I rise today to speak in support of the Defence Legislation Amendment (Accelerating Capability and Protecting Bases) Bill 2026. We know that Australia's defence capability must be delivered differently to meet the demands of a more dangerous and unpredictable era where the consequences of delay, costs, and capability underperformance are more serious than they have been in generations. Legacy capability systems, optimised for deliberation and risk minimisation, are not well suited to an environment that demands speed, integration and disciplined execution.

In reflection of this changing need, on 1 December 2025 the government announced significant reform to capability development and delivery, including the establishment of the Defence Delivery Agency from 1 July 2027, with an interim step of the formation of the Defence Delivery Group within Defence from 1 July this year; the establishment of a national armaments director to lead the new agency, responsible for providing advice to ministers on the delivery of acquisition and sustainment projects following government approval; and the centralisation of capability development and contestability functions under the Vice Chief of the Defence Force to support clearer prioritisation, streamlined decision-making and accountability.

This announcement followed the 2023 Defence strategic review and the 2024 National defence strategy, and it was reinforced by the 2026 National defence strategy. This found that defence acquisition and sustainment arrangements were not fit for the scale, complexity or urgency of Australia's strategic circumstances.

The key pillars of the 2026 National defence strategy are clear, urgent and unavoidable. First and foremost is increasing Australia's self-reliance over the longer term. Now, self-reliance doesn't mean fighting or facing threats alone; it means having the homegrown industrial strength to sustain the fight. So inextricably linked to this is another critical pillar from the 2026 National defence strategy, which is to grow Australia's sovereign defence industrial base by shoring up our sovereign supply chain and an appropriately skilled and qualified workforce. Other features of the 2026 National defence strategy include strengthening our bilateral and multilateral security partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

The government has also directed the ADF to maintain the capacity to defend Australia and our immediate region; to deter, through denial, any potential adversary's attempt to project power against Australia through our northern approaches; to protect Australia's economic connection to our region and the world; to contribute with our partners to the collective security of the Indo-Pacific; and to contribute with our partners to protecting and upholding global rules and norms. So what is required to focus on that is speed to capability. Speed to capability has two parts.

The first element of speed to capability is minimum viable capability. This phrase is sometimes misunderstood because of the word 'minimum'. In this context, minimum viable capability does not mean the bare minimum in terms of operational functionality. It does not mean procuring substandard or barely passable capability for our defence force. It doesn't mean that at all. Minimum viable capability means fit for mission, a capability that achieves a threshold capability effect inclusive of all fundamental inputs of that capability in the required time. Minimum viable capability delivers what Defence needs to achieve a military effect. It can be further developed, scaled and built up, and it includes materiel and sustainment elements so that the management, support and maintenance of the relevant military equipment and platforms can be achieved. In short, it's procuring something that can do the job well by the point in time it is needed.

The second element of speed to capability is minimum viable processes. Again, this does not mean poor or ill considered processes; it means the implementation of targeted and efficient processes that are smooth and that facilitate the delivery of the capability and its ongoing sustainment. Minimum viable processes can ensure that the capability is safe to operate, that it's fit for mission and that our Defence Force personnel have trust and confidence in it no matter the domain. It also ensures that risks and issues associated with that capability are always managed at the appropriate level within the organisation.

The reforms outlined in this bill have at their heart a focus on speed to capability. The development, testing and introduction of new capability just has to take place at a greater pace than ever before. A new capability has to operate in a meaningful and effective way with Australian industry and with our international partners. A framework to facilitate this requires careful thinking. In this respect, the bill establishes new legislative foundations that will enable Defence to develop and secure that capability at pace. It's a key enabler to the full implementation of the National Defence Strategy and the delivery of pillars I and II of the AUKUS trilateral security agreement and partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom.

A central objective of the bill in this respect is to replace fragmented and inconsistent legislative arrangements with clear statutory frameworks supported by defined safeguards, oversight and accountability mechanisms. The reforms improve transparency, consistency, accountability and certainty by establishing these transparent statutory decision-making processes that identify what activities can be carried out, the circumstances in which they may occur, the conditions that apply and the oversight mechanisms. The reforms reduce reliance on complex multijurisdictional exemptions, implied authorities and administrative arrangements that might otherwise be required to support defence activities. They're focused on defence activities, and they provide the legislative support to facilitate them. What does that look like?

Schedule 1 of the bill will create a defence capability framework, a fit-for-purpose capability development and testing framework including for activities conducted with industry and international partners. It is going to streamline the current patchwork of federal, state and territory legislation, which was not necessarily designed with defence purposes in mind and especially that need for speed to capability. Importantly, the framework will operate to remove legal and regulatory hurdles that adversely impact on that speed of capability development. The era of multiple exemptions, licences and approvals from different state and territory authorities for a single activity will come to an end under this framework and with it the corresponding delays, inconsistencies and uncertainties.

Australians expect a properly equipped defence force that uses the best available equipment that is fit for mission. It cannot be that the ADF and its defence industry partners are unable, or limited in their ability, to develop and test advanced capability here in Australia, because this limit would also have the effect of limiting or overly complicating the commercialisation of technology here in Australia, which does nothing to promote our competitiveness or provide incentives for industry to invest.

Importantly, the framework is also critical to enabling the delivery of AUKUS Pillar II signature projects—those being the development of cutting-edge payloads and enabling systems for uncrewed undersea vehicles—with delivery starting in 2027. These uncrewed undersea vehicles will support a range of missions, including to protect critical national seabed infrastructure; deploy cutting-edge surveillance, reconnaissance and strike capabilities; conduct logistics operations; and bolster superiority in antisubmarine and antisurface warfare, mine countermeasures, electronic warfare and contested littoral manoeuvre. All of this further enhances the asymmetric capability of Australia and its partners.

Pillar II often gets lost in the excitement of Pillar I, but Pillar II, with its focus on advanced capabilities and emerging technologies, offers a critical opportunity for Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States to pool resources, accelerate innovation, share technology and compete effectively with potential adversaries in areas such as cyber, autonomous capability and artificial intelligence. We've already seen what can go right in this respect, with the relaxation of export controls to enable smoother and faster collaboration and joint collaboration in a licence-free environment. Pillar II offers potentially more transformative impacts for the Australian defence industry and capability because, if it goes right, Australia will be in a position to develop world-leading defence capabilities, including autonomous capability, through growing its defence industrial base, encouraging innovation and then integrating this industrial base with that of its partners. Pillar II could transform the strategic balance in not only the Indo-Pacific but the broader Asian region, because it will illustrate that the world's leading liberal democracies, of which Australia is one, can innovate together to facilitate speed to capability, to deter aggression and to shape the future of warfare by detecting, deterring and responding to threats to critical infrastructure like undersea cables and pipelines.

With respect to Defence bases, the bill also establishes a modern Defence Security Zone Framework that consolidates and replaces a number of fragmented security regimes across defence legislation. The framework applies a consistent approach to security measures across Defence, ADF and relevant foreign partner assets, and it supports tailored security arrangements for Defence facilities, activities, infrastructure and capability. It also provides contemporary powers to address threats posed by drones and other uncrewed systems, including powers to detect, monitor, track, seize, recover, interfere with and, where necessary, neutralise uncrewed systems that present a security threat to Defence personnel, assets or sites.

The work that the men and women who are on our Australian Defence Force bases are doing is truly excellent, and it's non-negotiable that these bases, which house our personnel but also our assets and other Defence infrastructure, should be properly protected. This is urgent because the development of adverse drone and other uncrewed technology is happening rapidly, and our protection of Defence bases cannot lag behind this any more than it already does. Defence needs enduring legislative authority that allows personnel to protect Defence sites, Defence personnel and critical assets from drones and other uncrewed systems. This bill builds on the interim measures the Albanese government has already implemented through the Defence Amendment (Counter-UXS Measures) Regulations 2025.

The reforms in this bill move us further forward by modernising security arrangements currently spread across multiple Defence statutes and consolidating them into a single Defence Security Zone Framework. This provides a contemporary and consistent framework that enables Defence security zones to be established in order to protect locations, assets, personnel and capabilities, as well as foreign partner assets.

The reforms also support increasingly important security requirements associated with AUKUS activities, visiting US and UK nuclear powered submarines and major Defence industrial precincts. To be clear, the reforms do permit the detection, identification, monitoring, tracking and response to drones and uncrewed systems, including through destructive means if necessary, at defence bases that may be at risk, but this is entirely appropriate, and there are safeguards which provide that the action must be proportionate to the risk. The reforms in this bill will enable Defence to act before an authorised system compromises sensitive information, disrupts an activity or causes harm. Defence must work with other agencies including the Civil Aviation Safety Authority to ensure the safety of civilian aircraft when conducting these activities at shared facilities.

Australia's strategic environment is changing rapidly. It's characterised by increasing strategic competition, accelerating technological change, growing reliance on sovereign defence industry and deeper cooperation with allies and partners. The reforms in this bill are not only critical enablers of the National defence strategy and AUKUS. They support Australia's national security by facilitating speed to capability and giving authority to our defence personnel under rightly controlled circumstances to protect that capability and the defence bases on which they live and work in the interests of our country. I commend the bill to the chamber.

Australia's national security depends on our ability to respond to an increasingly complex and uncertain world, and ensuring our Defence Force has the capabilities, resources and protections it needs to keep Australians safe is one of the most important responsibilities of any government. But protecting Australia today requires more than maintaining the Defence Force we have always known. It requires us to prepare for the challenges of tomorrow and recognise that the nature of modern warfare is changing faster than ever before.

Across the world we're seeing new technologies fundamentally changing how military operations are conducted. Drones, autonomous vehicles, artificial intelligence and cyber capabilities are no longer technologies of the future. They're being used in conflicts the world over. As these technologies continue to evolve, Australia must ensure our Defence Force is equipped to respond, because we cannot expect our Defence Force to meet the challenges tomorrow while operating under legislation designed for the past. That is why the reforms before the House are so important. They will ensure Defence has the legislative foundations it needs to develop new capabilities, work more closely with Australian industry and protect our national security.

The Albanese Labor government understands that Australia is facing one of the most challenging strategic environments in generations. We're seeing increasing strategic competition across our region, rapid technological change and emerging threats to our critical infrastructure. Through the 2026 National defence strategy, our government is taking the steps necessary to strengthen Australia's defence capabilities and prepare for the challenges ahead. But delivering these capabilities requires more than investment alone. It requires legislation that supports innovation, rather than creating unnecessary barriers.

Right now, Defence can face a complicated combination of Commonwealth, state and territory laws when developing and testing new technologies. Many of these laws were never designed with modern defence capabilities in mind, and in some cases Defence must obtain multiple licences, exemptions and approvals simply to undertake a single testing activity. Different requirements can apply depending on where an activity takes place. This creates delays, additional costs and unnecessary uncertainty. At a time when defence technology is advancing so rapidly, those delays matter, because every unnecessary barrier can mean more time before an important capability reaches the people who need it, and every delay can mean a missed opportunity for Australian businesses developing the next generation of defence technology.

That is why this bill establishes a new defence capability framework that will provide a clearer and more consistent process for Defence to develop, test and evaluate new capabilities here, in Australia. It will support emerging technologies including autonomous systems, guided weapons, cyber capabilities and electronic warfare. Importantly, it will make it easier for Defence to work alongside Australian businesses and our trusted international partners. Take, for example, an Australian company developing an autonomous maritime vessel, which is a technology that could play an important role in surveillance, reconnaissance or protecting the water around our island home. Under existing arrangements, Defence and that company may need to navigate multiple layers of regulation before the vessel can even be tested, and these requirements can delay development, increase costs and make it harder for Australian innovations to become practical defence capabilities.

The new framework will help address these challenges by providing a clearer pathway for appropriate testing and development activities. This matters not just for Defence but for Australian industry because, when we make it easier to develop and test advanced technologies in Australia, we're creating opportunities for Australian workers and businesses. We're supporting researchers, engineers, manufacturers and the next generation of skilled workers, and we're strengthening Australia's sovereign industrial capability so that we're better equipped to develop and maintain the technologies our Defence Force relies on. This is particularly important when we consider the opportunities presented by AUKUS.

Our partnership with the United States and the United Kingdom represents a generational opportunity to strengthen Australia's national security. While much of the public discussion focuses on nuclear powered submarines, AUKUS extends well beyond submarine construction. Through pillar II, Australia is working with our closest partners to accelerate the development of advanced military technologies, including autonomous underwater vehicles, artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities and other emerging systems. But to take full advantage of these opportunities, Australia needs the ability to develop, test and integrate these technologies efficiently. We cannot afford to have Australian innovation held back by outdated regulatory arrangements, and we certainly don't want to see opportunities for Australian businesses move offshore simply because our legislation hasn't kept pace. These reforms will help ensure Australia remains an active participant in the development of the next generation of defence capabilities, and, importantly, they'll help ensure the economic benefits of these investments are realised here at home.

For my home state of South Australia, these reforms are particularly significant. South Australia is already playing a central role in Australia's defence future. From our naval ship building industry to the growth of advanced manufacturing and defence technology, South Australia is helping build the capabilities Australia will rely on for decades to come. While much of this investment is concentrated around major Defence precincts, the opportunities extend well beyond them. Across the northern suburbs of Adelaide, including communities in my electorate of Spence, defence investment has the potential to support local manufacturers and create highly skilled employment opportunities—opportunities for young Australians looking to enter the workforce, apprentices learning a trade or a small business looking to become part of Australia's defence supply chains. Because strengthening our national security and supporting Australian jobs are not competing priorities; they go hand in hand.

By strengthening Australia's ability to develop and manufacture advanced defence technologies, we are building a stronger economy and a more secure nation. But developing new capabilities is only one part of the challenge. We must also ensure that the people, facilities and infrastructure supporting those capabilities are properly protected. Increasingly, one of the most significant threats facing defence installations around the world comes from drones and other uncrewed systems. These technologies have become more affordable, more accessible and more sophisticated. While they have many legitimate recreational and commercial uses, they can also be used for surveillance, espionage and sabotage.

We've seen in conflicts around the world how relatively inexpensive drones can pose serious threats to sophisticated military equipment and critical infrastructure. As these technologies become more widely available, our Defence Force must have the tools necessary to respond. A drone operating near a sensitive Defence facility could potentially gather intelligence, disrupt operations or threaten personnel and equipment. Yet the legislation governing Defence's ability to respond to these threats has not always kept pace. That's why this bill establishes a modern defence security zone framework.

This framework will bring together and modernise existing security arrangements, providing Defence with clear authority to protect its personnel, facilities and sensitive activities. It will allow appropriate security measures to be applied to Defence bases, important industrial facilities and other locations where sensitive defence activities are being undertaken. Importantly, it will provide authorised Defence personnel with the ability to detect, monitor, track and, where necessary, neutralise drones and other uncrewed systems that pose a genuine security threat. Because Defence should not have to wait until sensitive information has been compromised or personnel have been placed at risk before responding to an emerging threat.

The framework also recognises that defence activities don't always take place within the boundaries of permanent military bases. There may be circumstances where sensitive equipment is being transported, where an Australian company is undertaking important capability trials or where an emergency requires temporary security arrangements. The ability to establish permanent, temporary or mobile and emergency defence security zones will allow security measures to be tailored to these different circumstances. This is particularly important as Australia continues to deepen its defence cooperation with the United States and the United Kingdom through AUKUS. As our partnerships expand, so too does the importance of protecting visiting military assets, sensitive technologies and major defence industrial precincts. We have a responsibility to ensure these activities can be undertaken safely and securely and that Australia remains a trusted and capable partner.

While these reforms provide Defence with important new authorities, they also recognise that those powers must be accompanied by appropriate safeguards. Strengthening national security should never mean abandoning accountability, and providing Defence with the powers necessary to respond to modern threats does not mean those powers should be unlimited. The defence capability framework does not provide a general authority for Defence to undertake any activity it chooses. Activities must fall within the legislative framework and be specifically authorised. It cannot be used to authorise domestic policing functions, compulsory acquisition of land or the use or threat of force against people in Australia. When authorising capability activities, decision-makers must consider whether the impact on people in Australia is reasonable and proportionate. They must also consider whether those undertaking the activities are suitable and whether appropriate safeguards are in place. These are important protections that ensure the development of new defence capabilities is accompanied by clear responsibilities.

The same principle applies to the defence security zone framework. Security zones must be geographically limited and no more extensive than necessary to achieve their intended purpose. There are also requirements for consultation with people who may be affected and time limits on temporary and emergency arrangements. Importantly, the legislation recognises the need for Defence to work with other agencies, including the Civil Aviation Safety Authority, to ensure that security activities don't unnecessarily compromise civilian aviation safety.

The bill also strengthens independent oversight through expanded functions for the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force, alongside parliamentary scrutiny through the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence, because Australians should have confidence not only in the capabilities of the Defence Force but also in the systems of accountability that govern its activities.

These reforms have not been developed in isolation. They follow a consultation across government, including with 19 Commonwealth departments and agencies, as well as a public consultation process undertaken by Defence in 2023. That consultation has helped inform legislation intended to balance the operational needs of Defence with the rights, interests and safety of the Australian community.

Ultimately, these reforms reflect a simple but important principle. If Australia is serious about strengthening our national security, we must ensure our legislative framework is capable of supporting the defence force we need for the future. We cannot expect our military personnel to operate with tomorrow's technology while navigating yesterday's laws, and we cannot expect Australian defence industry to compete internationally if unnecessary regulatory barriers prevent innovation from progressing here at home.

The Albanese Labor government is committed to building a defence force that is capable, adaptable and prepared for the challenges ahead; a defence force supported by advanced technologies, strong international partnerships and a growing sovereign industrial base; but also a defence force operating within a clear legislative framework, with appropriate safeguards and strong independent oversight. These reforms are an important part of delivering that commitment. They will help accelerate the development of new capabilities, strengthen the protection of Defence personnel and infrastructure. and create greater opportunities for Australian industry. As Australia's strategic environment continues to evolve, they will help ensure that our Defence Force has the authorities it needs to respond effectively, because, ultimately, our responsibility is not simply to respond to the security challenges Australia faces today; it's to ensure our nation is prepared for the challenges we may face in the decades to come. That means making the investments, building the partnerships and delivering the legislative reforms necessary to keep Australia safe. That is what these reforms seek to achieve, and that is why I commend them to the House.

I rise to support the Defence Legislation Amendment (Accelerating Capability and Protecting Bases) Bill 2026. The bill should be understood as part of something much larger. It is yet another positive step in the transformation of Australia's defence posture that has been underway since the Albanese Labor government took office.

We are spending more on defence, but the challenge before Australia is not simply to spend more on defence. It is to identify the capabilities our nation needs, acquire them faster, build and sustain more of them here at home, reduce sovereign risk, firm up supply chains, work effectively with our allies and trusted partners, and protect those capabilities, the people behind them and, importantly, the places from which they operate. That takes investment, and this government is providing it at a level unprecedented in living memory. But it also takes strategy, industry, skills, partnerships, accountability and, saliently, laws that are fit for the strategic environment in which the Australian Defence Force now operates.

The bill establishes a new defence capability framework to support capability development, testing, evaluation and preparedness, alongside a defence security zone framework to better protect defence personnel, the facilities, the information, the activities and the capabilities. Importantly, the bill also provides for independent oversight by the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force.

I've spoken in this House before about Australia facing the most challenging strategic circumstances since the Second World War. In fact, there are more conflicts right now than there ever have been since the Second World War. This is not a slogan. It is the starting point for serious defence policy—policy based on our own needs and interests and the development of a sovereign capability.

Since 2022, the Albanese government has been systematically answering some fundamental questions: What kind of Defence Force does Australia need? What capabilities must it possess? How rapidly must we acquire them? What must Australia do to build and sustain ourselves? And how do we make our Defence Force, our economy, our infrastructure and our communities more resilient? There is a clear chronology to what then followed.

In 2022, one of the first actions of the Albanese Labor government was to commission the Defence Strategic Review, led independently by former defence minister and former foreign minister Professor Stephen Smith and former Chief of the Defence Force, Sir Angus Houston. I know both of these men, and I know the seriousness and the expertise they bring to their work. That review was commissioned within the government's first 100 days. We did not begin with an arbitrary spending figure. We began by examining Australia's strategic circumstances, determining the force structure needed to respond to them, and then identifying the capabilities required to make that force credible.

The Defence Strategic Review was released in April 2023. It identified six priorities for immediate action: nuclear powered submarines, through AUKUS; longer range strike and Australian munitions manufacturing; strengthening our northern bases; growing and retaining the defence workforce; translating disruptive technologies into military capability more rapidly; and deepening Australia's diplomatic and defence relationships across the Indo-Pacific. As I've said previously in this House, thanks indeed to the extraordinary leadership of ministers Marles, Conroy, Keogh, Kahlil and Thistlethwaite, a great deal has followed on from that strategic review process.

In March 2023, Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom announced the AUKUS optimal pathway. That pathway provides for increasing submarine visits; the Submarine Rotational Force-West, from as early as next year; Australia's acquisition of Virginia class submarines, from the early 2030s; and, ultimately, the construction of SSN-AUKUS. For Western Australia, this is very real. HMAS Stirling will sit at the centre of the Submarine Rotational Force-West, with a planned rotational presence from as early as next year of one UK and up to four US conventionally armed and nuclear powered submarines. That means infrastructure, engineers, apprentices, nuclear stewardship, security, maintenance, sustainment and Australian supply chains. It means the development of sovereign Australian capability.

In April 2024, the government delivered Australia's first national defence strategy, establishing a strategy of denial as the cornerstone of defence planning and directing the ADF towards becoming an integrated, focused force. Modern deterrence requires integration across maritime, land, air space and cyber domains. It requires intelligence, resilient infrastructure and supply chains, advanced technology and a strong Australian industrial base, and that requires investment. The 2024 National Defence Strategy provided an additional $5.7 billion over four years and $50.3 billion over the decade above the previous Defence funding trajectory. The Australian Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance Plan committed $16 billion to $21 billion across the decade, including Australian manufacture of the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System missiles and maintenance of the Naval Strike and Joint Strike missiles. Buying capability is one thing; being able to replenish it, repair it, modify it and sustain it in a crisis is another.

That same year, Labor also introduced legislation for a dedicated Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence modelled in significant respects to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, on which I serve, and able to deal with the classified information. A statutory Defence committee had been a bipartisan recommendation actually over several parliamentary reports. When we build capability, we also have to build proper parliamentary oversight. The coalition, unfortunately though, played politics and failed to support the bill at that time and delayed the establishment of the committee.

In 2025, much of this planning became increasingly tangible. In January, the government committed another $262 million to develop Australia's AUKUS submarine supply chain, supporting around 125 Australian businesses with the skills, security, accreditation, manufacturing, equipment and qualifications for international submarine supply chains. Then, in September, the Prime Minister announced $12 billion in new funding for the Henderson defence precinct in Western Australia. By then the additional Defence investment over the decade had reached $70 billion.

Henderson will support continuous naval ship building, AUKUS, surface-vessel sustainment and future submarine support, with the government projecting more than 10,000 local jobs. On any visit there, you will see the place and how it's transforming. The energy, the absolute dedication and focus across all tiers of government—local, state and federal—is actually an extraordinary example of how we can work fast and collaboratively where it's needed on such a priority project.

The Prime Minister spoke of investment in both our capability and our relationships. That is an important distinction. Sovereign capability does not mean strategic isolation. Australian capability becomes stronger when Australian industry and workers are connected to the technology, the expertise and the scale of trusted partners. We are also seeing emerging technology move from theory to practice. During Exercise Talisman Sabre in July 2025, AUKUS partners deployed autonomous and remotely operated underwater vehicles and advanced algorithms aboard an Australian P-8 maritime patrol aircraft. Later that year, more than 200 defence personnel, scientists and industry participants tested around 30 next-generation capabilities through Maritime Big Play.

In December, the government announced major reform of capability acquisition and sustainment, including the creation of a dedicated Defence Delivery Agency and Australia's first National Armaments Director. Labor also reinforced the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence legislation in October 2025, and it finally passed both houses on 4 March this year. So today Australia has a statutory Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence with legislative scrutiny and parliamentary oversight, and that matters. The larger Defence becomes, the more sophisticated its capabilities become and the more tax money we obviously invest, so a stronger case is made for rigorous parliamentary oversight. Supporting Defence and scrutinising Defence are not competing objectives. Strong accountability makes Defence stronger.

Then we come to this year. The government has again increased the scale and pace of reform. The 2026 National defence strategy and Integrated Investment Program bring the combined additional investment to $117 billion over the decade to 2035-36. The 2026 strategy places greater emphasis on self-reliance, sovereign industrial resilience, international industrial partnerships, national civil preparedness and resilience. Under the NATO methodology, Defence spending is projected to reach three per cent of GDP by 2033. That is why the acquisition reforms matter.

The Defence Delivery Group commenced on 1 July 2026, with reforms intended to provide clearer accountability, stronger contestability and better cost estimation and assurance as Defence transitions towards the Defence Delivery Agency. The government's Rebuilding defence capability report says that with increased investment comes a clear responsibility to ensure Defence has the structures, the skills and the systems necessary to turn that strategy into real capability for the ADF. That task, of course, is made more urgent by the speed of technological change. Artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, quantum technology, hypersonics, long-range strike, undersea warfare and directed energy systems are developing extraordinarily quickly.

That brings us directly back to the bill. Modern military capability is increasingly developed with Australian companies, scientists, universities, researchers, engineers, startups, major primes and international partners. The new Defence Capability Framework provides a statutory foundation for developing, testing, evaluating and sustaining that capability. But speed must not come at the expense of safeguards, so the framework does not authorise military operations, intelligence collection or law enforcement activity, nor does it create a general exemption from Australian law or remove environmental heritage or native title protections.

The Defence Security Zone Framework addresses the other half of the equation: protecting what we build. Existing Defence security laws were written in years past, and Defence has identified gaps and inconsistencies, including in responding to contemporary threats such as drone incursions. It makes little sense to spend billions developing sophisticated military capabilities while leaving the people, the places and the technology supporting them vulnerable because our laws have not kept pace. The bill addresses that gap.

I just want to return to WA, because for Western Australia sovereign capability is already becoming real. Henderson and HMAS Stirling, as I said, are central to the story, but so are Western Australian businesses. I've spoken previously in this House about Hofmann Engineering in Ashfield and Bayswater, in my electorate of Hasluck, becoming the first qualified Australian company to receive a request for a quote to supply parts into the United States submarine supply chain. The Hofmann story demonstrates what sovereign capability can mean. A business that began as a backyard operation developed into an internationally connected Australian engineering company—Australian engineering, Australian workers and Australian skills connected into one of the most sophisticated defence industrial networks in the world. That is what AUKUS can look like in an Australian suburb, and that is why defence industry policy is a national security policy. Our security depends not just on what Australia can buy but on what we can build, what we can repair and what we can sustain and replenish.

Amid all of these strategies, investment programs, submarines, missiles and technologies, we should never lose sight of one thing: Defence is ultimately about people. Before coming to this place, I served in the signals reserves, and that experience gave me an enduring appreciation of the responsibilities that come with service and of the people who put on our nation's uniform. Since coming to parliament, I have continued to maintain that connection, including through Exercise Pitch Black, the ADF exchange programs and hosting officers from the ADF through the ADF parliamentary internship program. I'm also engaged through the ANU national security program, and I encourage every MP and senator in this place to participate in the same.

So this bill matters. Capability matters because we may ask our Australian service men and women to use it. I will conclude by saying that we are working now to develop that capability faster and to protect the capability better. I commend the bill to the House.

At the outset, I want to say I support this legislation. The Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission Bill 2026 and related bills are about protecting our defence bases, our personnel, our critical assets, as well as accelerating development of the capability that Defence needs to keep Australians safe. Why is it important for my electorate? Because my electorate is home to the biggest operational air base in the country, RAAF Base Amberley, which hosts a number of strategic fleets there such as the Super Hornets, the Growlers, the Globemasters et cetera.

Nearly one in 10 of the jobs in the city of Ipswich are created directly or indirectly by the presence of RAAF base Amberley. Of course, there are very strong defence related industry partners in the area, from Boeing to Rheinmetall to Saab to so many others in the Ipswich area. The contribution of RAAF Bass Amberley to the Ipswich economy is nearly $1.4 billion annually, so it's crucial. The expansion of the base since it was first created in June 1940 has been absolutely astonishing. Over the last two decades, we've seen a massive growth in the military base. It was crucial during World War II as it served the Australian and the United States militaries, and in operations in Papua New Guinea as well.

RAAF base Amberley is crucial, and this legislation is very important for my home city of Ipswich as well. It establishes a modern legislative framework. As a recovering lawyer, if I can put it like this, I'm always happy to see legislative frameworks in place to buttress rather than relying on regulations. I'm someone who truly believes that if the likes of Barton and Deakin and Parkes and Clarke et cetera were around here today, they would say that they had done a pretty good job on the Australian Constitution, but they could have mentioned local government and perhaps they might have given the federal government a few more powers. The relationship between local, state and federal governments in this country obviously bedevil, at times, the operation of military assets, so making sure we have a legislative framework in place is crucial. I know that the assistant minister did a regulation in relation to these matters, but making sure we've got a proper legislative framework is absolutely important.

The legislation is also important because we have bipartisan commitment to AUKUS pillars 1 and II. It provides that authority for countermeasures against drone technology. Drones aren't just about assistance in getting photographs at events to put on social media. They can be invasions of privacy and they can be threats to military capability. The ability of our military to detect, to monitor, to track, to take necessary action against drones is absolutely vital, not just in offensive operations but also in defensive operations and in the operations of our military technology. Countermeasures will be done safely and appropriate safeguards put in place here.

There are additional oversight powers in this legislation for the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force. The legislation ensures there's a self-reliance and support for the defence industry as well. It fulfils our mission. I think it's got important capabilities. This is a very important piece of legislation.

I know we're in the Federation Chamber, but let me tell you it's important that we have the legislative authority to do what we need to do. This legislation allows us to operate effectively with industry and international partners. We know that legislative frameworks change. I mean, we've seen the laws in this country evolve over years. The Commonwealth has greater powers. Sometimes that's been through cooperative federalism, sometimes that's been through constitutional change, sometimes that's been through High Court decisions, but it's important that the Commonwealth has those powers in relation to defence capability to make sure that our defence security arrangements are strengthened and that we have parliamentary oversight. The previous speaker, the member for Hasluck, spoke about the Joint Standing Committee on Defence. That is also great initiative of this Labor government. These establish the foundations, of course, and implement our National Defence Strategy, including making sure that we have capacity to interrelate with and be interoperable with our AUKUS partners as well.

This legislation will provide oversight. It implements decisions agreed to by the National Security Committee of cabinet in December last year to modernise defence legislation and support delivery of the strategy in AUKUS. There are two frameworks: the Defence Capability Framework and the Defence Security Zone Framework. Other speakers have gone through that, and I don't intend to delay the House about that. I just want to let them know that it is really important that we have this capacity to protect our personnel, because we want them to be serving in uniform. We want them, whether they're overseas or domestic, to be protected. We don't want our security assets to be vulnerable. The framework also provides information sharing.

The second schedule provides Defence with an enduring legislative authority and allows defence personnel to protect defence sites. That's crucial. We need Defence to do that. We can't just rely on the local police. I've got a lot of respect for the Queensland Police, but we've got to have the authority to take down drones and other uncrewed systems. It's important. If you went to the RAAF Base Amberley, you would see that there are homes around there. There's the Ivor Marsden cricket centre not far from RAAF Base Amberley. There are farms not far away from the base—to periurban area. There are plenty of opportunities, if someone wants to do the wrong thing, to do it, so we need the capacity to take down those drones if necessary. We want to make sure that we can detect, monitor, track and respond to that drone technology, which is used to undermine our national security.

There are safeguards, as I said, in relation to the scope and powers of the frameworks, and they're established in schedules as we normally do. There's the legislative criteria to which the minister or an authorised decision-maker has to have regard in decisions they make and activities under the framework. In relation to that, in terms of the authorisation of the capability activity, there's a 'reasonable and proportionate' test there as well. There's an appropriate safeguard test as well in relation to it. In relation to schedule 2, there's a requirement that the zone be geographically limited. I've just mentioned that cricket complex not far from RAAF base Amberley and Beams Road.

I'm sure Billy Beam, who lives on Beams Road and has been a regular member of the Amberley consultative committee with me over many years, has great proprietary interest in what happens right beside the RAAF Base Amberley on Beams Road. It's important that we get this right. The minister is required as far as practicable to consult with those people affected by the creation of the zone. I'm sure the minister would like to have a meeting with Billy to discuss those issues. I'm sure Billy will let him know next time he's at RAAF Base Amberley. I have been to RAAF Base Amberley with the assistant minister, and I'm sure Billy will be delighted to have a conversation with him in relation to it.

I want to get this passed by the end of the year because it's important for the legislative requirements. I want to comment in the minutes that remain about the importance of the RAAF base there and our defence spaces and what they do in terms of our defence estate. As I said before, RAAF Base Amberley has been important for Ipswich for over 85 years, and it plays an important role in our defence and security and also the humanitarian assistance disaster responses both locally and internationally. One of the things that is a really big issue for RAAF Base Amberley and around there—and I won't go on to the PFAs issue, because the assistant minister is taking action. We are engaging in litigation there on PFAs. I feel that we have historically let our local residents down in relation to that, but we are taking action.

The other issue is the need for noise attenuation in and around RAAF Base Amberley for local residents who are affected by extreme noise in relation to that. We have made an election commitment, and I'm looking forward to that being fulfilled as well. One of the things that really, really affects the personnel that we're talking about, who are affected by incursions on RAAF Base Amberley by these drones, is the Amberley Interchange right there on Cunningham Highway just beside the base. We've made a $200 million commitment to fix this interchange and build a graded separation interchange.

I am calling on the Queensland government, which has gone very quiet, to match our federal funding on the Amberley Interchange. It would really assist those men and women whose protection is going to be covered by this legislation. If you want to protect them in terms of legislation to protect them from drone incursions, you should also protect those people as they're entering the base and leaving the base on the road that leads to the base. I'm calling on the Queensland government to match our funding commitment to get on with the job, finish the planning work and get construction started. It's really important in relation to our local area.

To sum up, I want to thank the minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the assistant minister for bringing forward these critical reforms. They are very important. As I say, they provide a legislative framework, and I think that we need to be very vigilant and very contemporary in the way we do things in relation to our defence. We cannot be stuck in an era where, in terms of our mentality, we rely on the way in which our forefathers and foremothers engaged in warfare and operated our defence. Every country that does that ends up being destroyed and degraded because they are not advancing in terms of military technology and military capacity. So I applaud the minister and congratulate him and I commend the legislation to the chamber.

I thank all the members who've contributed to the debate on this bill, the Defence Legislation Amendment (Accelerating Capability and Protecting Bases) Bill 2026. The bill responds to the very real and very immediate threats that Australia faces now, particularly from malicious actors utilising drone technologies. These are very significant and urgent reforms that are critical to implementing the National Defence Strategy and ensuring progress on pillars I and II of AUKUS. Importantly, as we've heard, they help protect our defence bases, our significant sites, our defence personnel, our people, our capability and our assets.

They also support defence capability development and preparedness by allowing Defence to test advanced capabilities here in Australia. This is critical to ensuring we can provide Defence with the capabilities that it needs. Schedule 1 enables capability declarations to support the development, testing, evaluation and sustainment of defence capabilities. It also establishes a specialised framework for certain electronic capability activities. Schedule 2 modernises and consolidates existing security arrangements, improving Defence's ability to respond to emerging threats, including those posed by uncrewed systems such as drones and other evolving technologies.

These powers have clear statutory limits, conditions, privacy protections and other additional safeguards. Schedule 3 provides robust and independent scrutiny, oversight and review mechanisms for these powers through enhanced roles for the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence and the Inspector-General of the Australian Defence Force. Schedules 4, 5 and 6 make the consequential regulatory and contingent amendments necessary to support the effective implementation and operation of the measures contained in the bill. Importantly, these reforms are appropriate, they're proportional and they are necessary to keep Australians safe, to keep our defence personnel safe and to keep our defence bases safe in what is a very challenging strategic environment. I commend the bill.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

Ordered that this bill be reported to the House without amendment.