person, a family or a business dealing with the consequences. That brings me to the legislation before us. This Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026 gives the responsible minister, after seeking and considering AUSTRAC's advice, the power to restrict or prohibit high-risk mechanisms used to provide financial services. These powers can be exercised where the use of a mechanism has caused or is likely to cause significant harm to the community or financial system and intervention is necessary in the public interest. This means the government can respond where mechanisms such as crypto ATMs present unacceptable risks. Indeed, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security specifically recommended that restrictions or prohibitions on cryptocurrency ATMs be considered as a priority.
This legislation gives us the tools to respond to that risk. The bill also updates terrorism financing provisions and fixes practical issues in the anti-money-laundering framework. Importantly, this is not a blanket ban on cryptocurrency. Innovation does have a legitimate and important place in our financial system, and so do strong safeguards. The legislation provides for consultation, transparency and parliamentary scrutiny. The new high-risk mechanism powers are scheduled to commence on 1 July 2027 giving affected businesses time to prepare. We should want a financial system that embraces technology without giving criminals a free pass, and we should want financial capability to sit alongside these reforms, not to be treated as an afterthought. Give people the knowledge to make decisions, give regulators the tools to respond, and give criminals fewer options to exploit people. A scammer does not know how somebody votes. They do not care what their victim earns, where they live or how hard they've worked. They want the money; that's all. No party owns the responsibility to protect Australians from financial crime. It belongs to every one of us. This bill deserves the support of the Senate not because of who introduced it but because of the people who it seeks to protect. I want Australians to be financially capable, confident and secure. I want young people equipped before they make major decisions. I want older Australians to enjoy their savings and not lose them to criminals. Education is essential. Protection is essential. We cannot choose one and ignore the other. I commend this bill to the Senate.
Tyron Whitten WA, Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party
10:50 am
I foreshadow my second reading amendment. The issue with the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026 is the issue that we have had with so many Labor bills. It is not a bill to address a particular problem. All of the chatter around this bill talks about crypto ATMs being a menace to society, but the bill doesn't legislate against crypto ATMs. Instead, what it does is hand sweeping powers to the minister to designate anything that they believe may cause serious harm as a high risk mechanism and prohibit or restrict its use. That is where the issues with this bill lie. That is the pattern we see out of Labor. It is lazy politics, and it is potentially dangerous politics.
Any time that you see legislation with these sorts of broad powers, you shouldn't consider it from the perspective of what you would do with those powers. Of course you would use it wisely and judiciously. Instead, think about what those powers would look like in the hands of someone with malintent. Legislation isn't there just to regulate what the public can do. It is there to protect the public against government intervention in their lives. These powers can be invoked immediately and can only be disallowed during a parliamentary sitting. Imagine a minister banning a platform that you use vexatiously, locking up your investments or cutting you off from banking. If they did that on a Thursday next week, it could be overturned until February next year. And that's if you can make sure you have the numbers to disallow it in the first place.
Under this bill, the minister can ban what they like with no consultation for up to six months. Labor loves this sort of legislation. Businesses and Australians don't. How can we expect investment and growth in Australia when we continue to make laws that aren't rules? Who would want to play a game where the referee can change the rules at any point? This bill has the potential to sweep up perfectly legitimate businesses without the ability for parliament to properly scrutinise before it comes into effect. There are times during the year where parliament won't have the ability to overturn bad ministerial decisions for months. I know that Labor is critically short of real-world experience. They don't seem to understand that shutting down a business for months at a time is a death sentence.
There were some protections included in this bill for businesses and public. There is a mandatory consultation period of 30 days that must be undertaken. However, in typical Labor style, there is, of course, a shortcut. If they choose to skip the consultation process due to urgency, they can only keep their injunctions in for six months. Once again, that is long enough to crush businesses and make them think twice before they invest in Australia.
The worst part of this bill is that we have many recommendations and concerns by parliamentary committees ignored in the final bill. The scrutiny committee in particular had issues with the fact that the consultation period could be ignored. This isn't just One Nation saying this. Parliamentary committees are seeing the potential danger of having these powers vested in the hands of a minister with little in the way of safeguards. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security made six recommendations that it wanted to see before this bill was passed. There is no evidence that recommendation 4 was taken into account to provide additional clarity on the wording in the explanatory memorandum.
We don't want to see more powers in the hands of ministers that could have such major impacts on Australians lives. We want to make sure that all legislation is proportional and that safeguards are in place. Most of all, we need to have certainty in this country. We need to ensure that the people know the rules and can work within reasonable limits. This bill does not achieve that. It falls short of the expectation of Australians that the government lays out properly formulated and coherent rules for business. We will see more of this during this sitting. The government will push through more ministerial control and uncertainty. This needs to stop if we're going to see Australia and its economy get back on track. Now, don't be mistaken in thinking that what I've just said means we support scammers or criminals. We don't. But we expect the government of the day to govern appropriately.
Barbara Pocock SA, Australian Greens
10:54 am
I rise to speak to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026. We in the Greens don't oppose this bill, and I associate myself with the comments of my colleague Senator Shoebridge, who has canvassed a range of issues and concerns about the bill. I want to focus on two particular issues: one is the nature of the contract let by AUSTRAC in relation to this work, and the second is the process by which contracts are let by this government.
We don't oppose this bill, because we know we've got to keep dirty money out of housing, out of financial transactions. There's a lot of bad money floating around the world, doing great damage, undermining the integrity of financial systems and real estate transactions. It is vital that we have regulation to ensure that the damage is minimised and that organisations are held to account. Australia's financial data is supplied through AUSTRAC, as it should, to test for money laundering. We think that's a good idea. Our concern is with who is getting access to this data and the process of the contracts to let it.
We've heard Senator Shoebridge describe Palantir. It is notorious around the globe for its pro-fascist, open political agenda. It's a corporation, a company, a contractor, a consultant with a clear political agenda to influence politics in the worst right-wing ways we can possibly see. It's a contractor to the US government in its ICE raids on its citizens. My concern is with Palantir and the fact that we are, through this contract from AUSTRAC into Palantir, creating the potential for data harvesting by one of the most pernicious organisations in the world of contracting. Australia has entered into a large contract, and Palantir will have access to that data.
Palantir has its claws in our information—information about the financial transactions of Australian citizens—and we should be worried. We should be worried about that because this is a company that cannot be trusted. It's hard right in its politics, as I said. It cannot be trusted with this information, and the goal it has is always oriented to the interests of the US and particularly oriented to the right-wing, pro-fascist interests of the US and its politics. It's a corporation with a political agenda, and it should not have access to our information. Anyone who is holding or has access to Australian citizens' information in relation to financial transactions or other data should be a platform based in our country—an Australian supplier.
Palantir is engaged in a global culture war, and it has been completely open about its transactions, its political intentions and its active involvement in politics around the globe. We know that our transaction data are being fed into this company, and we're seeing an expansion of Palantir's scope through AUSTRAC's contracting. Public buy-in by a big, US, politically active company into this data is dangerous. It is wrong, and we should not be allowing this.
Most importantly, in any such process we need to have an open tender, at the very minimum. If you think about the amount of attention that this Senate and the current Labor government over the last term and this one have put into trying to improve the integrity of procurement and then if you look at the nature of this contract, you can see what a failed effort that procurement improvement has been. This is a contract let to this notorious right-wing agency at over $5 million without any tender. What sort of procurement process is that? There is no integrity, and there are real dangers. We need to make sure that we push for the open tender of any such contract, and we need to make sure, given the political objectives of Palantir—the open discussion of its political objectives—that Palantir has no role in any Australian contracts.
They are very strongly contracted into the US immigration enforcement system. They are agents for ICE and the military intelligence operations in both Gaza and Israel. They are a company that we should not be doing business with. They should be out of all of our agencies and government departments. And, in particular, we should be making sure that they have no role in the investment basket that is part of the Future Fund. Palantir currently have up to $165 million invested in them through our sovereign Future Fund. It is entirely wrong given the politics of this company and its failure to have proper probity over its investments.
It's time we got Palantir out of AUSTRAC, out of Australian data, it's time we have Australian platforms that actually securely manage our data and it's time we make sure that all contracts we give not only don't go to right-wing operatives like Palantir but are properly subjected to the procurement systems that keep our contracts and consultants honest—barely.
Murray Watt Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Minister for the Environment and Water
10:59 am
I thank honourable senators for their contributions to the debate on this bill. The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026 responds to the continuously changing financial crime environment, which facilitates serious crimes and harms to both Australia's financial system and the community. The bill will empower the minister responsible for the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 to restrict or prohibit high-risk mechanisms being exploited by criminal actors to move money. The bill will also make several technical amendments throughout the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 to ensure reporting entities have clarity when implementing their anti-money-laundering or counterterrorism financing obligations.
The reforms in this bill signify the Australian government's commitment to preventing the criminal abuse of our economy and the harm and suffering caused to the Australian community. The bill will introduce a new framework enabling the minister to restrict or prohibit a reporting entity from using a high-risk product, service, delivery channel or thing to provide a designated service. The power will support a flexible risk based response to emerging and evolving money-laundering and terrorism-financing risks, ensuring that Australia does not become a harbour for illicit financing. Restrictions or prohibitions will prevent harm being caused to the Australian community.
The bill also contains amendments to the definition of 'financing of terrorism' to reference new offences in the Criminal Code Act 1995. Further, amendments to the definition will allow new sanctions offences to be prescribed in the future, ensuring Australia unequivocally meets its commitments as a member of the Financial Action Task Force.
Following the passage of significant anti-money-laundering and counterterrorism financing reforms in 2024, the bill will make technical amendments to concepts introduced by those reforms. These amendments will clarify certain obligations introduced by the reforms, making compliance easier for Australian businesses that have anti-money-laundering and counterterrorism financing obligations.
I might just briefly address the points that have been made in the debate about Palantir. It is disappointing to see the Greens party are continuing to push mistruths about what is going on here. I understand that the Greens party has a political objective to cause fear in the Australian community about the involvement of Palantir and other external providers. But, as is often the case, the Greens' claims are untrue. AUSTRAC's use of Palantir technology is subject to contractual, privacy, security and data management requirements consistent with Australian government frameworks. These arrangements include access controls, monitoring, audit logging, security requirements and contractual obligations governing how information is handled, accessed and managed. AUSTRAC retains ownership and control of its information and determines how that information is accessed, used and managed. Palantir personnel do not have default access to AUSTRAC information. Any access is governed by contractual security and access control requirements and is limited to approved circumstances. No offshore access is permitted, and AUSTRAC retains ownership and authority over its information and controls access to information held within its environment. The services provided comply with the government's Protective Security Policy Framework and information security manual controls that apply to the protection of data. Any employees or Palantir employees who provide services are subject to strict Australian security clearance obligations.
In conclusion, these reforms will benefit the Australian community by hardening our response to criminal exploitation by ensuring the minister can restrict or prohibit high-risk mechanisms that enable illicit financing, money laundering and other financial crimes. These reforms will make an important contribution to protecting Australia from serious and organised crime.
Deborah O'Neill NSW, Australian Labor Party
The question is that the second reading amendment moved by Senator Shoebridge be agreed to.
Tyron Whitten WA, Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party
11:10 am
I move:
At the end of the motion, add ", but the Senate:
(a) notes:
(i) the broad prohibition powers in this bill around unspecified 'high-risk mechanisms' continues the trend by this Government to hand sweeping powers and discretions to ministers through regulation, rather than through primary legislation that is open to proper debate and scrutiny in Parliament,
(ii) the Government has provided crypto-ATM fraud and money-laundering as the reason that these ministerial powers are necessary, however, primary legislation should be targeted at the issue identified, rather than creating broad ministerial powers which cause regulatory uncertainty and that are open to abuse, and
(iv) as noted by the Scrutiny of Bills Committee, the bill requires a consultation period before making regulations, however, the regulations are not invalidated where the Minister has not consulted, allowing for the government of the day to create highly consequential regulations without adequate consultation; and
(b) calls on the Government to commit to preparing complete legislation to limit regulatory uncertainty and allow for proper parliamentary scrutiny and consultation, as opposed to relying on framework legislation that requires broader powers than necessary in the hands of the minister".
Deborah O'Neill NSW, Australian Labor Party
The question is that the amendment moved by Senator Whitten be agreed to.
A division having been called and the bells being rung—
Sean Bell NSW, Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party
I request there be a four-minute bell to give other people a chance to get to the chamber if they need to.
Deborah O'Neill NSW, Australian Labor Party
As there is no objection, we'll move to a four-minute bell.