Luke Simpkins (Cowan, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Aviation Transport Security Amendment (2009 Measures No. 1) Bill 2009. I do so because I believe very much in the best possible security for aviation, because with aviation there can be no mistakes. Mistakes in aviation history have resulted in deaths following bombings and hijackings. There are four amendments within this bill to modify the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004 and improve aviation security as well as strengthening the Office of Transport Security. Firstly, the bill will allow various categories of a security controlled airport. Although the details will come later with regulations, it is envisaged that security requirements may be modified depending on the attributes of location, size and specific security circumstances. The categories of security controlled airport will be assigned by the secretary of the department. The second change is to enable an aviation security inspector to enter and inspect the premises of an aviation industry participant that is not on an airport site. This will allow the inspector to carry out an inspection without notice, previously only allowed on airport land. The next change will create enforceable undertakings as a mid-range sanction against contravention of the Aviation Transport Security Act. The final change will see an expansion of the ability of the aviation security inspectors to issue compliance control directions to airport operators or screening authorities. Currently, pilots and aircraft operators can be issued with a compliance control direction, but this change will allow airport operators and screening authorities also to be issued with directions to ensure compliance with the Aviation Transport Security Act. This is a necessary change to allow the act to be fully applied.

Although September 11 is the aviation security failure that we all recall so clearly, I would like to go back to the Lockerbie disaster in 1988, as I think that was as bad a failure of security as could possibly be conceived. I still remember hearing the reports regarding the Lockerbie disaster when Libyan terrorist Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi caused the deaths of 270 people on the aircraft and on the ground in the Scottish village of Lockerbie. As part of the investigation that followed the 21 December 1988 bombing, the bodies of the dead lay in Lockerbie’s streets for days afterwards so as to allow a detailed forensic examination. It is little wonder that those who survived the destruction of the debris that rained down on the village from the 747 have little sympathy for the perpetrator of these murders. As we know, the perpetrator, al-Megrahi, was recently released from jail because he has a terminal illness. My view is that there are some mistakes that you do not get a second chance for. Child molesters are one example and mass murderers of innocent people are another. Their only end should be that they are carried out in a box, forever a reminder that evil has one end and compassion has no place when dealing with evil.

Leaving the principles of dealing with these people aside, my purpose in speaking about Lockerbie is to look at the failures of security—admittedly from another time but it is useful to remind ourselves how these disasters occurred so that we can very clear about making sure it will not ever happen again. Investigations into Lockerbie found that the explosion of a Samsonite suitcase filled with the plastic explosive Semtex and baby clothes was the device that caused a 51-centimetre diameter hole in the fuselage that split the aircraft into three main pieces within three seconds. Pieces of a circuit board from a radio cassette player were also found, making the entire device similar to a bomb used by a Palestinian terrorist group just two months earlier. The baby clothes were found to have been made in Malta and al-Megrahi was identified as the person who bought the clothes. He was not only a terrorist but also a Libyan intelligence agent and the head of security of Libyan Arab Airlines. It was subsequently found that the suitcase originated in Malta as unaccompanied baggage and was moved through Frankfurt and then onto Heathrow where it was loaded onto Pan Am flight 103. While I do not think that Australia has credibly faced such a threat for many years, it is interesting that a luggage-screening employee at Frankfurt did not even know what Semtex was until 11 months after Lockerbie.

In reviewing incidents over the last 40 years I have found out a great deal about aviation security and terrorism. It says a lot about the security standards that existed over the period from 1969 to 1985 that terrorists were pulling weapons and explosive devices out of their bags or their clothing in what we consider should be secured areas, such as on board aircraft and beyond immigration control. With regard to hijacking, the first incident occurred in 1931, when Peruvian rebels took control of a Pan American aircraft in order to drop leaflets. The next significant incident was in July 1968, when Palestinian terrorists hijacked an El Al Israel Boeing 707. Fortunately on that occasion there were no casualties. On 18 August 1969 a United Arab airliner was hijacked. On that occasion there were also no casualties. Just 11 days later Palestinians hijacked a TWA 707, taking it from Rome to Damascus, Syria. The aircraft was destroyed with explosives after it had landed. Most of the hostages were released immediately, but six Israelis were released months later in exchange for Palestinian prisoners.

Incident after incident has taken place since those days as terrorists elude existing security and overcome heightened security as the risks are assessed and changes made. The 2001 attacks in New York and Washington highlighted that terrorists have no remorse and are not prepared to act like normal humans. This country’s aviation security has greatly advanced since 2001, and in some ways we were more advanced than countries like the USA before 2001. Unaccompanied baggage is not allowed here. Baggage will always be offloaded if the passenger does not board. Similarly, passenger X-ray machines are very strict now and, beyond one’s watch and belt, very little metal remains undetected.

History has shown us that terrorists will continue to seek new options for their evil acts. I note that the day before yesterday three British-born Muslim men were found guilty in the United Kingdom of planning to blow up seven aircraft with homemade liquid bombs smuggled onto planes in soft-drink bottles. Their plot was discovered in 2006, and it was from that discovery that the rules changed around the world for taking liquid on board aircraft. This incident demonstrates that terrorists continue to plan and to target aircraft and that we must always be on guard against the threat. It is also worth noting that just because someone comes to your country and they or their parents swear loyalty as citizens it does not mean that they are loyal. In this case I understand all three were born in the United Kingdom and so were able to take advantage of the education and social system that country provides, only to find fault with that country and plan mass murder. Incomprehensible as it is, it demonstrates the mentality of those involved and serves as a warning for other nations.

Although we have a good history here in Australia, we always need to be on our guard. When I was in the Federal Police in the 1980s I always wondered what the standard of training was for those operating the X-ray machines at airports. It was obvious that they picked up weapons, as every time we walked through the machine our revolvers would set it off. However, looking at the screening of carry-on luggage—and this was more so in the past—I was never that confident that everything was 100 per cent checked, because of the way some of the operators conducted those checks. Yet it was at Perth Airport that I got my first arrest, with one passenger being found by the security guards with cannabis, so they certainly picked that up.

In any case, we have a good history in Australia, and with these changes the system will be further strengthened. I personally will be very interested in seeing the regulations surrounding the security controlled airport categories and how that will work. However, I do not see any negatives regarding this bill and I look forward to it passing. There is, however, no doubt that this will not be the last change to the Aviation Transport Security Act, because the evil murderers that are terrorists will continue to try to get around these security measures and we must continue to look for new ways to defeat them.

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