David Moncrieff (Hughes, Australian Labor Party) | Link to this | Hansard source

Fourteen December 2025 is a day that will remain seared in the minds of Australians forever. The devastating terrorist attack at Bondi Beach demonstrated with brutal clarity the profound consequences that extremism inflicts on individuals, families and communities. It was a shock wave through the national psyche, as Australians held their loved ones close and embraced their communities during an absolutely gut-wrenching time.

Australia's national terrorism threat level is currently 'probable', meaning there is a greater than 50 per cent chance of an onshore terrorist attack or attack planning in the next 12 months. As our national intelligence agencies have warned, radicalisation networks are aggressively targeting teenagers online. We cannot ignore the fact that a young teenager influenced by violent extremist ideology is capable of inflicting catastrophic harm. The first and most fundamental responsibility of government is to ensure the safety and security of its citizens and residents. That is precisely what this bill does.

The Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill 2026 strengthens key counterterrorism powers and ensures that our frameworks remain available and effective in managing threats, including terrorists and those who pose a significant risk of committing a terrorist act. It extends the operation of the control order, preventive detention order and post-sentence order frameworks in divisions 105, 104 and 105A of the Criminal Code for a further three years to 7 December 2029. Without the passage of this bill, these critical counterterrorism powers are due to sunset at the end of this year. In our current national security environment, it is of vital importance that they be extended. The control order and preventive detention order framework were first introduced in 2005. The post-sentence order framework was later introduced in 2016 to establish continuing detention orders, and was expanded in 2021 to include extended supervision orders.

Letting these powers sunset would leave a dangerous void in our national security architecture. By extending them, we give agencies operational continuity while continuously refining how those powers are exercised as we navigate an increasingly complex set of circumstances. While some of these powers are rarely used, they are reserved for judicious and proportionate use in cases involving the most serious risk to our community. Continuing detention orders remain a last resort for individuals who present a real risk to public safety and provide a highly regulated means of monitoring high-risk individuals in the community. That is why this bill retains the existing sunset clauses to allow reconsideration of their necessity by the parliament before they sunset in December 2029.

The bill also extends the operation of key terrorism related police powers in the Crimes Act for a further three years to the end of 2029. These important powers enable police to respond—

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These key terrorism-related police powers provide operational capabilities such as powers to stop, question and search persons in specified circumstances, as well as emergency entry powers where there is a serious and imminent threat to life or safety. These powers are designed for use in narrow circumstances, and the AFP has been appropriately judicious in its approach. The existing sunset clauses are retained to ensure reconsideration by parliament at the end of 2029.

Managing high-risk terrorist offenders starts with effective interventions before radicalisation takes hold. Our intelligence agencies have been clear that there is a growing cohort of young people influenced by online extremist content and youth recruitment networks who may come to pose a risk to the community. This bill extends the maximum duration of a control order for a young person from three months to 12 months. Importantly, these amendments only extend the maximum duration of an order, with courts retaining the discretion to impose orders of a shorter duration where appropriate.

Existing safeguards remain unchanged, such as the obligation for the best interests of the child to be taken into account in any decision to impose a control order. Extending the maximum duration of control orders against young people can facilitate more effective interventions by supporting longer term engagement, intervention, rehabilitation and reintegration measures.

Evidence based intervention and deradicalisation programs exist. By extending the duration in which they are able to be worked through with an at-risk individual means a greater chance of effectiveness. Strengthening the investigative capabilities of our key intelligence agencies and police is of vital importance. That is why the bill amends the Surveillance Devices Act and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act to strengthen the control order framework.

The amendments allow agencies to obtain warrants for information that will help determine whether a control order is necessary in cases of serious terrorist offenders nearing release from custody. This maintains existing operational capability with control orders, rather than extended supervision orders as, the primary mechanism for imposing conditions on serious offenders while also maintaining existing warrant thresholds, reporting obligations and terrorist oversight arrangements.

Terrorism does not respect borders, be they national or between states and territories. Terror thrives in the gaps between agencies. It exploits boundaries, shelters behind fragmented records and conceals its movements between jurisdictional silos. For too long our laws governing the sharing of criminal history, firearm registration and intelligence data between Commonwealth agencies and state police forces have suffered from rigid statutory constraints. In an era of fast-moving, multijurisdictional threats, seamless information sharing is an operational necessity in preventing future attacks and keeping Australians safe.

This bill knocks down barriers that prevent information about findings of guilt where no conviction has been recorded from being considered in control order and postsentence order proceedings. Such information can be highly relevant in assessing risk and determining the propriety of certain conditions. The amendments do not change the legal thresholds for obtaining control or postsentence orders; they simply ensure that courts have access to all of the relevant information necessary to make informed decisions. State and territory agencies may hold information that is relevant to whether a control order is necessary. While these amendments do not compel information sharing, they allow states and territories to disclose information where appropriate to support informed decision-making and risk assessment.

Every power extended or modified under this legislation remains subject to rigorous legal safeguards. Control orders and postsentence orders are not issued by police directives or politicians. They are ordered by independent judges and based on strict evidential standards. The provisions in these bills will ensure that judges have the requisite information to make decisions that are in the public interest and that properly appreciate the relevant factors in assessing risks to public safety.

The tragedy at Bondi Beach showed us the darkest aspects of extremism and radicalisation, but it also revealed the best of Australian spirit—those first responders who ran toward danger without a moment's hesitation and those who wrapped their arms around the Jewish community. There was the community of southern Sydney, who all gathered around the shop of Ahmed al-Ahmed to lay flowers and honour the bravery that Ahmed al-Ahmed showed in protecting the innocent from the attacks of the terrorist at Bondi.

This bill is balanced, this bill is proportionate and this bill plays a vital role in ensuring the continued safety and security of Australians into the future. That's why I commend this bill to the House.

Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal National Party) | Link to this | Hansard source

We say that there is no greater responsibility for any government than to protect its citizens. That's very true, but what we saw in Bondi last year in December is an example of where there was a collective failure on the part of our intelligence agencies and our police. Let's face it: it was a failure. It resulted in the death of 15 people—it's incredibly sad—who were there to enjoy Hanukkah, a religious festival for Jewish people.

I won't go into too much detail because, obviously, it's the subject of a royal commission, but I'm looking forward to seeing the results and recommendations of that royal commission so that governments across this country and our intelligence agencies and our law enforcement can properly assess and ensure that Bondi never happens again. Between the intention to keep Australians safe and the capacity to do so sits a body of law. Maintaining that law—

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Maintaining that law is parliament's responsibility. It means ensuring that police, intelligence and security agencies have the lawful powers they need to prevent terrorist acts, disrupt those who would facilitate them and manage the ongoing risk posed by serious terrorist offenders.

The Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill 2026 comes before the House in a serious and evolving security environment. Australia's national terrorism threat level remains at 'probable'. ASIO has warned that more Australians are being radicalised, that radicalisation is occurring more quickly and that children and young people are increasingly exposed to violent extremist ideologies.

The coalition will not oppose this bill in the House. Many of the powers extended by this bill were created and strengthened by coalition governments. They are important national security powers. They must not be allowed to lapse. But support for necessary counterterrorism powers is not a blank cheque for government. Labor has serious questions to answer about why it waited until only months before these powers expire to introduce this legislation. There is a pattern of conduct here. The government knew these powers were due to expire on 7 December 2026. Labor legislated that sunset date in 2023. It has had the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor's review of the post-sentence order regime since March 2023. Yet Labor did not table its response until 12 August 2026, the day it introduced this bill.

Parliament must have time to scrutinise laws that affect both community safety and individual liberty. As the Deputy Chair of the PJCIS, I constantly get bills that are pushed before the committee with unrealistic timeframes by this government, allowing insufficient time for stakeholders to have their important say on important legislation. The government cannot present major counterterrorism changes and expect parliament to wave them through because it has allowed time to run down. That is why the coalition will use the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security process to test the government's proposals and hear directly from the AFP, ASIO and other intelligence agencies. The central test is pretty simple: does this legislation keep Australians safer? Where that question cannot be answered clearly, the government must prove its case.

The bill extends key counterterrorism powers and frameworks for three years, until 7 December 2029. They include control orders under division 104 of the Criminal Code, preventative detention orders under division 105, post-sentence orders for serious terrorist offenders under division 105A, and police powers under division 3A of part IAA of the Crimes Act. These provisions can be mistaken for administrative housekeeping until an agency needs them. In reality, they are practical capabilities designed to manage terrorism risks.

Control orders allow a court to impose tailored restrictions where necessary to protect the public from a terrorist act, prevent support for terrorism or prevent hostile activity overseas. They can regulate movement, communication, association, technology use and other activities. Preventative detention orders provide a short term capability in exceptional circumstances. They can permit detention for up to 48 hours to prevent an imminent terrorist act or preserve evidence after an attack. The post-sentence order regime addresses the continuing risk posed by certain terrorist offenders at the end of their custodial sentence. The Crimes Act also contains emergency powers that can be vital in responding to terrorism related threats, including powers to stop, question and search people in defined circumstances.

These powers are subject to statutory thresholds, safeguards and judicial oversight. They are extraordinary powers for extraordinary circumstances, but they must remain available when the threat requires them. The coalition supports their continuation. The coalition built much of this legal architecture—control orders and preventative detention orders in 2005, continuing detention orders in 2016, temporary exclusion orders in 2019 and extended supervision orders in 2021. These are practical, lawful powers to manage serious terrorism risks, backed by appropriate oversight. But, when the threat environment changes, the law must be able to respond likewise. Where the government proposes to replace an existing framework, it must demonstrate that it is not diminishing Australia's ability to manage risk.

That is particularly important in relation to the bill's changes to post-sentence arrangements for serious terrorist offenders. The current regime includes continuing detention orders and extended supervision orders. An extended supervision order allows court supervised conditions to be imposed on a person in the community. It can operate for up to three years, it can be renewed if the legal requirements continue to be met, and it is subject to annual review.

The government proposes to reposition control orders as the primary mechanism for imposing conditions on serious terrorist offenders after release. Under the proposed model, an extended supervision order would not be available as a direct first-instance application by the AFP minister. Instead, it would be considered as an alternative where a court is considering a continuing detention order but is not satisfied that the detention threshold has been met.

The government says operational capability will be preserved. The coalition's response is simple: prove it. Before parliament proceeds, we need to know whether operational agencies support the new structure, whether any practical capability available under the existing framework will be lost, how an offender who continues to pose a serious risk as a control order approaches expiry will be managed and whether the framework supports the intelligence and surveillance work needed for future applications. These matters go directly to Australia's capacity to manage the risk posed by people convicted of serious terrorism offences after they leave prison.

Schedule 4 creates warrant powers intended to assist agencies in deciding whether to seek a control order for an offender nearing the end of a sentence, but the relevant warrants are available while the offender remains in custody or under a detention order. Parliament should test whether the AFP and ASIO are satisfied that adequate intelligence and surveillance capability remains available once an offender returns to the community. Australia should not surrender an existing national security capability unless what it is replaced with keeps Australians at least as safe, if not safer.

One of the most disturbing developments in the current security environment is the radicalisation of children and young Australians. Youth radicalisation is a present and alarming challenge. ASIO has warned that radicalisation is accelerating and minors are increasingly embracing violent extremism. The government's own figures show that around half of people identified in programs to counter violent extremism are under 24, that 31 per cent are under 18 and that eight per cent are aged between just 10 and 14. Prevention, early intervention, online safety, family support and deradicalisation must be a national priority.

The bill itself reflects the seriousness of this trend. Currently, confirmed control orders for young people aged 14 to 17 are subject to a special maximum duration of just three months. The bill removes that limit, meaning the general maximum period of 12 months would apply—that is, the same as for an adult. The coalition will examine this measure carefully. Strong powers should be available where necessary to protect the community and prevent serious harm.

But it's important to say what this amendment does and does not do. It does not make control orders available for children under 14. It does not mean every young person will receive a 12-month order. Courts retain discretion over the duration and conditions of an order, and the best interests of the young person remain a primary consideration. The amendment removes the special three-month maximum and permits the ordinary maximum to apply, subject to judicial discretion and statutory safeguards.

The coalition supports necessary and proportionate powers, but legal powers alone are not a youth deradicalisation strategy. The government must also demonstrate that prevention and deradicalisation programs are effective, properly targeted and capable of intervening before a young person moves from online exposure to extremist ideology, planning or, worse, violence.

This bill also comes before the House in the context of serious questions about Labor's wider approach to terrorism linked Australians returning from Syria. The coalition's position is clear: the Commonwealth should have the strongest lawful control possible over when and how terrorism linked Australians return.

In October 2022, the Albanese government repatriated four Australian women and 13 children from Syria. It argued a planned return was safer because the Commonwealth could control and manage the process. But Labor later changed course. The AFP commissioner confirmed at Senate estimates that Labor adopted a policy of so-called self-managed returns. In effect, the government would not—allegedly—assist people to leave, but, if they made their own way out and arrived in Australia, it would deal with them then. That is not a coherent national security strategy. It means the Commonwealth does not control departure, route, timing or circumstances of return. It manages the consequences once people arrive. That creates obvious questions about risk assessments, intelligence coverages and operational control.

In May, four women and nine children returned. Three women were arrested on arrival, one was charged with alleged membership of a terrorist organisation and entering or remaining in a declared area, and two were charged with alleged crimes against humanity involving slavery. Those allegations are before the courts, and each person is, of course, entitled to the presumption of innocence, but Australians are entitled to know what assessments were made, what powers were considered and why the Commonwealth did not retain greater control over these returns.

The temporary exclusion order regime was established by the coalition because, where the legal threshold is met, the Commonwealth must retain the capacity to control the timing and conditions of a terrorism linked Australian's return. The coalition also introduced the Criminal Code Amendment (Keeping Australia Safe) Bill 2026. Labor voted that legislation down. Australians deserve a government that plans properly, acts early and gives police and intelligence agencies the tools they need before a risk becomes urgent. The coalition will not oppose this bill, because the powers it extends are important and necessary and should not be allowed to lapse, but the government should not confuse support for these powers with approval of Labor's handling of national security.

Rebekha Sharkie (Mayo, Centre Alliance) | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak in support of the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill 2026. Unfortunately, this place has not yet had the benefit of the findings of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security on this bill. I respectfully ask all members in this place to support my amendment that I'll be discussing in consideration in detail on this bill. I also request that the committee that I referred to consider further broadening my amendment to incorporate all terrorism offences. I must say I do reserve the right to bring a private member's bill to that effect into this place to ensure that, where there is a guilty finding for terrorism, there must be a conviction.

Today's bill, coupled with my amendment, would strengthen—and will strengthen—protections for the Australian community against terrorism. First, to this bill—the bill amends multiple pieces of legislation, including the Criminal Code Act 1995 and the Crimes Act 1914. It will extend the operation of control orders, preventive detention orders and post-sentence orders that are due to expire on 7 December this year, and it will allow them to be further expanded for three years.

Control orders are not used lightly. They are issued by courts on application from the Australian Federal Police with consent of the Attorney-General to prevent terrorist activity and to protect the public. They can prevent a person from leaving Australia, being in certain places, associating with certain people, carrying out activities under certain items and accessing forms of technology such as the internet. They can, for example, require a person to be wearing a tracking device or require someone to report at a certain time. In line with the increasing use of such orders to manage the risk posed by serious terrorist offenders, the bill will strengthen control orders and adapt them better to the probable terrorist threat.

It will ensure that information about a person found guilty of an offence without conviction can be considered and disclosed in control and post-sentence order applications and proceedings where relevant, support improved voluntary information sharing between states and territories and the Commonwealth for the purpose of control orders, and provide for issuing of electronic surveillance warrants in relation to serious terrorist offenders in custody in relation to control order applications against those offenders. It will improve the Criminal Code terrorist organisation listing framework to allow for delisting and expand the protections of United Nations personnel.

This bill has been introduced by the government in the context of a national terrorism threat level of 'probable'. This means that there's a chance of more than 50 per cent, more likely than not, of an onshore terrorist attack in Australia or plans for such an attack in the next 12 months. The tragedy of Bondi and the subsequent royal commission demonstrate that the terrorist threat to us as Australian citizens is all too real. We have an urgent responsibility to do as much as possible to bring the risk level down and keep our communities safe from terrorism.

The Department of Home Affairs reports that there are 298 people in the Countering Violent Extremism deradicalisation program. Concerningly, that's up from 253 individuals in December last year, an increase of nearly 20 per cent in a period of six months. It's hard to believe that there are so many people on Australian soil enjoying living in Australia who hate this place so much. This group is made up predominantly of younger males. Deradicalisation is complex and costly, and success is not assured. In the 2026-27 budget program, $74 million was allocated over two years, such as the National Support and Intervention Program, and $25 million this year was allocated to national initiatives countering violent extremism.

I was surprised that the government's bill included a provision to ensure that information about a person found guilty of an offence without conviction can be considered and disclosed in control order and post-sentence order applications and proceedings where relevant. It begs the question of how there could be a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the most serious offence I can imagine—an offence of terror against our nation, our government and our communities—yet a court could proceed to dismiss such a charge without conviction.

My amendment, as I'll discuss in consideration in detail, would disapply section 19B of the Crimes Act 1914 so that it's not available in relation to a person found guilty of a terrorist act under section 101.1 of the Criminal Code. If charges are proven and a person is found guilty but the charges are dismissed and the person is discharged without proceeding to conviction, it means that, even though they've been proven guilty to the requisite standard of proof, no conviction would be recorded. Standard police checks will not show the finding of guilt for such an offence, because there will be nothing on their formal criminal record.

That affects employment. Just think; a person can then have a blank sheet, walk into a childcare centre and work. They can walk into aged care, NDIS—vulnerable people. They've been found guilty of a terrorism offence or pleaded guilty to a terrorism offence and have no conviction. In immigration terms, not having a conviction recorded may be of benefit to noncitizens, even if they are permanent residents. They would face mandatory visa cancellation or deportation if convicted of a serious offence. Already, the section 19B discretion is not allowed to proceed with respect to the Migration Act, where there are people-smuggling offences and findings of guilt. There are other examples at a state level.

Terrorism is sadly something that we live with now. We didn't have to live with it decades ago. Australia was a much safer place than it is today. The primary consideration must be the protection of the Australian community from criminals and other serious conduct where guilt of a terrorist offence has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. I commend this bill to the House and look forward to discussing my amendment in consideration in detail.

Michelle Rowland (Greenway, Australian Labor Party, Attorney-General) | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank my parliamentary colleagues for their contributions to the debate on this bill, the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill 2026 . The Australian government's first priority is the safety of all Australians and protecting the values we all hold dear. This bill makes targeted amendments informed by operational experience to ensure Australia's counterterrorism powers remain available, effective and proportionate. These changes are informed by the advice of law enforcement on their operational experience in responding to the current threat environment.

The bill extends the sunset date for key counterterrorism frameworks. It streamlines and enhances frameworks for responding to high-risk terrorist offenders. It strengthens the control-order framework and its application to young people and improves information-sharing provisions in the control-order and post-sentence-order frameworks. It also makes technical amendments to improve the framework for listing terrorist organisations. Finally, the amendments give effect to Australia's obligations under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.

The amendments in this bill are a proportionate and targeted response to the challenging terrorism threat environment facing Australia. The bill maintains and enhances critical counterterrorism powers and forms part of the government's continuing and holistic efforts to protect Australians from the threat of terrorism. We must stand in unity against that threat. I look forward to support for this bill from across the parliament.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.