Arch Bevis (Brisbane, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Homeland Security) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Bill 2007. In March 2005, the government appointed Anthony Blunn AO, a former Secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department, to undertake a review of the regulation of access to communications under the Telecommunications (Interception) Act 1979. The report on the review of the regulation, the Blunn report, was tabled in parliament on 14 September 2005 and recommended that legislation dealing with access to telecommunications data for security and law enforcement purposes be established. The Blunn report included public submissions and consultations with security and law enforcement agencies, the telecommunications industry, privacy organisations and individuals. The Telecommunications (Interception) Amendment Act 2006 implemented the first stage of the legislative amendments.

This bill will amend the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979, the T(IA) Act, to implement further recommendations from the Blunn report. It will transfer relevant provisions of the Telecommunications Act 1997 to the T(IA) Act and will provide comprehensive and overriding legislation that regulates access to telecommunications data for national security and law enforcement purposes, which Labor welcomes.

The bill also contains a number of additional amendments to the operations of the existing T(IA) Act which Labor supports, including ensuring that interception warrants are available in relation to the investigation of any offence relating to child pornography regardless of the maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed by state and territory criminal law; widening the definition of ‘exempt proceedings’ to allow disclosures for the purposes of proceedings in relation to the Spam Act 2003 and enabling the use of this evidence in court proceedings; implementing, in part, recommendation 24 of the Blunn report which recommended allowing access to the content of communications for the protection of data systems and the development of testing of new technologies; and a number of other minor amendments that generally improve operational efficiency.

The key purpose of schedule 1 in the bill is to transfer security and law enforcement provisions from parts 13, 14 and 15 of the Telecommunications Act to the T(IA) Act. Schedule 1, item 12 also inserts a new chapter 4, which deals with access to telecommunications data. The amendments establish a regime for particular officers of ASIO or an enforcement agency to lawfully authorise the disclosure of telecommunications data without breaching the general prohibitions on the disclosure of that data that exist within existing sections 276, 277 and 278 of the Telecommunications Act. The new chapter 4 transfers sections 282 and 283 of the Telecommunications Act to the T(IA) Act. The basis for lawful access will depend on whether the authorising body is ASIO, a criminal law enforcement agency or an enforcement agency.

The new provisions distinguish between access to historical telecommunications data—that is, data which is already in existence at the time of the request—and prospective data—that is, data that is collected as it is created and forwarded to the agency in near real time. Access to prospective telecommunications data is only available to ASIO or criminal law enforcement agencies because of the high privacy applications of this type of access. The key amendments are contained in part 1. Those amendments create a new two-tier access regime. The first tier encompasses the traditional access to existing telecommunications data. These agencies are defined as enforcement agencies. The second tier, which would be limited to a narrower range of agencies—that is, the criminal law enforcement agencies—would require a higher threshold of authorisation, allowing for future access to telecommunications data, and that is covered in proposed sections 176 and 180. The need to distinguish between historical and prospective data is a reflection of the advances in technology which enable the use of telecommunications data to provide, amongst other things, location information.

To reflect the increased privacy implications of access to prospective data, three more restrictive conditions are attached to these authorisations: firstly, restricting the disclosure of prospective telecommunications data to an authorised officer of a criminal law enforcement agency for the investigation of offences which attract a maximum term of imprisonment of at least three years; secondly, limiting the time frame for which an authorisation may be enforced to 45 days for criminal law enforcement agencies, under proposed section 180, and 90 days for ASIO, under proposed section 176; and, thirdly, requiring the authorising officer to have regard to the impact of the authorisation on the privacy of the individual concerned.

The bill also deals with voluntary disclosures of telecommunications data by employees of carriers or carriage service providers to ASIO and to enforcement agencies. These provisions make it clear that they only apply in the case of voluntary disclosures and that requests from agencies must be dealt with under proposed sections 175, 176 and 178 through to 180. There are certain safeguards set out in the bill in relation to access to telecommunications data: authorisations must be retained for a period of three years; the head of an enforcement agency must report on the number of authorisations to the minister on an annual basis; and this report must be tabled in the parliament. Transparency provisions of that kind are particularly important in matters like this.

The bill amends the Telecommunications Act by also inserting proposed section 306A. This provision is based on the existing record-keeping arrangements for the disclosure of historical telecommunications data. The proposed section provides for the records of prospective authorisations made under the T(IA) Act that are to be kept by carriers, carriage service providers and number database operators. The bill also provides for an offence for unlawful disclosure or use, including secondary use and disclosure, of telecommunications data.

Schedule 1, item 12, inserts a new chapter 5, which deals with cooperation with interception agencies. It requires carriers and carriage service providers to ensure that communications carried over the telecommunications systems are capable of being intercepted. The bill deals with the obligation on carriers that the intercepted information is capable of being delivered to interception agencies from a delivery point. The Attorney-General’s office advised that, although the above arrangements already exist under the Telecommunications Act of 1997, they are being transferred to the T(IA) Act. The legislation will remain valid within the Telecommunications Act for a transitional period and will then be repealed, although the Attorney-General’s office have not yet specifically identified the length of that transitional period. They may be in a position to provide some further advice today on that.

The Attorney-General may make written determinations on the interception capability of certain carriage services under proposed section 189. The new post of Communications Access Co-ordinator is defined by this bill. That person may grant exemptions to any interception capability obligation under proposed section 192. ACMA can also grant exemptions for trial services under proposed section 193. Carriers also have to prepare and submit an annual interception capability plan in accordance with the bill. The plans will now be lodged with the CAC rather than with ACMA.

The bill also inserts new item 12 in schedule 1, which states that various instruments are not legislative instruments. The Scrutiny of Bills Committee noted that, in each case, the explanatory memorandum states that the reason these exemptions are not legislative instruments is that the relevant documents contain sensitive and confidential information. For example, in respect of the instrument referred to in proposed section 192(4), the explanatory memorandum explains that, if the documents were not kept confidential, the limitations of interception capability and by implication how to avoid interception could become publicly apparent.

However, the committee did point out inconsistencies in the explanatory memorandum, which refers to exemptions granted by ACMA under proposed section 193(1) as administrative in nature. The committee queried:

... why, despite appearing to be very similar provisions, the exemption provided for under proposed new subsection 192(1) is considered to be legislative in character but the exemption provided for in proposed new subsection 193(1) is considered administrative in nature.

Again I invite the minister in his reply to comment on that or the Attorney-General’s office to consider that and provide some advice to the parliament or my office in due course. The Scrutiny of Bills Committee has sought the Attorney-General’s advice as to whether the exemption under the proposed section is administrative and should be subjected to review under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. We await the Attorney-General’s response.

Schedule 2 amends the act to ensure that the list of serious offences for which interception warrants may be sought includes all child pornography offences, whether or not the penalty for such an offence is imprisonment for at least seven years. Child pornography offences are already defined as serious offences by the act but only where the maximum penalty is imprisonment for at least seven years.

In relation to the Spam Act, the T(IA) Act provides that interception material can be used as evidence in an exempt proceeding. Schedule 2, item 5 widens the definition of ‘exempt proceedings’ to allow disclosures for the purposes of proceedings in relation to the Spam Act 2003. This amendment is consistent with the intention of recommendation 17 of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs report on the bill.

The bill contains several amendments to partially implement recommendation 24 of the Blunn review, which recommended allowing access to the content of communications for the protection of data systems and the development or testing of new technologies. The bill will allow the Attorney-General to authorise interception for developing and testing capabilities, subject to conditions and only by security authority. A ‘security authority’ is defined in schedule 2, proposed section 3, subsection 5(1) as:

... an authority of the Commonwealth that has functions primarily relating to:

(a)

security; or

(b)

collection of foreign intelligence; or

(c)

the defence of Australia; or

(d)

the conduct of the Commonwealth’s international affairs.

The bill also contains provisions concerning the definition of ‘passing over the telecommunications system’ for the purpose of a computer network operated by or on behalf of the Australian Federal Police. People who operate, protect or maintain the network or are responsible for the enforcement of professional standards in the AFP are treated as intended recipients so that their monitoring of outbound and inbound communications is not unlawful. These provisions were inserted by the 2006 amendment and were subject to a two-year sunset clause. The Attorney-General’s office has advised that the two-year sunset clause will also apply to the proposed amendments inserted in this amended bill.

Items 11 and 12 would expand the number of agencies eligible for exemption under subsection 5F(2) and 5G(2) to cover Commonwealth agencies—that is, the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity and the Australian Crime Commission; security authorities—that is, ASIO, the Department of Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and eligible authorities of the states—and that would include integrity, crime commission and police forces, as well as the AFP, which is currently exempt. This amendment would increase the number of agencies which can monitor all outbound and inbound communications for the purposes of enforcing those professional standards.

The bill was reviewed by the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. The committee handed down its report on 1 August 2007 and made a number of recommendations. I will refer to some of those now. At paragraph 3.77 the committee recommended:

... that proposed paragraph 5(1)(m) of the Bill be deleted to remove CrimTrac from the definition of ‘enforcement agency’.

That was a matter that we looked at with some interest. However, it is not proposed to move an amendment in relation to that. Whilst acknowledging that CrimTrac does not have the investigative powers of a traditional enforcement or security agency, we note that CrimTrac does play a vital specialist role in assisting law enforcement. It is for this reason that we think it should remain within the bill’s definition of an enforcement agency.

CrimTrac is a Commonwealth executive agency set up to develop, involve and manage advanced information systems that assist Australian police to carry out their law enforcement and crime prevention roles. By generating national approaches to information sharing solutions for law enforcement, CrimTrac is able to enhance Australian policing through the provision of high-quality information services that meet the needs of the policing community. Since November 2004, CrimTrac has been brokering Sensis Direct Access information on behalf of all policing jurisdictions and other criminal law enforcement agencies to provide them with pertinent information about telephone subscriptions when investigating, preventing and prosecuting criminal offences. Access to this information is governed by various processes and procedures according to the law enforcement agency requesting the information.

Enforcement of criminal law covers a wide spectrum of activities and depends on the organisation to which the investigator belongs. CrimTrac currently brokers that on behalf of all policing jurisdictions across Australia, including the AFP. In addition, CrimTrac also brokers telecommunications data on behalf of a number of other law enforcement agencies: the Customs Service, the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption, the Crime and Misconduct Commission of Queensland, the Australian Crime Commission and the Australian Securities and Investments Commission. The current application used by CrimTrac is a simple forward/reverse and address based search on behalf of those law enforcement agencies.

By undertaking these activities, CrimTrac ensures that all organisations are legitimately entitled to have access before approving individuals on a case-by-case basis. Access is granted to individuals, not organisations, work units or teams, according to their responsibility and rank.

In addition to this, all jurisdictions and other criminal law enforcement agencies have specific protocols and policy relating to additional approval and security levels. These additional specific protocols and policy relating to additional approval and security have an added authorisation for checks from the commissioned officer level status. Checks made by jurisdictions are subject to full security audit capabilities. All application use is logged to standards accepted by police and law enforcement agencies. This includes security and audit applications that have the capability to recreate what each user accessed, and these can then be recreated for evidential purposes in court.

As a result of the CrimTrac agency brokering of information from Sensis Direct Access, CrimTrac ensures that the jurisdictions and other law enforcement agencies are not required to commit to the development, establishment and ongoing support costs associated with the individual interfaces. That is a sensible thing which we support. In addition to this, CrimTrac, on behalf of the jurisdictions and other law enforcement agencies, has been in a better position to negotiate competitive transaction costs through the economies of scale. Their brokerage of information to law enforcement agencies is done via appropriate security level classifications within the AFP network, with the server being housed within the Defence Computer Bureau. In fact, CrimTrac has taken almost one year to establish and develop that current interface. The system has been used in all jurisdictions and has clearly proved beneficial. We therefore think its inclusion in the bill is appropriate.

The committee also recommended that the determination of the communications access coordinator under proposed subsection 183(2) address requirements for the consideration and documentation of privacy issues by authorised officers. We are not proposing to move an amendment in relation to that matter. The committee acknowledged that the department’s concern that seeking to provide that guidance within the bill is likely to be impractical given the range of circumstances confronting officers was a fair point, and we have taken that on board. Also, the committee recommended that the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security incorporate into his regular inspection program the oversight of the use of powers to obtain prospective telecommunications data by the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation.

We note that the IGIS has broad powers to incorporate oversight of these matters contained in this bill, and indeed the advice we have received from the Attorney-General’s office is that these powers are not impinged upon in any way by this bill. The committee itself noted advice from the department that the existing powers of the IGIS would permit such inspections. Having not long ago met with the IGIS, I am confident that his office will continue to monitor and inspect not only these matters but all significant activities of ASIO, and we are not proposing to proceed with an amendment on that matter, either.

The committee also recommended that the Attorney-General’s Department arrange for an independent review of the operations of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 within five years. The committee accepted the view of the government that it is unnecessary to amend the bill to require such a review—though I would anticipate that the parliament, irrespective of the election outcome, would want to keep a close eye on the operation of this bill and may well want to have a look at it somewhere in the time frame that the committee recommended. However, we accept, as the committee did, the point that is being made and we are not proposing to move an amendment in respect of that matter. The measures that are contained in the bill are, in the view of the opposition, fair and reasonable in the circumstances, and we support the bill.

Wilson Tuckey (O'Connor, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Bill 2007 is important legislation. It is representative of the demands that government must meet in protecting the Australian people in the war on terror and in protecting the younger side of our community from the activities of those who distribute child pornography via telecommunications, which leads to attacks on children and other most despicable things.

The legislation is also the result of the government seeking expert advice on these matters from a leading international expert, Mr Blunn, who recommended the processes that this bill will put in place. The advice was that it has now become apparent that what was once a small part of the Telecommunications Act, in which there was a provision for interception, now requires an entire act. This will enable our various law enforcement agencies wider access to telecommunications, accepting that telecommunication has come a long way from a hardwire telephone and accepting that what was once required by law enforcement agencies to track down some criminal doing theft or fraud is now required for other things. Suddenly, we are looking at people who are prepared to use terrorism against the community, and they have to communicate from time to time.

It is interesting that the advent of mobile telephones has been good news and bad news for law enforcement authorities and agencies. Once one knows, through interception, whom one wants to know the whereabouts of, mobile phone can give that information. On the other side, through the use of prepaid SIM cards and this matter attracted public attention just recently—criminals and people planning terror can give themselves not so much a false identity as almost a vacuum of identity. That is the phrase that comes to mind.

It was quite amazing to me that the media approach was focused upon where a certain SIM card was left in the United Kingdom by a person who was here in Australia. It was suggested that maybe it was in a car that burnt to pieces. One might wonder where you were going to find it in that vehicle. But I did not think that was the problem. The problem was that the card was still in existence after 12 months. It certainly was not kept for 12 months to expend the accumulated cash value that was in the card, because if that was the case it would not have lasted very long. Clearly, it was being retained by someone who wanted to make phone calls that would be difficult to trace by interception. It is worth putting that matter on the record.

This bill will complete the circumstances of transferring certain provisions from the Telecommunications Act to special legislation—that is, the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act, otherwise referred to as the T(IA) Act. I am advised by the explanatory memorandum that this bill will transfer those relevant provisions at the conclusion of this matter. I welcome the support of the opposition in this matter. People obliged to use these powers will have a single act to which they can refer. They will be able to see in the fairly clear provisions the impositions or controls that are placed upon them to ensure that privacy is protected to the extent that people are entitled to protection.

I see from the explanatory memorandum that the bill will:

• provide a mechanism for access to prospective telecommunications data, including establishing secondary use and disclosure offences and accountability mechanisms,
• impose obligations on carriers and carriage service providers in relation to interception capability and delivery capability, and
• preserve existing cost allocation principles between the telecommunications industry and interception agencies associated with interception and delivery capability.

The EM continues:

This Bill will also improve the effectiveness of the Australian telecommunications access regime by:

• Implementing in part recommendation 24 of the Blunn report, which recommended allowing access to the content of communications for the protection of data systems and the development or testing of new technologies ...

One can see how important that particular provision is when one considers the speed, the rapidity, with which the technology of the telecommunications industry advances. The EM continues:

• widening the definition of exempt proceedings to allow disclosures for the purposes of proceedings in relation to the Spam Act 2003, and enabling the use of this evidence in court proceedings ...

That, of course, has significant reference to child pornography, which I have mentioned already. Might I say, the more that we are able to control spam when we are trying to do our daily business, the more pleasant I will find it. I am not one of the leaders in computer adequacy. However, with two offices 1,000 kilometres apart, I rely on both of them feeding information into my computer, from which I am able to print letters and all those things. The first thing I have to do is clear the spam, although I have been helped with regard to no longer receiving pornographic spam because, apparently, I now have a blocker on the computer which takes away a lot of those things. More particularly, as the second reading speech advises us, the main area of focus of the legislation is child pornography—and so it should be. That is just the lowest of the low. Unfortunately, as I have said, that in itself leads to direct attacks on young children, and that is just unbelievable.

The explanatory memorandum tells us that the bill will also improve the effectiveness of the telecommunications access regime by:

• ensuring that interception warrants are available in relation to the investigation of any offence relating to child pornography, regardless of the maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed by State and Territory criminal law, and
• other minor amendments that will improve operational efficiency.

It is interesting to note that the financial impact statement says that there will be no cost to the taxpayer with regard to these matters, but no doubt the telecommunications companies will find costs involved in assisting law agencies in this regard.

As I said, this is not the sort of legislation that should be controversial. We all regret this increasing invasion of public privacy, but it is always the case of the lesser of two evils. The world has changed so much in recent times that there is no doubt that we must give our law enforcement agencies the legislative power necessary to engage with criminal and terrorist elements, as they have been doing. It is worthy of note that there are cases before the courts at present that are based almost entirely on interception. Fortunately, the agencies were able to identify the people whose phones they had intercepted and, it appears from media reporting, accumulate a large body of evidence to present to the courts. It is also a matter of some of the provisions existing in the act prior to these amendments relating to the rules by which an interception can be approved. It is not laissez faire; it is a situation where approvals must be granted. This amendment adds to the reporting requirements—that is another matter of importance. It is a case of making sure that the agencies have speedy access to an interception regime, but that there is a process that ensures that it is not abused.

I strongly support this legislation. I have already said that I welcome the contribution of the opposition on this matter. I trust that the provisions in this special legislation are such that they will assist our agencies in protecting the Australian community.

Paul Neville (Hinkler, National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

With the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Bill 2007, we are trying to achieve a single comprehensive legislative regime dealing with telecommunications information and enforcement processes. The bill transfers key security and law enforcement provisions from the Telecommunications Act to the interception act. The transferred provisions relate to access to telecommunications data—the provision of regulating telecommunications industry interception obligations. In doing so, the bill creates a clearer regime for accessing telecommunications data for national security and for law enforcement purposes. I am sure we do not have to stress that point.

Following on from the original bombings in London and the more recent wave of largely foiled bombings and the event in Scotland, where an attempt was made to breach airport security, British enforcement agencies were able to track down a number of the people responsible by way of their phone calls. These phone calls gave the police and security people the opportunity to nail people who were known associates of the bombers and would-be bombers. We need to have a regime in Australia that allows us to act decisively and promptly when we have a similar circumstance. I know that the Dr Haneef matter is somewhat contested but, nevertheless, the fact that his SIM card was made available to someone else was able to be detected. I suppose it shows, if nothing else, that our security enforcement people are able to link up certain people and at least test whether they are part of a network that could cause mayhem in our country or in a country friendly to ours, such as the United Kingdom.

As I said before, this bill represents the second stage of the government’s legislative implementation of recommendations from the Report of the review of the regulation of access to communications under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. The review was conducted by Tony Blunn AO and is known as the Blunn report. It talks about comprehensive and overriding legislation dealing with access to telecommunications data for security and law enforcement purposes. It talks about the basic elements of the telecommunications interception act that relate to privacy and access to real-time communications and recommends that that should be incorporated into and form the basis of such legislation, which should also incorporate relevant parts of the Telecommunications Act.

The bill gives effect to these recommendations. As I have said, we have all seen enough examples in recent times in our own country and overseas to, if nothing else, illustrate the importance of having the various instrumentalities of government and security able to do this. On that basis, I commend the legislation to the Main Committee.

Philip Ruddock (Berowra, Liberal Party, Attorney-General) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I first thank the member for Hinkler. He has spoken extremely constructively and helpfully and has demonstrated a degree of versatility that ought to be practised by us all. I also thank the member for Brisbane, who spoke as well. I note that the member for Brisbane has indicated—unlike he did in another place on another bill—his support for this measure and for the approach that the government is taking to recommendations from the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. I will speak to that in a moment. I also thank the member for O’Connor, who emphasised the importance of these powers in the current law enforcement and security environment. I welcome his contribution.

The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Bill 2007 implements recommendations made in the Report of the review of the regulation of access to communications, by Tony Blunn, a very distinguished former secretary of the Attorney-General’s Department who has held other senior offices as well. He recommended in that report the development of a single, overarching legislative framework for regulating access to telecommunications interception, stored communications and telecommunications data. To do this, the bill that we are speaking to takes the existing relevant provisions of the Telecommunications Act that enable carriers to disclose communications data to law enforcement agencies and transfers them to this bill.

The bill also makes important amendments to the interception regime to allow the use of telecommunications interception to assist in the investigation of all offences relating to child pornography. This change reflects not only the seriousness of those offences but also that these offences are overwhelmingly committed via the internet and can only be combated through access to telecommunications.

The bill has been considered by the Senate Standing Committee for the Scrutiny of Bills and the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs. I thank both of those committees for their work. The member for Brisbane raised in debate the query posed by the scrutiny of bills committee and invited me to respond. I have in fact responded to the committee, which has published my reply in its reports, but I note that the member for Brisbane usually does not seem to find this material when it has been in another place. I encourage him, as I did in another debate, to better prepare himself. The committee, as I told them in response, occasioned me to amend the explanatory memorandum to clarify that the exemptions to interception capability granted either by the communications access coordinator or by the body known as ACMA are not legislative in character. I also made some minor revisions to that explanatory memorandum to provide clearer examples of lawful secondary disclosure of telecommunications data and a distinction between the content of communications on the one hand and telecommunications on the other. I have also advised the committee that the power to grant exemptions is already reviewable under the AD(JR) Act. I wrote my signature on this explanatory memorandum, which I table, but I did it while I was walking. It is not that I was having a stroke or a heart attack or something else while I walked—but it is my signature.

I have also considered the recommendations of the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs in relation to ensuring appropriate privacy protections. I note that the committee recommended that the CrimTrac agency be removed from the list of agencies included in the definition of enforcement agencies. I do not agree with this recommendation, and I note that the member for Brisbane has reached the same conclusion. CrimTrac assists the Commonwealth, state and territory agencies in criminal investigations and, in its role as a provider of national security information, acts as the coordinating agent to obtain telecommunications data for other enforcement agencies. Negotiating access arrangements on behalf of a number of agencies results in economies of scale and more efficient use of resources. I also note that CrimTrac has always been an enforcement agency under section 282 of the Telecommunications Act 1997, listed under its previous name as the National Exchange of Police Information. CrimTrac is not a new addition to this definition.

The committee also supported the use of the communications access coordinator’s determination-making power to issue guidance to agencies on how to take privacy into account. The bill requires the communications access coordinator to consult with the Privacy Commissioner when developing this guidance, ensuring that privacy issues are given full consideration. The government agrees with the committee’s views on the roles of the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security. The Inspector General has extensive legislative powers to oversight the activities of intelligence agencies and will be able to use these powers of inspection and review in relation to access to prospective data by ASIO without the need for additional legislative provisions.

The fourth recommendation of the committee is that the Attorney-General’s Department arrange for an independent review of the operation of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 within five years. The government does not support this recommendation, not because regular review is not important for the interception regime but, rather, because the act is already subject to ongoing review and will continue to be so.

Finally, this bill is a significant step in modernising Australia’s laws for accessing telecommunications information for law enforcement and national security purposes. Mr Blunn concluded that the current distribution of functions between the two acts is complicated, confusing and dysfunctional. This bill clarifies and simplifies the law, consolidating several legislative regimes into a single act. This consolidation will provide a single, clearer regime for law enforcement agencies to use in the performance of their very important functions, and I commend the bill to the chamber.

Question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.

Ordered that the bill be reported to the House without amendment.