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The Parliament has not yet published the final text for this day, so the wording, who said what and the results of divisions may change.
Senate debates Bills
Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill 2026; Second Reading
Michaelia Cash WA, Liberal Party, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate
6:31 pm
I rise to speak on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill 2026. There is no more fundamental responsibility of government than keeping Australians safe. Protecting Australians from terrorism is not optional. It is the first responsibility of government, and that is the standard against which the coalition judges this legislation.
The coalition will support this bill. We will also support the government's amendments implementing recommendations 5 and 6 of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. But our support for these important national security powers should not be mistaken for an endorsement of the Albanese government's broader national security record, because, sadly, when it comes to national security, Australians deserve a government that acts before a crisis, not one that is constantly playing catch-up.
This bill is another example of the government leaving critical national security legislation until it is dangerously close to its expiry. The bill extends essential counterterrorism powers, including control orders, preventive detention orders and continuing detention orders, for another three years until December 2029. These are powers established and strengthened by former coalition governments. Court orders and preventive detention orders were introduced by the Howard government in 2005, continuing detention orders followed under the coalition in 2016, and extended supervision orders were introduced by the coalition in 2021. The coalition created these powers because we understood that protecting Australians requires strong laws, strong intelligence capabilities and a willingness to act. We will not allow them to lapse.
Labor has known for years that these powers are due to expire on 7 December 2026. Why? Because Labor itself legislated this sunset date in 2023. Yet it waited until August of this year to introduce the legislation reviewing them. The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor completed a major review of the postsentence order regime in March 2023. When did Labor finally table its response? It did so in August 2026, more than three years later, on the very day it introduced this particular piece of legislation. So Labor had the review, Labor knew the deadline, and yet, as is typical for this government, Labor delayed. That is, quite frankly, not good enough when Australia's national security is at stake.
Australia's national terrorism threat remains 'probable'. ASIO has warned that our security environment is becoming increasingly complex and that Australians are being radicalised at an alarming pace. We have witnessed the horrific consequences of terrorism in our own country. The terrorist attack at Bondi, which claimed 15 innocent lives at a Jewish Hanukkah celebration, was a devastating reminder of the threats confronting Australia. Terrorism is not some distant danger. It is a threat to Australians, our communities and the great Australian way of life, and it demands a serious response. That includes how we manage convicted terrorist offenders approaching the end of their prison sentences, how we supervise dangerous individuals in the community, and whether or not police and our intelligence agencies indeed have the powers necessary to protect Australians. That is why this legislation matters.
I want now to return to the report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. The committee's unanimous October '26 report made 10 recommendations and recommended that the bill be passed. The report recognised the importance of maintaining effective counterterrorism laws subject to appropriate safeguards and oversight. But the report also identified areas requiring improvement. One significant concern was the timing of applications for post-sentence orders. The committee found that applications were too often commenced shortly before offenders were due for release despite opportunities to actually commence the process earlier. That creates unnecessary difficulties for courts, legal representatives and corrective services, and, when we are dealing with serious terrorism risks, that is simply unacceptable. The committee recommended that applications for continuing detention orders and control orders ordinarily commence as soon as practicable within the 12 months before an offender's sentence or existing post-sentence order expires. Now, these are not merely administrative matters; they go directly to the effectiveness and the operation of Australia's national security laws.
The bill also makes important changes to how convicted terrorist offenders are managed following their release from prison. Currently, extended supervision orders and control orders can impose substantially similar restrictions on offenders living in the community, but they operate under separate legal frameworks. The bill removes this duplication by making control orders the principal mechanism for community supervision. Control orders generally operate for up to 12 months, with further orders available where the terrorism risk continues and statutory requirements are met. Importantly, continuing detention orders remain available for the highest-risk offenders who cannot be managed safely in the community, and where a Supreme Court declines to make a continuing detention order, it may still impose an extended supervision order where the legal requirements are satisfied.
The bill also ensures that the full 12-month control order period can commence upon an offender's release from custody. It improves arrangements for handling sensitive terrorism related material, it provides police with warrant powers to assess whether certain offenders approaching release should be subjected to control orders and it strengthens information sharing so courts can consider relevant findings of guilt, even where no conviction was recorded. The objective is straightforward: ensuring police and courts have the information and powers necessary to manage serious terrorism risks.
One of the most disturbing developments confronting Australia is the increased radicalisation of young people. The PJCIS report recorded that, since 2020, the AFP and its joint counterterrorism team partners had commenced investigations and operational activity involving 65 individuals aged 17 or younger. The youngest was, alarmingly, just 12 years old—12 years old! That should concern every member of parliament and every member of the Australian community.
Young Australians are being exposed to violent extremist material through social media, gambling platforms and online communications, and radicalisation can occur at frightening speed. The bill responds by increasing the maximum duration of control orders for young people aged 14 to 17 from three months to 12 months. The PJCIS supported this change, recognising that disengagement and rehabilitation programs need sufficient time to operate. Courts will retain discretion to impose shorter orders, and the child's best interests will remain the primary consideration.
We cannot ignore the broader problem. A control order is at the back end of the problem. We should be doing everything that we can to prevent a 12-year-old from becoming radicalised in the first place. That requires effective intervention, intelligence cooperation and rehabilitation programs that actually work. The committee was clear that community safety must remain the primary objective. Protecting the Australian community must always come first.
The government is bringing forward amendments implementing recommendations 5 and 6 of the unanimous PJCIS report. Recommendation 5 concerns special advocates. These are lawyers appointed to protect a person's interests in national security proceedings where sensitive information cannot be disclosed to them. The amendment strengthens annual reporting on the number and availability of qualified special advocates. That will improve parliamentary scrutiny of whether the system has sufficient qualified lawyers to operate effectively. Recommendation 6 concerns the experts who assess the risk posed by terrorist offenders. These assessments inform critical decisions about whether offenders should remain detained or be subject to restrictions following release. The PJCIS found that the existing definition provided insufficient guidance about the required expertise. The amendment strengthens that definition, requiring experts to be appropriately qualified to assess both the risk of further terrorism offending and how that risk could be reduced. The coalition supports both amendments, and they are practical improvements arising directly from the PJCIS's recommendations.
The bill also expands Commonwealth criminal protections for United Nations personnel engaged in humanitarian assistance, emergency aid and peace building. These changes will enable Australia to ratify the operational protocol signed by the Howard government in 2006.
Although the coalition supports this legislation, serious questions remain about Labor's broader approach to national security. The handling of Australians linked to ISIS returning from Syria is but one example. In 2022, Labor deliberately repatriated four ISIS women and 13 children. Subsequently, the government adopted an approach under which members of the ISIS linked cohort could make their own arrangements to return to Australia. The coalition has consistently argued that the Commonwealth should exercise the strongest lawful control available over the timing and circumstances of returns by people linked to terrorism, and that was the principle behind our Criminal Code Amendment (Keeping Australia Safe) Bill 2026. Sadly—in fact, shockingly—the Labor government opposed it.
The recent release of convicted ISIS supporter Isaac El Matari has again highlighted difficult questions about managing serious terrorist offenders. Again, shockingly but not surprisingly, the Labor government did not seek a continuing detention order, citing the high legal threshold, and the AFP instead obtained an interim control order. This legislation preserves the continuing detention regime but does not lower that threshold. The existence of strong powers is one thing, but actually utilising those powers and ensuring those powers can be effectively used to protect Australians is another. These matters demand ongoing scrutiny.
The coalition supports this legislation because the national security powers it preserves are essential. We support the government's amendments implementing recommendations 5 and 6 of the PJCIS report, and we expect the government to act on the committee's broader recommendations, including better timing of applications, effective risk assessments and stronger oversight. Above all, this legislation must pass before the existing powers expire on 7 December this year. Australians cannot afford a gap in these critical national security powers. Labor knew the deadline, Labor had years to prepare and the parliament should never have been left considering legislation of this importance so close to the expiry dates.
The coalition's position is clear. We will support strong counterterrorism laws, we will support the police and intelligence agencies charged with keeping Australians safe and we will always insist that community safety remains the overriding objective. But the first responsibility of government is not to explain away threats. It is to protect Australians from them. The coalition created many of the powers before the Senate. We strengthened them as threats evolved, and we will continue to fight to ensure Australia's counterterrorism laws are strong enough to meet the threats we face. On the safety and security of Australians, the coalition will never compromise.
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