Malcolm Roberts (Queensland, Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party) | Hansard source

My remarks are directed to the minister but also to people listening at home to the Senate and to researchers and historians that will look back at this vote today in an attempt to understand what the hell the Senate was thinking. The amendment the government circulated, no doubt with the approval of the Liberal Party, answers that question. The Online Safety Amendment (Social Media Minimum Age) Bill 2024 can act to force every Australian to be the subject of a digital ID in the name of keeping children safe—and that's what my question is about.

The government accepted widespread public concern that the bill was designed to force everyone to get a digital ID and promised to include an amendment to specifically rule that out. In this government amendment that you've moved, SY115, new provision 63DB(1) excludes use of government issued identification or use of digital ID. That is great, except 63DB(2) provides that, if social media platforms can come up with an alternative means of assessing age that does not involve digital ID or government documents, they can—wait for it—accept a digital ID identification. In effect, this amendment specifies that a social media platform cannot use digital ID by itself but it can use digital ID as part of a more comprehensive verification. There's no need to guess what that could be; this bill contains the answer: age-assurance software. The company which has been awarded the tender for the age-assurance trial is a British company called Age Check Certification Scheme. whose main business is provision of digital IDs backed by age-assurance software.

TikTok has used age-assurance software to remove one million underage accounts from TikTok in Australia. This software can tell if a person is, for instance, under 12. That's useful. The smaller the gap between the user and target age—16 in this case—the less accurate it is. This software can't tell age within six months, and there's no way of knowing a person turned 16 on the day of their application. You just can't tell that from face scan. Accessing social media on your 16th birthday and, most likely, for months afterwards will require a second identifier containing the child's facial scan and their date of birth, which is a digital ID, which this company specialises in. You're setting them up.

I have criticised this bill as an opportunistic attempt to capitalise on the public desire for better regulation of social media to force all Australians to get a digital ID. I'll say that again. I have criticised this bill repeatedly, as have others, as an opportunistic attempt to capitalise on the public desire for better regulation of social media to force all Australians to get a digital ID. This amendment requires a change in my language, which is now that this bill is an opportunistic attempt to require every child, once they turn 16, to get a digital ID if they want to access social media. What age does the government's digital ID start from? Sixteen. What a coincidence! This wasn't the intention all along? That's misinformation.

This amendment exposes the original intention of the bell. Your amendment exposes the original intention of the bill, which was hidden in what looked like a poorly drafted bill. It wasn't poorly drafted; it was deliberately dishonest, and the short committee referral, which the government fought against, has exposed the deceit. The truth is now out there, and the decision before the Senate is a simple one. A vote for this bill is a vote to require every child to get a digital ID on their 16th birthday.

Compulsory digital IDs aside, there are many other reasons not to pass this bill. I will now share with the Senate and with posterity the words of Australian Human Rights Commission on the bill. One Nation fully supports the commission's position, which deserves to be included in the Hansard record of the debate:

Social media is a vital platform for young people to share their ideas and opinions, engage in dialogue, and participate in social and cultural activities. It can be a valuable educational tool by providing access to diverse perspectives, news and learning opportunities, as well as vital information about health, well-being and safety. A blanket ban risks unjustly curtailing these freedoms.

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Social media is integral to modern communication and socialisation. Excluding young people from these platforms may isolate them from their peers and limit their ability to ability to access much-needed information and support. This is particularly important for young people from marginalised, vulnerable or remote communities.

These are the words of the Human Rights Commission.

The social media ban will rely on effective age assurance processes being adopted, which means that all Australians may be required to prove their identity in order to access social media. This may potentially require all Australians to provide social media companies with sensitive identity information, which poses a risk to our privacy rights in light of recent examples of data breaches and personal information being stolen.

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Technological workarounds—such as VPNs and false age declarations—may undermine the effectiveness of the ban. Additionally, a ban will not address the root causes of online risks or make the platforms safer for everyone.

The workarounds to this measure have not received enough debate. The bill carves out gaming sites, many of which have a chat feature. Children will move over to chatrooms and gaming sites which are not supervised. Tor—or, more accurately, onion routing—will provide another avenue for communication which is designed to make supervision exponentially harder than on mainstream social media platforms. I have advice from a leading internet security company that peer-to-peer social media, which again is harder for parents to supervise than current social media platforms, is making a comeback. As a result of this legislation, children will be exposed to more harm, not less. I had a call from a constituent—