Luke Gosling (Solomon, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

National security, the safety of Australians, must always be any government's No. 1 priority. Without protecting our citizens, without safeguarding our sovereignty, all else is exposed and we have no foundation or basis on which to build our national prosperity and wellbeing. Yet in protecting Australians we face a fundamental tension between individual freedoms and collective security, and that is at the heart of today's debate on this Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025. At stake is not just a set of powers for ASIO but a question: how do we balance the liberties that define us as a democracy with the reality that, in a dangerous world, we may need extraordinary tools to keep each other safe. Of course, we now consider this bill with the dark shadow of the Bondi terrorist attack. That tragedy looms large over it. Such a tragedy highlights that freedom must exist alongside constant vigilance. ASIO assumes the responsibility of maintaining that vigilance with its partners on behalf of our society, and this bill aims to give them the tools that they need to do that job.

ASIO performs some of the most important yet least visible work in protecting our nation. Every day, right now its officers are operating quietly and professionally to detect, to deter, to disrupt and to defeat threats to Australia's security. They do so under intense scrutiny and they do so within strict legal frameworks and also often without public recognition. I want to very publicly give them that recognition now in this place, and I thank other members that do the same. It is their dedication, their integrity and their professionalism that helps ensure Australians can go about their lives safely and freely. We owe them a great debt of gratitude for the work that they are undertaking right now—in the shadows, often, and quietly—to keep our democracy secure and to keep our citizens safe.

Let's consider the purpose of the bill and why it matters. Let me begin by summarising, which I'm sure honourable members will appreciate, what the bill does and why the government argues that we very much need it. I welcome the bipartisan commentary of the previous speaker, the member for Riverina, in this regard.

Currently, division 3 of part III of the ASIO Act grants ASIO compulsory questioning powers. Under a warrant, ASIO can compel a person to answer questions or produce materials relevant to serious security matters. This bill proposes to remove the sunset provision, making these powers permanent. It also expands the scope of what ASIO can question people about. It will include not only espionage—and we know there's plenty of that going on, and foreign interference—but now also sabotage, promotion of communal violence, attacks on defence systems, and serious border security threats. We know that these threats are a real and present danger to the Commonwealth. The bill also reforms the prescribed authority—that is, the person overseeing the questioning—by adding disqualifying criteria, and it strengthens reporting requirements, especially where a person has been charged or a charge is imminent. Importantly, it also mandates a Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security review three years after commencement.

The Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Cyber Security, the Hon. Tony Burke MP, wrote to PJCIS on 25 August last year to refer the bill for inquiry and report, and the review showed diverging views, with some placing more importance on security and others emphasising individual liberties and freedoms. That is the tension that I referred to earlier in my contribution. During the PJCIS review, a wide range of submissions were made, and they reveal a real debate between security advocates and civil libertarian voices. It's important that we listen respectfully to all the voices and to all members of parliament during this debate, no matter what their view.

The Department of Home Affairs, in its submission, argues strongly that these powers remain necessary in light of changing security threats. They say that over the past 20 years the regime has struck a sound balance between impact on individual rights and the need for intelligence, with which we protect Australian citizens and our interests. They also endorse expanding the questioning powers, notably for sabotage, defence system threats and communal violence. On the other hand, libertarian and legal rights groups—for example, Liberty Victoria and state civil liberties councils—have raised their concerns. They warn that making these powers permanent risks eroding fundamental rights—for example, the right to silence, the presumption of innocence, and fair trial protections. The Law Council of Australia, in its public commentary, explicitly cautions that these powers should remain subject to periodic parliamentary review and argue that removing the sunset clause removes a key democratic safeguard. Now, these are not fringe concerns. They reflect the principled worry about overreach, especially when coercive powers are not tightly constrained.

For an insight into the reasons the powers should be permanent, let us consider ASIO's submission to the review. From the Australian government's perspective and ASIO's perspective, the argument is straightforward. We have an evolving threat environment. I don't think anyone can credibly say that we don't. Threats to Australia are ever more complex. The Department of Home Affairs notes that sabotage, border threats and communal violence now present real risks. ASIO raised the terrorism threat level to 'probable' in 2024 and, according to ASIO'S submission 'Australia is confronted by multifaceted merging, intersecting, concurrent and cascading threats' being driven by the convergence of major geopolitical, economic, social and security challenges.'

In his address to the Lowy Institute on 5 November, Director-General of Security and head of ASIO, Mike Burgess AM, grouped threat actors into three cohorts, all threatening our social cohesion in different ways: the aggrieved—individuals that tear at our social cohesion and our social fabric; the opportunistic—organised groups that take advantage of whatever they can for the purposes of their personal or small group ideology; finally and most concerningly, the cunning—persistent and highly capable nation states that will play the long game to exploit faultlines and fractures in countries such as us that they consider hostile to their ambitions.

Secondly, they are causing real damage. The Australian Institute of Criminology, in partnership with ASIO, has calculated that the cost of espionage to Australia in the financial year 2023-24 to be about $12.5 billion—that's with a B. Now, to put that in perspective, that's just under a quarter of the annual Defence budget. Australia's defence systems are facing a greater threat from espionage too, and with this government's elevated level of investment should come elevated levels of protection for the sensitive capabilities and technologies that those investments will deliver. It's essential.

Mike Burgess spoke in terms of the threat actors previously described tearing away at or eroding our social fabric and social cohesion. The cost of this is of course very difficult to quantify; although, meaningfully, he makes this point: 'A more vulnerable, fractured and intolerant society means a less predictable and increasingly volatile security environment.' The costs of this, both financially and to our citizens' sense of freedom and safety, are incalculable.

Thirdly, there's been judicious use so far. These powers have been rarely used. According to public record, in 22 years, only about 20 questioning warrants have been sought and issued. This restraint, they argue, demonstrates that ASIO uses them sparingly, only when less-invasive means will not suffice.

Fourthly, there's better accountability, not less accountability, now. Rather than allow the powers to lapse, the bill embeds stronger oversight through a prescribed authority, reporting requirements and a future PJCIS review. Our government argues that these mechanisms sufficiently guard against misuse.

Fifth, they are a last resort tool. Our government frames these powers as a measure of last resort, a capability you don't want to need but you want to have. These powers are to be used rarely and only in extreme circumstances. These were the terms used by then Attorney-General the Honourable Daryl Williams QC when the powers were first introduced in 2023, and the reasoning still holds today.

There are several checks and safeguards against the use and potential abuse of these powers. These powers are not unfettered. It is critical when giving such serious powers that they are neither unaccountable nor lawless, and this bill exists not in a vacuum but within a framework of checks. So let me highlight briefly in the time remaining some of the key protections. In the issuing process, the powers will still remain subject to a thorough warranting regime. A questioning warrant must be requested by the DG of security and approved by the AG. The prescribed authority who oversees questioning is typically a former judge or someone with judicial type status—that is, a competent person. The bill tightens criteria for who can serve in that role, adding disqualification rules.

There are obligations during questioning. Persons under questioning have rights—access to a lawyer, protections against self-incrimination and other procedural safeguards. Noncompliance or giving false information is an offence with serious penalties.

Thirdly, there's ongoing oversight. The IGIS plays a key role. Questioning under warrant is overseen by an independent prescribed authority to ensure it's appropriate conduct. The bill mandates the review. As I've mentioned, in its submission, the Department of Home Affairs even suggests legislating periodic independent reviews every five years to ensure the regime remains fit for purpose.

In closing, we should support this bill as it delivers a finely-struck balance between what is necessary to achieve security and what is sufficient to protect the individual rights of Australians. It is necessary in these times to get that balance right. I believe that this bill does and, importantly, it allows our security agencies to do what they need to do to protect Australia and our interests.

See this speech in context