House debates

Wednesday, 19 August 2026

Bills

Australia's Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Amendment Bill 2026; Consideration in Detail

4:31 pm

Photo of Ted O'BrienTed O'Brien (Fairfax, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs) | | Hansard source

I move the amendment circulated in my name:

(1) Schedule 1, page 33 (after line 22), after Part 16, insert:

Part 16A — Significant researcher-to-researcher arrangements

Australia's Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act 2020

67A Section 3 (after the paragraph beginning "Generally, this Act applies to variations")

Insert:

Significant researcher-to-researcher arrangements

This Act also applies to certain kinds of research arrangements (called significant researcher-to-researcher arrangements) in accordance with the rules (see Part 4A). A significant researcher-to-researcher arrangement is not a foreign arrangement within the meaning of the Act, but the parties to such an arrangement must include both a person who works for an Australian university (called a covered researcher for an Australian university) and also a foreign entity or an employee of a foreign entity.

67B Section 4

Insert:

covered researcher has the meaning given by section 59A.

covered university has the meaning given by section 59.

significant researcher-to-researcher arrangement has the meaning given by section 59B.

67C After Part 4

Insert:

Part 4A — Significant researcher-to-researcher arrangements

Division 1 — Preliminary

59 Covered universities

For the purposes of this Act, a university is a covered university if:

(a) the university is established by, or under, a law of a State or Territory; and

(b) the university is a corporation to which paragraph 51(xx) of the Constitution applies.

Note: For how this Act (including this Part) applies in relation to the Australian National University, see section 55.

59A Covered researchers

For the purposes this Act, a person is a covered researcher for a covered university if:

(a) the person is:

(i) an employee of the university; or

(ii) engaged, under a contractual arrangement with the university, to perform certain duties; and

(b) the duties of the person as an employee of the university, or under the contractual arrangement, include performing research.

59B Significant researcher-to-researcher arrangements

(1) For the purposes of this Act, an arrangement is a significant researcher-to-researcher arrangement if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(a) the arrangement is not a foreign arrangement;

(b) the parties to the arrangement include:

(i) a person who is a covered researcher for a covered university; and

(ii) a foreign entity or an employee of a foreign entity;

(c) the arrangement relates to the conduct of research by a person mentioned in subparagraph (b)(i) or (ii);

(d) the arrangement:

(i) would adversely affect, or would be likely to adversely affect, Australia's national interest; or

(ii) would be, or would be likely to be, inconsistent with Australia's foreign policy;

(e) if the rules prescribe additional conditions that an arrangement must satisfy in order to be a significant researcher-to-researcher arrangement—the arrangement satisfies those conditions.

(2) The rules may specify circumstances in which an arrangement that satisfies the conditions in paragraphs (1)(a) to (c) is taken to satisfy, or not to satisfy, the condition in paragraph (1)(d).

Division 2 — Application of this Act to significant researcher-to-researcher arrangements

59C This Act applies in relation to significant researcher-to-researcher arrangements in accordance with the rules

(1) The rules may specify how this Act applies in relation to a significant researcher-to-researcher arrangement, and if the rules do so, this Act applies in relation to a significant researcher-to-researcher arrangement in accordance with those rules.

(2) Rules made for the purposes of subsection (1) may specify that this Act applies in relation to a significant researcher-to-researcher arrangement in accordance with any modifications of this Act specified in the rules.

(3) In making rules for the purposes of subsection (1), the Minister must have regard to the desirability of regulating a significant researcher-to-researcher arrangement in a way that is analogous to the way that a non-core foreign research arrangement is regulated by this Act.

(4) Rules made for the purposes of subsection (1) must not modify the definitions of covered university, covered researcher or significant researcher-to-researcher arrangement in this Act.

Note: This subsection does not prevent rules from being made for the purposes of paragraph 59B(1)(e) or subsection 59B(2).

In an era of heightened global tension, Australia's defence is more than just our military or our geography; it is also our capacity to work as a united nation. Indeed, our capacity to come together as team Australia when we are under any threat or any risk is fundamental to our ability to defend our nation.

This is a particularly acute reason for me to stand today to speak about this issue, because the risk that Australia is in today is well recognised on both sides of the chamber. We do have foreign powers who wish to extract information from not just government but also Australian institutions. It doesn't take much for somebody to remember the Victorian Labor government engaging in a Belt and Road Initiative deal with the People's Republic of China, without any Commonwealth oversight. That was a very clear example of something that was not a team Australia moment but a moment when one jurisdiction just went ahead without the usual checks and balances that a responsible Commonwealth government would typically apply.

That indicated a gap in our national security architecture, and it, among other examples of grey-zone activity, led to the establishment of the Australia's Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act 2020 and, within that, the Foreign Arrangements Scheme, a scheme that governs any such engagements through state governments, councils, territories and, indeed, public universities. As we've heard from other speakers, there has been a review, and the coalition is very happy to support the bill put forward by the government, which seeks to implement some of the findings from that review. That will strengthen that scheme. We want to see it work.

However, just as, years ago, a gap was found with respect to the BRI deal being signed, another gap has been found that the bill before the House unfortunately doesn't address. That is: we have arrangements in place that can be negotiated by university researchers in Australia with employees of foreign entities that don't go through this scheme. The purpose of this scheme is to notify the federal government so we can use the various agencies to do an assessment and identify whether there's a risk. If there's a risk, it could be cancelled. Today, we're debating improving this scheme, but there's this massive gap because you can have the exact same foreign actor dealing with the exact same topic of research and the exact same researcher at the exact same Australian university. That could be assessed, deemed inappropriate and cancelled if the university itself is party to that collaboration activity, but, where the university is not, there's no oversight. There's no statutory obligation.

That's a gaping hole that should be filled, and this is the opportunity to do it. I say to the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade across the table—and I acknowledge his presence today and thank him for being here. I ask Labor to come along with the coalition on this. This is a serious problem we have. Because we are fixing up other aspects of the scheme, now's the time to fix this one too. We can't have a situation, as we have had, where there's an example of a breach like this and the remedy is a letter from the minister to a university. Letters are limp. We need a statutory obligation, and it is in a very constructive and good-faith manner that I put to the government: let's do this right. Let's also close that final gap.

4:37 pm

Photo of Matt ThistlethwaiteMatt Thistlethwaite (Kingsford Smith, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Minister for Immigration) | | Hansard source

Australia has strong foreign interference and espionage laws that capture researchers, and our security agencies actively monitor and respond to threats to the national interest. If an Australian researcher passes sensitive information to a foreign power, that is espionage and it is already a crime under Australian law. Our government has been consistently clear that universities must play their role in managing risks, including through the University Foreign Interference Taskforce.

In the parliament, the shadow minister has recognised this, and he said: 'The Foreign Arrangements Scheme is not the only protection against foreign interference or inappropriate foreign involvement in Australian research, nor should it be. There are other safeguards.' We agree, and I note that the shadow minister is a member of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, which concluded that the government's amendments strike the right balance between maintaining Commonwealth visibility and oversight of foreign arrangements that may affect Australia's national interest whilst cutting unnecessary regulatory burden for lower risk activities.

There was a reason for the Huxtable review commissioned by the Albanese government and why they did not recommend the coalition's approach, and that's why the government will not be supporting this amendment.

4:38 pm

Photo of Ted O'BrienTed O'Brien (Fairfax, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs) | | Hansard source

I wish to respond to the Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade's comments. Australia does indeed have an espionage law, but the problem is that it's not working with respect to the problem we're talking about today. It is completely unacceptable that the Australian people, the Australian government, and certainly the opposition find out through the Australian reports that university researchers are engaging with foreign powers that have not been assessed by the Australian government. That is completely unacceptable, and to suggest for a moment that the existing regime is therefore doing its job effectively is patently wrong.

It was only a few months ago that we learnt that we had academics from the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney and the University of Adelaide collaborating with an Iranian university on unmanned drones. We've got to remember there is often a dual use when it comes to technology. An academic need not believe he or she is partaking in some nefarious activity. They could be doing it very honestly, albeit naively. This is the risk we have.

Unfortunately, these things are not coming to light because of government assessment; they're coming to light because of the media. What sort of confidence does that give the Australian people that our national security is being well looked after when we're relying on newspaper articles? In the morning you wake up and you find out that there have been researchers in Australia dealing with foreign universities that have not been assessed under the right regime. Now, I'm not going to make specific allegations with respect to that particular case. I don't prejudge it. But what that case tells us, along with other cases that have come to light even in recent weeks—again through the media—is there's a gaping hole here, and it is not satisfactory for the response from the government to be: 'No, that's okay. We've got another law over here.' Clearly that law has not been working. The ones who have been working, to their credit, have been the media. I give them credit for that. But our security as a nation should not rely on media. It should rely on government—its agencies, its laws.

Here we have a law in place which governs a foreign arrangements scheme—a scheme that is meant to investigate research collaborations between Australian public universities and foreign entities that have been selected and identified by government. And yet we have such collaborations able to take place and not fall within the scheme for one reason: instead of the research agreement having a university logo at the top of the paper, it's just got the name of the professor or the academic. Every other risk can be the same—same university, same research, same topic, same academics, the whole lot. This is why it's a gap, and it's not good enough. At the very time when we are trying to amend the legislation that can close this gap, the government is effectively saying, 'It's alright. We've got other laws that look after that,' when barely a week goes by that we don't hear about another story.

For the sake of the country, I again ask the government to reconsider what appears to be a position—that I hear from the assistant minister—of pushing back on the amendment that I'm genuinely putting in good faith.

Question unresolved.

Photo of Helen HainesHelen Haines (Indi, Independent) | | Hansard source

As it is necessary to resolve the question to enable further questions to be considered in relation to this bill, in accordance with standing order 195 the bill will be returned to the House for further consideration.