Damian Hale (Solomon, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today to voice my support for the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill 2009. This bill is yet another example of this government’s commitment to keeping the aviation environment as secure and safe as possible. The key elements of this bill will see practical reforms in four areas. The amendments are timely changes that will finetune a system designed to safeguard Australia’s civil aviation operations against ‘acts of unlawful interference’. Acts of interference include things like:

• committing an act at an airport, or causing any interference or damage, that puts the safe operation of the airport, or the safety of any person at the airport, at risk.

It also includes:

• placing, or causing to be placed, on board an aircraft that is in service anything that puts the safety of the aircraft, or any person on board or outside the aircraft, at risk.

The framework of Australia’s aviation security legislation has a number of layers to ensure the deterrence, detection and prevention of acts of unlawful interference with an aircraft.

Both the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government and his department are responsible for the development and implementation of a national framework of consistent aviation security measures. Practical operational aviation security measures are obviously required as a result of the changed environment in which the industry now operates. Following events like that of September 11 and the heightened threat of terrorism involving the unlawful use of aircraft and airport facilities, we all live in a new world order.

The aviation industry plays a key role in connecting Australia with the world and Australians with each other. As the minister said in his keynote address at Waypoint 2008:

The Rudd Government is committed to working with the aviation industry and the community to meet these many challenges.

We understand the aviation sector’s importance to Australia’s future economic development within the era of globalisation. Today, more than ever, the aviation industry underpins domestic economic growth and provides vital gateways to the global economy.

This sector supports almost 50,000 jobs and contributes an estimated $6.8 billion to our gross national product.

That is why we on this side of the House are committed to keeping the aviation environment as secure and safe as possible.

Whether moving tourists, families, freight or businesspeople, the aviation industry is essential to the efficient operation of the Australian economy. I know the wonderful people who live in my electorate of Solomon, as well as the tens of thousands of visitors who travel to the Northern Territory every year, understand this. They know only too well the significance of the aviation sector and, of course, the importance of having a secure and safe aviation industry. The Northern Territory is a huge area. Often places are cut off during the wet season and the only way of travelling around is by light aircraft.

From my own perspective, I know only too well about plane travel. I certainly acknowledge that the member for Kalgoorlie can relate to this. Last year alone, I think I spent 49 days in a plane—seven weeks of my life—travelling to Canberra. That is a lot of time out of my electorate and I thank all those involved in keeping me safe—the cleaners, the caterers, the security guards, the AFP, the check-in crew and the baggage handlers. They are all people who keep the airport safe.

This bill contains practical reforms to the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 in four key areas that bolster the enforcement powers of Australia’s aviation security regulator. Firstly, the bill increases the flexibility in designating an airport as a security controlled airport by enabling regulations to be made to categorise airports in accordance with their relative risk profile. The second key area of the bill will increase the range of situations in which aviation security inspectors may enter certain premises without notice. Thirdly, this bill will introduce the option of enforceable undertakings as a compliance measure. Lastly, but very importantly, this bill will allow aviation security inspectors to issue compliance control directions in a wider range of circumstances.

Finetuning these security measures now will provide a more comprehensive regime. The amendments proposed will eliminate the ‘one size fits all’ approach of the current act. It means that small regional airports like those in the Northern Territory could be spared much of the expense of developing their own security program. It means that small regional airports could benefit from the certainty of knowing what they need to do to comply. The finetuning will protect both the travelling public and aviation industry employees from potential unlawful interference with the operation of planes and airports. It means that small regional airports have a general reduction in regulatory requirements.

As it stands currently, the declaration of an airport as a security controlled airport places the same legislative requirements on all such airports, regardless of their size, location and the type of aircraft operating from the airport. This amendment provides finetuning to allow regulations to be made that prescribe different legislative requirements for each category of security controlled airport. This will ensure regulatory activity is better targeted to reflect the relative risk associated with each category of airport.

The amendments will allow an inspector to enter the premises of an aviation industry participant or accredited air cargo agent who is not on an airport site and inspect their activities without notice. At the moment, inspectors can only undertake these inspections ‘on-airport’, despite many critical aviation related businesses being located well away from an airport. Obviously the current requirements to provide reasonable notice of ‘off-airport’ inspections limit the effectiveness of doing the inspections. This is particularly the case for many businesses within the air cargo sector, as their security obligations are largely procedural in nature and, with notice, can be changed briefly during an inspection.

Under the amendments, inspectors will be allowed to enter premises, observe and discuss procedures, and in so doing access documents and records. This bill is an example of the Rudd government’s commitment to strengthening Australia’s national security framework across the vital areas of airport security, counterterrorism, policing and intelligence capability in our region. I commend the bill to the House.

Bob Baldwin (Paterson, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Defence Science and Personnel) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today to speak on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill 2009. The bill proposes amendments to the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004, which was introduced by the former coalition government, specifically to change the existing Commonwealth aviation transport security regime. The amendments aim to improve Australia’s aviation security apparatus and strengthen the enforcement powers of the Office of Transport Security.

The Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 established a regulatory framework to safeguard against unlawful interference with aviation. To achieve this purpose, the act establishes minimum security requirements for civil aviation in Australia by imposing obligations on persons engaged in civil aviation related activities. Under these laws anyone who operates within the aviation industry is responsible for helping to maintain Australia’s excellent reputation as one of the most secure places in the world.

It was the coalition that introduced legislation that strengthened the regulatory framework surrounding aviation security. Importantly, this legislation also involved aviation industry participants in order to provide the flexibility necessary to respond to the rapidly-changing environment. That legislation is what the House proposes to amend today. Because of the smart and thorough actions taken under the coalition government, Australian airport security is safer than ever before. The Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill will continue the work done by the former government to ensure airport security is a priority into the future.

I would like to acknowledge the contribution aviation has made to Australia’s overall economy. Steady economic growth, particularly during the years of the previous coalition government, and increased tourism made for a more profitable airline sector, which in turn has driven the expansion of Australia’s aviation sector. In the 2007-08 financial year, over 49 million passengers travelled on Australian domestic airlines. It is also very important to note that regional airlines carried 5.8 million passengers, a figure that represents an increase of 11 per cent over 2006. Regional airlines and regional airports are an important part of Australia’s aviation history and future.

A healthy aviation sector is vital for growth, and in particular I would like to acknowledge the development of Newcastle Airport, which employs hundreds of my constituents living in the Paterson electorate. Newcastle Airport is fast-emerging as a key player in aviation growth domestically, with the potential for international expansion mounting. The net regional economic benefit generated by Newcastle Airport has been assessed as $433 million annually, supporting 3,128 jobs—of which the tourism sector generates $150 million and supports 894 jobs annually.

Over the past 60 years, from its simple beginnings as Williamtown Civilian Airport after a charter flight landed at the RAAF Base Williamtown in 1947 to the first scheduled commercial operations commencing in 1948, Newcastle Airport has grown to a position of strength in the region. The federal government continued to run the airport until 1990. However, it was not until 1993 when the Newcastle City Council and Port Stephens Council accepted an invitation from the federal government to jointly operate the civil aviation area at RAAF Base Williamtown that Newcastle Airport Ltd was born. The two councils accepted full responsibility for operating, maintaining and developing what was to become Newcastle Airport.

The civil airport is located on Commonwealth land inside the boundary of Royal Australian Air Force Base Williamtown. Newcastle City Council and Port Stephens Council, under the auspice of Newcastle Airport Ltd, hold a 40-year lease, terminating in March 2045, from the Department of Defence for 28 hectares of land to the south of RAAF Base Williamtown. The structure of the operation of Newcastle Airport Ltd is a joint venture between the two councils. It is important to note that all profits from the operation of the airport and its facilities are reinvested in the operations and future growth of the airport.

For many years the passenger terminal at Newcastle Airport was nothing more than a little tin shed. This was remedied with the opening of new terminal facilities in 1975, and in 1994 and 2000 Newcastle Airport underwent further major upgrades which included the doubling of the terminal floor area, total refurbishment of the interior and exterior of the building and the provision of office suites for airlines. In 2000, jet services commenced with the introduction of the Impulse Airlines, now Jetstar, Boeing 717 aircraft to service the Newcastle to Melbourne route. In November 2003 Virgin Blue introduced B737 aircraft on a daily service to Melbourne and in May 2004 introduced daily services to Brisbane. In May 2004 Jetstar also commenced services on the Newcastle-Melbourne and Newcastle-Brisbane routes using Boeing 717 aircraft.

In 2005 Newcastle Airport underwent a further $9 million major upgrade which in turn doubled the terminal floor area, doubled the departure and arrival areas, introduced a retail precinct and provided additional office suites and upgraded the car parking and road systems. The terminal facilities were upgraded to cope with future demand and security requirements. In that same year, Newcastle Airport was named Regional Airport of the Year by the Australian Airports Association. This is an accomplishment which we can be extremely proud of in our region.

Today Newcastle Airport has grown to be one of the key regional airports in Australia. It is serviced by all the major domestic airlines that provide services to the major destinations along the east coast of Australia, including Aeropelican, Brindabella, Jetstar, Norfolk Air, Virgin Blue and QantasLink. Since the introduction of jet services into Newcastle Airport, the number of passengers using the airport has increased from 214,000 in 2003 to over one million people in the 2007 calendar year. The success story does not end there. The Newcastle Airport is at present undergoing further expansion, increasing the check-in facilities to accommodate the growing number of travellers and developing more parking to accommodate the needs of our travellers. It is important to take note of the commercial aviation developments during this time as well. Home to BAE Systems, Boeing Defence Australia, Raytheon, Thales, Jetstar Engineering and GE Aviation, and boasting a large network of specialist businesses, the Hunter region provides a highly skilled local workforce, sophisticated defence and civil aviation infrastructure and a proven track record in delivering defence projects.

Newcastle Airport also works in close proximity to and is supported by the Defence Support Group, the RAAF and especially RAAF Base Williamtown. An agreement exists with the RAAF to provide landing and take-off rights, services and the use of airport infrastructure. The current Newcastle Airport master plan demonstrates a strategic vision for the continued growth of the airport and harmony with RAAF operations. The airport’s master plan considers and protects the operational integrity of RAAF Base Williamtown in terms of aviation safety, air navigation, air traffic control, base security, aviation fire fighting and rescue services and communications. There can be no doubt that RAAF Base Williamtown is an important economic driver for our region and is the pre-eminent fighter base for the Royal Australian Air Force. It is one of the busiest RAAF bases in Australia, handling over 1,000 movements per week. It is home to the majority of RAAF’s FA18 Hornets and Hawk lead-in fighters and is headquarters for the Air Force’s Surveillance and Response Group, Air Combat Group and two training squadrons which include the FA18 Hornet, BAE Hawk 127 lead-in fighter and the Pilatus PC9 aircraft.

As you can see, their presence in the aerospace industry is particularly notable. One of the most significant tenants in the area is BAE Systems. BAE Systems is a global company engaged in the development, delivery and support of advanced air, land and sea defence, security and aerospace systems. The first major commercial aviation development was with the hangar and associated facilities built by BAE for the assembly of the Hawk lead-in fighter. BAE is contracted by RAAF to maintain the Hawk lead-in fighter and the FA18 aircraft. A second BAE hangar was constructed initially for the centre barrel replacement program but also in anticipation of future Joint Strike Fighter contracts with defence.

When I became the member for Paterson in 1996, I became concerned at the amount of underemployment of ex-RAAF personnel in our region. A range of very highly skilled people who chose after their service to the defence of Australia to live in and around the area were not able to find work in their field of expertise and, rather than facing another posting or travelling to other areas to continue in their field of expertise, they took up employment in other fields, quite often well below their capacity. I was of the view that more needed to be done to provide opportunities for these people. With the introduction of the BAE Hawk lead-in fighter contract, I was determined to establish an aviation technology park with airside access for service to both military and commercial aircraft. I have been on the public record promoting and actively supporting this project since 1996, and when I served on Port Stephens Council in 1999 I helped drive the development of employment opportunities at the airport through pushing for the redevelopment of the farmland surrounding the airport.

The stage is now set for the increasing presence in aerospace and aviation development within the region with the Williamtown Aerospace Centre by Hunter Land, which includes the Newcastle Airport precinct and the 80 hectares of industrial land surrounding the airport. The centre will provide world-class facilities, tow-way access and a variety of infrastructure solutions to meet the needs of individual organisations of any size or requirement. Williamtown Aerospace Centre will position the Hunter as a major national and international centre for the aerospace and aviation industry. The success story will be about utilising those skill sets that have served our country and are now looking to reside in our wonderful area.

The amendments presented today reflect and continue the work begun by the coalition. They will support regional airports such as Newcastle Airport and I am happy to support them. The first amendment of the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill 2009 will give the secretary of the department the power to designate an airport as a security controlled airport. In order to achieve this, the airport must fulfil certain security requirements. This amendment will allow security controlled airports to be assigned to a category that prescribes specific requirements reflecting the risk profile of each airport.

Under the current arrangements, any airport which is declared to be an SCA faces the same security requirements regardless of their location, size and type of aircraft operating from the airport or security situation. This means that a regional airport, such as Newcastle Airport, will be subjected to the same security requirements as Sydney Airport. Many regional airports would benefit from a more flexible and appropriate system directly related to their personal situation.

A consistent approach needs to be adopted for aviation security, particularly at regional airports and in particular with the jet versus non-jet powered aircraft issue being an example. Allowing an airport to be assigned to a particular category will enable security resources to be allocated in a more appropriate way, rather than applying the same requirements to all airports. Security should be a risk based cost-benefit approach, otherwise it will become a significant disincentive for regional air travel and potentially put smaller airlines out of business. It is important to note the cost of implementation to regional airports. If costs can be reduced through a more appropriate security regime, the viability of regional air services will be enhanced. This can only benefit regional areas, such as Newcastle, that depend so much on the resources that aviation provides.

Terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, nine years ago this Friday, reinforced the importance of the security of aviation operations globally, including in Australia. September 11 demonstrated the potential for disaster, where the repercussions are still being felt globally. Since the incidents on September 11, the coalition took action to improve aviation in security in Australia. Since this time, over $1 billion has been spent to enhance aviation security.

The coalition provided additional funding to improve security in the air cargo industry, and the second amendment will continue with the coalition’s commitment by allowing unannounced aviation security inspections of businesses involved in air cargo. Currently, inspectors are only able to exercise their powers without notice within the boundaries of a security controlled airport. This amendment will extend their inspection powers to sites not located at airports, without the need to provide prior notice. It is important to note to the House that such an inspection would only be carried out at a time when the site is open and operating, and it would only be carried out at sites directly associated with aviation security. Under no circumstances does this amendment propose to grant inappropriate powers to aviation security inspectors; it merely seeks to extend the current powers to cover non-airport sites related to aviation security.

The third amendment will introduce the option of enforceable undertakings as a compliance measure. There currently exists a variety of sanctions available to aviation authorities. For example, if an aviation industry participant was to contravene the act, or breach their transport security program, the authorities are able to issue an infringement notice. If a stronger response is warranted, the next step would be court action, which may require shutting down the activities of the aviation industry participant. Therefore, enforceable undertakings would provide an appropriate midrange sanction in some cases. Enforceable undertakings would require aviation industry participants to take or refrain from taking specified actions.

Under the amendment, the secretary of the department would be allowed to enter into enforceable undertakings with aviation industry participants in relation to all matters that are dealt with under the act. The department would establish the terms of an enforceable undertaking in consultation with aviation industry participants. The breach of an enforceable undertaking would enable the secretary to apply to the Federal Court for an order to direct compliance. It is very important that the views and concerns of airlines, air cargo agents, airport operators and other industry participants are taken on board when resolving security issues. This amendment is designed to encourage voluntary solutions to minor security issues.

The fourth and final amendment will allow aviation security to issue compliance control directions in a wider range of circumstances, such as to airport operators or screening authorities. This will enable inspectors to direct screening authorities or airport operators to take specified actions in relation to the airport, or to screening points at the airport, in the same way that they are currently able to direct pilots or aircraft operators. Overall, the bill will provide more flexible and appropriate security regimes that will enhance aviation security without imposing undue or excessive restrictions on industry participants.

Therefore, the coalition supports these amendments unreservedly.

Craig Thomson (Dobell, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to support the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill 2009. This bill contains amendments which aim to strengthen the aviation security legislative framework. In particular, the amendments would improve the Office of Transport Security’s ability to perform its duties as regulators of aviation security to ensure compliance with the act and regulations in order to safeguard against unlawful interference with aviation.

The bill contains four key amendments to the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 which would: firstly, enable regulation to be made to designate security controlled airports a particular category of airport, according to their risk profiles; secondly, allow unannounced inspections of businesses involved in air cargo; thirdly, allow the secretary of the department to enter into enforceable undertakings with aviation industry participants as a remedial measure; and, finally, expand the scope of ‘compliance control directions’ to cover operators of security controlled airports and screening authorities.

I will look at the amendments in a bit more detail, starting with the categorisation of security controlled airports. Currently, a subsection of the act provides that the secretary of the department may declare an airport to be a security controlled airport. Such a declaration allows, amongst other things, the secretary to then establish airside and landside security zones. There may be different types of such security zones prescribed by regulation but, as their name implies, these zones are intended to provide appropriate levels of security by controlling movements of persons, vehicles and goods et cetera.

Furthermore, the act requires the operator of a security controlled airport to have a transport security program. The declaration of an airport as a security controlled airport places the same legislative requirement on all such airports, regardless of their size, location and type of aircraft operating from the airport. Regulatory activity could be better targeted if airports were categorised in accordance with their relative risk to security.

Therefore, it is proposed that the secretary of the department be able to designate, by notice, a security controlled airport as a particular category of airport. The assignment of a particular category to an individual airport will be done in the same way as airports are now declared to be security controlled airports—that is, by publishing a notice in the gazette and giving a notice to the airport operator. A decision by the secretary made under this amendment would be reviewable by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

It is also proposed that the regulation-making power under the Aviation Transport Security Act be amended so as to allow regulations to be made to designate security controlled airports as a particular category of security controlled airport. This will enable regulations to prescribe different legislative requirements for each category of security controlled airport to reflect the relative risk associated with each category of airport. Section 79 of the act details powers of aviation security inspectors, including powers to enter and inspect any area, building—other than a residence—or vehicle under the control of an accredited air cargo agent or aviation industry participant. Aviation security inspectors are employees of the administering department or state or Federal Police officers or Protective Service officers under the Australian Federal Police Act 1979. Such inspectors have wide-ranging entry and inspection powers under existing section 79, which can be exercised for determining whether a person is complying with the act and/or investigating a possible contravention of that act.

Amongst the inspection powers are those to enter and inspect any area, building or vehicle under the control of an accredited air cargo agent or aviation industry participant. However, where the proposed entry and inspection is in a place that is not within the boundaries of a security controlled airport, reasonable notice must be given before exercising the power. Currently, these powers cannot be exercised outside of the boundaries of a security controlled airport without providing reasonable notice. The requirement to provide reasonable notice reduces the effectiveness of inspection activity as businesses can briefly alter their practices for the period of the inspection.

There are good reasons why this amendment is being made. Firstly, most businesses involved in air cargo supply chains are located outside of the boundaries of a security controlled airport, requiring reasonable notice of an inspection; and, secondly, the obligation placed on many regulated business, particularly accredited air cargo agents, are procedural in nature, allowing easy short-term amendments to practices during an inspection. This makes regular procedural non-compliance difficult to identify. In order to address this issue it is proposed that the act be amended to allow aviation security inspectors to exercise the following powers at any time and without notice: firstly, enter any area, building—other than a residence—or vehicle under the control of an aviation industry participant or an accredited air cargo agent and inspect equipment, documents and/or records. This includes photographing or copying documents and/or records and operating equipment to gain access to documents and/or records; and, secondly, observe operating procedures and discuss those procedures with employees of an accredited air cargo agent or aviation industry participant or an accredited air cargo agent itself or aviation industry participant itself.

On the amendments covering enforceable undertakings, currently the regulatory powers under the act of the Office of Transport Security in relation to aviation industry participants are generally concentrated at the higher end of the hierarchy. For example, should an aviation industry participant breach their obligations under a transport security program, they face the possible sanction of the cancellation of their transport security program, thus preventing them to continue to operate. The act fails to provide a set of middle-range sanctions to address regulatory issues and contraventions of the act, particularly in instances where the breaches are not serious enough to warrant the imposition of a criminal penalty or preventing an aviation industry participant to continue to operate. Introducing enforceable undertakings as a middle-range administrative enforcement tool under the Aviation Transport Security Act will enable a more responsive regulatory approach, generate more confidence on the part of both the travelling public and the industry and encourage better industry compliance.

It is envisaged that this would also enable the Office of Transport Security to deal more effectively, flexibly and in a more timely fashion with compliance issues under the act and provide greater ability to set compliance strategies, negotiate outcomes and accept voluntary solutions. For example, an enforceable undertaking would involve a commitment to future security standards by industry, including steps that are to be taken by an aviation industry participant to ensure that specific types of incidents does not occur again.

The proposed amendment would allow the secretary of the department to enter into enforceable undertakings with aviation industry participants, which may be made in relation to all matters that are dealt with under the act. An aviation industry participant may withdraw or vary the undertaking at any time with the written consent of the secretary. In addition, the secretary may, by written notice given to the participant, cancel the undertaking.

Finally, should an aviation industry participant breach an enforceable undertaking, the secretary may apply to the Federal Court for an order which may include the following: an order directing compliance with the undertaking; an order directing a payment of an amount of financial benefit that the participant has received, whether directly or indirectly, as a result of the breach; an order directing the participant to compensate another person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of the breach; or an order that the court considers appropriate.

Finally, in the amendments, we come to the expansion of compliance control directions. The Aviation Transport Security Act currently permits aviation security inspectors to direct the pilot or operator of an aircraft that is in Australia, but not in flight, to take a specific action in relation to the aircraft. Such a direction by an inspector is a compliance control direction. An inspector is only allowed to issue a compliance control direction if it is necessary to ensure compliance with the act. However, there is no currently no scope for aviation security inspectors to issue compliance directions to airport operators or screening authorities. Therefore, the amendment would expand the operation of section 74B of the act in order to allow an aviation security inspector to direct operators of security controlled airports, screening authorities or screening officers to take specific action in relation to the airport or screening points at the airport: for example, an airport operator or screening authority may be directed to screen or rescreen certain passengers and baggage.

It is clear in these times of increased security risks around the world that we need to make our airports the safest possible places to travel through, work at and do business with. All of us have become used to going through increased and enhanced security checks when we fly. Those countless times when we have had to take off our shoes, boots or belts, dislodge the laptop computer from our carry bag or be subject to a random personal scan at the airport are all part of the modern security regime and are all for the good of the community in general. We have learned not to take these things personally. We understand that it is for the security of this country. While these sometimes tedious encounters at the security points might seem a hassle, it is much better to feel safer in the knowledge that screening is widespread at our airports and includes everyone.

The amendments outlined in this bill are only modest changes to the Commonwealth’s aviation transport security regime; nevertheless, they are important. Indeed, the act has been regularly amended since 2004 to incorporate various changes to the regime. While a principal aim of airport security is to prevent ‘unlawful interference’ with aircraft that could lead to fatalities among passengers and crew, major airports themselves are critical infrastructure for the ongoing health of the economy and for our people’s lives and livelihoods and are potential targets for serious crime and terrorism. A substantial amount of both exports and imports pass through our airports, and annual passenger arrivals and departures total some 100 million, with about one-fifth of that figure being international passengers. Airports also provide direct employment for about 150,000 Australians.

Unfortunately, the flow of wealth and people through these concentrated nodes that we call airports can also be the target for criminals and terrorists. We can never afford to have lax security or even petty criminality at our airports, because this can provide opportunities for terrorists to exploit weaknesses in airport security. We must always bear in mind the fact that staff, however much they are checked and screened at the outset, can be bribed to ignore criminality or be paid large sums to assist in drug trafficking or theft. This type of seemingly petty criminality can always lead to worse things. Once compromised, such employees may be unable to stand up to terrorists. Of course, terrorists also need money to conduct their operations. For funding, they regularly engage in theft, drug trafficking and fraud. A classic example of this was in 2004, when the Provisional IRA stole ₤24 million from a then Australian owned bank in Belfast.

The Australian government, state and territory governments and the private sector have made many positive security changes and have dedicated significant resources to combating terrorism, especially since the attacks in the United States on September 11 2001. But there is still work to be done. As the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit reported so eloquently just three years ago:

The primary objective of aviation security is the protection of life and property. However, perhaps the greatest current threat to aviation security, terrorism (as opposed to hijacking or other activity), does not confine its target to life and property. Terrorism is an attempt to terrorise, to destroy a public’s sense of security and confidence.

The report went on to say:

An important consideration in implementing an aviation security regime, therefore, is not only the effectiveness of security outcomes but public confidence that the regime is effective.

This bill and the amendments contained in it will go quite a way towards not only improving our systems of security at Australian airports but also helping public confidence, and therefore I commend the bill to the House.

Judi Moylan (Pearce, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am pleased to have an opportunity to participate in this debate on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill 2009. These amendments make modest changes to substantial legislation that was passed in 2004, the Aviation Transport Security Act. It was introduced to implement a national framework for protecting Australia’s aviation industry, airports and, indeed, the travelling public. Earlier, the Howard government also introduced the Air Security Officer Program, which placed sky marshals on selected international and domestic flights.

We just heard the member for Dobell saying that many of us have experienced inconvenience at airport check-ins, but I think we are all pleased that we can be assured that there is good security in our airports and that we are reasonably protected from the kind of chilling events that we saw unfold in the United States in 2001—a terrorist act that changed security arrangements at major airports all over the world. So I do not think any of us really mind the inconvenience so much as long as we know that we are reasonably safe when we embark on air travel.

I think that, as operations have progressed, there has at times been a clearly seen need to make additional changes, and there have been amendments since the 2004 legislation was passed to incorporate various changes in the regime. I think that is understandable. Certainly the security we need has not been experienced at the level we have seen since that 2001 event. There have been reviews as well. There was the Wheeler review in 2005 and, in 2006, a report of the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit on these security issues in the aviation industry.

As a result, I think, of the tightening of security worldwide, terrorist attacks on aircraft have been intercepted. Certainly the risks to the travelling public, thankfully, have been averted. Almost every country in the world has adopted very stringent security measures to protect the travelling public as well as to protect public and private infrastructure and those who work or live in it. However, government must continue to be vigilant in maintaining a high level of security at airports within their jurisdiction, making the safety of the travelling public of paramount importance.

Aviation is a vital industry responsible for connecting the towns and cities across our expansive country and ensuring fast transport to countries beyond our borders. Trade and industry, tourism and service delivery all rely on a modern, efficient air transport system, so it is really important that the public have confidence in how our airports are being administered in terms of security. In 2007 and 2008, for example, Australian domestic airlines carried in excess of 49 million passengers, and 23 million international passengers passed through Australian airports. Domestic air travel has experienced national growth of five per cent over the previous year of operation. It is therefore not surprising that a high priority has been given to security. Since 2001 over a billion dollars has been spent to boost security in Australia’s airports and aviation hubs.

Five years on, the commitment of the Howard government and the legislative framework for airport security is being further strengthened with the amendments contained in this bill. Air transport is a fast-growing industry and an essential element of Australia’s transport infrastructure. The industry contributes over $6 billion to the Australian economy annually and it directly supports 50,000 jobs, and 780 million tonnes of freight is carried by air. A significant proportion of operations are in regional areas, providing a significant boost to local economies. In fact, the increase in passenger numbers in regional areas was 11 per cent, up in 2007 on the previous figures.

Those of us who live in Western Australia—as in your state, Mr Deputy Speaker Scott—understand the importance of a strong air transport system because air travel means people and goods can be transported to the many outlying towns in Western Australia in a timely and efficient manner, ending the isolation and boosting local economies. Flights have become a part of a regular way of life for many people, whether they are commuters from Perth and the eastern state cities to the powerhouse mines in north Western Australia or businesspeople and tourists traversing the nation.

The Bureau of Infrastructure Transport and Regional Economics has forecast that there will be a four per cent increase each year for the next two decades in air passenger movements in Australian airports. Around the country there are approximately 180 security controlled airports. While some of these are major city hubs, many are in smaller regional airports and currently when an airport is designated as a security controlled airport it becomes subject to the same blanket regulations and requirements regardless of its size, location or capacity as other so classified airports.

This bill will introduce a classification system so that individual airports may be assigned more appropriate legislative requirements, depending on the need and relative risks associated with each of the airports. Other amendments arising out of this bill include the extension of aviation security inspectors’ power so that they can inspect security controlled premises outside the airport grounds without notice and can issue compliance control directions in a wide range of circumstances. The sanction regime is strengthened by the introduction of enforceable undertakings that are stronger than mere warnings but less severe than restricting the operation of an aviation industry participant. It is highly desirable that all Australian airports operate in a nationally consistent way and under a nationally consistent framework, and this legislation should deliver such an objective. It is my hope that further advancements will be made in this vein in the near future for strengthening of legislation and regulation concerning all other aspects of airport operations.

In Western Australia we have recently had first-hand experience with the consequence of what appears to be an inconsistent and inadequate approach to changes to air flight paths and remedies for members of the public who are subjected to the consequences of those changes. On the face of it, it appears that there is a lack of clear legislation and regulation governing these changes and the consequences that people face. Major changes to flight paths at Perth Airport have taken place without adequate community consultation. Not unreasonably, residents in affected areas are extremely upset, indeed angry, about this situation. Many people living in the suburbs of Glen Forrest, Bickley and Chidlow are experiencing flights on an hourly basis between midnight and six o’clock in the morning and the amenity and peaceful enjoyment of their homes has been dramatically impacted.

These are not new issues. Disaffection of the public about the way in which airport operations are managed and the inconsistencies from one capital city airport to another has long caused considerable angst. There is a long history of private members’ bills and motions in relation to problems with airport noise, changes to flight paths and lack of open and public accountability and consultation in this place, and often there has been considerable bipartisan support for changes to be made, as there is for this for this amendment bill before us today.

I take the opportunity in speaking to this bill to raise these issues because three weeks ago I sent a survey about the changes to air flight paths to 3,500 constituents in affected suburbs of Pearce. We have already had 466 returns and only 4.5 per cent of the respondents were aware of the changes before they were subjected to the constant noise that has had a profound impact on their quality of life; 95.5 per cent of respondents were not aware of the decision to change the flight paths and yet they are very directly and very profoundly affected by this event.

The member for Grayndler, who is now the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, actively represented his constituents affected by aircraft noise at Sydney Airport when in 1999 he presented a bill to establish an aviation noise watchdog or an ombudsman for aviation. When he spoke to the Aircraft Noise Levy Collection Amendment Bill 2001 he said:

The practical impact of aircraft noise on the people in the communities that I represent is much greater than suggested by the theoreticians, the forecasters who sit comfortably in offices in Canberra.

While I wholeheartedly agree with this observation—and it is for that reason that I support the extension of a uniform but flexible national framework not only for security issues but also for all aspects of airport operation and particularly for security as we are achieving in these amendments today—more recently, in 2007, the minister contributed to a debate on the Airports Amendment Bill 2006 and said:

We will revisit key issues in government in a broader review of the legislation to make sure that airports act in conjunction with local communities rather than disregarding them.

I say, ‘Hear, Hear!’ to that because it is exactly the experience of the people of Pearce and others in the Perth metropolitan area who going through that now, and they feel very aggrieved because they are disregarded in changes made to flight paths. The minister’s colleague the member for Melbourne, now Minister for Finance and Deregulation, said when speaking to the Adelaide Airport Curfew Bill in 1998:

We in the opposition say that everybody in Australia who lives in the immediate vicinity of a major airport should be entitled to insulation based on a small ticket tax on the basis that it is offered in Sydney. That should be done on the same basis of equality right across the country.

          …            …            …

There is no reason why you should not have equality of treatment across the country.

Now that the member for Grayndler is the responsible minister and the member for Melbourne is the finance minister, I call on them to implement these policy objectives with haste, not just for the people of Pearce and Grayndler but for the many thousands of Australians who have no opportunity to engage in any meaningful consultation on the aircraft noise that so affects their quality of life. The legislation before us is a timely reminder that it is the responsibility of the Australian parliament to act to ensure that there are nationally consistent frameworks for all aspects of operation of Australian airports, not just for matters of security but for those aspects of airport administration, such as flight path consultation and noise abatement measures, where there is a constant and invasive presence in people’s lives. There is a need for real bipartisan action to better manage the operation of air traffic. We need a consistent national approach to a contemporary issue that will continue to grow.

This is an issue that will not go away. Just as we need to constantly upgrade and consider the security issues for airports we also need to look at their operations as they grow and develop. For example, Perth Airport have already achieved their 2015 passenger movement targets. There is a master plan for an expansion program and there will be a greatly increased amount of traffic through that airport. So it is not just the security issues that need our full bipartisan attention. All issues in relation to operations of major city airports, in particular, need a bipartisan approach to give consistency and fairness right across the country, not just to people who live in one city but to people who live in all cities and people who are affected by the worst aspects of increasing aircraft movements.

Airports and the aviation industry generally are an integral aspect of Australia’s transport infrastructure. That is fully understood and it is appreciated. We can be very proud of our aviation industry and, with proper consultation and review processes, we can ensure that it is not a zero-sum game between those who are affected by aircraft noise and pollution and those who use the aircraft and those who run businesses which rely on air traffic. But, returning to the specifics of this bill, maintaining public confidence in the safety of air travel is a very high priority, and anything that can be done to further refine and expand the screening of passengers and checked baggage is welcome progress. Let us not forget that it was the coalition in government that strengthened the regulatory framework for aviation security, with the flexibility to respond as required, and took immediate action to put air marshals on both domestic and international flights.

The confidence of the public can be easily shattered, and that is why we in this place have a grave responsibility to make sure we are doing everything we can to maintain public confidence. We have seen unfold during this past week, and in recent times, events in Britain, so the public want to feel secure when they travel by air. It is highly commendable that the responsibility for managing security of Australia’s airports is being advanced today on a bipartisan basis. It demonstrates that, when there are grave matters of national interest, we can come together and pass sensible and vigorous legislation in this place to make sure that those aims are achieved. These are sensible amendments which will further strengthen the process of enhancing aviation security which originated in 2001.

We think of air transport in terms of tourism, trade and commerce, but it is also very important in delivering emergency services around this country. I am very proud of the fact that in Western Australia my great-uncle was responsible for the fledgling services that became the Flying Doctor Service and the bush nursing association in Western Australia. I think often about his contribution to health care, particularly in the regional and rural areas of the big state of Western Australia. Whether it is flying sick people to major city hospitals or fighting fires, today it is a fact of life that we are more and more reliant on air transport to achieve these objectives in the interests of public safety and public service. I pay tribute to all the men and women who carry out what is sometimes very dangerous work flying sick or injured people to major hospitals and to those who are involved in flying aircraft to prevent the spread of fire. They are dangerous occupations, and we have seen some great heroics in the recent terrible events in Victoria. This is an opportunity to say thank you to the many men and women throughout Australia who fly planes as a public service.

The next phase in airport management, I hope, is to extend a national framework to all aspects of airport operations to cover important issues such as airport noise abatement and the introduction of clear and consistent guidelines for community consultation to be undertaken by airports and Airservices Australia when flight paths are changed. We understand that there are times when changes are necessary in the public interest, due to safety issues. At a recent meeting that I attended in Perth, Airservices Australia made the point that they are no longer funded by government; they get their funds from the airlines and the airline industry. That is a conflict of interest, because it means that they do not feel any great need to consult the public about the changes. We are never quite sure. We understand that there probably are safety issues but we have not to date seen the evidence to demonstrate that the decisions to change the flight paths in Perth were made on the basis of safety. Some constituents who have expertise have done an extrapolation which appears to show that a lot of the flights have been taken away from the western suburbs and have been transferred to and concentrated over the eastern suburbs. The time has come for some independence and for the opportunity for the public to have a say about these kinds of changes before they actually occur and have a profound impact on their lives.

I commend this bill, which strengthens the security in all airports around Australia, to the House.

Brett Raguse (Forde, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today to speak in support of the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill 2009. I agree with the member for Pearce, who has just spoken, that the issues are much larger than just the security of aviation. It is also about the impacts on infrastructure. I will talk about that later in the debate. The economic considerations are very important.

The bill contains four sets of amendments to provide additional flexibility in managing security at Australian airports. These are amendments to enable the secretary of the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government to designate security controlled airports as a particular category of airport according to their risk profiles. They will also enable regulations to be made to prescribe different legislative requirements for each category of an SCA in order to reflect the relative risk profile associated with each category of airport. This will allow security controlled airports to have different levels of security based on category. This advancement will mean that security arrangements can be better tailored to size, location and type of aircraft at an airport.

The second set of amendments will allow unannounced inspections of businesses involved in air cargo. Currently, inspections outside of the boundaries of a security controlled airport can only occur with reasonable notice, which reduces the effectiveness of inspection activity. It is anticipated that this will better utilise inspection resources and provide additional confidence in the inspection process.

The third set of amendments allow the secretary of the department to enter into enforceable undertakings with aviation industry participants in relation to any matter dealt with under the act. Enforceable undertakings are currently concentrated at the more serious end in terms of potential consequences. These changes are to put in place middle-range sanctions to address regulatory issues and contraventions of the Aviation Transport Security Act. Flexibility is central to the operation of these amendments. An aviation industry participant would be able to withdraw or vary an undertaking with written consent of the secretary, and the secretary would be able to cancel an undertaking with written notice.

The final set of amendments expand the scope of compliance control directions to cover operators of security controlled airports, screening authorities and screening officers. Currently, aviation security inspectors cannot issue compliance control directions to airport operators or screening authorities, despite their role in airport security. It is proposed that an aviation security inspector will be able to direct operators of security controlled airports, screening authorities and screening officers to take specified actions in relation to the airport or screening points at the airport.

On the Queensland Gold Coast—and, as the member for Forde, I represent part of the Gold Coast hinterland—confidence in Australia’s aviation security is essential for our economic wellbeing and sustainability. In August this year I had the pleasure of touring the Gold Coast Airport at Bilinga, near Coolangatta. The Gold Coast Airport services residents and supports tourism in the Gold Coast and Tweed Coast areas. It is very important to have our Minister for Tourism in the chamber today. He understands very well the Gold Coast and its developing needs for infrastructure, as well as the connection with aviation security and the importance of people feeling safe when they travel to our region. My tour of the airport was escorted by Paul Donovan, who is the chief operating officer at the Gold Coast Airport. The Gold Coast Airport is owned by Queensland Airports Ltd, who also own the smaller Townsville and Mount Isa airports, located in the electorates of Herbert and Kennedy respectively.

The Gold Coast has not been immune from the challenges of the global economic difficulties. Unemployment on the Gold Coast moved from 3.7 per cent in July 2008 to 6.4 per cent in July 2009. Overall numbers of visitors, particularly domestic visitors, have slowed. However, despite the global economic challenges, the Gold Coast Airport achieved its second highest throughput month in July this year, with nearly 415,000 passengers. In the previous financial year, over 4,600,000 passengers passed through that particular airport. Importantly for international tourism, this number actually conceals a large increase in international traffic. There are nearly 57,000 international passengers a month. In the 2008-09 financial year there was a 97 per cent increase in international passengers—almost 510,000 people. Airport security and aviation security is essential in a continually growing region like the Gold Coast.

The Gold Coast Airport terminal is currently midway through a $100 million development planned for completion by March 2010. Two of the four stages are now complete, with the final terminal to be double the current size at 28,000 square metres. Upgrades so far include 32 common-use check-in areas, a new $2 million modern baggage system, new departure lounges, new shops and a new common-user security area. The airport facilities have a massive 20,000-square-metre roof catchment area. To take advantage of this catchment, a one-megalitre water-harvesting facility has been installed. This will provide water for toilets and other essential services, which are responsible for up to 60 per cent of the terminal’s water consumption. Stages 3 and 4 of the upgrades promise new baggage carousels, a new facility for transit passengers, a customer control area and an international arrivals hall.

In the long term, one of the most exciting plans is to connect the Gold Coast Airport to the Brisbane domestic rail network, at an estimated cost of almost $700 million. It is planned for between 2019-20 and 2025-26. This project will open up the Gold Coast Airport in much the same way that the Airtrain opened up the Brisbane airport in 2001. As I said at the start of this speech, the economic sustainability and the importance of airport security for the large numbers of people who will move through these regions is ever important.

Just this year, the Rudd government committed $365 million in funding to a light rail system for the coastal areas of the Gold Coast. Having also received $464 million from the Queensland government, the Gold Coast Rapid Transit Project is now in full swing. The construction of the corridor from the Griffith University to Broadbeach is planned to start in 2011, with the system operational from late 2013. In the long term, the Gold Coast rail is planned to also connect with Coolangatta. This will provide another valuable link for the airport to the central tourist areas of the Gold Coast, including Broadbeach and Surfers Paradise.

These investments will complement many other substantial investments made in recent years on the Gold Coast. In early 2008 the Queensland Premier, Anna Bligh, opened the $160 million Skilled Park stadium at Robina. This modern facility is brilliantly located within walking distance from bus and train public transport facilities. Many residents of Forde have enjoyed a good Rugby League game at Skilled Park since it opened. The connections with the airport and that infrastructure are vital and are also supported by the aviation security.

In the works now is a major upgrade of the AFL stadium at Carrara. The Queensland government has put forward $60 million, Gold Coast City Council $20 million, the AFL $10 million and the federal government $36 million. These are big dollars and mean jobs and tourism for the Gold Coast. Around 350 jobs will be created in this process, and this is before the Gold Coast AFL team joins the league in 2011, which will also increase the numbers of sporting visitors and tourists to the area. The strong dedication to infrastructure of the Queensland government, the federal government and private interests is to be applauded. With transport and facilities advancing rapidly, the Gold Coast is securing a vibrant future. This is all on the back of ensuring aviation security for economic sustainability.

Just recently the Standing Committee on Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government has been inquiring into the impact of the global financial crisis on regional Australia. As part of that inquiry the committee members and I toured the Gold Coast and parts of my electorate of Forde, which includes the Gold Coast hinterland, as well as taking evidence in Beenleigh on the following day. I must thank the Gold Coast councillors and the mayor, Ron Clarke, for their gracious welcome and hospitality. On a sad note I should say that Ron Clarke lost his daughter only last Saturday to the sudden onset of cancer. I would like to express my best wishes and those of the federal members of that region, and I am sure all members of this House, to Ron, his wife, Helen, and their family. Ron Clarke, who has been a strong advocate for infrastructure and tourism for the Gold Coast, understands that tourism brings employment and wealth to the Gold Coast and surrounding areas.

Strong and effective airport security systems are essential to supporting this industry and providing certainty for domestic passengers. The changes proposed in the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill 2009 are about flexibility. The range of amendments proposed provides flexibility in addressing security issues in airports. The amendments will better cater for different airport types, provide more effective inspections and allow better enforcement activities to be undertaken. While the security and safety of travelling passengers through the airports is important, aviation security is also about economic sustainability because our tourism industry depends so heavily on having safe transit and transport. One thing that I know from travelling overseas is that people overseas do see Australia as a safe destination, and these security measures for our aviation sector are so very important. Given this consideration and given the amendments, I would like to commend these amendments to the House.

Luke Simpkins (Cowan, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill 2009. I do so because I believe very much in the best possible security for aviation, because with aviation there can be no mistakes. Mistakes in aviation history have resulted in deaths following bombings and hijackings. There are four amendments within this bill to modify the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 and improve aviation security as well as strengthening the Office of Transport Security. Firstly, the bill will allow various categories of a security controlled airport. Although the details will come later with regulations, it is envisaged that security requirements may be modified depending on the attributes of location, size and specific security circumstances. The categories of security controlled airport will be assigned by the secretary of the department. The second change is to enable an aviation security inspector to enter and inspect the premises of an aviation industry participant that is not on an airport site. This will allow the inspector to carry out an inspection without notice, previously only allowed on airport land. The next change will create enforceable undertakings as a mid-range sanction against contravention of the Aviation Transport Security Act. The final change will see an expansion of the ability of the aviation security inspectors to issue compliance control directions to airport operators or screening authorities. Currently, pilots and aircraft operators can be issued with a compliance control direction, but this change will allow airport operators and screening authorities also to be issued with directions to ensure compliance with the Aviation Transport Security Act. This is a necessary change to allow the act to be fully applied.

Although September 11 is the aviation security failure that we all recall so clearly, I would like to go back to the Lockerbie disaster in 1988, as I think that was as bad a failure of security as could possibly be conceived. I still remember hearing the reports regarding the Lockerbie disaster when Libyan terrorist Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi caused the deaths of 270 people on the aircraft and on the ground in the Scottish village of Lockerbie. As part of the investigation that followed the 21 December 1988 bombing, the bodies of the dead lay in Lockerbie’s streets for days afterwards so as to allow a detailed forensic examination. It is little wonder that those who survived the destruction of the debris that rained down on the village from the 747 have little sympathy for the perpetrator of these murders. As we know, the perpetrator, al-Megrahi, was recently released from jail because he has a terminal illness. My view is that there are some mistakes that you do not get a second chance for. Child molesters are one example and mass murderers of innocent people are another. Their only end should be that they are carried out in a box, forever a reminder that evil has one end and compassion has no place when dealing with evil.

Leaving the principles of dealing with these people aside, my purpose in speaking about Lockerbie is to look at the failures of security—admittedly from another time but it is useful to remind ourselves how these disasters occurred so that we can very clear about making sure it will not ever happen again. Investigations into Lockerbie found that the explosion of a Samsonite suitcase filled with the plastic explosive Semtex and baby clothes was the device that caused a 51-centimetre diameter hole in the fuselage that split the aircraft into three main pieces within three seconds. Pieces of a circuit board from a radio cassette player were also found, making the entire device similar to a bomb used by a Palestinian terrorist group just two months earlier. The baby clothes were found to have been made in Malta and al-Megrahi was identified as the person who bought the clothes. He was not only a terrorist but also a Libyan intelligence agent and the head of security of Libyan Arab Airlines. It was subsequently found that the suitcase originated in Malta as unaccompanied baggage and was moved through Frankfurt and then onto Heathrow where it was loaded onto Pan Am flight 103. While I do not think that Australia has credibly faced such a threat for many years, it is interesting that a luggage-screening employee at Frankfurt did not even know what Semtex was until 11 months after Lockerbie.

In reviewing incidents over the last 40 years I have found out a great deal about aviation security and terrorism. It says a lot about the security standards that existed over the period from 1969 to 1985 that terrorists were pulling weapons and explosive devices out of their bags or their clothing in what we consider should be secured areas, such as on board aircraft and beyond immigration control. With regard to hijacking, the first incident occurred in 1931, when Peruvian rebels took control of a Pan American aircraft in order to drop leaflets. The next significant incident was in July 1968, when Palestinian terrorists hijacked an El Al Israel Boeing 707. Fortunately on that occasion there were no casualties. On 18 August 1969 a United Arab airliner was hijacked. On that occasion there were also no casualties. Just 11 days later Palestinians hijacked a TWA 707, taking it from Rome to Damascus, Syria. The aircraft was destroyed with explosives after it had landed. Most of the hostages were released immediately, but six Israelis were released months later in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.

Incident after incident has taken place since those days as terrorists elude existing security and overcome heightened security as the risks are assessed and changes made. The 2001 attacks in New York and Washington highlighted that terrorists have no remorse and are not prepared to act like normal humans. This country’s aviation security has greatly advanced since 2001, and in some ways we were more advanced than countries like the USA before 2001. Unaccompanied baggage is not allowed here. Baggage will always be offloaded if the passenger does not board. Similarly, passenger X-ray machines are very strict now and, beyond one’s watch and belt, very little metal remains undetected.

History has shown us that terrorists will continue to seek new options for their evil acts. I note that the day before yesterday three British-born Muslim men were found guilty in the United Kingdom of planning to blow up seven aircraft with homemade liquid bombs smuggled onto planes in soft-drink bottles. Their plot was discovered in 2006, and it was from that discovery that the rules changed around the world for taking liquid on board aircraft. This incident demonstrates that terrorists continue to plan and to target aircraft and that we must always be on guard against the threat. It is also worth noting that just because someone comes to your country and they or their parents swear loyalty as citizens it does not mean that they are loyal. In this case I understand all three were born in the United Kingdom and so were able to take advantage of the education and social system that country provides, only to find fault with that country and plan mass murder. Incomprehensible as it is, it demonstrates the mentality of those involved and serves as a warning for other nations.

Although we have a good history here in Australia, we always need to be on our guard. When I was in the Federal Police in the 1980s I always wondered what the standard of training was for those operating the X-ray machines at airports. It was obvious that they picked up weapons, as every time we walked through the machine our revolvers would set it off. However, looking at the screening of carry-on luggage—and this was more so in the past—I was never that confident that everything was 100 per cent checked, because of the way some of the operators conducted those checks. Yet it was at Perth Airport that I got my first arrest, with one passenger being found by the security guards with cannabis, so they certainly picked that up.

In any case, we have a good history in Australia, and with these changes the system will be further strengthened. I personally will be very interested in seeing the regulations surrounding the security controlled airport categories and how that will work. However, I do not see any negatives regarding this bill and I look forward to it passing. There is, however, no doubt that this will not be the last change to the Aviation Transport Security Act, because the evil murderers that are terrorists will continue to try to get around these security measures and we must continue to look for new ways to defeat them.

Kay Hull (Riverina, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is a great pleasure for me to speak on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill 2009. As we have heard from other speakers, this bill serves purely to ensure that aviation is secure across Australia, and we have a proud history in securing aviation. There are four sets of amendments to the ATSA in the bill, and many of them are to do with the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government designating security controlled airports a particular category of airport, according to their risk profiles. Included in this risk profiling are our very valuable regional airports, which are valuable in more ways than one. There are the commuter airports that deliver medical professionals and businesses into rural and regional communities to ensure their sustainability and equity of access to medicine, and there are other airports that bring the aviation history of Australia to our attention.

Australian aviation has a very proud history. Legislation changes and improvements such as we see today enable our aviation history, both civilian and military, to be celebrated. One such celebration of aviation which is very relevant to the way in which the Australian people understand and appreciate aviation and the need for aviation safety is the Temora Aviation Museum. In the midst of the current economic difficulties and the drought which grips vast areas of rural and regional Australia, the Temora Aviation Museum is a success story which few rural and regional towns and cities can match. In just 10 years this museum has grown into a world-class institution. It is truly a tribute to the hard work and determination of both the Temora community and military aviation enthusiasts, who have been led by Sydney businessman and former Australian aerobatic champion Mr David Lowy.

It was indeed fitting that just 10 years ago a decision was made to locate and develop a military aviation museum in Temora. That decision was consistent with Temora’s aviation history in the Second World War, having been home to the No. 10 Elementary Flying Training School established by the Royal Australian Air Force in May 1941. No. 10 EFTS was the largest and the longest-operating flying school established under the Empire Air Training Scheme during World War II, and it was always focused on the safety of aviation for the Australian people, pilots and all those involved in aviation.

Throughout World War II more than 10,000 personnel were involved at the school, with upwards of 2,400 pilots being trained there. The great majority of the graduates served either in Australia or overseas in the European or Asia-Pacific theatres. At its peak the Temora unit contained a total of 97 de Havilland Tiger Moth aircraft. Four satellite airfields were set up around the Temora district to cope with the demand to train RAAF pilots. I often meet ex-RAAF officers and men who are based in Temora, and invariably they mention the hospitality they received when based in this mid-sized country town which was focused on aviation safety and security.

No. 10 EFDS ceased operation on 12 March 1946, making it the last World War II flying school to close. Since then Temora has continued its aviation heritage, becoming the preferred airfield for a growing number of sport aviation activities, including gliding, parachuting and recreational flying—all with an emphasis on aviation security and ensuring that safety measures are undertaken at every possible opportunity. However, it was the forward-looking decision in 1999 to establish the Temora Aviation Museum that has had a significant impact on both the town and the commemoration of the deeds of the men and women who served in the RAAF in World War II and in the Korean and Vietnam campaigns. The museum’s hangar facility was completed in February 2000 and the donations of the first aircraft followed. The museum was opened for public viewing in June 2000, and construction commenced in late 2000 on the exhibition buildings containing the display space, a theatre, an admissions entrance, a gift shop, a children’s playground and a picnic area. These were completed and opened to the public in August 2001, at no cost to the government, to enthuse and attract people to aviation, the safety of which is paramount in Australia.

Stage 3 of the museum complex was completed in November 2002 with the opening of a 1,980 square metre display hangar. All aircraft are housed in this new hangar, with the original hangar becoming a customised engineering and maintenance facility focused on aviation safety. Stage 4 was completed in 2007 and includes a specialised aircraft restoration facility, a storage hangar and additional car parking. Since that time the museum has gone from strength to strength. The most recent flying display earlier this month attracted more than 7,500 military aviation devotees—all committed to safeguarding aviation’s future and ensuring that the aviation measures in place meet the expectations of all government departments. We saw an original Tiger Moth, a Spitfire, a Hudson bomber, a Vampire jet and a Gloucester Meteor all doing their routines in the clear Riverina skies. Australian-made aircraft also featured, with a Wirraway and a Boomerang attracting very keen interest.

It needs to be said that the museum would not have been a success but for three vital elements, including, first and foremost, the vision, passion, expertise and generosity of Sydney businessman David Lowy, the founder and president of the museum. Over a 10-year period he has contributed countless hours of his time in planning and executing the tasks that go with developing a world-class institution—with aviation safety in mind. In the museum’s first decade of operations he has donated more than $30 million to fund the purchase of the items in the collection, the buildings, the plant and equipment as well as the recurrent costs which provide for the specialist technical skills that are needed to maintain military aircraft. The museum employees 23 full-time staff and has an active apprentice program in order to educate the Australian public and the massive visitation to the museum about the need to respect aviation’s past and make its future safe.

Secondly, the unstinting efforts of the Temora community, including its municipal office bearers, have been critical. On each occasion that there is a flying day—and there are eight flying weekends per year—the staff of the museum swells from 23 full-time members to 70 or 80. The difference in numbers is due to the specially trained community volunteers, who manage to handle a crowd which exceeds the entire population of Temora. The museum attracts more than 40,000 visitors each year. They are given a consistent and complete education experience on aviation history and the need for aviation security now and in the future. The museum is a true community partnership. On flying days the food services are provided by the local volunteer fire brigade, with all of the profits being donated to local area charities. To date, approximately $200,000 has been raised and donated.

I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the work of the RAAF personnel who have so ably and readily assisted the museum. Take, for example, the most recent flying display. The Chief of Air Force, Air Marshal Mark Binskin, was on hand to officiate at the first public flying of the recently restored Sabre jet fighter. I also acknowledge that my colleague in the Senate and senator for the ACT Senator Kate Lundy was in attendance. I welcomed her to the Riverina. The Sabre restoration was a joint RAAF-TAM effort which took more than three years. The RAAF technical experts assisted the TAM crew in the complete rebuilding of this aircraft. In addition, over the years RAAF personnel and others, as part of their recreational flying, have donated their time to pilot the museum’s aircraft and explain to the many aviation enthusiasts and the general public across Australia the critical requirements for aviation safety.

It is important that the members of this parliament take an active interest not only in civil aviation—as we have seen today with the amendments that we have put forward—but also in military aviation and this particular military aviation museum, as its importance extends well beyond the township of Temora. The museum is an active reflection of Australia’s air defence history and Australia’s commitment to safety for its pilots, whether they be used in military defence personnel or in civil aviation history. Australia, as a large and mainly uninhabited island continent, needs a strong air force to protect its shores, and also to protect those who are assigned to be its defenders whether on land or sea. This is what we are particularly focused on with the Temora Aviation Museum, or TAM, as I have previously referred to it.

As well as preserving our historical Australian military aircraft in flying condition, the museum goal is to pay tribute to those Australian men and women who have served in the defence of our country. In this regard I would especially draw to members’ attention the homecoming on 31 August 2009 of the last of those young Australians who went missing in action and failed to return from the Vietnam War. Young aviators Pilot Officer Robert Carver and Flying Officer Michael Herbert were flying a Canberra Bomber with a call sign Magpie 91 when it went missing on 3 November 1970. I commend to members the moving speech of the member for Charlton and Minister for Defence Personnel when he addressed the repatriation ceremony at Richmond Air Base, which was attended by relatives, friends and colleagues of the deceased. For those of you who watched the repatriation ceremony on national television, the aircraft positioned just behind the minister was Temora Aviation Museum’s Canberra Bomber, currently the only operational Canberra Bomber in the world. The museum provided the aircraft for the ceremony at Richmond Air Force Base. The aircraft was piloted by Air Commodore Rod Luke, a retired RAAF pilot.

Finally, it is important that any young Australian who aspires to join the armed forces be able to see in action the equipment used by previous generations in defence of Australia. This tangible reminder of our history is something that should be sustained if we are to maintain the culture of service in defence of one’s country and its citizens. Accordingly, I offer an invitation to all members to visit my electorate and go to Temora to witness the work that has been done to recognise the contribution of our past and present Air Force personnel. It is just a two-hour drive from this parliament and a drive which you will find well worth while.

In speaking to this bill today, I would suggest that everything that is undertaken at the Temora Aviation Museum is designed with a focus on the future of aviation security. I commend this bill to the House and I commend to the House the much appreciated efforts of all of those involved with the advent and the successful operation of the Temora aircraft museum.

Sussan Ley (Farrer, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Justice and Customs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am pleased to also talk today on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill 2009. Security at our airports in Australia, whether they be metropolitan or regional, is of great importance. The aviation sector is a key contributor to the Australian economy. It is in many respects the lifeline of rural and regional Australia, where I am a local member, as is the previous speaker, the member for Riverina. The coalition believes it is integral to maintain high standards in order that we compete in a marketplace that has evolving environmental, safety and security standards. More than any other country, Australia’s economic prosperity is closely tied to the health and the competitiveness of the country’s aviation sector. This is due to the vast distances within Australia between this continent and the rest of the world. ABS statistics show that Australia has the world’s 55th largest population and the 15th largest economy but it manages 11 per cent of the world’s air space, second only to the United States. Aviation specific businesses contributed $6,427 million towards Australia’s total GDP in 2007-08. As at August 2008, they employed 48,800 staff.

Undoubtedly since the events of September 11, 2001 the importance placed on the airport security apparatus, specifically passenger screening and security checks, has increased markedly. To address the new and evolving security threats of the 21st century, the former coalition government invited aviation expert Sir John Wheeler to undertake a review of aviation security in Australia. The subsequent Wheeler report, released in 2005, made 17 recommendations, including recommendations for regional airports. Following the report’s release, the then federal government implemented all 17 of those recommendations. The Sydney Airport incident which involved a violent confrontation between members of the Hell’s Angels and Commancheros motorcycle clubs on 27 March this year does, however, demonstrate that this government has more work to do on airport security.

Sir John Wheeler noted in his 2005 review that a large measure of the uncertainty surrounding everyday security in criminal matters in airports is caused by a disconnect between those units charged with counterterrorism first response responsibilities and those who have the tasks of community policing and of investigating crime. The Australian Federal Police Protective Service officers performing the counterterrorism first response role do so, in the judgment of the review panel, with varying degrees of competence and professionalism. But many at airports expect more of them and cannot understand why these uniformed officers do not participate fully in handling crime or breaches of the peace. The fact that the AFP Protective Service uniforms display ‘Police’ on jackets and caps reinforces in the minds of the public the belief that these are regular police officers. But in terms of their constitution and powers they are not, and therein lies the difficulty. As well as having a visible police presence at the airports, it is just as important to ensure that there are sufficient police numbers, including sworn police. Paul Maley reported in the Australian on 19 March 2009 in his article ‘Airport security still lacks force’:

The Police Federation of Australia yesterday said low police numbers and divided responsibility between the states and commonwealth was putting commuter and public safety at risk. … “We (also) understand the numbers have deteriorated further since June 2008,” Mr Burgess said. “In other words, the major airports are understaffed with sworn police by a staggering 35 per cent or more.”

Mr Maley goes on to report:

In the Police Federation’s submission to the Transport Department’s green paper into the aviation sector, Mr Burgess said that as of June 2008, 233 state and territory police officers have been seconded to Australia’s airports—124 short of the 2005 COAG commitment and 101 short of the subsequent reviewed commitment.

I understand the Police Federation has been receiving anecdotal reports that the number of police at the airports has declined since then. In true tradition of Labor breaking election promises since this government came to office, 199 Australian Federal Police members have been made redundant. This is despite a Rudd government promise to bolster the force with an additional 500 members. Time is running out for those additional promised 500 members.

The incident at Sydney Airport, while most unfortunate, probably partly demonstrated that we do not have sufficient numbers of sworn police and that the secondment of state police to the AFP and the interaction between sworn Federal Police and Protective Service officers in similar uniforms have added to an allusion that the public is protected when the reality is quite different. Our major airports are understaffed, as I said, by a staggering 35 per cent. As at June 2008, the AFP had 233 state and territory sworn police officers seconded to work at the major airports. This falls short of the COAG commitment of 357 officers for major airports and 101 short of the reviewed commitment. The airport security awareness training program, Operation Hawkeye, which was supposed to be implemented in 2007, I am advised was shelved also indefinitely by this government.

Air cargo is an important part of Australia’s international and domestic trade. It is a vital part of the aviation industry and a contributor to our economy to the tune of $28 billion in 2007-08. Approximately 80 per cent of Australian domestic cargo is carried on passenger aircraft. The coalition, when in government, worked hard to ensure security risks were minimised in the air cargo screening regime. Australia’s aviation security system uses a combination of examination methods at various points along the cargo supply chain. The government in their last budget slashed $17.1 million over four years from their risk based cargo inspection regime. The CEO of the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service, Michael Carmody, said that inspections of air cargo consignments would be reduced from 6.2 million to 1.5 million as a result of these cuts. So we will see target inspections for air cargo drop by 4.7 million consignments over this financial year. This decision to cut funds to a vital area of Customs will put strain on staff that are already overstretched and will inevitably lead to more illicit drugs, illegal weapons, biosecurity threats and illegal smuggled wildlife slipping through our borders. It is not good enough to base cargo inspections on a resource factor. It needs to be done purely on a risk basis, which means that if it is required that more than 20 per cent of containers are inspected then that ability should be there—and the resources should be there to allow that to happen.

Intrinsically linked to aviation security and the cargo supply chain is the issue of infiltration of airports by organised criminal groups. Figures from the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government reveal that around 10 per cent of the 33,644 people who have applied for an aviation security identification card since October 2008 have been convicted of a crime. Of those, 148 have been denied a security card. So, of the approximately 33,000 who have applied for the card, only 148 have been denied.

As reported in the Age on 25 June 2009 by Nick McKenzie and Linton Besser, a three-year intelligence operation by the Australian Crime Commission has revealed serious weaknesses in the security of ports and airports. The Australian Crime Commission listed in their ‘Crime in the transport sector’ inquiry those that had been investigated by the ACC and other agencies, including associates of outlaw motorcycle gangs and other crime groups who are working at major airports—including the Vice-President of the Outcasts motorcycle gang, who has a Commonwealth security pass and is a Melbourne airport baggage screener—and an executive of an Asian airline who used his security pass to smuggle drug money through secure sites at Melbourne airport and on to an aircraft. McKenzie and Besser reported that the Australian Crime Commission in its three-year probe produced 86 reports of criminality in the airport sector. It is concerning that criminal figures are working at our major airports more than three years after the Wheeler inquiry into airport security called for a thorough overhaul. It has also been reported that ongoing problems at airports, including inadequate screening of casual employees, nepotism when hiring, camera black spots and poor coordination between police and security companies are all contributing to an extremely substandard environment.

I know the Minister for Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government, at the table, will have turned his attention to reports in today’s Fairfax newspapers about security shambles at our ports. While the substance of that article deals with port security, it is clearly noted that there is a still secret review of the aviation security identity card system which has recommended sweeping changes. If that review is with the minister, I suggest that he acts on it fairly swiftly because I would not be surprised if it finds that workers convicted of serious criminal offences have been granted passes to work in security-sensitive areas—airside, in container-loading depots and, as I said, in the most sensitive areas of our airports. While this bill deals with further access for airport security inspectors, the minister would do well to look at the criteria under which the aviation security identification card is issued. There is no point in ramping up security in one area if it remains lax in another. There has been ample evidence demonstrated of that laxity.

The government conceded in their aviation green paper that Sir John Wheeler was correct in his 2005 review that the aviation sector was exploited by criminal groups. I again quote Mark Burgess, from the Police Federation of Australia, who noted in that federation’s submission to the green paper:

As at June 2008, the AFP had 336 State and Territory sworn police officers seconded to it and 233 of those officers were seconded to work at major airports. This falls 124 officers short of the Council of Australian Governments’ (COAG) commitment…Further, because States and Territories have been unable to meet and maintain all commitments to provide secondees, there were at 30 June 2008, 86 vacancies in the Airport Uniform Police. For example, the three Queensland airports had 37 vacancies, Melbourne had 15, and Sydney had eight vacancies. All up, officers deployed falls short of the COAG commitment by 124 sworn police officers. We understand the numbers have deteriorated further since June 2008. In other words the major airports are understaffed with sworn police by a staggering 35 per cent or more.

It is evident that this Labor government is not serious about securing Australia’s ports or airports. I commend the amending legislation to the House.

Anthony Albanese (Grayndler, Australian Labor Party, Leader of the House) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

in reply—I thank members for their contributions to the debate on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill 2009, however confusing some of them might have been, particularly the contribution from the member for Farrer, who gave a critique of this bill but then commended it to the House. I note that no amendments have been moved to this legislation and that the opposition will be supporting it.

This legislation is a part of the government’s ongoing vigilance when it comes to transport security. Australia’s aviation security framework has a number of layers to ensure the deterrence, detection and prevention of acts of unlawful interference with an aircraft. The Rudd government is vigilant to ensure security agencies have the necessary tools to deal with threats to the Australian aviation industry. The Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill 2009 makes four important amendments to the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004. The government’s aviation security agencies need the tools provided by these amendments to improve security at airports and along the freight supply chain. I note that these are all improvements to the regime that we inherited from the former government, and the shadow minister’s critique of the former government’s transport security regime was very interesting indeed. Indeed, it is quite astonishing that those who were part of the former government forget that they were there for 12 years.

Reference was made to the report today on the maritime security regime at our ports. That is a regime that we inherited from the former government. I believe that the former government were ahead of the curve when it came to instituting the MSIC. That was in response to the circumstances arising from the acts of terrorism in September 2001. The former government did act, did put in place a regime and that was supported by the then opposition. Upon coming to office we instituted an audit of that regime. I received that report just weeks ago, and we are consulting with industry before we announce the details of a tightening of the security regime at our ports. But it is a tightening of the former government’s regime. I do not seek to make points of a partisan nature on this because I believe that any fair analysis will show that the Howard government were ahead of most of our major industrialised countries in taking action, but improvements can be made. But the idea, though, that a shadow minister can make a critique of the former government as though it was our regime and nothing to do with them is, quite frankly, extraordinary.

This bill makes four important amendments to the act. The first amendment will amend the act to allow for greater flexibility in the categorisation of airports for security purposes. All airports where regular passenger transport services land are security controlled airports. At present they are all subject to a standard set of Commonwealth security regulations. This amendment will enable the secretary to designate security controlled airports into categories and insert a regulation-making power to prescribe different requirements for each category of airport. Categorising airports according to their relative risk will allow security resources to be deployed based on risk, giving greater flexibility to the regulation of airports while maintaining security. This measure will not be implemented until there has been consultation with industry, and passage of the bill will allow that consultation to start in the near future.

The second amendment expands the powers of aviation security inspectors from the Office of Transport Security in my department to allow them to make unannounced inspections of air cargo businesses that are not at an airport. Currently, inspections of cargo businesses outside airports can only be undertaken with reasonable notice. While many air cargo companies are located well away from an airport the integrity of their security procedures is important for aviation security because the freight that is packed at those sites ends up in the body of a plane. Amendments to aviation security inspector powers are required to ensure effective compliance monitoring of the Accredited Air Cargo Agent Scheme, which will commence early next year.

The third amendment introduces enforceable undertakings as a middle range enforcement tool under the act to deal with breaches of transport security plans. Currently, there are no intermediate penalties if an operator breaches their transport security plan and offences may trigger cancellation of the plan, which would prevent the cargo operator or airline from operating. Enforceable undertakings are flexible and conciliatory in nature, presenting a particularly useful option considering the often unpredictable nature of the aviation security environment.

Finally, the act will be amended to expand the scope of compliance control directions so that they can also be issued to airports and screening authorities. Currently, the act permits aviation security inspectors to direct the pilot or operator of an aircraft that is in Australia, but not in flight, to take a specified action in relation to the aircraft. Such a direction by an inspector is a compliance control direction. The amendment will allow an aviation security inspector to direct operators of security controlled airports, screening authorities or screening officers to take specific actions. For example, an airport operator or screening authority may be directed to screen or rescreen certain passengers and baggage.

The bill makes important changes to the aviation security legislation framework. The government will continue to monitor the effectiveness of measures within the aviation security framework to ensure that it remains responsive to threats to the travelling public and the Australian aviation industry. We will continue to do this on an ongoing basis, we will make changes wherever they will improve transport security and we will continue—as we have with this legislation—to consult with the opposition to ensure that these measures gain bipartisan support, because it is important when it comes to our transport security framework that it be in the national interest rather than politicised, as the previous speaker sought to do.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.