Helen Haines (Indi, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I give the call to the

Matt Thistlethwaite (Kingsford Smith, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Minister for Immigration) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Deputy Speaker. It's good timing for me, thank you. Australia's security environment is becoming more dynamic, diverse and, unfortunately, degraded. We know that Australia is facing multifaceted, merging, intersecting and cascading threats, and the Albanese government is committed to ensuring that our Australian Security Intelligence Organisation is properly equipped to respond to this complex web of threats. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) will amend ASIO's compulsory-questioning powers contained in division 3 of part III of the ASIO Act to ensure the framework reflects the security environment and strengthens existing safeguards.

ASIO's compulsory-questioning powers are a valuable intelligence collection tool to protect Australia and Australians from threats to their security. For over 20 years, ASIO has used these powers to obtain high-value intelligence in circumstances where ASIO's other powers were not appropriate. Since the introduction of this compulsory-questioning framework in 2003, it's been the subject of multiple parliamentary and independent reviews, causing the parliament to extend the sunset date of these provisions on five occasions. This bill will make the framework permanent by repealing the sunset provision, in recognition that these powers have yielded high-value intelligence and been subject to multiple reviews, and would be consistent with ASIO's other powers.

In September 2023 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security elected to review the existing compulsory questioning framework ahead of its sunset date but did not complete its review prior to the prorogation of the parliament earlier that year. The measure proposed in the bill had been developed with close regard to the submissions made by interested parties in that PJCIS inquiry. The reforms also expand the scope of adult questioning warrants to include sabotage, promotion of communal violence, attacks on Australia's defence system and serious threats to Australia's territorial or border integrity, in addition to espionage and politically motivated violence, including terrorism and acts of foreign interference, to reflect the dynamic, diverse and degraded security environment ASIO have described.

This ASIO bill further amends the eligibility and termination provisions for prescribed authorities to ensure the independence and impartiality of persons appointed to that role. The changes also introduce additional reporting requirements to ensure that the Attorney-General is made aware of relevant information regarding conduct under a compulsory questioning warrant. Finally, the bill introduces an additional safeguard for questioning where a person has been charged with a related offence and that charge is still to be resolved or for whom such a charge is imminent by requiring that postcharge questioning occur only before a prescribed authority who is a retired judge.

These amendments are supporting ASIO during a time at which Australia's security environment is becoming more dynamic and rapidly evolving. We need only see what, unfortunately, occurred on Australia Day in Perth, with a terrorist incident there, and of course the shocking terrorist incident at Bondi on 14 December to know that we are living in a heightened threat environment in Australia and in many respects throughout the world.

The historic threats that we have always considered with respect to violent extremism and terrorism remain. But as the Director-General of ASIO, Mike Burgess, has made clear, increasingly we're also finding people who are younger becoming radicalised faster and radicalised online. This is a deeply disturbing emerging threat. We're increasingly finding people for whom it's no longer a set ideology, albeit what would be viewed as an extremist ideology purporting to be based on faith or what would be described as right-wing racist ideology. It's now also mixed ideologies as part of these rapid forms of radicalisation. That's meant that the threats and the needs have evolved. The government's response needs to evolve as well. In this shifting landscape, ASIO provides the government with the eyes and ears needed to navigate these dangers. They provide the foresight that allows us to protect our sovereignty and, importantly, to protect the Australian people.

Finally, I'd like to acknowledge the people behind the acronym. The officers of ASIO are everyday Australians—our neighbours, parents and friends—who have chosen a career of distinct service. They can't come home and tell their families about their job or the work they do. They work in high-pressure environments, often dealing with the darkest aspects of human nature, yet they do so with professionalism and restraint. They carry the burden of knowing the threats we face so that the rest of us don't have to face those threats. The ASIO Amendment Bill (No. 2) will help support ASIO to continue that vitally important work.

Tim Wilson (Goldstein, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Small Business) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In rising to speak on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025, I think we need to acknowledge, tragically, this is the most challenging environment that we are operating in for the security of this nation in a long time. During the past few years, we have seen a massive spike in social division, which is tearing at the social fabric of our nation. We are seeing the rise of extremism, which is a direct consequence of people increasingly feeling like they don't have control over their own lives or their own future. We can debate the sociopolitical consequences that sit behind that, but there is a simple responsibility for people in this parliament to pass the laws necessary and have the agencies properly resourced to keep Australians safe.

We've seen this in recent months in the context, obviously, of the tragedy of the Bondi terrorist attacks and, as the minister mentioned before, on Australia Day, where I think we saw one of the most terrifying—thankfully unfulfilled, but nonetheless still terrifying—attempts. That was the alleged attack in Perth, where an unexploded ordnance was thrown at a number of Indigenous protesters protesting against our national day. We can disagree on the issue or the views, but there is no place in our nation for violence against people exercising those basic rights and freedoms peacefully. I think it sent chills down the spines of many Australians, including mine, that we could have seen, for want of a better phrase, back-to-back fulfilled attacks of this nature. So it speaks to the challenge that we all face right now.

I know those on the front line of the security agencies do everything they can. I am somebody who, of course, believes very much in the importance of people's freedom to be able to live out the best of their lives and that we should temper security measures because of the risks that they can be abused. That's why laws must have proper safeguards, and the compulsory questioning power is no different from that. The compulsory questioning power that ASIO holds has a direct and specific purpose necessary to the proportionality of their functions to make sure that they can find out the nature of what is happening in our community. It is targeted in a way with the safeguards to ensure, firstly, that is not abused but, more importantly, that it has to meet certain thresholds and seek certain levels of approval and power, with political accountability.

The provision of this bill is very important and tragically necessary. I wish it were not and we didn't have to support these types of powers. One of the things I also support is the ongoing review of these powers and sunset clauses so that there's an acknowledgement that they've not become a permanent state of affairs. But we know what happens when they don't exist. It makes Australians weaker and less safe, and that's the basis on which I'm prepared to support the legislation.

Tom French (Moore, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In 2026, security is not just borders and bases; it's networks, data and trust. That is the world this bill addresses. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025 modernises ASIO's questioning framework. It keeps what works, fixes what is outdated and strengthens safeguards end to end. Schedule 1, part 1 repeals section 34JF of the ASIO Act. This removes the 7 September 2025 sunset and makes division 3 permanent while keeping the existing safeguards and oversight in place. Schedule 1, part 2 expands the definition of an of an adult questioning matter. Adult questioning warrants may now apply beyond espionage, politically motivated violence and foreign interference. They may also relate to sabotage, the promotion of communal violence, attacks on Australia's defence system and serious threats to Australia's territorial and border integrity.

Schedule 1, parts 3 and 4 strengthen the independence of prescribed authorities. They do this by widening the categories of people who cannot be appointed and by clarifying when appointments may and must be terminated. Schedule 1, part 5 strengthens ministerial oversight. It requires the Director-General to report to the Attorney-General on any relevant non-compliance or contraventions connected with a questioning warrant. This includes breaches of guidelines, procedures, warrant conditions or prescribed authority directions. Schedule 1 part 6 adds a specific safeguard to post-charge questioning and closely related circumstances. In those cases, questioning, and any production of documents, must occur only before a prescribed authority who is a former judge of a superior court.

Finally, schedule 1 part 1 also amends the Intelligence Services Act. This enables the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security to undertake a further review of division 3 three years after this act commences. That is the legislative skeleton.

Now I'll move to the 'why'. Since 2003, ASIO has had compulsory questioning powers under division 3 of part III of the ASIO Act. They have been used judiciously to obtain high-value intelligence in circumstances where ASIO's other powers may not be appropriate. That restraint tells Australians that the power is exceptional and applied only when necessary. But the threat environment has changed profoundly in two decades. Espionage is now digital extraction, not trench coats under bridges. Foreign interference can be covert influence campaigns disguised as community debate. Sabotage can target satellite links, water treatment plants or defence supply chains. Radicalisation can happen in a private chat channel faster than any pamphlet could spread.

A legal framework frozen in 2003 cannot keep Australia safe in 2025. This bill recognises that reality and updates the reach of the power with tighter guardrails. Australians expect strong powers and strong safeguards, not one at the expense of the other. That is what this bill delivers. The Attorney-General must personally approve each questioning warrant. Questioning occurs before an independent prescribed authority who oversees conduct throughout. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security can review every stage and inspect records. The post-charge safeguard ensures questioning of a charged person occurs only before a retired judge. That recognises the interface with the criminal justice process and protects fairness.

The strengthened eligibility and termination settings for prescribed authorities reinforce independence. The new reporting requirements to the Attorney-General enhance ministerial oversight in real time. The framework remains targeted, warranted and proportionate. Courts remain the arbiters of guilt and innocence. This bill respects that line and keeps it bright.

Let me bring this home to Moore. In Joondalup, Edith Cowan University's cybercapability is world class. ECU's work with government and industry shows national security runs through suburbs like ours, not just Canberra. ECU'S cyber researchers safeguard the critical systems our community depends on every day. This bill does the same, protecting our institutions and our people. It strengthens capability and accountability together, not one at the expense of the other.

Some will ask whether making the framework permanent opens the door to overreach. The answer lies in the checks: Attorney-General approval; prescribed authority supervision; IGIS review; and a mandated PJCIS review after three years. That combination provides discipline, transparency and renewal.

Others will ask whether the expanded matters are too broad. The matters reflect real-world harms that Australians face today. Sabotage can be disabling of a critical control system from offshore. Promotion of communal violence can be foreign backed agitation designed to fracture social cohesion. Attacks on our defence system can be interference with command, control or supply. Threats to territorial or border integrity include hostile activities short of armed conflict. Each remains subject to the same warrant thresholds and the same oversight. The expansion recognises contemporary risk; it does not loosen standards.

We also hear questions about rights. Rights are protected by process, and this bill strengthens that process. Questioning is time bound, recorded and supervised. Legal representation is available. Protections against self-incrimination apply as provided by law. Complaints and reviews are possible through established oversight bodies. These safeguards are not decorative; they are enforceable and enforced. That is how liberal democracies wield exceptional powers responsibly.

Now I have a word on cost and consultation. The explanatory memorandum states that the amendments have no financial impact. Agencies will operate within existing resources. The reforms were refined through consultation across government with the PJCIS process. Stakeholder feedback sharpened definitions and improved reporting triggers. The framework has been examined repeatedly over two decades and is now being modernised methodically. That's reform done properly not on the run.

I turn to the opposition. The coalition will likely support this bill, and I welcome that, but they've had years in which these reforms could have been made. During that time the threat has evolved rapidly, and reform did not keep pace. This government is providing the clarity that the agencies and public deserve. Our approach is straightforward—capability and transparency. Capability without transparency is risky, and transparency without capability is hollow. We are delivering both. That is the Labor balance. I'd like to return to Moore for a practical example. Suppose a hostile actor targets a research partner connected to ECU's cyber-labs. Traditional powers may not be sufficient to identify the facilitator and method quickly. A questioning warrant approved by the Attorney-General and overseen by a prescribed authority may close that gap. The session is recorded and reviewable, and the outcome is reported to the Attorney-General. If the matter moves to a charge, any further questioning occurs before a retired judge. Parliament would later examine the framework's operation through the PJCIS review. That change shows how power and accountability work together.

Another Western Australian example involves a small Defence supplier helping to secure our systems. If a foreign agent attempts to subvert access credentials, time is critical. The questioning framework can surface who is involved and how the intrusion was orchestrated. The inspector-general can audit the use and the records. The parliament stays informed through mandated reported and scheduled review. That is practical, not theoretical, protection.

For prescribed authorities, independence is not rhetoric. It is defined by law and enforced by rules. The amended eligibility and termination provisions reduce any risk of perceived bias. Tenure settings create clarity about service and departure. Removal grounds are spelled out not improvised. These changes keep the safeguard independent and seen to be independent.

On reporting, the Attorney-General must be informed of relevant warrant conduct. That creates a clearer picture on how powers are exercised and why. It supports ministerial accountability to this parliament. It also assists the PJCIS in its future review. Together these measures embed transparency throughout the life cycle of a warrant. They are practical tools for oversight not paperwork for its own sake. Some may ask whether these reforms restrict operational agility. The opposite is true. Clear rules speed decisions and improve confidence in outcomes. Scheduled review encourages continuous improvement. I want to speak to my younger constituents, studying at ECU and working in local tech firms. Many of you will serve your country by strengthening systems not by wearing a uniform. These laws support that service by ensuring agencies can act quickly and lawfully when you are targeted. These also ensure that your rights are respected and your trust is earned. To local businesses in Joondalup, Edgewater and Woodvale, certainty matters. Permanent powers with clear checks provide certainty. You should not be left wondering whether necessary authority exists when a threat hits your network. You should also not worry that power is used without restraint. This bill addresses both concerns.

National security is not a static portfolio. It is a discipline that adapts as adversaries adapt. The best way to avoid overreach tomorrow is to legislate carefully today. This bill reflects that philosophy. It moves the framework from ad hoc renewal to stable authority under constant scrutiny. It recognises more kinds of modern harm and matches them with proportionate process. It upholds a line between intelligence and prosecution. It respects the role of courts and the rights of individuals. It keeps the parliament firmly in the loop through mandated review. That is how a mature democracy protects itself.

I would like to thank the officials and the oversight bodies who have contributed to the process. I also acknowledge the constructive input received through the prior PJCIS review process. The result before the House is a balanced bill that reflects experience and evidence. The community expects trust in matters of national security.

The business community across Perth's northern corridor depends on secure and predictable supply chains. Students and staff in Joondalup expect strong protections for research security. Families in Kingsley, Padbury and Craigie look for confidence in the protection of democratic institutions. This bill delivers that confidence through stronger powers, clearer safeguards and firm oversight.

Australians want their government to be calm, competent and careful in this domain. That is what this bill represents. It is a careful adjustment, not a sweeping departure. It is grounded in two decades of practice and review. It puts in statute the standards the public rightly expects. It delivers continuity for agencies and accountability for parliament. It keeps Australians safe while keeping Australia itself open, free and lawful.

From the cyberlabs of ECU to the workshops of Heathridge and the homes of Iluka, Mullaloo and Duncraig, these reforms matter. They matter because they reduce risk without reducing rights. They matter because they make the exceptional possible and keep it exceptional. They matter because they ensure the law keeps pace with reality. That is the essence of responsible legislation.

I support this bill because it serves my constituents in Moore by safeguarding what they build and rely upon. I support this bill because it serves Australia's security without eroding Australia's liberties. I support the bill because it replaces uncertainty with clarity, and pairs it with accountability. These are the hallmarks of good law in a serious parliament. I commend the bill to the House.

Michael McCormack (Riverina, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, ASIO, was established in 1949 to fill a really important need in Australia at that time. The end of World War II had happened only four years earlier, and there was a lot going on in our nation at that time—the rise of communism, a fear of communism. There was so much subversive activity going on to get information about Australia, about its organisations, about its defence capability and the like. The establishment of ASIO was a critical part of making sure that we kept in front of state organisations in other countries that would seek to do us harm.

Never has there been a more important time for the role of ASIO to be at its peak, to be at its utmost level of capability than right now. We are facing, in this nation and throughout the world, a time where people who seek to do us harm are everywhere and endeavouring to infiltrate organisations, even down to local councils and businesses. This is a critical time that we invest, both in resources and people, what is needed to ensure that our intelligence agencies, especially ASIO, are the best that they can be. We should thank them, because we have some incredible people, some amazing and talented people, in ASIO and in our intelligence organisations here and abroad working for us and on our behalf, working to ensure that the safety and security of Australians is paramount.

The world changed with 9/11, with the hijacking of aeroplanes in the United States. Ten Australians were killed in the World Trade Center. I've been to Ground Zero; it's a very sobering and sombre place. I know that the work that ASIO and other organisations have done, particularly since that point in time, has been truly remarkable. Yes, we've had incidents. Yes, we've had some people who would who want the destruction of our society because they hate us. They have been curtailed in their attempts to wreak havoc amongst our peace-loving and law-abiding citizens. Many of those attempts, of course, we never know about. I've been 2IC of the security committee, the peak body here in Australia—not that I'll go into what is said and put across that table, of course—and rest assured it's very comforting to know that our people, ASIO and others, are the best that they can be and the work that they do is always ongoing. It's 24/7. It's 365 days a year. We thank them, and anything that we can do to help them has to be encouraged and has to be followed through.

I know that sometimes there are nefarious and evil-minded people whose activities slip through the cracks—not always but sometimes. We see incidents such as 14 December on Bondi Beach, where out of the blue these acts of terror occur and these people who perpetrate these acts and to and who help others to do just that have to be have to be stopped. It should never happen. They must be prevented from carrying out their terror in the future. And I thank everybody who has a part to play in that, because, indeed, we are very much a peace-loving nation and that is just something that goes against everything we stand for—the traditions and the norms on which our society is based. What we've seen in recent nights in Sydney has been simply unacceptable, and I have to say hate speech on our streets leads to hate events in our communities. It has to be stopped. I know that ASIO very much looks at these on a on an overall level and look at these on an overall basis, but it starts with us as a society following the laws of the land. When these protests go beyond the laws of the land, well, what we see result is what occurred, in particular, two nights ago in Sydney. It's unacceptable. For the Greens to do what they do as a political party—to encourage that sort of hatred in our society—is reprehensible, is abhorrent. I just cannot understand it.

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025 amends the compulsory questioning powers in the ASIO Act. There are several points pertaining to this. It widens the scope of adult questioning warrants to include promotion of communal violence, sabotage, attacks on Australia's defence system and serious threats to Australia's territorial and border integrity. It amends the eligibility and termination provisions for proscribed authorities to ensure the independence and impartiality of persons appointed to the role. It introduces additional reporting requirements to ensure the Attorney-General is made aware of any relevant information regarding conduct under a compulsory questioning warrant. It requires that post-charge questioning occur only before a proscribed authority who is a retired judge and it makes the framework permanent by repealing the sunset provision. That is important too.

I know these things are under constant review, and that last point about repealing the sunset provision is noteworthy, but I think many of the aspects related to this bill are very much bipartisan in the sense that the major political parties get it. We just do. We understand it, and I appreciate that you do too, Deputy Speaker Haines. I know that integrity is one of the hallmarks of your political advocacy. But we do have elements within this building who do not always value the role that fundamental organisations such as ASIO play in this nation. They always want to try to completely tear down the very precepts and concepts of what administering the law means. By that I mean that they're always trying to change things.

That is why it's so important that the PJCIS and those sorts of organisations are run by the serious people within the parliament, and I think everybody in this room knows exactly who I mean by 'the serious people'. There are people in this parliament who, quite frankly, just don't like the organisation, the administration and the way our country is run. How they get elected is beyond me—but anyway; we move on.

Bill No. 2 also amends the Intelligence Services Act 2001 to permit the PJCIS to undertake a further review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of the framework three years after the commencement of this bill. The PJCIS plays an important role in national security and the way things are done through the parliament as far as defence and security are concerned.

I appreciate, too—and I do need to make mention of this—that concerns have been expressed by the coalition that the bill promotes some overreach. I know our then shadow home affairs minister, the member for Canning, who I have a lot of respect for regarding the role of national security and the importance of ensuring that national security is front and centre of everything we do, said on 30 July last year, in his speech in the second reading debate on the predecessor bill, 'It should be noted that there are people on both sides of the House who have concerns in relation to the extension of the powers at the heart of this kind of legislation.' He added that in the opposition we were alive to those concerns and that we should also explore them as part of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security inquiry into this bill, and that's important. He knows, as does the member for Cowper, the importance of the PJCIS, the importance of putting the ruler over every line of this and making sure we give it the full accountability it requires.

I acknowledge the role the member for Cowper has played in police work, because police work also goes to the nub of security. We should give thanks not only to organisations such as ASIO but also to the people who don a uniform and go to work every day. I note the member for Solomon opposite, and I acknowledge the part he played in the Australian Army. When people require assistance, the first people they run to are the police. And if things get so bad, the first people those under threat require to do the job for them is our Australian defence forces. Earlier I mentioned the Greens. If the Greens got in trouble, the first thing they'd do is pick up the phone and dial triple zero, and the first people who'd be responding would be the police, and they'd expect that. Yet they turn on the police every step of the way. I don't know why; they just seem to hate the way our country is run.

In the course of the months since the middle of last year, when the member for Canning, as shadow home affairs minister at the time, made the points about this bill I referred to earlier, these issues have, we believe, been satisfactorily examined and addressed, especially in the form of questioning of a number of witnesses, including ASIO, as part of that PJCIS inquiry. So, that's good. And I think the government needs to listen. I have this genuine concern that, given the Labor government's huge role in the House of Representatives, there is a bit of complacency setting in, that the government is not taking seriously the stakeholder engagement and the consultation it should on each piece of legislation. I fear that there is this inclination to just push things through the House of Representatives and then do the negotiations with those who hold the balance of power in the Senate to get it through. But that's not the way parliament's intended. That's not the way parliament should run.

There is a requirement to make sure that people who want to speak, wish to speak and should speak on bills are given the opportunity to do so, and there is an obligation and a duty upon the government of the day, irrespective of the majority it might have in the House of Representatives, to ensure that it does listen to the opposition. I appreciate that things have been interesting of late, but there are very serious people with very serious and qualified backgrounds in the opposition to assist the government, particularly on bills such as this involving national security and involving our national security organisations. Those experienced and qualified views should be listened to.

I know the PJCIS plays an important role in that, and I commend the government for at least making sure that the questions that we raised in the middle of last year were addressed. Thank you. That's to be commended, because national security is too important to place at any risk and ASIO deserves the very best help and everything that it requires. Those concerns included the view from some individuals and organisations that compulsory-questioning powers are excessive measures for an intelligence agency to possess and they ordinarily should not be broadened, but some also argue that the infrequent use of these powers in the past makes the case that there is no need for their extension.

We do support these bills. They are important. I'm glad that the PJCIS has run ruler over them, and I commend them to the House.

Luke Gosling (Solomon, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

National security, the safety of Australians, must always be any government's No. 1 priority. Without protecting our citizens, without safeguarding our sovereignty, all else is exposed and we have no foundation or basis on which to build our national prosperity and wellbeing. Yet in protecting Australians we face a fundamental tension between individual freedoms and collective security, and that is at the heart of today's debate on this Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025. At stake is not just a set of powers for ASIO but a question: how do we balance the liberties that define us as a democracy with the reality that, in a dangerous world, we may need extraordinary tools to keep each other safe. Of course, we now consider this bill with the dark shadow of the Bondi terrorist attack. That tragedy looms large over it. Such a tragedy highlights that freedom must exist alongside constant vigilance. ASIO assumes the responsibility of maintaining that vigilance with its partners on behalf of our society, and this bill aims to give them the tools that they need to do that job.

ASIO performs some of the most important yet least visible work in protecting our nation. Every day, right now its officers are operating quietly and professionally to detect, to deter, to disrupt and to defeat threats to Australia's security. They do so under intense scrutiny and they do so within strict legal frameworks and also often without public recognition. I want to very publicly give them that recognition now in this place, and I thank other members that do the same. It is their dedication, their integrity and their professionalism that helps ensure Australians can go about their lives safely and freely. We owe them a great debt of gratitude for the work that they are undertaking right now—in the shadows, often, and quietly—to keep our democracy secure and to keep our citizens safe.

Let's consider the purpose of the bill and why it matters. Let me begin by summarising, which I'm sure honourable members will appreciate, what the bill does and why the government argues that we very much need it. I welcome the bipartisan commentary of the previous speaker, the member for Riverina, in this regard.

Currently, division 3 of part III of the ASIO Act grants ASIO compulsory questioning powers. Under a warrant, ASIO can compel a person to answer questions or produce materials relevant to serious security matters. This bill proposes to remove the sunset provision, making these powers permanent. It also expands the scope of what ASIO can question people about. It will include not only espionage—and we know there's plenty of that going on, and foreign interference—but now also sabotage, promotion of communal violence, attacks on defence systems, and serious border security threats. We know that these threats are a real and present danger to the Commonwealth. The bill also reforms the prescribed authority—that is, the person overseeing the questioning—by adding disqualifying criteria, and it strengthens reporting requirements, especially where a person has been charged or a charge is imminent. Importantly, it also mandates a Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security review three years after commencement.

The Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Cyber Security, the Hon. Tony Burke MP, wrote to PJCIS on 25 August last year to refer the bill for inquiry and report, and the review showed diverging views, with some placing more importance on security and others emphasising individual liberties and freedoms. That is the tension that I referred to earlier in my contribution. During the PJCIS review, a wide range of submissions were made, and they reveal a real debate between security advocates and civil libertarian voices. It's important that we listen respectfully to all the voices and to all members of parliament during this debate, no matter what their view.

The Department of Home Affairs, in its submission, argues strongly that these powers remain necessary in light of changing security threats. They say that over the past 20 years the regime has struck a sound balance between impact on individual rights and the need for intelligence, with which we protect Australian citizens and our interests. They also endorse expanding the questioning powers, notably for sabotage, defence system threats and communal violence. On the other hand, libertarian and legal rights groups—for example, Liberty Victoria and state civil liberties councils—have raised their concerns. They warn that making these powers permanent risks eroding fundamental rights—for example, the right to silence, the presumption of innocence, and fair trial protections. The Law Council of Australia, in its public commentary, explicitly cautions that these powers should remain subject to periodic parliamentary review and argue that removing the sunset clause removes a key democratic safeguard. Now, these are not fringe concerns. They reflect the principled worry about overreach, especially when coercive powers are not tightly constrained.

For an insight into the reasons the powers should be permanent, let us consider ASIO's submission to the review. From the Australian government's perspective and ASIO's perspective, the argument is straightforward. We have an evolving threat environment. I don't think anyone can credibly say that we don't. Threats to Australia are ever more complex. The Department of Home Affairs notes that sabotage, border threats and communal violence now present real risks. ASIO raised the terrorism threat level to 'probable' in 2024 and, according to ASIO'S submission 'Australia is confronted by multifaceted merging, intersecting, concurrent and cascading threats' being driven by the convergence of major geopolitical, economic, social and security challenges.'

In his address to the Lowy Institute on 5 November, Director-General of Security and head of ASIO, Mike Burgess AM, grouped threat actors into three cohorts, all threatening our social cohesion in different ways: the aggrieved—individuals that tear at our social cohesion and our social fabric; the opportunistic—organised groups that take advantage of whatever they can for the purposes of their personal or small group ideology; finally and most concerningly, the cunning—persistent and highly capable nation states that will play the long game to exploit faultlines and fractures in countries such as us that they consider hostile to their ambitions.

Secondly, they are causing real damage. The Australian Institute of Criminology, in partnership with ASIO, has calculated that the cost of espionage to Australia in the financial year 2023-24 to be about $12.5 billion—that's with a B. Now, to put that in perspective, that's just under a quarter of the annual Defence budget. Australia's defence systems are facing a greater threat from espionage too, and with this government's elevated level of investment should come elevated levels of protection for the sensitive capabilities and technologies that those investments will deliver. It's essential.

Mike Burgess spoke in terms of the threat actors previously described tearing away at or eroding our social fabric and social cohesion. The cost of this is of course very difficult to quantify; although, meaningfully, he makes this point: 'A more vulnerable, fractured and intolerant society means a less predictable and increasingly volatile security environment.' The costs of this, both financially and to our citizens' sense of freedom and safety, are incalculable.

Thirdly, there's been judicious use so far. These powers have been rarely used. According to public record, in 22 years, only about 20 questioning warrants have been sought and issued. This restraint, they argue, demonstrates that ASIO uses them sparingly, only when less-invasive means will not suffice.

Fourthly, there's better accountability, not less accountability, now. Rather than allow the powers to lapse, the bill embeds stronger oversight through a prescribed authority, reporting requirements and a future PJCIS review. Our government argues that these mechanisms sufficiently guard against misuse.

Fifth, they are a last resort tool. Our government frames these powers as a measure of last resort, a capability you don't want to need but you want to have. These powers are to be used rarely and only in extreme circumstances. These were the terms used by then Attorney-General the Honourable Daryl Williams QC when the powers were first introduced in 2023, and the reasoning still holds today.

There are several checks and safeguards against the use and potential abuse of these powers. These powers are not unfettered. It is critical when giving such serious powers that they are neither unaccountable nor lawless, and this bill exists not in a vacuum but within a framework of checks. So let me highlight briefly in the time remaining some of the key protections. In the issuing process, the powers will still remain subject to a thorough warranting regime. A questioning warrant must be requested by the DG of security and approved by the AG. The prescribed authority who oversees questioning is typically a former judge or someone with judicial type status—that is, a competent person. The bill tightens criteria for who can serve in that role, adding disqualification rules.

There are obligations during questioning. Persons under questioning have rights—access to a lawyer, protections against self-incrimination and other procedural safeguards. Noncompliance or giving false information is an offence with serious penalties.

Thirdly, there's ongoing oversight. The IGIS plays a key role. Questioning under warrant is overseen by an independent prescribed authority to ensure it's appropriate conduct. The bill mandates the review. As I've mentioned, in its submission, the Department of Home Affairs even suggests legislating periodic independent reviews every five years to ensure the regime remains fit for purpose.

In closing, we should support this bill as it delivers a finely-struck balance between what is necessary to achieve security and what is sufficient to protect the individual rights of Australians. It is necessary in these times to get that balance right. I believe that this bill does and, importantly, it allows our security agencies to do what they need to do to protect Australia and our interests.

Kate Chaney (Curtin, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025 engages some of the most intrusive powers available to the Commonwealth, coercive questioning powers that allow ASIO to compel answers from individuals, including people who are not accused of any offence and minors over the age of 14. They engage multiple fundamental rights, including the right to silence, freedom of movement, access to legal representation and the privilege against self-incrimination. Powers like these demand a careful, evidence based approach and a legislative framework that's proportionate to the threat environment and our democratic values.

ASIO'S coercive questioning powers have always been considered extraordinary, even by the standards of national security legislation. That's not just my assessment; it's the consistent language of our human rights institutions and legal profession. Their concerns about proportionality, necessity and safeguards should inform this House in charting a sensible path forward.

This bill makes several significant changes to ASIO'S coercive questioning powers under division 3 of part III of the ASIO Act 1979. In short, it proposes to remove the longstanding sunset clause and, at the same time, expand the grounds for which an adult can be subject to compulsory questioning. The bill makes relatively minor adjustments to oversight and reporting in relation to the exercise of these powers.

The government argues that the security environment is degrading and that certainty is needed for ASIO'S collection powers. I accept this, but the challenge for us is to ensure that, in meeting today's risks, we do not erode the trust that underpins our democracy. Oversight mechanisms must match the gravity of the powers involved. Since 2003, parliament has attached a sunset clause to these questioning powers, extended on six occasions, precisely because they are exceptional and require regular justification. The bill would remove that safeguard entirely, even as it broadens the matters for which questioning can occur. That combination—more scope with less review and scrutiny—sharpens the need for parliament to consider proportionate amendments.

The additional safeguards proposed in the bill, while welcome, are marginal, especially given the extraordinary powers are now proposed to be expanded and made permanent. They are no substitute for the safeguard provided by periodic review and public scrutiny. We know the powers are rarely used but potentially far-reaching. Only a small number of questioning warrants have been issued since their introduction in the wake of September 11, two decades ago, as limited and temporary measures. Yet the powers remain coercive by design. They compel individuals to appear, produce items and answer questions, and noncompliance is a serious offence punishable by up to five years imprisonment. Rarity does not make these powers ordinary. It underscores why their continued necessity should be tested periodically and transparently.

The sunset clause has functioned as an accountability measure that prompts detailed review and parliamentary debate before continuation. Removing it would end that automatic cycle of scrutiny. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security is currently empowered to review these extraordinary powers, but only at the committee's discretion. That is, without the sunset clause, there's no automatic cycle of periodic review and public scrutiny. I note that, in a 2024 submission to the PJCIS, ASIO's preference was to not abolish sunsetting but extend it by five years, to 2030. Even though ASIO's position had changed in its 2025 submission to favour making the powers permanent, the organisation specifically recognised that, to fulfil its mission, ASIO must maintain the confidence and trust of the Australian people, parliament and government.

The Law Council has consistently characterised these as extraordinary coercive powers and opposed making them permanent without stronger justification and safeguards, calling for measures such as judicial ratification and enhanced lawyer access. Their central argument is that if scope is broadened then oversight must be strengthened, not relaxed. Across multiple reports in 2025, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights questioned the necessity of repealing the sunset clause, warning that remaining safeguards may be insufficient given the extent of rights interference.

The common theme is consistency. Powerful tools should be balanced by predictable, structured scrutiny. That's not anti-security; it's the formula for durable legitimacy, which in turn strengthens compliance, cooperation and public trust. The test we should apply is not whether ASIO needs tools to protect Australians. I agree that it does. Rather, the test should be whether the combination of permanently entrenching coercive questioning powers and expanding their scope is necessary and proportionate and whether the oversight architecture is strong enough to command enduring public confidence.

Compulsory questioning affects the rights of people who may never be charged with an offence. It intrudes on the right of silence and can limit access to counsel in ways that are unusual in our system. These features explain why, for 20-plus years, parliament has insisted on sunsetting to force a recalibration if the security context or operational experience changes. Removing that discipline risks normalising exceptionality.

I will be introducing two amendments which would ensure that the bill functions effectively and responsibly. They reflect alternative routes to improving oversight and accountability. Firstly, I will propose that the sunset clause is retained, extended to March 2030, in order to preserve the discipline of periodic parliamentary review. This approach gives immediate operational certainty to ASIO while reaffirming that extraordinary powers must be regularly justified. As a second safeguard, which could operate with or without my first amendment, I'll introduce an amendment to ensure the mandatory statutory review of these powers by the PJCIS. Currently that review is discretionary, even though the PJCIS itself said in its inquiry report tabled last week:

With the entrenchment of the compulsory questioning powers, regular review, including parliamentary oversight by the committee is more important than ever.

I want to address some possible objections to these amendments. Some will ask, 'Won't stronger oversight slow ASIO down?' Well, my proposed amendments to retain the sunset clause and mandate the committee's periodic review of the powers will not burden ASIO's daily operations. They provide legitimate legislative oversight without impeding ASIO's ability to seek or execute questioning warrants.

Another objection could be, 'If the powers are rarely used, why do we need strong safeguards?' We need these safeguards because they are coercive and exceptional powers. Severe but rarely used powers require predictable, independent scrutiny to ensure that they remain necessary and proportionate and are not just permanent and beyond review.

Another objection could be, 'Isn't permanent standard for other ASIO powers?' It's true that many of ASIO's special powers, like those concerning surveillance devices and computer access, do not sunset. But compulsory questioning sits in a different category. It compels information from people who may not be suspects, limits rights normally seen as fundamental, and historically was justified as temporary and exceptional. Treating it differently is consistent with its exceptional character.

Trust grows when powers are used proportionately and overseen credibly. That's why this bill should balance operational need with visible accountability. We cannot afford a false choice between security and rights. Our task is to hold both in view, recognising that the legitimacy of our security laws is itself a national security asset, a measured framework which embeds periodic review and oversight, helps protect against overreach, and sustains the social licence that ASIO needs to do its job effectively. I think there is a credible, constructive middle course: retain the sunset clause consistent with two decades of practice and continue to ensure these powers remain proportionate and appropriate; and/or legislate mandatory periodic reviews by the PJCIS to ensure that parliament periodically tests whether the powers remain necessary and proportionate in light of contemporary risks and practice. Either path respects both the complexity of our security environment and the integrity of our democracy. Either path acknowledges that extraordinary powers deserve extraordinary oversight.

I urge the government to consider amending the legislation in this way—to choose measured safeguards today in order to preserve the legitimacy we will rely on tomorrow. This is how we keep Australians safe while strengthening the trust that keeps us together.

Ash Ambihaipahar (Barton, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025. It's largely a technical bill aimed at amending the compulsory questioning powers in the act. At its core, this bill is about making sure our intelligence laws keep pace with the world around us—a world that is quickly changing, with new threats emerging and extremism on the rise. These changes are not theoretical; they reflect the real pressures our security agencies are dealing with every single day. I want to expand on the context during this speech, while also explaining what this means for the role of being a local MP. While enhancing ASIO's powers is essential, we as elected members must also provide a responsible, reliable and empathetic connection between our constituents and the House.

Security laws alone do not keep this country safe. Trust, social cohesion and a sense of belonging do that. That is how we combat distrust in government and reduce the appeal of extremism. Without this work at the community level, we make the task of our security agencies, law enforcement and judiciary harder, and we jeopardise the safety of our constituents. It is a duty that goes to the core of a local member's work, and one that I do take very seriously.

First, I would like to place these reforms within the security environment we find ourselves in. Mike Burgess, the Director-General of Security for ASIO, has said that Australia has entered a period of 'strategic surprise and security fragility'. He made these comments in February last year. In plain terms, what he's telling us is that the world has become more unpredictable, more volatile and less forgiving of complacency. The threats we face are not always obvious and they do not always look like the threats of the past. He went on to say that this fragility is underlined by eroding social cohesion, declining trust in institutions, and a plague of misinformation and conspiracy. These are not abstract concepts—we see them play out in everyday life in how people talk about politics, how they treat one another online and how quickly misinformation spreads. This isn't just something discussed in reports or briefings. It is something that people are living with every single day. It shows up in the 'us versus them' mentality that increasingly defines public debate, and in the digital echo chambers where false claims are repeated until they feel true.

I acknowledge the particular works of the member for Cowan, the Minister for Small Business, Minister for International Development and Minister for Multicultural Affairs. Dr Anne Aly has done a lot of work in this space, and I think it's important that the chamber should take the time to look at her work that she has contributed in this space.

It's the division and hateful rhetoric we see on our streets online, designed to radicalise Australians who feel left out, angry or alone. We don't need study after study to tell us that we are living in a precarious period. People feel it, they see it, they experience it. I encourage people who don't believe me to just to look at the comment sections of my Facebook posts. It's content that I can't put on the Hansard. It's really difficult that debate our community has resulted in that. That kind of language doesn't appear out of nowhere. It's cultivated, encouraged and amplified, often by people who benefit from that division.

Since that day, many Australians have told me they feel a heightened sense of fear and vulnerability. That's not just in the Jewish communities but across the board. When I began writing this speech, before the Bondi massacre on 14 December, we knew that we were living in a dangerous context, but the horror and the evil that unfolded on that day is something that many of us could not have imagined. It was antisemitism, a vile hatred, that motivated such an attack. In the aftermath, many Australians feel that hatred and insecurity all around them.

I am particularly concerned by the number of young people being radicalised in online spaces. ASIO has warned that this will only increase. In ASIO's submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security they note that, in 2020, a third of their counterterrorism case load involved minors. This was aggravated by an increased amount of time spent online during the COVID-19 pandemic. Burgess has said that this cohort is overwhelmingly male, largely Australian born and drawn together not by a single ideology but by a fascination with violence. That detail matters because it challenges some easy but incorrect narratives. I'm not repeating these facts to lay blame. Rather, they show that claims about imported violence are often themselves a symptom of radicalisation, not a reflection of reality.

Our young people are being targeted at one of the most vulnerable times in their lives. They're being told that their loneliness, frustration and lack of opportunities are the fault of a neighbour, migrant or minority group. In truth, the threat is often far closer to home. It is the anonymous online forum that rewards outrage. It's the algorithm that promotes the most extreme content because it captures attention. It is the replacement of real human connection with constant exposure to anger and fear. This is why measures like the social media ban matter. They recognise that what happens online has very real consequences offline, especially for developing minds.

As parliamentarians we see this evolving context play out in our communities and, yet, I also hear something else from constituents: how lucky they feel to live in this country and how strongly they want it to remain a safe and welcoming country. There are two parts to that task. The first is passing legislation like this bill before us and the anti-hate legislation that was passed a fortnight ago. The second part is less visible but just as important. We must ensure we are playing proactive, constructive roles in our communities. Being an MP does not just mean turning up to presentations or events, while I do enjoy that. It means connecting with all these groups, families and religious groups across the electorates and providing them with effective, efficient connection to government. It's a role that I'm very much humbled to be able to have and I'm proud to play a part in it. It is about consistent, genuine engagement. It means speaking with people one on one, explaining decisions early and listening seriously to their concerns. Populism connects with people because it speaks directly and plainly. We can do the same, without the fear, division or extremism that often accompanies it. If we do not, we risk increasing the likelihood that extraordinary powers will be needed more often. We want ASIO to have the powers it needs to keep Australians safe and we want those powers to be used carefully, proportionately and only when necessary. To make that possible, we as MPs must do our part.

In a similar vein, let me explain the amendments that are before us. ASIO has a compulsory questioning warrants framework under the act. The warrants were first introduced by the Howard government in 2003 as temporary measures, and these compulsory questioning powers are a valuable intelligence collection tool to protect Australians from threats to their security. The clauses in question have been used sparingly but continuously over successive governments. Though originally temporary, the sunset clause on these provisions has been extended five times. Each time, it has been subject to multiple parliamentary and independent reviews. These amendments remove the sunset clause and make the regime permanent. By making it permanent, we are formalising an already regular practice and, in turn, providing certainty and clarity to our security organisations.

As it stands, there are only three grounds upon which an adult can be questioned. These grounds are if the adult has engaged in espionage, politically motivated violence or acts of foreign interference. It covers where these acts are directed or committed in Australia or not. We are adding four new grounds on which an adult can be questioned. These are where they engage in sabotage, where they promote communal violence, where they attack Australia's defence system or for the protection of Australia's territorial and border integrity from serious threats. The addition of these grounds gives ASIO the power it needs to investigate any potential threats to Australia's peace and security. Put simply, this ensures ASIO can investigate the full range of modern national security threats, not just the ones we were focused on 20 years ago. I think the power to investigate threats of communal violence is particularly important in the wake of 14 December. Wherever there is an actor spruiking violence against a group of people for simply existing, ASIO should have the power to investigate and question this person before the threat becomes real.

There are also amendments to ensure that, for every questioning warrant, the Director-General must give the Attorney-General a written report containing listed details. These details include any non-compliance or contravention of warrants granted. Such enhanced reporting obligations ensure that these laws are not misused whilst maintaining transparency and accountability.

A prescribed authority is a person appointed by the Attorney-General under subsection 34AD(1) of the ASIO Act. They play a crucial role in ensuring compliance with the law and protecting the rights of the person being questioned. Eligible persons are former judges who have served on a superior court for at least five years, the current president or deputy president of the ART, or a senior counsellor like a barrister who has been enrolled as a legal practitioner for at least 10 years and holds a current practising certificate. These amendments expand the list of persons who are not eligible to be a prescribed authority. It does so to make sure that anyone with a conflict of interest cannot act in this role. They include members of the Defence Force, APS employees or a Public Service agency head, members of parliament, the Director of Public Prosecutions or solicitors-general. They also propose grounds where the Attorney-General may or must terminate the term of the person serving in that role.

This bill reflects the reality of the security environment Australia is now facing. It acknowledges that threats have evolved and extremism is adapting and that our legal framework must do the same. At the same time, it reinforces the principle that strong security powers must sit alongside strong safeguards, oversight and accountability. And it reminds us that laws alone are not enough. As parliamentarians, we must continue to build trust, strengthen social cohesion and ensure people are heard, supported and included. That is how we reduce the conditions in which extremism thrives. That is how we support the work our security agencies do, and that is how we keep Australia safe not just in law but in practice.

Helen Haines (Indi, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025. This is the second and, I would say, more controversial of the two bills introduced to this parliament to update the powers of our national intelligence agency. The first extended the operation for compulsory questioning powers. This bill goes further by making those powers permanent. The bill proposes to remove longstanding sunset provisions, establish new grounds for compulsory questioning warrants, alter who may oversee that questioning, and change the circumstances in which warrants may be issued when a person has been charged or a charge is imminent.

Once again, I'm disappointed that debate on legislation of such gravity is being relegated to the Federation Chamber, rather than being debated in the full light of the House of Representatives. Measures that shape the reach of our intelligence agencies deserve the highest level of scrutiny, not a narrow window for debate. It's a troubling pattern. Laws with profound consequence for civil liberties and the rule of law must never be met with constrained debate, limited scrutiny and the erosion of any safeguards.

ASIO plays a critical role in maintaining our national security and responding to serious threats through the collection of intelligence information. I don't underestimate the complexity of these threats, nor the responsibility of government to equip our agencies with powers that are effective and proportionate to the threat environment—powers that protect our citizens and contribute to peace throughout the world—but effective powers must never become unfettered powers.

Compulsory questioning powers were introduced in 2003 as part of Australia's response to the increased international threat of terrorism, following the horrendous September 11 attacks on the United States. They were framed then as a measure of last resort, reserved for the most extreme of circumstances. In 2020 these powers were expanded to cover warrants in matters relating to espionage, politically motivated violence and acts of foreign interference. This bill now substitutes the definition of 'adult questioning matter' to include espionage, sabotage, politically motivated violence, promotion of communal violence, attacks on Australia's defence system, acts of foreign interference, and the protection of Australia's borders. During the lapsed statutory review—only in the last parliament—both ASIO and the Department of Home Affairs recommended against including border security in this list of powers, yet they've changed their tune in recent times. We have little detail to properly consider the shift in this opinion, and detail is important.

Australia already has a very rigorous, multi-agency border protection framework. Evidence to the PJCIS inquiry into this bill did not suggest a historic peak in threats to border protection but instead noted global developments that can drive the displacement of people. We should remember that people seeking asylum are some of the most vulnerable people around the world; they are fleeing conflict and violence, not seeking to perpetrate it.

One justification advanced for these changes is the convenience of aligning ASIO's compulsory questioning with the rest of their warrant powers, including broadening additional heads of security through undefined or vaguely defined terms. Convenience, however, is not a sufficient test for necessity or proportionality when extraordinary powers are at stake. While this bill strengthens some eligibility and termination provisions for prescribed authorities, it gives the Attorney-General certain discretion over appointments and it does not fully resolve concerns about actual or perceived conflicts of interest. In my view, the ratification of warrants would be better safeguarded in a judicial setting, instead of by ministerial approval.

This bill also fails to strike an appropriate balance regarding access to legal advice for someone being questioned under these powers. The point has been well made that such legal representation is only meaningful if sufficient information is available about the basis and the scope of the warrant. There remain unresolved concerns about rule-of-law principles, including privilege against self-incrimination.

Less than two years ago, ASIO told the PJCIS that it no longer saw a strong case for retaining the power to question minors under warrant. This was because ASIO had at the time never used or requested a minor questioning warrant. ASIO has walked back this position and now argues it's proportionate to the potential threat to security. Again, it's difficult to understand the evidence base behind this when we know little about the threat.

Repeal of this power is not before the House, and I question why successive governments have retained these powers when they remain unused and unjustified. The prospect of extraordinary powers being held in reserve for hypothetical future use on a child does not give me assurance that any of these powers are indeed proportionate to the threat. It further concerns me that we're not seeking other alternatives within our judicial system for such circumstances.

It's so important in this House when we legislate laws of such consequence as these that we don't engage in groupthink, that we do put forward questions to really interrogate why we need these laws and the proportionality of them. A sunset clause was not part of the original bill but was negotiated in to secure its passage and provide a protective measure—in fact, by Labor in opposition. To my point, we must never groupthink. We must really interrogate these. The sunset clause has been renewed five times since 2003. That reflects the parliament's consistent recognition that these are extraordinary powers and that they should be monitored.

I acknowledge that ASIO has used these powers at a discretionary level over the past 20 years and that they have cited the complex, challenging and changing nature of the threat environment as a reason they continue. This bill, though, removes the sunset clause and replaces it with a statutory review in three years. I share the view expressed by the Law Council and others that the sunset clause signals the extraordinary nature of compulsory questioning powers. The very restraint in their use underscores the function of the sunset clause. And by requiring parliament to regularly revisit them, the sunset clause delivers the accountability and balance that were central to its original purpose. It ensures that extraordinary powers remain subject to deliberate democratic scrutiny by us—by the parliament—retaining the check and balance that was a condition of Labor's support back in 2003 and that has proven its value over decades.

It is a responsibility of us as legislators to interrogate laws of such great consequence to our citizens. Entrenching these extraordinary powers in our laws, even with the statutory review mechanism, risks normalising executive overreach. At a time when our nation is still living the shock and grief of terrorist atrocity committed against Jewish people at Bondi in December and another terrorist attempt against First Nations people on 26 January, our nation is desperate for effective responses to radicalisation and threats to public safety. Just last month this parliament strengthened laws addressing hate crimes and a longstanding need to improve information-sharing between agencies to better identify and respond to threats.

However, in pursuing security we must not lose sight of lessons from around the world of the tragic consequence of governments exercising extraordinary powers over its citizens. We see the consequence of the politicisation of state powers and its undermining of individual freedoms and the safety of citizens. We have fervently protected our democratic conventions, and we should avoid weakening the mechanisms of scrutiny that preserve the balance between executive and judicial powers. We cannot allow the creep of overreach to compromise that balance.

Of course we must be vigilant against external threats, but we must also be vigilant against the erosion of principles that define our democracy, because protecting those principles provides the ultimate safety for Australians, their rights and the rule of law.

Claire Clutterham (Sturt, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak in support of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025. As with the other bills pertaining to security and intelligence that have been debated in the 48th parliament, the primary purpose of this bill is to implement reform to keep Australians safe. The role the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation plays in doing that and keeping Australians safe from national security threats cannot be underestimated. There is a grave need, more than ever, for its powers to be adequate to support this function at the same time as being necessary and proportionate to respond to the everchanging and challenging security environment.

This bill will operate to amend the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation's compulsory questioning powers as contained in division 3 of part 3 of the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Act 1979. Division 3 of part 3 of the ASIO Act provides for ASIO to request that the Attorney-General issue a warrant to require a person to appear before a prescribed authority to give information, or produce a record or some other thing that is or may be relevant to intelligence that's important in relation to the matter being questioned. The Attorney-General may issue an adult questioning warrant for a person over 18 years or a minor questioning warrant for a person aged 14 to 17 years.

In doing this, the bill also seeks to make comprehensive reforms to the compulsory questioning warrants framework by amending the act to do the following. It expands the scope of adult questioning warrants to include four new grounds and, by making amendments to requirements relating to prescribed authorities, includes new grounds that would disqualify a prospective prescribed authority from being appointed and amending when the Attorney-General can terminate the appointment of a prescribed authority. The bill also makes an amendment to the Intelligence Services Act 2001 to require that the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security review the amendments contained in the bill on the third anniversary of its commencement. Background that is important and relevant to this is that on 25 August 2025 the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025 was referred to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security for inquiry and report. Six public submissions were received, and a public hearing into the operation of the framework was held on 17 November 2025, resulting in that amendment.

The four new expanded grounds, in relation to which the scope of adult questioning warrants apply, are already set out in section 4 of the ASIO Act under the definition of 'security'. Security is defined in that legislation as:

… protection of, and of the people of, the Commonwealth and the several States and Territories from:

(i) espionage;

(ii) sabotage;

(iii) politically motivated violence;

(iv) promotion of communal violence;

(v) attacks on Australia's defence system; or

(vi) acts of foreign interference;

whether directed from, or committed within, Australia or not …

Of these elements in the definition of security, sabotage, promotion of communal violence, attacks on Australia's defence system and serious threats to Australia's territorial and border integrity will be included in the scope of adult questioning in additional to espionage, politically motivated violence including terrorism and acts of foreign interference. These newly expanded areas were already contemplated in the ASIO Act as being relevant to the security of the Australian people. They will now join the other existing elements of that definition with respect to the scope of adult questioning.

In his 2025 annual threat assessment, the Director-General of Security outlined ASIO's outlook to 2030, which assessed that, over the next five years, Australia's security environment will become more dynamic, more diverse and more challenging. Australia is facing multifaceted, merging, intersecting, concurrent, cascading threats, and, if we are to ensure that Australians are safe and feel safe, ASIO must be properly equipped to respond. The 2025 annual threat assessment also outlined that now more than ever information is needed to allow ASIO to anticipate, to look forward, to identify trends and to identify patterns of behaviour. Credible risk assessments and advice to government and other stakeholders can only be developed in relation to credible information from relevant sources. ASIO's compulsory-questioning powers are part of this. They are a vital capability in protecting Australia and Australians from threats to their security. Introduced in 2003, following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, the powers were intended to improve ASIO's ability to identify and counter threats to terrorism. The security environment has evolved considerably since 2003, and these reforms have been made to the framework as a result.

Our environment, from a security perspective, is becoming more complex. We have seen recent instances of foreign interference on our shores. Along with security threats from espionage and politically motivated violence, these remain our principal security concerns. But, as things move and change and they do so rapidly, it is important that ASIO's powers continue to evolve to enable ASIO to respond in an increasingly volatile threat environment.

The compulsory-questioning framework is therefore critical, but it must also be proportionate and reasonable to the objective. In this respect, the compulsory framework has, since its introduction, been subject to five parliamentary and two independent reviews. The use of compulsory-questioning powers over more than two decades by ASIO has demonstrated that the powers have been used judiciously to obtain high-value intelligence in circumstances where ASIO's other powers may not be as effective.

In reflection of the fact that proper and thorough oversight is critical, given the nature of these powers and the need to ensure trust and confidence, the bill will also make consequential amendments to the Intelligence Services Act 2001 to enable that further review of the compulsory-questioning framework by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. This is a part of a process of continual review and measurement to ensure that the bill and the framework it promotes are working but working in a way that promotes public trust and confidence.

In this bill the compulsory-questioning warrants will become a permanent feature of ASIO's intelligence collection powers, allowing ASIO to collect the information and intelligence it needs to anticipate Australia's needs in a changing security environment. It must be proactively equipped to deal with this, and this step is illustrative of the government's view that these compulsory-questioning powers now form an essential part of ASIO's collection powers, particularly in light of the evolving security environment.

As an Australian citizen living and working in this great country, I want ASIO to be able to anticipate, to be able to properly advise government and other stakeholders and to be able to prepare accurate and thorough risk assessments so that dynamic and critical risks to the security of the Australian people can be properly managed. I want to know that ASIO knows what is going on and what the threats to this country and its people might be and how best to counter them.

That being said, these compulsory-questioning powers are, of course, serious and need to be used within a framework of the highest standards of integrity, fairness and probity. ASIO has used these powers judiciously since inception, and the framework must be designed so it can continue to do so. The bill therefore retains the existing safeguards, oversight mechanisms and accountability measures that apply to the framework, including oversight by the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security.

The measures are available to all members to review in section 34 of part III of division 3 of the ASIO Act and include contact with legal and other representatives, the use and disclosure of information so as not to prejudice a fair trial, the prohibition on questioning of persons under 14 years of age, access to interpreters and additional time for questioning if an interpreter is required. They also include the requirement that the subject of compulsory questioning be advised of the nature of the warrant in terms of what it allows the prescribed authority to do, the period for which the warrant is in force, the circumstances in which the subject may be apprehended, the subject's right to apply for financial assistance and the subject's right to make a complaint in relation to aspects of the warrant.

A person who is the subject of a compulsory questioning warrant continues to have the ability to seek a judicial remedy in relation to the warrant or treatment in connection with the warrant. The person also has a right to contact the Inspector-General of Security and Intelligence to make a complaint in relation to ASIO, to contact the Commonwealth Ombudsman to make a complaint in relation to the Australian Federal Police or to contact the complaints agency of the relevant state or territory to make a complaint in relation to the police force of that relevant state or territory. So with respect to these safeguards and the new regime, division 3 of part III will remain consistent with article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as it is reasonable, necessary and proportionate to achieving the legitimate objective of maintaining national security.

Further, the measures in the bill will provide additional strength to the existing safeguards already in place in the framework, including by ensuring the independence and impartiality of prescribed authorities and ensuring the Attorney-General is made aware of relevant information regarding conduct under the warrant, including any instances of noncompliance. These amendments will strengthen key safeguards in the existing legislative framework to promote fairness, uphold human rights and the right to a fair trial, and to enhance transparency and accountability.

The Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation performs an essential role in protecting Australia and Australians from threats to their security. ASIO's compulsory questioning powers provide them with a unique and necessary tool to investigate the most significant threats confronting Australia today. The important reforms contained in this bill are designed to ensure that ASIO's powers remain commensurate to the emerging challenges being faced by Australia so that ASIO can execute its mission to counter threats to Australia's security, and ensure that all Australians not only feel safe but are safe.

Terrorists, malign actors and extremists need to get it right once in order to cause destruction, injury and death on a mass scale. ASIO has to get it right 100 per cent of the time, and it needs to be properly equipped to do so. I stand with the Minister for Home Affairs in this important work, and with this government as it prosecutes its commitment to ensuring Australia's national security laws continually evolve to protect the Australian community while ensuring that strong safeguards and public trust and confidence in the process remain firmly in place. I commend the bill to the House.

Barnaby Joyce (New England, Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

This obviously is important because we're dealing with the lapse of legislation if it doesn't pass. We're also strengthening powers of investigation for malfeasance that warrants investigation. It's pertinent at the moment because we live in a dynamic environment, which is changing to our detriment. We have in the world at the moment the rise of totalitarianism and there is most definitely an overt form of intrusion into Australia's operation of its government.

We have, even in this building, had issues pertinent to people with interests working, whether they realise it or not, on behalf of other governments, and I also have had reason to question the motivations of policy directions at certain times. I'll go back to the time of changes to the Foreign Investment Review Board that surrounded the sale of Cubbie Station. I made it a distinct purpose to tighten restrictions, especially those pertinent to state-owned enterprises. I remember reading in the Chinese English newspapers that I was noted as 'Ban-a-Buy' Joyce because of my role to try and tighten up foreign investment by state owned enterprises in our nation. I was derided as a bigot, a racist, a redneck and a xenophobe. Now I'm just correct because the state owned enterprises were doing precisely that. Chinese state owned enterprises were doing precisely that to get a foothold in Australia. People have to understand that the Chinese government sees things in their national interest as not being defined by their borders. If they have a financial interest, that's a national interest.

I go to one that is of great concern recently—not so much because of its significance but because of the discussion and the rhetoric that surrounds it. It is the Port of Darwin. The Prime Minister of Australia, whilst in Dili at a press conference, made it clear that Australia was going to reacquire or take back the Port of Darwin. It is owned by Landbridge. That's a Chinese state owned enterprise. It was an incredibly foolish thing that we lost control of it. Ambassador Xiao Qian almost immediately came out in Canberra and said, 'No, you won't be taking that back.' It was as direct as that. To this point, I haven't seen any discussion in the chamber or a statement from the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to how they're going to reconcile those two completely different positions. This is in live time. This is happening right now, and it isn't so much a secret. It is playing out right in front of people's faces.

We in this nation have a great reason to try and become as strong as possible as quickly as possible, and I've been saying that for a very long time. Ultimately, strength is the only thing that is going to keep you safe, and in Australia we've almost been on a working plan to make ourselves weak. We've done it with everything from energy policy to our loss of manufacturing to a fascination on policy that we can't possibly change such as climate policy, and all the time we have been becoming comparatively weaker and less able to deal with the substantial change in circumstance that is around us.

We've also have to realise that President Xi Jinping has said that they will take Taiwan by 2027. We are in 2026. We either believe that he's having a joke with us or it's rhetoric or that he's serious. I'm of the view that he's serious. In doing that, there will be a diligent process of organisation to iron out any possible problems that we might be part of for their purpose, which means there is a heightened reason for them to be right on the balls of their feet, trying to insert themselves in a way that gets people on side even if they're not even aware they're on side—but, you know, friendly fools—and also using things such as AI to its umpteenth degree to make sure that they have the appropriate code in the appropriate areas that can create mass disruption if required at the appropriate time. There is also just straight out observation, whether it's cartography or oceanography, to work out all the dynamics so that, if it's really required, they can bring devastating force upon our nation.

Is that rhetoric? No, it's not. We have seen the flotilla that went to the Tasman Sea adjacent to Sydney and practised live fire exercises. The issue there is that we didn't know about it. That was one of the most sophisticated ships in the Chinese navy. What is the purpose of being there? Well, there are two. One is to give a very unsubtle message to Australia to be careful, and the other one is to practice just in case they need to do it. And of course they're practising why? They're practising because they're near Sydney. It's as simple as that. At the same time, a so-called 'research vessel' was making its way through Bass Strait, no doubt getting all the forms of the oceanography that are required so they have complete understanding of that section of Australia. Why? Because Melbourne's there. So that's Sydney and Melbourne.

Now, it's so terrifying that people just want to switch off and say, 'It's not happening,' but it is, and that's the issue. If they're willing to put the tens of millions of dollars just into those excursions before you even look at the platforms they used then they're also willing to put the money into working out how they can have eyes and ears inside this building, how they can have useful fools, how they can create the mechanism for financial gain in such a form as you feel beholden to them. That is also absolutely the point. We have seen, no doubt, people who have been members of parliament and their next job is for Chinese company, for a Chinese state-owned enterprise. The question has to be raised: When did those discussions for that job after politics start? Was it whilst you were in politics? And if it was whilst you were in politics, what were those discussions? Where did you have them? What was the skill set that you were really offering that company that they'd want you to work for—I don't know—Landbridge?

Obviously this says that ASIO has to be the absolute essence of patriotism, the absolute essence of guile, the absolute essence of cunning to match up to the threat that is ever-present right now. Then we have, I believe, decided in our foolishness to create a form of Australia where we don't have cultural control because we've believed in this euphemistic idea of multiculturalism when we should be concentrating on Australian culture, creating guardrails.

The tragic representation of the balkanisation and the discord from a clash of cultural views of the world was Bondi. Why do I say that? Because the murderers at Bondi believed that they were doing something that was appropriate. They didn't know the people. There was no heat in it. It was cold, clinical, calculated and driven by their cultural belief. If there was an overarching form of guardrails of Australian culture—and that is not saying that is determined by creed, by colour, by race; it's just that there has to be those guardrails there—then there would be no motivation for a person to go out and kill other Australians in broad daylight.

My concern is that they're not the only two people in Australia who think like that. My concern is that there is a whole range of people now in Australia who think like that. We saw, even after these so-called hate laws—which were censorship laws because they haven't addressed the problem—a demonstration in Sydney which explicitly reaffirmed the tenor of views that were the seed stock for the Bondi massacre. And it happened on television; we were watching it. There's been no seismic change in this continual process of believing that there is a higher purpose than an attachment to the Australian culture. In a metaphorical state, there is no clearer indication than what we observed in that demonstration the other night. There was not one Australian flag there. There were Palestinian flags. There were sort of quasi-fundamentalist flags, where they do the appropriate changes so they can't be held. But, you know, it is a sign. It is a metaphor for what they want to portray. It was organised. It had the capacity to co-ordinate people to arrive. Obviously, the questions now are: How is that happening? What is that organisational structure? And people say, 'Well, you know, they might be all well-meaning.' No. Within that structure there's a very good chance there's a malevolent force that has the capacity to create discord. That is ultimately what happens to Australia—you get a mechanism of discord, and the driving of it mightn't be as obvious as you'd think. It mightn't be people who really have their heart set on what is happening in Gaza or Palestine or Israel. What their heart might actually be set on is creating disturbance—that's what they want. They want disturbance, they want discord, they want disruption and they want panic, because that makes us, as a nation, weaker.

There's another thing that we should be very aware of. At the appropriate times and the appropriate venues—and we've seen it out the front of this building—the Chinese government have the capacity to organise quite a substantial number of people to turn up and either praise or demonstrate. How does that happen? How do they do it? What chat group are they on? Who's organising it?

These are right in front of us now, so we need to have ASIO, ASIS and the Australian Signals Directorate working within government on a regular basis at the highest levels. The National Security Committee must have these bodies at the table, and these bodies must be courageous enough not to tell you what you probably read in the Australian that morning but to get to the substance of the issues that need to be pursued.

I don't doubt for one second the patriotism of the Prime Minister or anything like that. Dismiss any idea that I have such an inclination—I don't. But we have to understand that, given where we are right now, in the western Pacific, and noting what is happening in real time around Australia and within Australia, the circumstances that we find ourselves in are entirely different to what they would have been 20 years ago or 30 years ago, and the technology and capacity that is here now is multiple times more complicated and more destructive than what we would have had 20, 30 or 40 years ago. This is way beyond Cold War clumsiness, the Petrov affair and Kim Philby—that's all interesting reading. This is sleeping code, whether it's in the banking sector or whether it's in critical infrastructure, which has a 24/7 process of observation. For this purpose I support the bill, but I say: it's really just a forerunner of the far greater work that we need to do.

Tania Lawrence (Hasluck, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak in support of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025. The central responsibility of this parliament is to keep Australians safe, in their homes and in their communities. The terrible events across the country recently have stressed that duty, and the parliament has responded. We also have a parallel duty to ensure that the powers that we confer upon the government and its security agencies are exercised lawfully, with proportionality and with proper oversight. These objectives are not in conflict. Proper oversight provides a strengthening of our systems of security. As Minister Burke stated earlier in this debate, there are amendments here to ensure the independence and impartiality of the prescribed authorities, further safeguards around questioning powers, and additional reporting requirements to the office of the Attorney-General.

ASIO's compulsory questioning powers are among the most serious authorities available to the Commonwealth. They are powers that the parliament has revisited repeatedly over the past two decades, not because we doubt their necessity but because we understand the gravity of granting them. Each review, each sunset extension and each added safeguard reflects a consistent parliamentary instinct: vigilance. This bill acknowledges a changed security environment while reinforcing that instinct. As the Director-General of Security has made clear in ASIO's most recent threat assessment, Australia faces a more complex, more diffuse and more interconnected set of risks than at any time in recent history. Espionage, foreign interference, sabotage, attacks on defence systems, the promotion of communal violence and threats to border integrity are no longer discrete risks operating in isolation. They overlap and reinforce one another and evolve quickly. The bill responds to that reality by extending adult questioning warrants to additional heads of security. This is not about expanding powers for its own sake. It is about ensuring that the tools available to ASIO match the threats it is tasked with countering.

But with expanded remit must come strengthened restraint. One of the most significant changes in this bill is the removal of the sunset clause on compulsory questioning powers. Sunsets have played an important role. They have forced governments to justify the continued use of extraordinary powers and have required parliament to take stock of how those powers operate in practice. The fact that these provisions have been reviewed multiple times by parliamentary committees and independent reviewers should give the House confidence that they have not drifted beyond their original intent. Removing the sunset does not mean removing scrutiny, though. On the contrary: this bill embeds further statutory review by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security three years after commencement. The PJCIS is a committee of which I am proud to be a member.

I want to focus on what I regard as the most important aspect of this legislation: the strengthening of safeguards. The bill tightens the eligibility requirements for prescribed authorities, expanding disqualifying factors to ensure clear independence from the executive, parliament and prosecutorial roles. And that matters. When individuals are compelled to answer questions under warrant, public confidence depends on the independence and impartiality of the authority overseeing that process.

The bill also clarifies and strengthens arrangements for post-charge questioning, ensuring that, where criminal proceedings are underway or imminent, questioning occurs only before appropriately qualified prescribed authorities. This process protects the integrity of the criminal justice process and the fundamental right to a fair trial. In addition, the enhanced reporting requirements to the Attorney-General, including mandatory reporting of any noncompliance or contravention of warrant conditions, reinforce transparency and accountability. These are not procedural niceties; they are core democratic safeguards.

In Hasluck, I represent communities that are richly diverse, outward looking and deeply connected to the world beyond our shores. As well, many of my constituents work in defence-adjacent industries—logistics, resources and advanced manufacturing. Others come from communities with direct lived experience of conflict, authoritarianism and state overreach. When they talk to me about national security, they do not frame it as an abstract debate; they want Australia to be resilient in the face of foreign interference and emerging threats. But they are equally clear that our response must reflect the democratic values that brought many of them to this country in the first place. This is why, for me, safeguards, independence and proportionality are not theoretical concepts. They inevitably shape whether people trust our institutions, cooperate with authorities and have confidence that the government's power is exercised judiciously and fairly.

In previous contributions to this House I have spoken about the importance of proportionality—the idea that strong laws are legitimate only when they are accompanied by strong protections. Australians understand the need for security agencies to operate effectively. But they also expect, rightly, that extraordinary powers will be used sparingly and lawfully and will be subject to rigorous oversight. Public trust is not automatic. It is earned through transparency, restraint and accountability.

This bill reflects that balance. It recognises that security and rights are not competing values but complementary ones. A system that protects rights strengthens security, because it maintains the legitimacy on which our institutions depend. I've spoken previously in this House about the importance of pairing security with humanity and restraint. In August 2025, when speaking on a motion commemorating Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I reflected on the long shadow cast when states pursue security without sufficient regard to human consequences. That contribution was not about history alone. It was about the enduring lesson that power, once normalised, must always be bounded by conscience and law. Similarly, during debate in 2024 on domestic and family violence measures, I spoke about community safety as something that is strengthened, not weakened, when people trust the institutions designed to protect them. That same principle applies here. Intelligence powers are most effective when the public is confident that they are used judiciously, independently and as a last resort.

Finally, this legislation is a reminder of parliament's ongoing responsibility. National security laws are never set-and-forget. They require constant attention, regular review and a willingness to adapt as circumstances change. By modernising ASIO's questioning powers, expanding their scope to meet contemporary threats and reinforcing the safeguards that govern their use, this bill meets that responsibility. It equips ASIO to do its vital work, while ensuring that the exercise of power remains subject to law, oversight and democratic control. I commend the bill to the House.

Allegra Spender (Wentworth, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today to speak on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025. Australia's intelligence agencies, including the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation, ASIO, play a critical role in keeping the Australian community safe from harm. ASIO's ability to undertake its important work, including through the use of tools such as compulsory questioning, is essential to its ability to identify and pre-empt threats. But the powers that they have are significant, and I believe they should be subject to close and regular scrutiny to ensure that ASIO is undertaking its work in line with the expectations and needs of the day.

As a parliament, we have a responsibility to ensure that the powers with which we equip our security agencies are proportionate and necessary. This is why I take very seriously the opportunity to examine this bill. This bill proposes to considerably expand the compulsory questioning powers contained in the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 and to make these powers permanent rather than subject to sunset every three years. The compulsory questioning framework was introduced in 2003 following the September 11 attacks, when many countries, including Australia, were faced with a new reality. We felt the imperative to ensure that our national security agencies had the tools they needed to collect intelligence to pre-empt and disrupt plans of terrorism. The compulsory questioning powers became an important part of our ability to do that. In light of the extraordinary nature of these powers, and to ensure that they were only used judiciously and sparingly, the parliament legislated a sunset period so the powers would be subject to regular review. Since that time, parliament has reviewed and extended the powers every three years. This bill proposes to go further now, removing the sunset provision entirely, and so making these powers permanent. It also expands the scope of adult questioning warrants to cover new grounds, including sabotage and threats to Australia's territorial or border integrity—a significant widening beyond the original focus on acts of espionage and terrorism.

The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation plays a very important role in upholding Australia's national security in identifying and disrupting threats and keeping Australians safe. ASIO's compulsory questioning powers are extremely important, and I should note that there is no suggestion that these powers have been used improperly or excessively in the more than 20 years that they have been in place. But it is not something we should take for granted. I honestly don't believe we should take a set-and-forget approach to the significant powers with which we entrust our national security agencies. These powers are extraordinary and should remain so. I urge the government to consider not making these powers permanent. I support the renewal of these powers, and more so than ever given the devastating terrorist attack in my own community. But, given how broad and powerful these powers are, I urge the government not to remove the sunset clause but to retain the sunset clause.

Compulsory questioning is something that I don't take lightly. Under these powers, ASIO has the ability to force someone to answer questions at risk of penalty, including if they're a minor. I take very seriously the submission of the Law Council of Australia regarding this legislation, which noted among other things that compulsory questioning was never intended to be made permanent and that a regular review is a critical protection. The passage of time alone should not transform an extraordinary power into an ordinary one. The sunset clause has functioned, I believe, very effectively until now as a safeguard against misuse, and I haven't yet been proposed a credible case to change this in this bill.

I support the amendments proposed by the member for Curtin, which would retain the sunset provision and make a review every three years by the PJCIS a mandatory rather than an optional safeguard of the legislation. Until such a time as the PJCIS has an Independent member, it is particularly important that the committee can be counted on to review significant legislation such as this bill as a matter of requirement, rather than according to the preference of the government of the day.

I also am concerned by the bill's failure to wind back the provision for ASIO to compulsorily question minors and support the amendments proposed by the member for Warringah to sunset the minor-questioning provision. Again, these are sunsets which I think are appropriate. I acknowledge the advice from ASIO and others that people are being radicalised younger than ever before—I recognise that threat—and that minors represent a substantial proportion of their case load, but the Law Council has raised that the ability to compulsorily question minors has the potential to significantly trespass on the human rights of a child. ASIO and the Department of Home Affairs have, themselves, accepted that there are less intrusive ways to collect intelligence from minors and that, by the time the minor's activities reach a threshold to warrant compulsory questioning, the matter is better dealt with by the police. Of course, the ideal scenario is that the young person would have been successfully deradicalised long before this point is reached, but that is a topic for another time.

The antisemitic terrorist attack on Bondi Beach tragically reminded us that radicalisation and extremism remain pervasive threats in our society. Bondi showed us that we cannot take for granted for a moment the safety of our community from terrorism. We need to do everything we can to stamp out terrorism and radicalisation while also preserving our social cohesion and civil liberties. This is a difficult balance to strike and something that we must regularly re-examine to ensure that we're getting the balance right.

By the nature of their work, ASIO operates in such a way that most Australians have little idea of what's going on behind the scenes to keep them safe, but the Australian people do deserve to have the confidence that the powers we equip the security agencies with are not being set on default mode. It's precisely because these powers are so extraordinary and because ordinary citizens have so little visibility of ASIO's work that I believe the powers should be subject to regular review by parliament. Really, what I'm urging the government to do is to retain a sunset provision—I think that is a really important part of this bill—and to accept, in particular, the amendments by the member for Curtin. Thank you.

Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal National Party, Shadow Cabinet Secretary) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025. This is an important bill that acknowledges Australia's challenging and increasingly complex security environment, a reality most tragically borne out by the Bondi terrorist attack. It also comes at a time when the national terrorism threat level is classified as 'probable', meaning around 50 per cent. But the risks we face are not limited to terrorism. Australia faces multiple dynamic threats from ideological actors who seek to disrupt society and sow discord, often in ways that are not so obvious at the outset. The bill responds to this reality by formalising and recalibrating ASIO's compulsory-questioning powers to ensure they remain fit for purpose to address the contemporary threat landscape.

ASIO's compulsory-questioning framework allows ASIO, with the approval of the Attorney-General and a prescribed authority, to compel a person to appear and provide information relevant to serious national security threats. In practice, this allows ASIO to require answers and the production of documents where voluntary cooperation is insufficient. These powers exist because intelligence work is inherently preventive. They are designed to identify and mitigate serious risks before they crystallise into acts of violence or mass harm rather than after tragedy has occurred.

The bill removes the longstanding sunset clause over the compulsory questioning powers and makes them permanent. When I say it makes them permanent, I mean it makes them permanent to the extent that anything is permanent in this place—that is, it is always subject to amendment, always. We're not talking about permanent like we talk about permanency with Constitutional provisions. Every single provision of every single bill that comes through this place is always subject to amendment. So while we talk about making them permanent, to the extent that anything is permanent in this place, if anything, after 10 years, I've learnt is that nothing is permanent in this place and the only thing constant is change.

Since their introduction in 2003, these powers have been repeatedly extended because the threat environment has not diminished. What was initially considered an exceptional post 9/11 measure has, regrettably, become an enduring feature of Australia's national security landscape. Not only has the threat endured but it has also continued to evolve. The bill formalises what has already been the de facto position for years. It provides legal certainty to ASIO and allows parliament to focus scrutiny on governance and safeguards rather than repeatedly revisiting the power's existence. Importantly, the bill also expands the scope of adult questioning warrants, which are the warrants that allow ASIO to compel questioning of adults in relation to serious national security threats. Currently, such warrants may be sought in relation to: espionage; politically motivated violence, including terrorism; and acts of foreign interference. The bill amends the definition of an 'adult questioning matter' to include sabotage, the promotion of communal violence, attacks on Australia's defence systems, and serious threats to Australia's territorial and border integrity.

We live in the most geopolitically unstable period since 1945. Foreign interference and espionage rate as some of our greatest national security challenges. Although Australia is a relatively small country by population and, therefore, its ability to be able to walk and chew gum—or to be able to afford to do so—our intelligence agencies have to be able to be equipped to be dealing with not only the threat that we are facing from, quite frankly, countries like China and Russia from an espionage perspective but also the threats that we face from within from extreme Islamic fundamentalists that we have seen result in the deaths of people in Bondi. We cannot be myopic in how we deal with the security of this country. We have to be able to walk and chew gum.

The expansion of the definition of an 'adult questioning matter' that is dealt with by this bill is significant because it reflects our current complex threat environment and recognises that contemporary security threats can be interconnected and do not always fall neatly within what we once considered traditional categories. For example, foreign actors and extremist networks often exploit domestic grievances. We know this to be the case. We have seen Iran up to their armpits in Australian domestic affairs, such that Iran was directly involved in acts of terrorism on Australian soil which led, quite rightly, to this government expelling the Iranian ambassador and two or three other diplomatic staff.

These attacks that were perpetrated by Iran-linked antisemitic groups, which were just criminal gangs, demonstrate how foreign interference can manifest not merely as covert espionage but as direct efforts to inflame communal tensions and undermine social cohesion. In such cases, waiting until conduct escalates into a narrowly defined terrorism or espionage offence may leave intelligence agencies without effective tools at the point that they are most needed. The expanded definition also supports earlier intelligence collection and disruption in complex threat scenarios. It enables ASIO to intervene where there is credible intelligence of serious harm while preserving existing warrant thresholds, ministerial approval requirements and independent oversight mechanisms.

The bill also strengthens oversight, reporting and administrative safeguards. It tightens eligibility and termination provisions for prescribed authorities to reinforce their independence and impartiality. A prescribed authority is an independent legal official, typically a former Superior Court judge or senior legal practitioner, who supervises and controls questioning to ensure it is conducted within strict legal bounds. The bill enhances reporting obligations to the Attorney-General and requires that any questioning occurring after a person has been charged must take place before a retired judge, providing an additional level of independent oversight. Public reporting indicates that ASIO'S compulsory questioning powers have been used very, very sparingly, with only around 20 warrants issued over more than two decades. Oversight bodies, including the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security—the independent statutory watchdog for intelligence agencies—have consistently found that the powers are exercised judiciously and as a measure of last resort. Their limited use reflects the deliberately high statutory threshold governing their application, not overreach or misuse.

Some critics argue that legislation of this kind risks compelling innocent people to undergo questioning, but intelligence agencies are not investigating completed crimes; they are seeking to prevent serious harm to Australians. That necessarily involves compelling information from individuals who may not themselves be suspects but who may possess intelligence critical to disrupting imminent threats. Given the increasingly complex and volatile threat landscape facing Australia in 2025, it is crucial that ASIO retains the legal authority to compel information from individuals who may hold intelligence of national security importance, especially where those individuals would otherwise refuse to provide it.

While this bill is essential, it should not be the end of the conversation when it comes to equipping our intelligence agencies to navigate our current threat environment. More needs to be done to prevent emerging threats in the current security environment post Bondi, particularly threats emanating from radical Islamist extremism. Following the Bondi attack, the coalition's antisemitism, extremism and counterterrorism taskforce called for a broader package of reforms to modernise Australia's counterterrorism framework. This includes updates to control order regimes, surveillance capabilities and other preventive powers. These commonsense measures would complement the intelligence tools provided in this bill and help ensure Australia's counterterrorism laws remain effective in a heightened and evolving threat environment. This bill is a step in the right direction, but much more must be done to properly equip our intelligence and security agencies to navigate the complex threat environment we face today.

I've had the privilege of serving in this place as the deputy chair of the intelligence and security committee that oversees ASIO and our intelligence agencies. I have seen how the sausage is made. It's really important that we retain that parliamentary oversight of our intelligence agencies. For all those who may argue that our intelligence agencies have too much power, I want to remind them of one thing. Just think about Bondi. Just think about the 15 people who were killed. The threat environment in which we live is extremely dynamic and, as Mike Burgess, the ASIO director-general, has rightly pointed out, ASIO and our other intelligence agencies are not all-seeing and they are not all-knowing, nor do we want to be in that environment. We do not want to live in a police state where our freedoms are taken away from us in the name of national security. We have to get the balance right between keeping Australians safe and ensuring that we have the appropriate liberties that 103,000 Australians have died for over the last 126 years.

I want to use my last few moments to, as I often do in this place, acknowledge the efforts of our ADF personnel. We often acknowledge the 103,000 men and women who paid the ultimate sacrifice for protecting this country, but we rarely, in my view, acknowledge the efforts of our intelligence agencies and their people that are stationed in the four corners of this world whose job it is to keep Australians safe. They don't wear a uniform, they certainly don't wear a flag on their left shoulder, they're not armed and, yet, they work to keep us safe. All those men and women often work in what are incredibly dangerous situations for their own personal safety. They do that for you and me and the other 27 million Australians. We should acknowledge the risks that they take every day, and we should thank them for their service.

Zali Steggall (Warringah, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

We must oppose overreach of power, especially when applied to children, who are the least able to protect themselves. A fair society does not normalise secret, coercive questioning of children. National security should never come at the cost of our fundamental values. Australia can be safe while also upholding human rights and the rule of law. Parliament has a duty to stay vigilant. Democratic accountability is important.

In speaking on the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025, I want to say at the outset that I have a deep respect for the work of our intelligence agencies, but I also have a responsibility to scrutinise legislation, especially legislation that seeks to make permanent some of the most intrusive powers ever granted to a Commonwealth agency. Espionage, foreign interference, sabotage and politically motivated violence are real threats. We know this. ASIO plays a vital role in keeping Australians safe amidst complex multithreats to national security and to our security here. We know, following the Bondi terrorism attack, that the accountability of our agencies is incredibly important to ensure Australians are safe. That's why—in that very context—parliamentary oversight is so incredibly important when we are looking at and talking about such broad-reaching powers that this bill seeks to make permanent.

This bill seeks to make three significant changes. It removes the sunset clause for ASIO'S compulsory questioning powers, making them permanent. It expands the scope of those powers and, most concerning, it allows the powers to apply to minors as young as 14, despite ASIO previously stating it does not need those powers in relation to children. Compulsory questioning powers were introduced in 2003 post 9/11 as extraordinary and temporary measures. Over the past 20 years, they have been extended repeatedly. This bill seeks to make these changes permanent and mean that we will not, on a regular basis in this place, make sure that there isn't an overreach of power and have the parliamentary oversight that is so important.

Each time this law has been extended, civil liberties groups and the Law Council of Australia have raised concerns. Rather than addressing those concerns, this bill goes in the opposite direction. It expands the powers and makes them permanent. I have a fundamental issue with that, and every member in this place should also have an issue with that. Sunset clauses are crucial democratic safeguards. They force the parliament to look at the evidence and to consider if laws remain fair and necessary. Removing them strips parliament of oversight and undermines accountability. There should be much more scrutiny of why the government is taking this step at this time.

Grounds for compulsory questioning are expanded in this bill. It now includes sabotage, promotion of communal violence, attacks on our defence system and threats to border integrity. ASIO is on the record stating it does not need powers in relation to border integrity, but they have been included in this bill regardless.

Under this legislation, the scope of adult questioning warrants essentially covers ASIO'S entire security remit, a drift far from the original purpose of the legislation post 9/11, when, I remind you, they were meant to be interim exceptional measures being introduced. The government is now taking a step to make these permanent. It's no longer looking at it from an exceptional point of view but as a permanent situation. It means these powers may be applied in situations that do not present immediate or grave risks to the communities. So the very premise on which these powers were first introduced is not at all the basis on which they are argued to continue.

My biggest concern in relation to this legislation is that this bill fails to protect minors. Children as young as 14 can be compelled to answer questions under threat of criminal penalty. Removing the sunset clause prevents parliament from revisiting whether that is appropriate. Is that commensurate and proportional to threats, embedding a process where minors may be forced to participate in secret questioning? Think of that. We as a nation are saying that we are okay with 14 -year-olds being secretly questioned by ASIO. That is the standard the government is asking us to accept. Australia is a signatory of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which requires that children's best interests be a primary consideration and that they be protected from coercive measures. How is that being given effect in this legislation? I ask that of members of government supporting this legislation. Permanently enacting powers that compel children to be interrogated is not consistent with those obligations under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Then there's a real issue about how children could be interrogated and treated under this legislation in the name of all Australians. In 2024, ASIO confirmed that it had never used a minor questioning warrant and no longer saw a strong case to retain the power—yet children remain captured under this bill. Why? If ASIO are saying they do not need these provisions, why is the government persisting and proceeding with this legislation as it stands? Parliament has a duty to oppose the overreach of power, especially when it comes to children, who are unable to protect themselves. A fair society does not normalise secret, coercive questioning of children. I will move amendments to repeal minor questioning powers or, at the very least, retain the sunset clause for children and add new safeguards.

Compulsory questioning is a powerful and intrusive tool. It compels attendance and answers. It criminalises refusal and it conflicts with core legal principles such as self-incrimination and the right to silence. Proposed safeguards in the bill are welcome but incremental, and they don't address the fundamental overreach. The fact that these powers are rarely used is no reassurance. Once permanent, the powers risks becoming normalised and expanded even further. National security and human rights are not mutually exclusive. Australia can be a safe country without enacting disproportionate and unnecessary laws. We can empower intelligence agency while preserving parliamentary oversight, and protect national security without breaching children's rights. Ultimately, Australia's laws must be fair and proportional. They must keep our nation secure but also protect our democracy and its most vulnerable people—children. For these reasons, I will oppose the bill.

Colin Boyce (Flynn, Liberal National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The question is that this bill be now read a second time. There being no more speakers, I put the question.

Question unresolved.

As it is necessary to resolve this question to enable further questions to be considered in relation to this bill, in accordance with standing order 195, the bill will return to the House for further consideration.

Sitting suspended from 13:26 to 16:00