Michael Hatton (Blaxland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In the two minutes in which I spoke previously on the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006, I indicated that it is a slight bill with minor amendments. There is a reduction in the number of days—from 90 down to 60—during which the Secretary of the Department of Transport and Regional Services can look at applications made by shipowners or the controllers of ports or of offshore facilities for variation of security plans. In addition, there is a possible extension of that time by up to 45 days or so where more information is required. The connected matter is that a series of consequential amendments need to be made across a range of different bills to bring this legislation up to date. I had also referred to our amendments and to the broader question of maritime security in Australia as it relates to shipping and ports and to offshore facilities.

Mr Deputy Speaker, looking at the Notice Paper and at the order of presentation, you will note that only one government member will be speaking on this bill. If you take it simply that the bill itself is slight and that most of the changes are procedural—they are directed towards making it easier for those involved in maritime security, ports, offshore facilities and ships to cope with the administrative burden and towards creating a more efficient situation than where you have to put into place a five-year plan every time you want to make a variation or where a major change must be made when one of the contact people no longer remains with the company or the entity—you can understand why the government might not put up many speakers. However, where a series of amendments go to the very core of what Australia’s problems are in maritime transport and offshore facility security, you might expect more than one government member—no doubt the member for Fairfax will directly enter this debate, and I hope that he does—to speak to the bill and engage in a real debate here.

I believe that part of the reason that only one government member will speak in this debate is that the government has actually done very little at all about maritime security. So far, most of its concentration has been on areas where there is an expectation of terrorist attacks, according to where they have happened in the past. That has created a pattern of response both here and overseas. Such attacks have occurred by road, by rail and by air and they have impacted not just facilities and infrastructure but also the thousands of people who have been killed. There have been the events in the United States in September 2001; the train incidents in Madrid, where so many people died; and the bombings in Britain, on a bus and on the underground system. Just recently we had brought to our notice the planning of another series of attacks in Britain—again, a series of air attacks—and an announcement has just been made about another planned attack. None of those elements goes to the question of maritime security, and that probably conditions the response of governments and agencies when looking at what they might have as a hierarchy of probabilities.

However, two significant episodes have occurred over the last five years or so. One was the maritime attack on the MV Limerick and the other was the attack on the USS Cole. The attack on the USS Cole could have been worse if the terrorists had known where to hit it. Luckily, they did not. They hit it amidships. The impact was significant and resulted in some American naval officers being killed. But the terrorists did not hit the vessel where the most damage could have been inflicted. Attempts are made with US and Australian warships to contain ammunition and flammable materials so that, if these ships are attacked in such a way, major explosions do not occur. But those attacks are a precursor of what might happen. They are also a precursor of what the intent could be and what Australia’s particular problems are in dealing with maritime security.

We can look at the length of our coastline, at our dependence on trade by sea, at our close regional concerns with major shipping lanes through—as the member for Brisbane pointed out—the greatest area of piracy in the world, the Malacca Straits, and at our direct intersection with Asia and how difficult it is for us to actually maintain a security presence along that great expanse of water and coastline. Our fundamental approaches have been in relation to, firstly, illegal fishing in the north and, secondly, refugee problems that occurred after the Australian government supported the freeing of East Timor—just prior to the 2001 election, when 11,500 people came to our country in just 2½ years and the government completely lost control of our border security. That is where the emphasis has been.

There has been very little planning with regard to maritime security. We should have substantial legislation before us that does a great deal more than effectively ask people to make administrative changes. It should allow them to make it easier to present a maritime security plan, tick it off and say: ‘That’s terrific. That’ll be looked after. People have done that. It can be regulated and it’s not as hard as we thought it might be.’ We need to pay more attention to this and have a far closer reading of it.

The former minister for transport, the member for Gwydir, had a response to an ASPI—the Australian Strategic Policy Institute—document. ASPI is funded by the Australian government, but it is set up as an independent think tank. It put out a document in April 2005. That document is called Future unknown: the terrorist threat to Australian maritime security. It has an excellent first page introduction from the director of that organisation and an executive summary which goes to the key problems in Australian maritime security. In the series of recommendations that it made—which is extensive; it covers a number of pages—its underlying point is that we have not done enough and the planning is not there.

There have been investments made by the Australian government and by Australian industry, particularly the transport industry, to try to better secure ourselves, but they have largely been directed towards road and rail, particularly into airports, but not into the maritime area. ASPI quite sensibly points out that if you are dealing with airports—even though there is a variation between general aviation airports and the major domestic and international airports—there is a commonality amongst airports throughout Australia and wherever they are in the world. There has been a huge volume of people going through them and there has been a concentration on that in an attempt to improve airport security, but there has been very little attention paid to maritime security or to looking at it as a whole.

The government announced in December 2004, I think, a plan to try to secure Australia’s situation off Western Australia. It would provide vessels, which are passing there at the moment from the Northern Command, to try to secure our fundamental resources on the North West Shelf. That is immensely important. Just one of those trains run by Woodside at the North West Shelf is responsible for billions of dollars worth of exports of liquid natural gas. We know that the major contract signed with Guangdong Province was for a 25-year program with $25 billion worth of export. I was there when Woodside was putting together its fourth train. It is in the process of doing a fifth train.

Over on Barrow Island, where the petroleum resources are running down, one of the provisions Chevron is putting into place so it can continue exploration for gas resources is to do geosequestration of CO. Chevron is putting together the biggest liquid natural gas program Australia has ever seen. There is a minimum of 60 years worth of production for Australia, and the probability is that, in Gorgon and its associated field, there is 100 years or so of capacity. Chevron has got a broader and possibly even more productive field under view.

Those resources—our offshore oil platforms, our offshore gas platforms, what we are developing in the Greater Sunrise area, our intersection with East Timor and what is being developed through there—is enormously important to Australia’s economic future. One single maritime attack on those offshore facilities would do immense economic damage to Australia. And yet we have the protocols that have been put into place and the efforts that have been made by the government. Just look at this bill. What is it about? A bit of auditing and a bit of benchmarking. Luckily we have got an Australian Defence Force who understand the critical nature of this. I know they understand it, because I have discussed these issues with them directly and taken them up on it in committee and on site. I have spoken to people in the command, and they assure me that they understand the critical nature of that infrastructure and that Australia’s defence resources need to be directed to that.

If you look at what the government has done and the approaches it has taken, though, it is just not on the job with regard to this. The member for Brisbane made a comment when he was speaking with Mr Beazley, the opposition leader, about Australia’s maritime security and the need for a coastguard—which is one of the amendments we have here; in fact, that has not been put into place—and also the need for a department of homeland security. At the very time they were making the announcement, there was a major, high-risk ship full of ammonium nitrate steaming to Australia with foreign crew. There had been virtually no coverage in relation to that ship to determine what risk there would be to Australia.

If a ship like that ran into one of the ports in Queensland, into Gladstone for instance, and blew up there, it could do immense damage. A ship full of ammonium nitrate coming into Sydney Harbour would blast Sydney’s CBD to pieces. I have spoken to our Defence personnel, who are responsible for our maritime security within Sydney Harbour, and they say that they have the plans in place to deal with those kinds of incidents. I trust that they have. I do not trust this government has, because there is not the same focus on our fundamental maritime security needs.

It is possible that because of what has happened so far, and I think this is highly likely, there is a projection forward, which is normal in human affairs. Whatever has happened, people project into the future. When we had high interest rates, people projected we would always have high interest rates. They go up and down—the cycle is indicative of the changes in economic conditions. You had the same sort of operation on the subject of terrorist attacks. But the problem is people get fixated on what has happened already. The key problem is the attacks they have not yet made. ASPI deals at length with the idea as to why there has not yet been a major maritime security incident in Australia—at a port or with a ship or indeed with our offshore facilities.

There may be a range of reasons, and that may include the fact that bin Laden and al-Qaeda have such an investment in shipping—that is, they utilise shipping to do the rest of their terrorist activities—that they have not concentrated on the area yet. It may be that the degree of difficulty is such that it is significantly harder or that there just will not be enough bodies destroyed, enough lives lost, in this kind of incident. They would like to blast us back into the Middle Ages. They want to bring down our whole economic superstructure—the fundamental infrastructure that girds the modern world. The intersections between us and Asia and the sources of our wealth are their fundamental targets. The attacks we have seen so far have been more iconic in the aircraft that have come down, the railways that have been attacked and the people who have been killed. A much more massive impact could be made by destroying the very heart of our economic capacity.

That is where the Australian government, not the Defence Force, needs to be measured. The Defence Force take directions from the government, and the government does not have clear direction with regard to this. There is no real perception within the government of airport security. There are a whole range of areas where it has been extremely poorly handled. There is no perception that, if you scan only 10 per cent of containers coming into Australia, the 90 per cent you leave out probably have the terrorists in them. The member for Brisbane pointed that out. They found one bloke who had the plans and all the rest of the stuff he was going to do. He wanted a bit of extra air, and he just happened to be seen. He was pulled out. It is the area that is not covered where the most significant and difficult problems are. If you look at all of the planning, where is the indication that the government understands that port security, for instance, is not just horizontal? You have a much more difficult problem with ports than you do at airports, because you have to look at the seaborne approaches to that port, at the underwater approaches and at the land approaches and you have to secure the air approaches and the activities that are occurring within it.

I do not think it is enough to just tick off the list that people have put their plans in and to then rely upon that to secure us. We are dealing in these amendments with Australian regulated ships. We have had difficulties with the question of those having foreign crews, but also we have high-risk ships coming into Australia and—apart from US defence vessels—we do not know who the crews on those are. We do not know whether or not they are subcontracted to al-Qaeda. We have a radar capacity to pick up that shipping and we can travel it, but we do not really know as much as we should about the manifests in those ships or the manner in which the threat could be much greater than it is already perceived to be. I stand by every one of the amendments that we put forward and underline this fundamental and key fact: it is no good projecting from the past onto the future. You have to look into the areas that have been explored or covered already. Our fundamental area of difficulty is our continental size and reach. One of our great weaknesses is in the capacity of a terrorist organisation to hit at our trade and do fundamental damage. I commend the amendments to the House.

Alex Somlyay (Fairfax, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006. On many of the things he said, I agree with the previous speaker, the member for Blaxland. It is essential regarding terrorism that we look into the future and not back to the past. It is important that any legislation enacted by this parliament is flexible in its nature so as to anticipate some of the things I think it is our sad duty to acknowledge are going to happen. You would be a very brave person if you were to predict when the war on terror, as we call it, was going to end. My fear is that it is going to get a lot worse before it gets better. I think we will see more and more bills coming before this House to address issues that many of us have not even thought of yet. The actions of terrorists have no bounds, the extent of the terror has no bounds and we have to be prepared for any contingency. We must remember the reference in our history to the importance of eternal vigilance.

The bill is aimed at enhancing the capacity of maritime industry participants to deter and deal with unauthorised incursions into maritime security zones. Following a comprehensive review of Australia’s maritime security policy settings conducted by the Secretaries Committee on National Security, the government decided to enhance the powers of maritime security guards under the act by providing them with limited move-on powers. These powers acknowledge a key difference between maintaining security at our airports and maintaining security at our ports. We have heard a lot about airport security in recent times, but with airports people can be prevented from unauthorised access by the use of fences and monitored gates. The area is easier to contain. Ports are different by their very nature, being open on at least one side—that is, the water side.

By providing maritime security guards with the means to request that waterside intruders move on, the bill addresses this natural weakness in our port security. Under the existing act, maritime security guards may restrain an unauthorised person in a maritime security zone and detain him or her until law enforcement officers arrive, but they do not have the power to request identification, to ask the person why he or she is in the zone or to request that the person moves on. These are simple, basic security powers to prevent crime, threat and sabotage. Neither do maritime security guards currently have power to remove unauthorised vehicles or vessels. They have to call the police to do that.

The government believes that a faster and more convenient solution is needed to remove potential threats from a maritime security zone. To ensure this faster reaction to a potential threat, the key provisions of the bill are as follows. Firstly, that a maritime security guard may request that a person found within a security zone provides identification and a reason for being in the zone. Secondly, that a maritime security guard may request a person found in such a security zone without authority to move out of the secure zone; if they do not, the guard is empowered to remove the person. Thirdly, that a maritime security guard may remove or have removed any vehicles or vessels found in a maritime security zone without authorisation. Fourthly, to balance the authority being conferred on security guards, the bill provides safeguards to ensure the guards identify themselves and do not subject an intruder to greater force or greater indignity than is necessary.

To summarise, this bill empowers maritime security guards to ask a person who they are and what they intend doing in a secure area and, if necessary, to remove that person and any unauthorised vehicle without having to wait for police to come and do so. To me these provisions are commonsense precautions against possible threat. Being aware and the ability of authorised personnel to react quickly are essential in preventing security—possibly terrorist—threats.

The Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee conducted an inquiry into this bill, and its report was tabled in September last year. It recommended that this bill be passed in its present form. It has now been passed in the Senate and I am happy to commend the bill to the House.

Martin Ferguson (Batman, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Primary Industries, Resources, Forestry and Tourism) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006 is exceptionally important because it goes to our security as a nation in the fight against terrorism. It is also about whether or not we are going to be committed to the employment of Australian seafarers, because it raises serious questions about the Howard government’s lack of commitment to promoting local employment, which is part and parcel of the fight against terrorism because of weaknesses in the system that currently exist. This is clearly reflected in the second reading amendment, moved by the member for Brisbane and shadow minister for homeland security.

In that context, the changes to the act—it is an act of 2003, so it is not all that old—going to maritime and transport offshore facility security ensure that threats from terrorist and criminal activity are minimised in the interests of national security. That is the objective of the amendment. Obviously they are changes that the Labor Party support as the opposition but we also say that they simply do not go far enough. This is not the first time we have raised in the House some of these weaknesses. In fact, as the person who in the last parliament was the shadow minister for transport, I can say that we raised a number of these issues in discussion with the government in the lead-up to the legislation being taken through the parliament. We have also raised them subsequently, both privately and publicly, as an opposition. The reason the opposition supports these changes is that they include simplified procedures for making changes to security plans, shorter statutory timeframes for approval of security plans—and how could you oppose these options?—technical amendments to clarify the intent of the act, a technical amendment to the related Customs Act 1901 and various consequential amendments to other acts.

I would emphasise the point I made in a similar debate last evening as to the priorities of the nation going to Indigenous employment and education—that is, unfortunately there are problems with the government’s commitments to its legislative priorities. There are serious questions about existing weaknesses in the maritime security legislative framework which could endanger the security of Australia in the foreseeable future; for example, think about the red alert that currently exists on aviation security in the United Kingdom and the United States. It is also interesting to note that unfortunately we are moving up to a further anniversary next week of September 11 and the devastation that event caused in the United States.

I think it is fair to say that the new, improved measures will benefit maritime transport and offshore facility security only if this government manages to implement them. There is a big difference between passing legislative change and implementing it in the field. Just as with Indigenous education, we the opposition have little confidence in the competence of this government in the area of maritime security. In the past, when it has been a supposed election issue—as with, for example, the question of Tampawe have had a number of government members wanting to talk on the issue of so-called maritime security. When it comes to doing something practical about it, it is interesting to examine the record and the seeming lack of willingness by government members to come in and talk about these legislative changes. Unfortunately this is becoming, all too often, the nature of the government’s performance—almost a sense of arrogance with regard to the role of parliament in addressing bills that are currently being debated in the House of Representatives. This is also, as has been noted by members of the opposition, flowing through to the performance of a range of members of government in their attendance at and participation in committees of the House of Representatives and the joint House committees in association with the Senate. I think the lack of attention to detail in terms of the legislative program by members of the government reflects a sense of arrogance and contempt for the parliament and a clear lack of commitment to doing something in a legislative sense and then following it through—putting pressure on the department to make sure that the changes, which are about the security of Australia, are fully implemented.

On that note, my colleague the member for Brisbane, who is respected in the maritime industry, has, because of his commitment to doing something about strengthening Australian borders, been forced to say in this place:

In the past the government has enacted legislation with the support of the Labor Party and then failed to properly administer it.

The reason he knows this is that not only does he participate in the debates and offer up practical suggestions; he also regularly goes around the country and not only talks to the employers, the unions and industry but seeks to understand firsthand on the ground what is happening and where the weaknesses are in maritime security. I commend his work.

In the case of maritime security, just as one example I refer to the failure of this government to ensure that, as required by law, all ships advise details of their cargo and crew members 48 hours before they reach an Australian port. This issue is in fact picked up in part (1) of the second reading amendment by the opposition, where we draw attention to the fact that there has been a failure by the Howard government to conduct security checks on foreign crews, which goes to the manifest of crew members.

This is an issue that the opposition has been pursuing since the early part of the parliament of 1996, when we started pursuing this issue through questions to the minister for immigration, which then unfortunately led into more serious questions going to the operation of maritime security in Australia. For the government to think about it only 10 years later, when in a second reading amendment we are forced to again raise the question of the failure of the government to actually conduct adequate security checks on foreign crews, raises serious questions in the minds of many in the Australian electorate about the commitment of the government to do something about protecting the Australian community.

I say that because the most recent information given to the Senate tells us that, interestingly, just 67 per cent of ships coming to Australian ports actively comply with the requirement to properly advise of their cargo and crew 48 hours before they reach an Australian port. That is an indictment of the minister and an indictment of the performance of the Howard government on the maritime security issue. It is also interesting to note that a third of ships simply do not comply with the law, and this government is doing nothing about it. Of those ships, half do not inform authorities about their cargo and crew until they are berthed in an Australian port. And we are supposed to be concerned about border protection in Australia in 2006, moving up to yet another anniversary of September 11! I just shake my head.

I tell you what: a lot of Australians are shaking their heads about the lack of commitment by the Howard government to their protection, because they want to sleep in the knowledge that we have a government actually committed to doing something genuine and practical on the ground in the fight against terrorism—and it is an international fight. It is about time Australia pulled its weight. It is no longer just a simple issue of being seen to do the right thing through passing legislation; it is also a more serious question about enforcing existing legislation over and above the amendments that the Labor Party supports in the debate before the House today.

That takes me to another area of grave concern and, in my view, absolute dereliction of duty on the part of this government. This dereliction of duty relates to the failure to carry out a comprehensive security check on foreign crews. I think it is fair to say that the government do not know who is actually coming into Australia as part of a foreign crew from day to day. They do not know and, to be honest, they do not care. This is about detail and hard work, and they have no commitment to actually going into the detail and doing the hard work to protect the Australian community. This is a very important issue raised by Labor members and senators on many occasions, publicly and in this parliament. When it comes to foreign crews, the names on the manifest are checked against existing databases, usually—and you have to be surprised at this—after the ship is berthed. Then they check to see if any of them are persons not wanted in Australia. The fact is that there is no way of knowing whether the people on the ship are who they say they are, and no security checks are done on any of them by the Howard government anyway.

Conversely—and this is what is expected of Australian seafarers beyond Australia—it is an interesting comparison to see what our seafarers have to go through overseas, as against foreign seafarers coming to Australian shores. Australian seafarers are required to undergo the most rigorous and thorough security checks by the Australian Federal Police and by ASIO, and appropriately so. We want to make sure that Australians working in the maritime industry are there for the right reasons: they are merely seeking gainful employment in an industry that they love and care about, and these seafarers also care about the security of Australia. Why aren’t we applying the same standards to foreign crews coming to Australia? Why aren’t we prepared to commit to saying to foreign crews that we expect them to undergo the same security checks by the Australian Federal Police and ASIO as those which we apply to citizens of Australia? There is no good reason why there should be lesser security checks on foreigners coming into Australia than the security checks that we apply to Australian citizens. It is fundamental that we have the same standards of security.

Importantly, our seafarers also have to have a maritime security identification card. There were detailed negotiations with the government leading up to the legislation which provided for this card. The requirements with respect to the maritime security card are similar to those required to get a clearance to actually work in and around our airports and as aviation workers. Aviation security identification cards certify that the holders are people of good character. We have no idea whether or not foreign crews include people of good character and good background—which I think we should know about foreign crews—who are appropriate for employment in a security sensitive area. That is what we are asking for with respect to foreign crews—that you are required to prove that you are of good character and good background and therefore welcome to enter our ports. We are carrying pretty sensitive cargo. I think we have to make sure that we are thorough about ensuring that those who are involved in the carrying of that cargo are of good character and good background. I defy the government to suggest that we should have any other standards. If it is good enough for Australians to meet the required tests by the Australian Federal Police and ASIO of being of good character and good background, then surely we should ask the same of those crews coming to Australia which could cause major terrorism damage to Australia.

It is a fundamental security measure, and the Australian public must be assured that we are in safe hands at our airports and in our ports. The same can be said of the way the government handles our maritime security. As my colleague the member for Brisbane put very well: ‘The Howard government hands out permits for flags of convenience crews like it was a Friday night chook raffle at the local pub.’ I think that is a fair description of the Howard government’s approach to maritime security. None of the checks—the types of checks that would give us confidence in Australia that our seafarers are carrying out their duties in a proper way—are carried out. Flags of convenience crews are, frankly, floating terrorist opportunities to do serious damage to Australia.

The use of ships of convenience was a measure to handle peak periods of demand that was introduced by the Howard government in an extreme campaign against the rights of Australian workers. The government is now using these ships to replace Australian ships and crews on a routine basis, in the process sacrificing the safety of Australia’s sea lanes and ports. The ports of Sydney, Brisbane and Fremantle are major population centres. We need a government that cares about guaranteeing the future, the security and the safety of those local communities.

The government is exposing our maritime ports of entry to the hazards of foreign crews handling dangerous goods. What types of goods? We should be concerned about this. I am concerned about explosive grade ammonium nitrate, but it would seem that the Minister for Transport and Regional Services, Mr Truss, is not. I am concerned about the potential for terrorists to smuggle explosives and weapons into this country. I am also concerned about the potential for other criminal activities. It seems the Prime Minister is not concerned about these issues, because foreign crews are not told that they also must be of good character and good background.

As the shadow minister for resources, I have other problems. I am concerned about the lack of commitment by the Howard government to working with the industry and the Maritime Union of Australia to ensure that well-trained, highly skilled Australian seafarers maintain their pre-eminent role in the LNG shipping trade. Think about the current growth in resources. Why aren’t we training Australians to share in the benefits of these exports opportunities?

For over 25 years, the continuity of operations agreement between the North West Shelf venturers and the MUA has ensured the safe, reliable, on-time delivery of LNG cargoes to customers around the world, in particular Japan. The agreement has served the industry and Australia well. Receiving nations can rest easy in the knowledge that LNG tankers will safely operate in their sea lanes and ports under the control of highly skilled, security-cleared seafarers—people of good character and good background. If it is required in Japan, why isn’t it required in Australia? It seems that the Prime Minister is more concerned about the safety of Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagoya than he is about the safety of people living in and around the ports of Sydney, Brisbane, Darwin, Melbourne, Geelong, Portland, Adelaide, Fremantle, Kwinana and Karratha—to name a few of the ports that depend on, or are exposed to, foreign crews.

Japanese, Chinese or Korean LNG receival terminals are entitled to this degree of security but Australian terminals are not. Those countries require a high degree of assurance that their cargo, vessels and onshore terminal facilities will be secure, yet we do not expect the same standards in our own ports. One of the strengths of the Australian LNG industry is its reputation as a reliable, safe supplier in the global marketplace, and one reason Australia has been able to maintain its global position as a reliable shipper of LNG is that the shipping contracts have been written on a delivery ex-ship basis. This means that the seller controls the shipping. I would be concerned if there were any move away from ex-ship contract terms to free-on-board shipping contracts, where the seller generally controls the shipping. This is a very serious policy issue, and I ask the government to start thinking about it. In Labor’s view, a move to free-on-board weakens Australian involvement in the LNG transportation task. It introduces more flags of convenience shipping into the LNG trade. It risks Australia’s reputation as a reliable LNG supplier, and it creates potential new security risks here and in the ports of our customers. If that is the case, we will lose.

A 2004 report produced by Scandia National Laboratories, under contract to the US Department of Energy, titled Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spill Over Water made mention of the fact that Australia’s LNG risk management strategies are world’s best practice—good enough for overseas but not good enough for Australia in terms of foreign vessels and foreign crews coming to Australia. The same level of risk assessment and commitment to high-quality risk management strategies cannot be guaranteed if ships contracted to carry Australian LNG are drawn from the flags of convenience registries. We are already exposing our maritime points of entry to the hazards of foreign crews handling dangerous goods such as explosive grade ammonium nitrate. They are floating targets, with crews about whom we have no understanding of whether they are of good character or goodwill. I do not want to accept those risks and in doing so expose the LNG trade.

I am asking today for a greater commitment from the Howard government to seriously address the potential for terrorists to smuggle explosives and weapons into the country and the potential for other criminal activity to run riot in Australian ports. That takes me to the issue of security checks on the enormous number of containers that come through our ports every year. Just 10 per cent of them—imagine that!—are X-rayed when they are unloaded. In Hong Kong, one of the busiest ports in the world, 100 per cent of containers in two of their nine terminals are now X-rayed. If it can be done in Hong Kong, it can be done in Sydney, Brisbane, Perth or any other port. Why not in Sydney? Why can we only X-ray one container in 10 in Sydney? The Howard government does not think this is an issue of great concern.

Australia has a coastal border of 37,000 kilometres. Protecting this border and the points of entry to Australia is a priority, but the issues raised by me today are not on the government’s agenda. This government has no plan for maritime security. The bill before the House is a small step forward, but a lot more needs to be done. We as a nation deserve better when it comes to our national security and the protection of our maritime borders and points of entry.

The second reading amendment raises the issue of serious weaknesses in the system. I join with the member for Brisbane in condemning the government for its neglect of its duties on maritime security, for using flags of convenience permits to undermine Australian shipping and jobs and for its failure to guarantee, as any ordinary Australian rightfully expects, that people supplying Australian ports on overseas vessels with foreign crews are of good character and of good background. The Howard government needs to answer that question. (Time expired)

Michael Danby (Melbourne Ports, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006 is one of a series of bills the government is introducing in the area of maritime security. The aim of this bill is to simplify security procedures for ships and port facilities, to clarify processes for drawing up security plans and maritime facilities and to amend various acts to keep them consistent with the principal act.

Next week we mark the fifth anniversary of September 11, 2001 and the terrorist attacks on the twin towers in New York. It should have been an alert to Australia that we needed a new regime in transport security—both aviation and maritime security. I have spoken a number of times in this House on issues relating to both aviation and maritime security, because I remain unconvinced that this government and, in particular, the National Party Minister for Transport and Regional Services are taking this issue seriously enough. Like the member for Batman, I am convinced that the ethos by which this government judges maritime security is the lowest common denominator—but dollars are not security.

There are still huge holes in the government’s transport security system—holes that are quite unacceptable in our current security environment. Last month, I spoke about the glaring inadequacies in our aviation security. This is becoming a major scandal. Only yesterday the Minister for Transport and Regional Services had to admit that no baggage is being screened at major regional airports such as Launceston, Townsville, Maroochydore and Alice Springs. This completely ignores the recommendations of the Wheeler report, which the government itself commissioned. Again, like a broken record, I repeat: does the government not realise where the September 11 attacks began? They began from a small regional airport in Portland, Maine, where the terrorists got themselves on the security side of the airport and were therefore able to get onto the major planes, which they hijacked at Logan Airport in Boston.

This is a pattern which is blatantly obvious to anyone. It means that thousands of passengers travelling from these major regional airports around our country and flying directly to Sydney and Melbourne are arriving with unscreened bags. I have to ask: what have the government members who represent these regional centres been doing? Where are the protests from the honourable members for Bass and Herbert about their constituents being put at risk in this way every time they fly? The people of Launceston and Townsville deserve better than this. I am sure that after the next election they will elect members who look after the security of the communities they represent.

As the Leader of the Opposition said yesterday, the admission by the minister is fresh evidence that the Prime Minister cannot be believed when he claims that his government is doing everything it can to protect the travelling public. The Prime Minister certainly cannot look Australians in the eye and tell them that he is doing everything he can to protect them from terrorism. As the Leader of the Opposition rightly said: if Australia had a full-time inspector of transport security, tasks like regional airport security would get the attention they deserve. The same is of course true for maritime security, which is the subject of this bill and not the subject of the bill that the member for Fairfax talked about—the maritime security guards and other measures bill.

I must say that it is surprising that, with so many debates in this House, so few members of the government are willing to speak in favour of their own legislation. It was a disgrace—and I will recount this to the House—that in the Main Committee during debate on our deployment of troops to Afghanistan there were 15 speakers from the opposition but only one speaker—not a backbencher but a parliamentary secretary, so I suppose it was part of his duties—from the government side. There were 15 opposition people and only one government person who spoke on this very important deployment involving the physical safety of members of our defence forces.

This bill requires the House to look again at our maritime security. While Labor are not opposing the bill, we are taking the opportunity to highlight once again this government’s continuing failure to take maritime security seriously. The honourable member for Brisbane, the shadow minister for homeland security, spoke in detail on the many problems which this government has failed to deal with, apparently because it does not want to offend the stevedoring or shipping companies. We all remember from the maritime dispute of 1998 how close this government was to certain interests in the maritime industry. We can now see the consequences of that with the neglect of the security of our ports and all of those who work in the maritime industry.

Australian law currently requires all ships arriving in Australia to advise authorities of the details of their cargo and crew 48 hours before they reach an Australian port; but, as the honourable member for Brisbane told us yesterday, only 67 per cent of ships coming into Australian ports comply with that requirement. So 33 per cent of ships entering Australian ports do not comply with the legal requirement to inform Australian authorities about their crew.

The member for Batman pointed out the difference in the treatment of LNG carriers, which are such an important part of our export trade, and the crews on flags of convenience ships are coming into Australia on an increasing number of single voyage permits. The government allows this because of the National Party’s lowest common denominator attitude to shipping and to the safety of Australian citizens. I have to ask: what kind of government passes laws and then does nothing about people who blatantly ignore these laws? What kind of government gives this House pious lectures about security and then fails to enforce its own laws—laws passed with the bipartisan support of this parliament—in such a vital area? The answer is: a complacent government, a slack government and an incompetent government.

The centrepiece of Labor’s maritime security policy is the creation of a coastguard. The Minister for Defence claims that this an outrageous policy and a slur on the Royal Australian Navy. In fact, it is nothing of the kind. The function of the Navy is to project military power at sea, often far from our shores. The Royal Australian Navy is currently doing just that, with its usual efficiency. I can testify to that, Mr Deputy Speaker, having had a chance to see for myself Australia’s role in the recent RIMPAC exercises in Hawaii. I can testify to the efficiency of HMAS Manoora and HMAS Stuart and the great work that the sailors and officers on those ships are doing on behalf of Australia.

The functions of a coastguard would be to protect Australia’s coastline from all manner of threat—few of them would be military in a direct sense, such as illegal immigration, illegal fishing, environmental threats such as oil dumping—to monitor the activity of shipping and, if necessary, to enforce Australian law with regard to shipping. If we had a coastguard, we could enforce our own shipping laws and protect Australian ports while not diverting the RAN from the important tasks that we have a Navy for, which often takes it far away from our shores.

In the United States, ships that fail to provide necessary information are required to stand offshore, and the US Coast Guard enforces this requirement. In Australia, we have no coast guard; we just let them sail in anyway. Of course, again, as both the member for Brisbane and the member for Batman have pointed out, we have an increasing number of flag of convenience ships and an increasing number of single voyage permits, with ships coming into Australia, 33 times out of 100, with sailors about whom we have no idea what their backgrounds are or what their purpose is. So, if Jemaah Islamiah were to fill a Panamanian tanker with ammonium nitrate, hire a Ukrainian crew who spoke no English and had no idea where they were or what they were carrying, and sail it into Port Melbourne in my electorate, the requirement that it notify the port authorities of its cargo would probably not be enforced, and we would have no capacity to prevent it from coming into port, even if we found it suspicious. Does this government really think it is appropriate that the Royal Australian Navy keep its warships tied up in every Australian port to guard against threats of this kind? That is not what the RAN, with its highly specialised ships, equipment and crews, is trained and funded for. That is the role of a coastguard.

The government likes to pretend that a coastguard is some kind of second-best, Gilbert and Sullivan outfit. Let me remind the House that the US Coast Guard has more than 40,000 personnel, that it has an annual budget of $US5 billion and that it deploys five large coastal patrol ships, 12 high-endurance cutters, 27 medium-endurance cutters and many smaller craft of various kinds, plus 200 aircraft. Its personnel have specialist training in maritime surveillance, search and rescue, police work and interception. I point out in passing that Australia actually has a longer coastline than the US, although of course it is not as densely populated.

Every day, on average, the US Coast Guard conducts 82 search and rescue missions, seizes $US2.4 million worth of illegal drugs, conducts 23 waterfront facility safety or security inspections, responds to 11 oil and hazardous chemical spills and boards 202 vessels of interest to law enforcement. Far from thinking that the Coast Guard is a waste of money, the US is currently planning a major expansion and re-equipping of the Coast Guard to meet the new challenges of the times, including the terrorist threat to US ports and shipping lanes—a threat which I suggest equally pertains to Australia. The United States Coast Guard’s motto is ‘semper paratus’, which means ‘always ready’. This government’s motto, by contrast, should be ‘numquam paratus’, which means ‘never ready’. I suppose it goes with ‘never, ever’, doesn’t it.

I have spoken before about the fact that the National Party has been responsible for the transport portfolio ever since this government has been in power and that it therefore has been responsible for our maritime and aviation security. As I have said, it is Labor’s view that these matters should be the responsibility of a minister for homeland security, but this government in its wisdom has chosen to leave them to a succession of National Party transport ministers—ministers who have many other things to think about. There is evidence that these ministers have never seen the security of Australia’s ports and airports as their top priority.

In the case of the current Minister for Transport and Regional Services, the honourable member for Wide Bay, his top priority this year has been saving his political neck and the collective neck of the National Party from the ever-widening scandal of the ‘wheat for weapons’ scandal, which of course took place during the time when he was Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry from 1999 to 2005 and while his leader, the current Deputy Prime Minister, was Minister for Trade.

I am sure the Minister for Transport and Regional Services has given less than his full attention to the issues of foreign crews on freighters entering Port Melbourne or to the issue of screening baggage at Townsville Airport. The reason is that he has been anxiously awaiting the report of Mr Justice Cole’s royal commission into the ‘wheat for weapons’ scandal. And he has every right to be anxious, because every week the news from the Cole commission gets worse for the government.

Last week we learned about the role of BHP Billiton in the so-called Tigris affair, which was a calculated attempt to rort the UN’s oil for food program. It seems that BHP was more than willing to join with the AWB, which I have previously called the militant wing of the National Party—remember that great picture of Mr Flugge, the former National Party candidate, half naked, with his pistol, sitting there in Iraq?—in recouping more than $10 million. The National Party militant wing, the AWB, together with BHP, wanted to recoup more than $10 million from the UN’s escrow accounts which BHP had paid to Iraq in effect as a bribe to buy Australian wheat. The AWB did this by inflating the price charged for Australian wheat and then passing the money on to BHP. This gives the scandal a bipartisan aspect, since of course BHP has very close links with the Liberal Party. Once again, it was the National Party ministers who were asleep on the job, while the AWB and BHP joined forces to collude with Saddam Hussein’s regime in rorting the oil for food program.

I am sure you would be pleased, Mr Deputy Speaker Jenkins, if I came back to the bill. The bill deals with maritime security, and there is certainly plenty more to say about the risks to the security of Australian ports and the people who live around them, such as the people of Port Melbourne in my electorate. The fact is that we live in the most dangerous region of the world in this respect. In April, the US Department of State released a report on threats to maritime security in our region. The report said:

While Indonesia has significantly improved its efforts to control the maritime boundary area with the Philippines, the area remains difficult to control, surveillance is partial at best, and traditional smuggling and piracy groups provide an effective cover for terrorist activities in the area.

The 2005 annual report of the International Maritime Organisation shows that nearly half of the world’s reported piracy incidents occurred in South-East Asian waters. One hundred and seventeen of the 266 cases, including a number of shipjackings, were in this region. It is not difficult to imagine al-Qaeda or Jemaah Islamiah hijacking a ship and using it as a floating bomb, aimed at one of our busy ports. There would be almost nothing to prevent this.

The government has not implemented the measures needed to reduce the risks to our ports. The policy of handing out single or multiple voyage permits without any proper process to ascertain the bona fides of the shipping operators increases this risk. Last year we had the case of the Pancaldo, which carried 3,000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate up the Australian coast without any security checks on its crew.

Other countries, even countries we usually regard as high security risks, are a long way ahead of us. The Philippines has recently banned the importation of ammonium nitrate. I realise that Australia is not in a position to do this, but we might at least make an effort to prevent it being carried into Australian ports in ships about which we know nothing, manned by crews about whom we know nothing either.

Labor supports this bill, but that should not be taken as an endorsement of this lazy government’s failure to act to protect the security of our seafarers and our port communities or even to enforce the laws that this government itself has passed. That is why I support the amendment moved by the honourable member for Brisbane, namely:

“whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House condemns the Howard Government for its failure to provide necessary maritime security and protect Australians, including:

(1)

the Howard Government’s failure to conduct security checks on foreign crews;

(2)

the Government’s continued failure to ensure foreign ships provide manifestos of crew and cargo before arriving at an Australian port;

(3)

the ready availability of single and multiple voyage permits for foreign flag of convenience ships including the ready availability of permits for foreign flag of convenience ships carrying dangerous materials in Australian waters and ports;

(4)

the failure of the Howard Government to examine or x-ray 90% of shipping containers;

(5)

the Government’s failure to create a Department of Homeland Security to remove dangerous gaps and to better coordinate security in Australia; and

(6)

the Howard Government’s failure to establish an Australian Coastguard to patrol our coastline”.

Under a Labor government we will have a full-time minister for homeland security, we will have a full-time inspector of transport security and we will have a full-time professional coastguard. Only then will Australia have an acceptable level of maritime security.

Jill Hall (Shortland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I would like to congratulate the member for Melbourne Ports on his excellent contribution to the debate. He highlighted most of the issues and more than the issues that are of great importance in this area. The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006 amends the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003. The bill simplifies the procedures for making changes to maritime shipping and offshore facilities security plans, clarifies measures relating to the plan’s approval process and makes a number of technical amendments to clarify the act.

I find it really quite disturbing—and I have said this on numerous occasions—that we constantly have to come into this place to clean up and amend bills that were rushed through with indecent haste. It is very important for the government to make sure that all bills are drafted properly and that the consequences of the legislation are looked at fully. We should not have to return to this House to introduce additional legislation to clarify legislation we have already debated. It was quite obvious when this legislation was first introduced that there would be problems.

One of the main purposes of this bill is to require various ships, ports, offshore facilities and other places to have security plans in place to minimise the danger to them from terrorism or acts of violence. The plans must be approved by the Secretary to the Department of Transport and Regional Services. In this legislation, there is a change to the process of approval of security plans in schedule 1—that is, that the secretary will have only 60 days in which to approve a security plan instead of the current 90 days. As well as that 60 days, 45 additional days can be given if more information is required in order to make the decision on a security plan. Invariably, I think we will find that there will be additional information required. It concerns me that those plans must be put in place in a timely manner. When you need an extension of 45 days for that additional information to be put in place, then you have a problem.

This legislation will tighten up the previous bill and, as such, it should be supported. I do not think there will be any members of this parliament who would not feel inclined to do so. More to the point, I think we need to support the second reading amendment moved by the shadow minister. This really highlights the failure of the Howard government in the area of maritime security. I would have to say that much of this government’s legislation relating to maritime matters has always been driven by its ideological hatred of the Maritime Union of Australia. I find it totally unacceptable that legislation that is put in place for one purpose could be distorted, not by what is in Australia’s best interests but rather by the government’s ideology.

The Labor amendments address the Howard government’s failure to conduct security checks on foreign crews and its continued failure to ensure that foreign ships provide manifests of crew and cargo before they arrive in Australian ports, which is essential if we are to ensure that our ports and coastline are secure. They address the ready availability of permits for single voyages—I am also very concerned about continuing voyage permits—and the ready availability of permits for foreign flag ships, including the foreign flag of convenience ships carrying dangerous materials such as ammonium nitrate into Australian waters and ports. Finally, they address the failure of the Howard government to examine or X-ray 90 per cent of shipping containers.

At a time when security is such a major issue, at a time when Australian seafarers and maritime workers are required to obtain maritime safety identification cards, it would appear rather strange and incongruous that foreign seafarers are not subject to the same type of security—at least at the same level. The requirement of 48 hours notice for crews and cargoes is only adhered to in 67 per cent of cases. That means that 33 per cent of ships entering Australia do not adhere to that rule. Fifteen per cent do not advise about crew or cargo until they have berthed. From my perspective, that is a major security issue. There are no effective security checks of foreign crews.

When we are talking about foreign crews, it is important to examine who these foreign crews comprise. My predecessor in this House, Peter Morris, was chair of the Standing Committee on Transport, Communications and Infrastructure.

Dick Adams (Lyons, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

A great chairman.

Jill Hall (Shortland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

A great chairman, yes. He was chair of the committee when it did a report that highlighted—

Dick Adams (Lyons, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

He knew more about shipping than the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Environment and Heritage, who is at the table.

Jill Hall (Shortland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

As my colleague points out, he knew more about shipping than many of us here—not only people on the other side but just about any person in Australia. The report of the committee was called Ships of shame. In the report, the committee identified who the crew members were. They were people who were treated in subhuman conditions, people who were totally powerless, people who were expendable and people who could not question or in any way buck the will of the person in control of the ship. They were desperate people. These are the people who are entering our waters without proper checks.

Australian sea men and women are being checked. They must have the maritime security card. Foreign crews are not effectively checked. The list of crew is submitted; in 33 per cent of cases it does not meet the 48-hour criterion and in 15 per cent of those cases there is no advice until the ship has berthed. When those ships enter our harbours and the names of the crew are presented, there is no effective way of scrutinising them and clearing that the people who are actually identified are the people who form part of the crew. The whole system is anything but effective. If the government is really serious about security, it should address that issue—and address it as a matter of urgency. It will be too late—far too late—once we have an accident in our waters.

Shortland electorate is a coastal electorate. Mr Deputy Speaker, let me give you an idea of some of the changes that have taken place in relation to shipping under the Howard government’s reign. Until a couple of years ago, the Wallarah used to take coal from Catherine Hill Bay—a delightful little settlement in Lake Macquarie and part of Shortland electorate—to the port of Newcastle. It was Australian owned, it had an Australian crew and it was carrying Australian cargo. That ship has now been sold. It is sailing under a foreign flag, with foreign crew. I do not think that is good enough. I do not think it is good enough at all.

Back in about 2002, I visited Newcastle harbour and went aboard the Angel III, which was a container ship. I met the captain. It was a Maltese flagged ship with a Greek captain, crewed by Burmese seafarers. The crew were very frightened. The safety instructions were in English and the crew members could not even speak English, let alone read it. I think this is a serious issue—an issue that, as a parliament, we cannot allow to continue and an issue that the government has failed the Australian people on. The policies have not only led to the destruction of the shipping industry and the continued abuse of crews but placed in jeopardy the safety of all Australians.

It has also come to my notice that al-Qaeda owns somewhere in the vicinity of 15 to 18 ships. These ships come under the flag of countries such as Malta, Tonga or wherever the ship is able to obtain a flag from—a flag of convenience. These ships are crewed by foreign seafarers—people who are desperate, people who have been used to sailing in atrocious circumstances. These are the ships that are coming in and out of our ports, carrying cargoes such as ammonium nitrate. These are the ships with crew members that are not being properly scrutinised.

It really makes me shiver. It is a great worry to us on this side of the House. But it seems that the government is not concerned about these desperate people who are crewing ships that could come from wherever; it is more interested in scrutinising Australian seafarers and making sure that their credentials are in order. To me, it does not gel.

What about overseas, in the United States? The government of the day is very close to the United States government, and we on this side of the House respect much that the United States does. One of the things we are particularly supportive of is the fact that they will not allow ships to enter their ports unless they give 48 hours notice of who their crew are or 48 hours notice of their cargo. The coast guard will actually make sure that they do not enter the port until that information is presented. To my way of thinking, that is the way our government should be operating and, when those ships do enter, the government should be able to ensure that the information about the crew is validated.

I would now like to move to the fact that the government has recently announced and was very proud of the fact that it is X-raying 10 per cent of all cargo that enters Australia in containers. That means that 90 per cent of all cargo that comes into Australia is not X-rayed; and in the past cargo containers have been found to contain explosives. Once again, it is not good enough. In Hong Kong, 100 per cent of all cargo is fully X-rayed. If we are really serious about security at our ports then we should be ensuring that all cargo is X-rayed. It is imperative to ensure the safety of our ports.

I mentioned that Shortland is a coastal electorate, and that raises the issue and makes it even more important to me that we have safe waterways and that the ships that are sailing in those waterways are safe. September 11 changed the way we look at safety, security and terrorism. When we are looking at our waterways and the ships that sail them, and at the fact that we have ships sailing with single voyage permits and continuous voyage permits, security is paramount. Coupled with that is the impact that these ships can have on our environment. By not ensuring the security of these ships we can have enormous devastation to our environment and to our coastline. It is imperative that we as a nation have control over the shipping that takes place in Australian waters. That is something that, I hate to say, has diminished greatly under the Howard government. In Australia we should have an Australian shipping industry with Australian seafarers crewing those ships, and seafarers should be evaluated in a way that ensures that any foreign seafarer coming into our country will be scrutinised in the same way that Australian seafarers are.

I think it is time that this government became serious about security at our ports. It is important to have a strong security regime in our ports, similar to what exists in the US or Hong Kong. To do that, a government must have a commitment to the shipping industry. I urge the government very strongly to make that commitment to an Australian shipping industry, to safety on our coastline and to ensuring that our environment and our people are protected.

The legislation that we have before us today clarifies a rather murky piece of legislation that was introduced back in 2003. It puts in place provisions to enable the act to work in a much more effective way. But I do not think we should be constantly coming back to this parliament, time and again, debating legislation that the government should have got right the first time. I support the amendments moved by the shadow minister, and I urge the Howard government to ensure that foreign crews that enter Australia meet the safety checks and are scrutinised in the same way that Australian crews are. I urge the government to move immediately to ensure that all cargo entering Australian waters is safe and to undertake a program of X-raying all shipping containers, not just 10 per cent.

Dick Adams (Lyons, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I find it pretty appalling that only one member of the government backbench spoke on this bill and we have got 15 or 16 speaking on the Labor side of the House. It shows the interest that the government has in maritime matters and in the security of the country. It also shows up the government’s hypocrisy. The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006 has some severe implications for Australia, but it is not a bill that goes far enough and it never has. The other bill that this is amending was not good enough, and this one has been brought in to try to stove it up a bit. But that is not getting there either. The government has not dealt with the matter as it should have.

Labor have been calling for urgent maritime security reform for some years and we welcome this amendment bill. However, many urgent reforms are required in Australian maritime security. You see government ministers weekly, nearly daily, talking of the security of Australia and the difficulties we are in. We have to take these issues seriously. We have changed act after act giving more powers to security forces and police forces in this country. We may need to do that, and we have done it, but in the maritime sector we are still falling pretty short. We still have not got there. We have got nowhere near where we have to be.

We seem to want to pick on Australian seamen. We want to make sure that they have the credentials, we do security class checks and make sure that they have their security cards et cetera, and that is fair enough. But we allow foreign seamen to enter the country. We have ships tying up to the wharves around Australia without the same sort of checks.

It seems to be hypocrisy on the part of this government. In one area we are stressing enormous numbers of security issues. We have made boat people into terrorists. We are creating very high tension around these things. But we do not seem to want to deal with the issue of foreign crews coming into the ports of Australia. We know, and I think my predecessor mentioned, that the United States of America do not allow foreign crews into their ports because of the security issues. They do not allow them to sail around the shores of their country. I understand why; there are many reasons why.

The amendments that my colleague the member for Brisbane has moved to this amendment bill are good and I will be supporting them. It was the government trying to deregulate the shipping industry some years ago which pointed them in a bad direction. The amendment bill gives effect to Australia’s international obligations under the International Maritime Organisation, the IMO; the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code; and chapter XI-2 of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, the SOLAS convention, of 1974.

That act establishes a means to protect against unlawful interference with maritime vessels and associated transport or offshore facilities by setting up a regulatory framework centred on the development of security plans for ships, ports, port facilities and offshore facilities which are crucial to imports and exports oriented maritime transport or domestic energy supplies. Naturally, that is what we have done in this country to protect our ports and the export and import industries—to protect what we import and the great wealth we get from our exports. Presently a participant cannot change a plan without submitting a revised plan—that is, somebody coming into an Australian port cannot position a boat without saying that they have revised what they have done. I think there is a change here to make that slightly easier. I accept that as being a reality, and that is fine.

But ship security is something that we need to be far more careful with than this current legislation is. In the past the fact that we have had Australian crews operating on ships around Australia has probably given us a false sense of security. Our crews are highly trained and they have a great sense of loyalty to their country. Our crews go back to the Second World War and our merchant navy, where they served their country well. Their loyalty is not questioned.

On the whole they are probably some of the best seamen in the world, and they are recognised as such. Other countries will seek out Australian crews because they know they can rely on them, their skills and their ability to manage ships and make them work—as opposed to foreign crews, who are normally very badly trained, if trained at all, and have very little safety knowledge or understanding. Also there are always language issues that are never dealt with in any way, and they should be. I think my colleague the member for Shortland made some very good points about being on ships, and I have also been in this situation, and seeing frightened foreign seamen in pretty bad distress—not people that you would want to rely on, people that could probably be manipulated in many ways. That is not a very good security situation to have.

We have set a standard for Australian shipping and for overseas ships that come to Australia, but I understand that 20 per cent of ships that dock and tie up in Australian ports have not notified who their crew are or what they have on board the ship. That is appalling, but it is what we seem to be letting happen. We also have foreign crews taking permits and using ships for coastal freight around our boundaries.

In Tasmania, we sell vodka to the Russians, tulips to the Dutch, truffles to the French—they might go on the plane—meat to the Japanese, wood to China and milk powder to Jordan, and hundreds of other products produced in Tasmania are sent out to the world. A lot of that is shipped from the ports in Burnie and Devonport, and our ferry ports take in many other things. Concrete from the Railton cement works goes out from there. The port of Bell Bay at the top end of Launceston looks after Comalco and the other refineries. There is also the port of Hobart, which of course is not very big anymore. These ports take foreign ships and foreign crews, and we do not know who is on board these ships when they tie up to the port. That shows a lack of security and understanding. Ministers who sit in this parliament stand up at question time and go on television to lift the security level of this country to a very high level and get people at a higher sense of alert, but they are not taking seriously these sorts of situations. They are allowing foreign crews on the coastlines of Australia to flout the regulations that we are setting for ships that come into the ports to notify who their crews are and what they have on board.

Many of the Australian crews have been trained through the Maritime College, which is in my electorate in Tasmania. It is an excellent facility that trains in security and safety and all the other aspects that are needed. It is a great course used by many people from other parts of the world to train to become good seamen, and we have retrained many Australian seamen there. It is recognised as a great training facility right around the world.

In the 1990s I sat on the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Transport, Communications and Infrastructure for the inquiry into the ships of shame and I was around when the Ships of shame reports were tabled. Peter Morris, the previous member for Shortland, was the chair, and he knew a heck of a lot about shipping in the world. We watched the deregulation of the shipping industry and saw foreign ships come into the ports and the security issues come into play, knowing that the ships of shame had been highlighted. Ships of shame were in the world and needed to be dealt with, but we still allowed ships to come into Australian ports. Given that, I find it even more difficult to work out why ministers and why this government’s agencies have not acted.

We have touched on a few bits of what can be carried. I remember being in Halifax, Canada, some years ago and reading about the great explosion, which was the greatest explosion in the world prior to the dropping of the bombs on Japan during the Second World War. In Halifax, Canada, a ship blew up in 1917. It was loaded with gunpowder and petrol and was leaving to go to the front in France. It devastated the city, and I remember reading a book about it while I was there. That ship did not have ammonium nitrate on it, but after reading that book I started to take notice of some of the other enormous explosions that have taken place, like the Oklahoma City bombing, which killed 168 people and injured 500. That was ammonium nitrate. The IRA used ammonium nitrate in a bombing of London’s Canary Wharf. The total damage was estimated to be about £85 million; two people were killed and 100 were injured. In 2004 the UK arrested some people on terrorist charges and they had half a tonne of ammonium nitrate, fertiliser, in their lockup, and we know what they were trying to do. The most famous incident dealing with ammonium nitrate was the explosion of the SS Grandcamp in Texas City in the United States in 1947. It was carrying 2,300 tonnes of ammonium nitrate. The explosion was heard 150 miles away and it threw the 1.5-tonne anchor two miles from where it started.

So one would think that we would not allow ammonium nitrate to be in a foreign ship with a foreign crew sailing around Australia and calling into ports. But we do. There is something seriously wrong in allowing this to occur. This government is failing the people of Australia. It is raising the security level of this country up and up but it does not want to do anything about some bits of it. We are saying that a standard for an Australian seaman has to be at this level, which is fine. He has to have a security pass, has to reach a standard, has to carry his card and has to be at this level. We accept all that. We know that he can reach a level of safety and competence to meet any test in the world. But we know that there are foreign crews that cannot meet any level. We know that they are not up to any sort of level that we could put them up to.

This should be dealt with. This bill does not deal with it. As I said, I understand that 20 per cent of ships that come in and tie up in Australia do not notify who is on board the ship, who is in the crew and what is in the ship to be unloaded. A part of the international standards that were pulled together was to make sure that those things occurred—that ships were to notify. As I said, these things have been around since the Ships of shame days and all that good work done by Peter Morris, who went around the world speaking about those ships. This House should be very proud of the work done by its transport committee in those days because I know that report was a world-renowned report.

Whether we have taken shipping to a better degree and a better level is something that awaits further reports, but it is a standard that we should be setting for the world. We should be a part of it. We need to deal with these issues. We need to come to grips with these things. Under Labor’s plan, as announced by our leader earlier this year, we would establish a department of homeland security and organise around two core responsibilities of border protection and protecting against terrorist attacks on the border by making sure that we had a coast guard. We would deal with local groups as well. We could make sure that the volunteer coast guard people were right up to date. We could do things with proposed acts like this to make sure that those foreign crews, if they were going to be on the coast, have the same standards that Australia has.

I just want to mention the Australian shipping industry. When you see that so much of all the commodities that we are selling to the rest of the world out of Australia today is going out in foreign owned ships, that is a bit of an indictment, and we need to come to grips with that. (Time expired)

Brendan O'Connor (Gorton, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I too want to make some comments on this bill and I support the amendment moved by the member for Brisbane. Clearly the government is seeking in this bill to amend what some people would say are rather technical changes in order to improve upon a bill that was enacted some time ago.

The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006 is certainly a specific bill insofar as it relates to the time in which the Secretary of the Department of Transport and Regional Services would have to approve a maritime security plan. As I understand it, items 5 and 6 combine to reduce the 90-day approval time to 60 days, which would be defined as the ‘consideration period’. However, the secretary would also have the discretion of extending that time of 60 days by another 45 days where, in order to make a decision on the plan, additional information is requested from the person seeking approval of the plan. That is the nub of the bill, which is seeking to amend what was clearly a deficient piece of legislation that was introduced by the government and passed by the parliament some time ago.

But I think it is important to note the second reading amendment moved by the member for Brisbane which seeks to enunciate—and I think quite clearly enunciates—concerns the opposition has with respect to maritime security. It seems to me and others on this side that the government is big on rhetoric when it comes to national security but small on action. There really is an ever-increasing gap between what the government says it will do and what the government does in relation to national security. I think increasingly people are beginning to be made aware of this.

It is also clear that the government shows very little regard for national security in this place. It is important to note that again we have a situation where there are many opposition members getting up to discuss issues regarding national security—in this case, the maritime security bill. There has been one member of the government—you, Mr Deputy Speaker Somlyay—who has contributed, not for the full amount of time but certainly you contributed to this debate. Other than you in your capacity as the member for Fairfax, no government member—certainly not the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for  the Environment and Heritage—has spoken on this bill.

What you really see, time and time again, is that the government introduces bills in this place and then does not have either the respect for this place, the respect for its own constituents or the interest in the actual matters that it is putting forward to enact to actually speak to the bills. I understand this bill is relatively technical, as I said, but the second reading amendment that has been asserted by the member for Brisbane is significant and would need rebutting if the government concerned itself with debate in this place. But the government, of course, fails to have any regard for this chamber. Again, what you see is a list of opposition members seeking to engage the government in matters that it introduces into this place and the other place, and the government not even turning up to discuss these matters.

I refer to the amendment that has been moved by the member for Brisbane. I would like to go to at least certain parts of that amendment. The amendment criticises the Howard government’s failures in maritime security, including its failure to conduct security checks on foreign crews. We have heard concerns raised by a number of people and organisations with respect to this matter. The Maritime Union of Australia, I know, is a much-maligned organisation as far as the government is concerned, but it is indeed an organisation that represents workers in the industry. If the government had regard to what concerns the employees in the industry have then they would listen to that organisation with respect to security.

Clearly, with respect to the failure to conduct security checks on foreign crews, the government believes there is no security issue around not knowing the identity and the security risk or otherwise of foreign crews. The member for Brisbane enunciates that in the second reading amendment. The amendment also clearly outlines the failure of the government to ensure foreign ships provide manifestos of crews and cargo before arriving at an Australian port. So there is no regulation which would improve the security of these arrangements for crew and cargo arriving in this country. Further, there is criticism in the amendment of:

... the ready availability of single and multiple voyage permits for foreign flag of convenience ships including the ready availability of permits for foreign flag of convenience ships carrying dangerous materials in Australian waters and ports ...

Examples of such dangerous materials include ammonium nitrate, which can explode without being deliberately detonated, and was used, as was indicated earlier by a number of Labor speakers, in the terrorist attack upon the federal building in Oklahoma in the United States only 10 years ago. The amendment also criticises the failure of the Howard government to examine or X-ray 90 per cent of shipping containers, the failure to develop an adequate training regime and qualification level for maritime security guards, the failure to create a department of homeland security to remove dangerous gaps and to better coordinate security in Australia, and, indeed, the Howard government’s failure to establish an Australian coast guard to patrol our coastline.

The opposition have for some time been seeking to impress upon the government the need to fill these holes in our security. We have really had enough of the rhetoric and the fridge magnet. It is time for the government to seriously have regard to these deficiencies in national security.

I return to some of the concerns that have been expressed by people who work in the industry, and I include in that the Maritime Union of Australia. Some of the concerns they have raised are in relation to just the day-to-day activities that their members and companies of this country are engaged in and, as a result of a lack of security, could potentially lead to disaster.

Firstly, we would say that a strong maritime security regime is critically important in securing Australia’s growing liquid natural gas trade. We have an obligation to our trading partners when we send a ship from here to their ports that that ship is secure. That is not only a sensible thing to do and an economic thing to do; it is an ethical thing to do. The use of Australian shipping and the use of highly skilled, highly qualified Australian crews are important parts of the adoption of a strong maritime security regime. This has been demonstrated where Australian LNG tankers crewed by Australians have demonstrated a commitment to the highest levels of maritime security aimed at maintaining the security of both the LNG tankers and their valuable cargoes. Furthermore, this high-level Australian commitment to maritime security is important in maintaining our enviable reputation as a reliable and secure supplier of liquid natural gas to the world market.

The security of Australian liquid natural gas is one of Australia’s key marketing advantages in the global LNG market. I think it is fair to say that we are not the sole supplier in relation to that product. There are other places for those countries in need of liquid natural gas to go to if they seek this energy source. So one of the factors that would certainly weigh on the minds of decision makers in other nations when seeking to import an energy source like LNG is: will that import come into their ports—whether in China, Korea or Japan—in a manner that is safe for the particular port and safe for the country? We would argue that there is a clear nexus between highly trained domestic crews working on those ships and increased safety and security in relation to trade in such substances.

I would argue that one reason Australia has been able to maintain its global position as a reliable shipper of LNG is that the shipping contracts have been written on a delivered ex ship basis, meaning the seller controls the shipping. Indeed, people to whom I have spoken, and to whom I am sure others have spoken, would be concerned—and many in the industry are concerned—that any move away from ex ship contract terms to free on board shipping contracts, where the seller generally controls the shipping, weakens Australia’s involvement in the LNG transportation task, introduces more foreign and flag of convenience shipping into the LNG trade and creates potential security risks.

I refer to a 2004 report produced by Sandia National Laboratories, a division of the Sandia Corporation under contract to the United States Department of Energy, entitled Guidance on risk analysis and safety implications of a large liquefied natural gas spill over water. The report made mention of the fact that the Australian LNG risk management strategies were already adopting the risk treatments proposed by Sandia as world’s best practice. What is referred to in that report is the industry undertaking the transportation of such potentially dangerous energy sources at world’s best practice, and I would hate to think that the government, because of its ideological blindness, hatred and enmity towards unions and unionised workforces, would not only risk those contracts but endanger the lives of people here and abroad. The same level of risk assessment and commitment to high-level quality risk management strategies cannot be guaranteed if ships contracted to carry Australian LNG are drawn from FOC registries and even some of the second registers of non-FOC countries. Australia is strongly committed to the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code which, as you might know, Mr Deputy Speaker, came into effect only two years ago.

It is fair to say that, despite the conflicts that have occurred between the Commonwealth and the maritime unions, most infamously in the 1997 maritime dispute, as a result of the work that has been put in between the maritime unions, the maritime industry and the Commonwealth there has been some effort to ensure that the maritime security regime has been secured. However, notwithstanding the goodwill of the Maritime Union, the industry and, one would hope, the Commonwealth, this failure to see past the enmity towards MUA is a real problem for the Commonwealth. I can understand that the MUA may not be on the Prime Minister’s Christmas card list, but you must be pragmatic and work with all parties in matters that assist the security of this nation. You must consider and put at the forefront in your area of public policy the safety of the citizens of this country.

Therefore, I ask the government to genuinely engage with the maritime industry, which includes those organisations that represent employees, to find ways to minimise the likelihood of a national security risk, which has increased as a result of the threats of terrorism. It should be noted that we have far more to fear from terrorists than the government, we would hope, would fear from unionised workforces. Clearly, in the priority of things, you would hope that the government would not make a decision that would adversely affect the union and that that would be its priority, rather than working together with all parties in the maritime industry in order to secure improvements to the way the industry undertakes its job in securing safe shipping in both our ports and the ports of other nations.

As I said at the beginning of my contribution, this bill in itself is rather limited in its application. Its purpose is to amend a particular time threshold from 90 days to 60 days, enabling the Secretary of the Department of Transport and Regional Services to approve a maritime security plan. That change has reduced the days but it has provided that same secretary with the discretion to increase the days by an extra 45 if there is a requirement. It is fair to say that this bill is rather innocuous in the breadth of concerns people and indeed the opposition have with respect to maritime security, but this is a good opportunity—and the member for Brisbane took this opportunity—to raise some serious concerns about the failure of government to properly secure our ports, to properly scrutinise the cargo that comes into our ports and to properly screen crews on foreign vessels or indeed foreign crews on our own vessels. These are serious matters.

We are now only a week away from the fifth anniversary of those awful events in the United States. It is such a vivid memory for all of us—particularly the dreadful destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York by two planes that were deliberately piloted into both towers by terrorists. But I think it is fair to say that a breach of maritime security can be just as dangerous—indeed more so, because a vessel that enters a port could have far greater capacity for explosion than even the awful event a week from five years ago. Therefore, I think it is important that the government turn their collective minds to that issue and, instead of fighting and resisting engagement with the Maritime Union of Australia, sit down and talk with them because they are, along with the employers in the industry, experts in the field. They should be listened to; we would have a safer industry as a result.

Warren Snowdon (Lingiari, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Northern Australia and Indigenous Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I want to thank my colleague for another insightful contribution. It is a pleasure to see him in this place, giving us his words of wisdom. The purpose of the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006 is to amend the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003, to simplify the procedures for making changes to maritime ship and offshore facilities security plans, to clarify measures relating to the plan approval process, to make a number of technical amendments to clarify the intent of the act, to make amendments to various acts consequential to the enactment of the Legislative Instruments Act 2003 and to make a technical amendment to the Customs Act 1901.

The opposition spokesperson, Mr Bevis, has moved an amendment, and I think it is worth reminding ourselves of what that amendment entails. It entails a number of criticisms, condemning:

... the Howard Government for its failure to provide necessary maritime security and protect Australians, including:

(1)

the Howard Government’s failure to conduct security checks on foreign crews;

(2)

the Government’s continued failure to ensure foreign ships provide manifestos of crew and cargo before arriving at an Australian port;

(3)

the ready availability of single and multiple voyage permits for foreign flag of convenience ships including the ready availability of permits for foreign flag of convenience ships carrying dangerous materials in Australian waters and ports;

(4)

the failure of the Howard Government to examine or x-ray 90% of shipping containers;

(5)

the Government’s failure to create a Department of Homeland Security to remove dangerous gaps and to better coordinate security in Australia; and

(6)

the Howard Government’s failure to establish an Australian Coastguard to patrol our coastline …

I know that there have been considerable changes in the Department of Defence, some of which we believe are to deal with deficiencies in the security arrangements off the northern coast of Australia, in particular, with the creation of the Joint Operations Command, but I am afraid that the changes that have been made thus far do not satisfy the needs of Australia’s security environment as identified by the opposition spokesman. I say that as the member for Lingiari and as a shadow parliamentary secretary with responsibility for Northern Australia.

Our northern waters require much closer surveillance for security purposes than they have hitherto had. That is no condemnation of the role that the Australian Navy or, indeed, the Customs Service has played. Frankly, they just have not had sufficient resources to do the job that they are required to do. I must say that my knowledge of the Australian Navy personnel who are engaged in this task is that they do their job very professionally and they do it under very arduous circumstances.

Whilst I note that the new Armidale class of patrol vessels is gradually being put into service in the northern waters, I have to say that the poor buggers have been and still are sailing the Fremantle class patrol boats. They are not the most comfortable vessels. In those northern waters in the peak of the cyclone season—a very hot time of the year—they are not comfortable vessels by any stretch of the imagination. These personnel have a very difficult task that they have to undertake on our behalf. Despite the difficulties they have had with that equipment—and that is not to say that they have not been well served by it, but it is a difficult exercise—they have undertaken their task with much vigour and much application, and they deserve to be commended for it.

As I have highlighted many times in this chamber—as recently as last year in relation to the antiterrorism bill and earlier this year in relation to the Fisheries Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fishing Offences) Bill 2006—the problem of maritime security and border protection in Australia’s northern waters has not been addressed sufficiently by this government. We know this because of the number of vessels that continue to come into our waters for illegal fishing. The endemic nature of this illegal fishing was identified by Labor’s caucus—the Transport and Maritime Security Taskforce—in its report Maritime security and illegal fishing: A national disgrace. According to the task force, illegal fishing is a highly organised, sophisticated criminal activity. It is not about subsistence fishers on traditional vessels. They are using modern commercialised fleets equipped with modern technology: echo sounders, radars and GPS equipment.

From the work undertaken by Professor James Fox of the Research School for Pacific and Asian Studies of the Australian National University in a report entitled Report on illegal fishermen in Australian waters 2005, we know that Australian waters are being targeted as easy pickings for illegal fishers. As I told this chamber on 31 May this year in my speech on Fisheries Legislation Amendment (Foreign Fishing Offences) Bill 2006:

What we know to be the case is that foreign fishers are using Australian shores, landing their vessels and in some cases setting up caches of food and even going so far as sinking wells for fresh water.

Along with the increased number of vessels is the increased possibility of vessels landing on the mainland. As you would know, Mr Deputy Speaker Quick, this provides a significant risk for quarantine issues on our northern borders and it has grave implications for industry—in particular in the Top End but, nevertheless, in the broader community. This concern was also raised in the caucus report.

We have had discussion in the past about our concerns regarding avian flu—indeed, much was made of that fact—and the possibility of an epidemic here in Australia. We now know that these vessels that foreign fishers have been sailing in have been landing on Australian soil. There is a distinct possibility that at some time down the line, if we do not stop these practices, we could end up having on our soil an exotic disease, such as avian flu, or another animal-borne disease, such as foot-and-mouth or rabies, impacting upon our broader population. You do not have to be an expert on these issues to understand what the implications would be to the Australian community if this were to take place.

From evidence regarding foreign fishing vessels in Australian waters given by Rear Admiral Crane to a Senate estimates committee on 17 February this year, we know that in 2005 there were 13,018 sightings of illegal vessels—and these could have been repeat sightings. This was a 35 per cent increase on the sightings of the previous year. In the same year, only 280 illegal vessels were apprehended and only 327 boats had their fishing gear and their catch confiscated. This represents 4.6 per cent of total vessel sightings for that year. Again, we would be negligent as a parliament if we did not express our concern to the government about this appalling state of affairs.

Again, in evidence given to Labor’s Transport and Maritime Security Taskforce, there was an assertion that nine out of 10 illegal fishing trips are successful. I recall in this chamber on 31 May recounting an example of one illegal fisher who had been arrested in Arnhem Land in the Northern Territory. This individual, as I said then, was not on his second, third or fourth visit; the person caught had made 103 voyages to Australia. We know now that deterrence has not been a real problem for these fishermen; they are still coming to Australian waters.

According to Professor Fox, 40 Indonesian fishermen drowned in Australian waters last year. These deaths should not have happened. We have even had deaths while Indonesian fishermen have been in the custody of the Australian community; there have been deaths of fishermen who had been detained by our defence forces or Coastwatch people and brought into Darwin Harbour. We know that, if we had an adequate maritime security operation which prevented or deterred fishers from coming into Australian waters, the threat or risk of such deaths would be minimised.

I know that the previous speaker, the member for Gorton, in his contribution talked about this—and, I have to say, this is a very important issue for the Northern Territory. Also, I am a bit alarmed that, despite the importance of this piece of legislation, there is only one government speaker making a contribution to this debate, and that is Alex Somlyay. Where is the member for Leichhardt? Where is the member for Solomon? Where is the member for Kalgoorlie?

Jennie George (Throsby, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Environment and Heritage) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Missing in action.

Warren Snowdon (Lingiari, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Northern Australia and Indigenous Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

And that is always the case here. They beat their breasts about how well the government is doing but, when it comes to representing the real needs and interests of their communities, they are found wanting. I think it is a major disgrace. In particular, with the member for Solomon, we have a member who has got up in this place before and spoken about the resource industries of the Northern Territory—none of which, by the way, are in his electorate. The only resource in his electorate is the hot air that emanates from his own being. All the oil and gas mining activity takes place in waters which are either offshore waters or in the electorate of Lingiari—my own electorate. The oil and LNG plant in Darwin Harbour is in my electorate. However, we see the member for Solomon getting up in this place and proudly spouting forth as to how these industries have all been as a result of the beneficence of the Howard government.

Where is the member for Solomon tonight? Why isn’t he here talking about the potential threat to those very industries if we do not have proper and adequate maritime security? This is critically important to securing Australia’s LNG trade. We might also ask him if he has any concerns at all about the way in which potential terrorists might actually get into Darwin Harbour, either on a particular vessel or by exploiting the circumstances that exist in relation to the resources in the community.

I note that the shadow minister, Mr Bevis, raised the significant issue of concerns about the potential for terrorists to mount suicide missions into Australian waters on vessels using an explosive like ammonium nitrate. You would want to know what the impact of that might be on Wickham Point in Darwin Harbour. You would want to have some interest in securing Darwin Harbour from that sort of threat. You would want to have some interest in securing our offshore platforms against that sort of threat. But we do not see it being demonstrated by the member for Solomon here this evening.

As important as it is for us to ensure we have adequate security to protect ourselves against those possible incursions, we also need to understand that an important part of satisfying our need for this sort of security—especially as we cannot identify, in most cases, the personnel on foreign vessels who are coming into Australian harbours—is to use, as far as possible, Australian shipping and of course highly skilled, highly qualified Australian crews. I believe this is an important part of adopting a strong maritime security regime.

This has been demonstrated already by the North West Shelf project where Australian LNG tankers crewed by Australians have a demonstrated commitment to the highest levels of maritime security aimed at maintaining security of both the LNG tankers and their valuable cargoes. Furthermore, the high level of Australian commitment to maritime security is important in maintaining our enviable reputation as a reliable and secure supplier of LNG on the world market—and this is potentially of great significance to those of us in the north of Australia where these LNG resources are being exploited. The security of Australian LNG is one of our key marketing advantages in the global LNG market. Not only is it good for Australians but it also delivers energy security to our LNG customers. Japanese, Chinese or Korean LNG receiving terminals can have a high degree of assurance that their cargo, the vessel and the onshore terminal facility will be secure while an Australian crewed LNG carrier is in port.

It has been a concern of mine for some years that Australian crewed vessels are absent from these important areas of trade. I am most concerned that, when we contemplate the development of our economy in the north of Australia and we contemplate the development of these massive resources off our shores, we do so in a secure environment where we know they will be protected. We know they will be protected not only for the economic benefits that they bring to us but also, and most importantly, because of the cost in human life that could eventuate should some disaster befall them such as a terrorist attack.

I recall that when the Timor Gap Task Force was in existence, during the years of the Hawke and Keating governments, one of the issues that we raised was the potential for ensuring the security of supply and the security of shipping into the port of Darwin and other places. We are here to support this legislation because it is important, but the government has failed us significantly in the area of maritime security and transport security and it needs to do a lot more to meet Australia’s security needs.

Jennie George (Throsby, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Environment and Heritage) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I take the opportunity this evening in this debate on the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006 to again raise my concerns and protest about this government’s failure to provide the necessary maritime security that this nation requires and its failure to provide protection for our communities, particularly communities like mine, which is centred on a port in the electorate of Throsby. The member for Lingiari was absolutely right to draw attention to the totally inadequate response from the other side of this chamber. There is one speaker on the government side today compared to 12 speakers on this side of the chamber. I dare say that intelligent members on the government benches are embarrassed about the totally inadequate performance of the Howard government in many areas of concern identified in our amendment. They must be embarrassed otherwise they would be in here defending the government’s record in light of the many areas of inadequacy that our shadow minister has brought to the attention of the chamber in the amendment he has moved.

I take the opportunity to speak on maritime bills when they come before the parliament because they are of great importance to Port Kembla, to the suburbs and communities that live in the vicinity of the port and to the workers that are employed at the port and their families. Last year when I spoke on the Maritime Transport Security Amendment Bill I drew the parliament’s attention to a comprehensive report on Australia’s maritime security issued by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. I want to quote a paragraph from that report which sums up the concerns of a credible independent body. It said:

A terrorist attack on Australia’s maritime interests is a credible scenario. We have high dependence on shipping and seaborne trade, and are adjacent to a region where terrorist groups have maritime capabilities.

…            …            …

Australia still faces major institutional and operational challenges in reducing the risks of maritime terrorism. We haven’t met these challenges fully, and we lack consistency in the response across the states and territories.

These are the words of an authoritative and independent body that is there to provide fearless advice to the government. The Howard government has failed to appreciate the seriousness of the situation. Labor’s amendment to this bill, outlined in detail by the member for Brisbane, indicates significant areas of government failure in providing necessary maritime security and condemns the government for its failure and inaction in regard to many of the concerns highlighted in that amendment.

I want to again take the opportunity to repeat some of the concerns I have previously raised in the House, particularly with regard to the ready availability of single and multiple voyage permits for foreign vessels which, as we know, carry dangerous materials in our waters and into our ports. The government is abusing the rules for the granting of these permits. This is a very important matter, for about 1,000 coastal permits are now issued each year for foreign ships carrying oil, chemicals, LPG and dry cargo between our ports. Very alarmingly, an investigation by the Australian newspaper last year found that foreign ships with foreign crews were carrying explosive cargo, such as fuel or fertiliser, and that they could have lodged fraudulent documents to obtain voyage permits for coastal shipping trade. The headline of the article that appeared in the Australian said it all: ‘Lax ship checks expose ports to terror threat’. In this article the Australian revealed details of an internal audit of the Howard government’s administration of coastal shipping under the Navigation Act. The audit of the administration was obtained under freedom of information laws by the freedom of information editor of the Australian, Mr Michael McKinnon. He did the community a great service in pursuing the outcome of this audit.

The audit was conducted by KPMG, a very reputable body, for the Department of Transport and Regional Services and it was completed in October 2004. It delivered a damning assessment of the government’s performance, finding that the administration of coastal shipping licences and permits for foreign vessels is a shambles. The audit revealed that one in six coastal shipping permits is granted without a signed application, which according to KPMG meant that ‘the department risks granting a permit based on a bogus or unauthorised application’. The audit revealed that inadequate financial controls mean that the government may be unaware of fraud, errors or other irregularities relating to the licence and permit applications, that poor record keeping means data relating to more than one in five approved licence and permit applications is ‘absent or incorrect’ and that existing regulations are, in KPMG’s words, ‘out of date’ and ‘do not reflect current operating procedures’.

If all that was not enough, the report also found that the department has breached the navigation regulations and ministerial guidelines by failing to properly establish if a licensed Australian ship is actually available before issuing permits to foreign vessels. Single and continuous voyage permits are supposed to be issued only when a licensed ship is unavailable. The minister also has to be satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so. As we know, unlicensed foreign ships are not required to pay their crew Australian wages when trading on the Australian coast. Many foreign ships—many of them ships of shame, flag of convenience vessels—undercut Australian wages and conditions. It is a sad indictment of this government that it has presided over the demise of the Australian coastal trading fleet while giving a leg-up to foreign shipping that uses substandard vessels and engages cheap foreign labour.

A recent story on The 7.30 Report by Heather Ewart showed clearly that Australia’s remaining merchant fleet is under severe threat as a result of the abuse of this permit system. Under the Howard government, half of Australia’s fleet has already been decimated. We are now down to 50 Australian vessels. MT Stolt was the last Australian flagged chemical carrier. The vessel, after a dispute in Tasmania, is now to be reflagged from Australia to the Cayman Islands and the 18 sacked Australian workers are to be replaced by foreign seafarers. It is of no surprise that on The 7.30 Report one of the MUA officials, Mick Doleman, said that single voyage permits are now being handed out by this government like ‘confetti at a wedding’. On that program, the Minister for Transport and Regional Services put an entirely new construction on the issuing of permits to foreign vessels, saying that an Australian vessel must be available and ready to operate under ‘reasonable terms and conditions’.

We know from this government’s position what ‘reasonable terms and conditions’ means: a drive to the bottom in competing against foreign crews and foreign labour. The result of that policy position is becoming manifestly clear, and that is that the remaining Australian merchant fleet continues to remain under direct threat from foreign competition through the abuse of the permit system.

It is important to understand why the government’s failure to properly administer the cabotage system in this country really matters. First, it is clear from the findings of the audit that the lax administration of foreign ships on the Australian coastal trade places Australia and its citizens at a heightened risk of maritime terrorism. The Department of Transport and Regional Services has been issuing permits, as we know from this audit, in response to unsigned applications, which in the restrained words of the audit report means it has risked granting a permit based on a ‘bogus or unauthorised application’.

It is no secret that the international shipping industry has a dark side. During the course of its inquiry into the introduction of maritime security identification cards, the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee had evidence that made this very clear. International maritime security agencies now accept that Osama bin Laden owns a fleet of cargo ships all flagged under the flag of convenience system. As we know from the very important Ships of shame report, this system allows for the evasion of taxation and most other regulated costs. But, more importantly, it provides the beneficial owner with the most effective veil of anonymity available in international trade. In my view there is no more effective veil of anonymity than a blank application form. In fact, I can hardly think of a way to make Australia more vulnerable to terrorist attack than by permitting foreign ships to sail from port to port without the inconvenience of lodging a signed permit form. As we know from the KPMG audit, that has occurred.

The latest Australian maritime transport compendium commissioned by the Australian Shipowners Association contains a telling statistical tale about the growing use of foreign ships to transport goods around Australian ports. It reveals that since 1991-92 the number of permits issued to foreign ships has grown by over 325 per cent. In 2003-04, the last full year subject to the report, foreign vessels were permitted to carry almost 30 per cent of the Australian interstate and intrastate sea freight trade. As we know, foreign seafarers are not subject to the same rules that apply to Australian seafarers serving on Australian ships. Not only are foreign seafarers denied Australian pay and working conditions but they are not subject to the same security regime as Australian seafarers. I want to commend the Maritime Union of Australia for the way it has willingly and efficiently cooperated with the government in introducing the maritime identification card system and other very important measures that it understands are necessary to secure and protect Australia’s maritime trade. It is just a great pity that this government is letting the shipowners, the seafarers and the Australian community down so very badly in the many areas that were identified in our amendment.

The Labor Party has continued to argue that the carriage of highly dangerous goods, like ammonium nitrate, by foreign ships around our coastline must stop now. I commend the Leader of the Opposition on the many important contributions he has made in this chamber highlighting the grave dangers that exist in allowing foreign vessels to transport ammonium nitrate around our coastline. As I said earlier, the MT Stolt was the last Australian flagged chemical carrier and it has now gone. It should be clear to everyone that the safest way to transport high-consequence dangerous goods around Australia is obviously on Australian ships crewed by Australian men and women subject to appropriate security screening. Secure ships and secure seafarers mean better protection for the Australian community. It is bad enough that this government has facilitated an explosion in the number of single and continuous voyage permits issued to foreign ships; it is worse that the government is leaving Australia vulnerable because it will not or cannot regulate a coastal trade according to the rules.

It is not just a matter of supporting Australian shippers and Australian maritime workers, as important as that is. It is not just a matter of keeping dangerous substances like ammonium nitrate out of the hands of terrorists. The increasing carriage of sea freight around our coast by foreign ships, many of them flag of convenience vessels subject to very minimal regulation, also puts our natural environment at risk. Mr Deputy Speaker Quick, I know you will be very concerned about that, coming from the island state of Tasmania. It is in my view a matter of good luck not good governance that Australia has not seen a major environmental disaster associated with the carriage of chemical or petroleum products by one of these ships of shame.

The Howard government’s neglect of shipping policy threatens our economy, it threatens our national security and it threatens our natural environment. It is well and truly time that the Howard government ceased abusing the cabotage system. There is a real threat of a ship being used as a weapon in a terrorist strike, just as we saw jet aircraft used in the disastrous 2001 World Trade Centre attack. A maritime vessel could be used against a population centre, like the one that I represent, adjacent to a port facility, or it could be used in shipping channels with frightening consequences.

The Leader of the Opposition has referred to what happened back in 1947, and I will remind people again about the explosion on the SS Grandcamp in Texas City. The vessel was carrying 2,300 tons of ammonium nitrate, and it gives us an idea of the horrendous consequences of what might happen. That explosion on the vessel was heard as far as 150 miles away, with a mushroom cloud rising 2,000 feet. Locals thought it was a nuclear bomb. The Grandcamp’s 1.5-ton anchor was flung two miles and was embedded 10 feet into the ground. Texas City was devastated. The explosion killed at least 567 people. As I indicated, the Leader of the Opposition has raised that incident to alert the community about the possible dangers of these very dangerous chemicals being transported around our coastline.

The Australian parliament passed legislation in 2004 to provide for better exchange of information between state and federal agencies on users of ammonium nitrate. But this government has done nothing to prevent the carriage of ammonium nitrate by foreign flagged ships, often crewed by unidentified seafarers, with all the possibilities of terrorist infiltration and attack that this might allow.

Given the known business links between Osama bin Laden and shipping, this is an area of serious vulnerability that demands urgent and immediate attention. Coupled with the high incidence of piracy in our near northern waters and the operation of terrorist groups in islands bordering those waters, the government’s complacency is so negligent and so appalling. In the same way, it is inexcusable that ships arriving from overseas are not being required to meet their notification obligations. I pursued this matter with the Minister for Justice and Customs and, in the replies that I received, it is clear that nearly eight per cent of ships in 2004 failed to provide details of crew and cargo until after arrival. It is too late then if they are carrying explosives, a dirty bomb or worse.

The requirement to identify vessels and cargo before arrival is a thoroughly sensible procedure. Labor supports it. Indeed, we have been critical of the government’s failure to properly implement it. The government needs to make clear how this reporting requirement will be implemented in future to ensure complete compliance with the legislation. It could take a leaf out of the book of the United States, where these procedures are strictly enforced. Ships that fail to provide necessary identification there are denied access to ports and are interdicted if required.

The situation at our ports is serious when, as we know, currently only about 10 per cent of inbound containers are screened. With more than 20,000 ship arrivals and over 3½ million movements of loaded containers in Australia, there is plenty of room for error when 90 per cent of containers go unchecked.

I want to conclude by saying that the member for Lingiari was absolutely right to draw attention to the vulnerability of the Top End of Australia in particular. We have had about 13,000 cases of suspected illegal fishing boats in Australian waters. Only 200 of those were apprehended. Even if they double that target, that still leaves about 12,600 boats that go free. Our northern border has become so porous that illegal vessels are now routinely sighted on our mainland and even upstream, where camps have been found.

In conclusion, let me repeat the words from the report of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute:

A terrorist attack on Australia’s maritime interests is a credible scenario.

The government should urgently address the deficiencies that we have pursued in our amendment to this bill.

Roger Price (Chifley, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is a pleasure to follow the very thoughtful contribution of the honourable member for Throsby on this matter. In particular, I wanted to draw to the attention of the House items (5) and (6) of the amendment moved by the honourable member for Brisbane, the shadow minister for homeland security—namely:

(5)

the Government’s failure to create a Department of Homeland Security to remove dangerous gaps and to better coordinate security in Australia; and

(6)

the Howard Government’s failure to establish an Australian Coastguard to patrol our coastline.

The honourable member for Throsby in her contribution alluded to the porous borders that we have to our north. I could not but agree with her. It is a well-known fact. The honourable member for Throsby pointed out that there were more than 13,000 sightings of illegal fishing boats in our northern waters. These fishing boats do three things: obviously, they fish for fish; they fish for shark; and, in respect of some of the reefs, they destroy reefs in their quest for trochus shells. Particularly, they do not limit the taking of the shells to trochus shells—sized or undersized—but they remove all shells from the reef.

When the honourable member for Throsby said that there were more than 13,000 sightings of illegal vessels, she was right. We only intercepted 200. Notwithstanding the extra $300 million, we are going to reduce the number of illegal fishermen from our shores from 96,000 illegal fishermen per year to the much more comfortable figure of 72,000 illegal fishermen, who will enter our borders, rape and pillage our waters and destroy the livelihood and the environment of hardworking fishermen and our Indigenous community—and, while they will not go undetected, they will not be interdicted or interrupted. It is an utter disgrace. For a government that prides itself on issues of national security and what it is doing to bolster national security, to have this happen in our northern waters is a disgrace. It is not good enough.

I will tell you why it is not good enough. The government will not set up a department of homeland security. The United States may have done it in response to what has happened there—and I remind everyone that the September 11 anniversary is not far away. They experienced those attacks and they set up a department of homeland security. The one reason why this government will not set up a department of homeland security is that the Labor Party has been advocating it. We have been pointing out the need for better coordination and a more focused fight in the war on terrorism.

There have been a number of announcements by the government to try and improve coordination. They have embedded a new unit in Defence; they have got Customs officers and Defence officials working there, and I think that is a good thing. But, lest you feel too warm a flush about the success of the government’s moves, not one additional officer or official from the Department of Defence or from Customs has been added as extra. But we would want to do far more. We want to set up a fair dinkum unit of homeland security and we want to stop the illegal fishing.

In a very frank moment in response to a question on notice, a government minister has admitted on the Hansard record that Australia stands at risk of getting avian flu from these illegal fishermen landing on our coastline on our northern waters. Can you imagine what that would do to devastate Australia? In the same response it was happily and freely acknowledged by the government minister that we stand at risk of having rabies enter this country through the activities of these illegal fishermen landing on our coastline. Is there no wonder that there is not one National Party member coming into this chamber and contributing to the debate? Can you imagine, Mr Deputy Speaker Quick—and I know of your great interest in farming communities—how our farming communities, not only in our north, because it would not stay just in our north, but right across Australia, would be devastated by the impact of rabies entering the dingo population and eventually migrating south? There is avian flu, rabies and possibly even anthrax.

So I find it absolutely and utterly amazing that in a national security debate on this legislation, where admittedly the opposition, as it has traditionally done, is supporting the government to get the legislation through but wanting to have practical plans implemented—and hence the amendments—we get only one coalition speaker and a total absence of the National Party. They do not care about our northern waters, they do not care about the fishermen operating in our northern waters and they do not care about the Indigenous community. In this place in this debate they are mute, and I think they are deaf as well. For the life of me I do not understand it.

In her contribution the honourable member for Throsby pointed out what was happening with foreign flagged ships. Firstly, there is a great danger, which the opposition has pointed out, about ammonium nitrate—fertiliser. Fertilisers are used by our farmers and are a necessary ingredient for successful agriculture that comes to this country. Ammonium nitrate is also used, quite properly, by the mining community in the making of explosives. So that I am not accused of gilding the lily, I just want to read from the explanatory statement of the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Amendment Regulations 2005 (No. 2), SLI No. 163 OF 2005, under the heading ‘Terrorism concern’:

Of particular interest to Australia is that Jemaah Islamiyah ... had planned to use ammonium nitrate to bomb US and other western targets in Singapore, including the Australian High Commission.  The Prime Minister of Singapore, announcing the arrest of 13 JI members on 19 February 2002, said JI planned up to seven simultaneous attacks using ammonium nitrate truck bombs. The group had already stockpiled 3.9 tonnes of ammonium nitrate and planned to acquire another 16.7 tonnes.

So when Labor members of the opposition legitimately get up in this place and express concern about how ammonium nitrate can be used by terrorists in Australia, this one paragraph in the government’s own explanatory memorandum highlights the fact that we are vulnerable and at risk.

In terms of the domestic trade, one of the proud boasts of the coalition government was to get rid of Australian flagged vessels operating on our coastline. It is called cabotage; it is a fancy word, but it meant that you had to have Australian vessels, Australian flags and Australian crew carrying this cargo. Their very proud boast was that they got rid of it. They have opened it up to foreign vessels, all in the interest of economic rationalism. One of the real sadnesses of Australia—the largest island continent in the world—is that traditionally so few of our ships have been crewed by Australians and owned by Australian companies.

If you do have an Australian flagged vessel with an Australian crew you have the most rigorous of checks, and I do not object to that. I think that is a good thing. You are checked by the police and you are checked by ASIO to be able to work as a crew member. It is very thorough. Flippantly, the Deputy Leader of the National Party in this place said, ‘All this security stuff like the airport security cards and’—I presume—‘the maritime security cards that are checked by ASIO and the police are a bit like parliamentary passes.’ Mr Deputy Speaker, I do not have to tell you or other honourable members in this place that neither we nor our staff are checked by ASIO or by the police when we are issued a parliamentary pass in this place. There is a world of difference.

It is a good thing that that happens for Australian crews, but it does not happen for overseas crews. In fact, the only requirement Australia places on foreign ships coming to Australia is that they tell us what cargo they have and details of their crew. That is all they have to do. But, Mr Deputy Speaker, do you think they are doing that? Do you think they are complying with this requirement? They are not complying with the requirement. It seems to be an optional thing. Ships are coming to this country without giving that information.

In the United States of America there is exactly the same requirement. If a ship does not provide that information 48 hours before it berths, it does not berth. In Australia they are required to give information in the same time line, but we say, ‘We don’t know who you are, we don’t know what you’ve got, but come on in.’ This is what we consider to be an appropriate way to deal with a terrorist threat. It is an absolute disgrace.

I would make this observation: I suspect there is a greater likelihood of a foreign crewed vessel being an instrument of a terrorist threat than an Australian one. So wouldn’t you think we would be more rigorous as a country on foreigners than we are on our own? It is exactly the reverse.

This government prides itself on its national security credentials. The Labor Party is saying it is not taking practical measures. A practical measure would be not only requiring foreign vessels to provide this information about crew and cargo 48 hours before they dock but insisting that they do it. This is a very simple measure. You would think it would be like a hot knife cutting through butter. It is pretty simple to understand. It is not too complex. We would have a 100 per cent compliance rate—not 99, 98 or 95 per cent but 100 per cent.

That is what they have in America. But of course, Mr Deputy Speaker, as you and I know, we do not have a coastguard in this country. In America they have a coastguard and in America in the very same situation that ship would be required to stand off away from their ports. It would not be allowed to be a danger to their ports and citizens and it would be inspected by the coastguard.

This government just cannot do it because again, as much as we advocate practical measures like establishing a coastguard and dealing with these issues, the government says, ‘No, we’re not going to have a coastguard’—not because it is not a good idea but because the Labor Party has been seen to advocate it. In national security measures we should set partisan politics aside. We should not be worried about whether the government or the opposition gets an advantage. We should do things that are in the best interests of our nation.

In this particular matter we are merely pleading with the government not to bring a new law down or extend an existing law but to take the practical step of ensuring that this is implemented, that it is actioned and that we get results. The government’s failure to take a practical step to implement it is putting this country at risk. We are a prime target, whether we like it or not and regardless of whether we would wish it otherwise. I am certainly in that latter category. We have to understand that some of the decisions that we have taken as a nation, whether unanimously or otherwise, have made us a prime target for the terrorists. We have to take the interests of the Australian people seriously and to heart. We cannot ignore this. We cannot accept that we are a target but be lax in taking effective measures.

Another area of concern is the containers coming into Australia. Customs reassure people by saying, ‘We physically examine all those high-risk containers.’ That sounds most reassuring. But what are the results? They actually physically examine 1.8 per cent of the containers coming into this country. To put it around the other way—and I hope my maths is right; I know you, Mr Deputy Speaker, would pick me up and give me a private talking to if it was not—that means that 98.2 per cent of all containers are not physically examined. They are not even screened. They are not even X-rayed.

John Murphy (Lowe, Australian Labor Party, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Opposition) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

That’s a disgrace!

Roger Price (Chifley, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is an absolute disgrace. The last thing any member of this House would want to see would be Australia paying an awful price for its failure to take terrorism seriously and to ensure that things like containers are X-rayed, but that is the risk we are running. Wouldn’t it be a practical step in trying to combat the threat of terrorism for us to be assured about the crew, the ships and the cargo coming into the country and that containers, whether they are high risk, medium risk or average risk, were being X-rayed to remove that element of doubt?

I ask the minister at the table: what differentiates a high-risk container from a moderate-risk container from an average-risk container from a low-risk container? What are the proportions of containers coming in in the different categories? What gives you such certainty that physically examining 1.8 per cent of the containers is going to leave Australians safe in their places at night? I have no confidence in this regime.

I wanted to speak about a couple of things. I know that other colleagues have given more fulsome contributions on this matter and that the honourable member for Holt wants to make a contribution. I will point out again the tragedy that we have had one coalition speaker speak on this bill, and not one National Party member has made a contribution.

John Murphy (Lowe, Australian Labor Party, Parliamentary Secretary to the Leader of the Opposition) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

That is a disgrace!

Roger Price (Chifley, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I think that that is a tragedy. I think it is a disgrace, as the honourable member for Lowe points out. I cannot but agree with him. I hope the government will implement practical steps. (Time expired)

Anthony Byrne (Holt, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

That noteworthy presentation by the member for Chifley is a very hard one to follow. As you walk out of the chamber, Member for Chifley, take a bow. I am pleased to rise tonight to support the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006, but obviously I support the opposition amendment, which, whilst not declining to support the bill, urges the government to do a lot more about what we perceive to be, and I think rightly so, threats to our national security. I will detail the amendment:

(1)

the Howard Government’s failure to conduct security checks on foreign crews;

(2)

the Government’s continued failure to ensure foreign ships provide manifestos of crew and cargo before arriving at an Australian port;

(3)

the ready availability of single and multiple voyage permits for foreign flag of convenience ships including the ready availability of permits for foreign flag of convenience ships carrying dangerous materials in Australian waters and ports;

(4)

the failure of the Howard Government to examine or x-ray 90% of shipping containers;

(5)

the Government’s failure to create a Department of Homeland Security—

as there is in the United States of America—

to remove dangerous gaps and to better coordinate security in Australia; and

(6)   the Howard Government’s failure to establish an Australian Coastguard to patrol our coastline”.

Some on the other side may well be saying that the reason why Labor are moving this amendment is to make a political point, but from where I sit as Deputy Chair of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security I can certainly say that we cannot be doing enough to protect the security of our ports and our borders. In looking at this legislation and supporting the provisions of this legislation, from my perspective the legislation clearly does not go far enough. As we have heard from some other contributors, even the legislation that has been implemented has not been appropriately applied. Given what I perceive to be this nation’s risk—and I will come back to that particular point in a moment—I believe that the government must do more to ensure the national security of Australian citizens.

I mentioned before the current threat environment. Today, in my capacity as deputy chair of the joint intelligence committee, I received a briefing from a gentleman called Robert Pape, who has written a book called Dying to Win, which is a very thorough analysis of the strategic logic of suicide terrorism. That book talks about the reasons why suicide terrorism is being used by organisations like al-Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiah, the Tamil Tigers and a range of other organisations. Through a thorough analysis of suicide terror bombings, we can see that it is not just linked to the Islamic population. There are other examples, and I have just cited some of them. It is a tool used by an organisation to make a point to a country, to weaken a country’s resolve and to strike at the psyche of a particular community. When you look at the history and conduct a thorough analysis of the attacks that have been conducted, it is not a tool that is only applied by organisations that cover themselves with the Islamic umbrella. But, having said that, we should be very mindful of this point made by the very thorough and incisive analysis conducted by Associate Professor Robert Pape: those nations that participate in occupying forces in foreign countries are invariably at a much higher risk of retaliatory attack by organisations like al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiah. There is a very well documented and researched book which establishes that fact.

Australia has a force in Iraq and, when one looks at some of the analysis that was conducted into the reasons behind the Madrid bombings, the bombings in London and the attempted bombings in London, quite clearly organisations like al-Qaeda are targeting allies of America as a consequence of their involvement particularly in Iraq—because that is the focus of al-Qaeda’s recruitment campaign at the present time—rather than just attacking American interests and America. Australia is an ally of America that has a force in Iraq and, as a consequence of this involvement, according to this very well researched document, we are at a high risk of terror attack.

Whilst we are debating this amendment and this particular bill, which has welcome measures to improve transportation security, we must not forget the threat that we face. We must also remember that we must do much more in light of that increased threat to improve Australian transportation and maritime security. In the past I reflected on the speech made by the shadow minister for homeland security, Arch Bevis, when we were talking about legislation that we had supported with respect to ships having to give 48 hours notice before being permitted to dock in Australian ports. What we found, due to a Senate committee report, is that up to 15 per cent of ships had actually berthed in Australia without notifying Australian authorities about the contents of their cargo and about their crew.

That is completely unacceptable because one of those ships could be carrying a very large amount of ammonium nitrate. Colleagues prior to my presentation tonight have spoken about one particular incident in 1947. A government document about the Customs (Prohibited Imports) Amendment Regulations spoke about the devastating effects, in the government’s own words, of the use of ammonium nitrate. It states:

The best known example of terrorist use of ammonium nitrate was the bombing of the Alfred P Murrah building in Oklahoma City in 1995, destroying the nine storey office block, killing 168 people and injuring over 500 more. Approximately two tonnes of ammonium nitrate was used in that bomb.

Ammonium nitrate was also used in the IRA’s 1996 bombing of London’s Canary Wharf. Total damage was estimated at £85m and several buildings had to be demolished. Two people were killed and 100 injured, the low casualty count due to a series of IRA coded warnings which gave police an hour to evacuate the area.

Clearly, that is not being done with regard to terror atrocities committed by Jemaah Islamiah and al-Qaeda. It continues:

Ammonium nitrate was also used in the 1998 Omagh bombing which killed 29 and injured 330 people.

On 30 March 2004, UK police announced the arrest of eight individuals on terrorism charges. The eight were British citizens, possibly of Pakistani descent, and a related search of a ‘lock-up’ found half a tonne of ammonium nitrate fertilizer. The men were arrested on suspicion of being involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism.

The problem is that in Australia something like 95 per cent of ammonium nitrate is used as an explosive, particularly in the mining industry, which is an industry that is powering the Australian economy at the present period of time. It continues:

There is no regulation of its sale as either a fertilizer or an explosive ingredient in Australia, and very little regulation governing its security ...

It is also used in the agricultural sector. Consequently, we have the potential, even in our own country, for enormous damage to be caused by hundreds of thousands of tonnes of ammonium nitrate sloshing around the country, basically unregulated and basically unsupervised. In terms of the threat level to this country, that is completely unacceptable.

It is believed that al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden have somewhere in the order of 11 and 15 ships being used or under their control that can be used. One would think that in this set of circumstances, given the level of threat that I have described, we would be doing everything in our power to ensure that no Australian ship that entered a port was crewed by foreign crews or, if they were, that they would be thoroughly and securely vetted before they got into this country or that their ships would be interdicted, like they are in the United States, if they do not actually report their contents and crew within 48 hours of arriving at that particular port. The fact that that is not being done in this country absolutely stuns me. We are a seafaring country. The other thing is that we export a large amount of LNG, and one of the potential targets by ships carrying ammonium nitrate are sea lane targets. Whilst this legislation, as I have said before, is welcome, it does not go far enough. It should be oversighted by a department of homeland security.

Warren Truss (Wide Bay, National Party, Minister for Transport and Regional Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

What about New Orleans?

Anthony Byrne (Holt, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It is good enough for America but not good enough for us—that is effectively what the minister is saying. But that does not surprise me. It is good enough for us to go into Iraq with America but not good enough to take the protective measures that the Americans take to have a coordinated department of homeland security. Is the minister saying that he does not care about the security of Australians, like the Americans did when they pumped huge resources into one coordinated department? Or are we going to have to have a September 11, Minister—is that what you are asking for?—before we actually implement a policy that has been implemented by one of our major allies? Interestingly, some of the European countries are looking at the same sorts of models. Are you saying, Minister—because I want to put this out in a local press release—that you do not think we need a department of homeland security, unlike the Americans?

Warren Truss (Wide Bay, National Party, Minister for Transport and Regional Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Ask the people of New Orleans if they want one.

Anthony Byrne (Holt, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Or are you going to say this after we have a terrorist attack? Are we going to have to have a terrorist attack on our soil before you get up in this place and effectively say, ‘We need the same protective mechanisms that the Americans have’?

Barry Haase (Kalgoorlie, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Order! The member for Holt will address his remarks through the chair.

Anthony Byrne (Holt, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

You might want to stop the minister interjecting as well.

Ian Causley (Page, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The member for Holt will address his remarks through the chair.

Anthony Byrne (Holt, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I will do so. I hope that my presentation has been educative for the minister concerned but, as I said quite clearly, the stakes are very high—not just outlined by the Labor opposition but by experts like Robert Pape. My question to the minister is this: can the minister say why it is acceptable that 15 per cent of vessels that come into this country, that berth in this country, do not detail the contents of their crew or their cargoes? Does the minister say that it is acceptable that only 10 per cent of ships that enter Australian ports are X-rayed when in Hong Kong at the present time they are experimenting with 100 per cent X-ray and the Americans are looking at the same thing again? It is quite interesting that, whilst we subject ourselves to an increased terrorism threat as a consequence of our involvement with our allies, we will not implement the same protective security measures to protect our population.

Frankly, Minister, I do not see how you can defend this. Whilst I support the provisions in this bill and strongly support the amendment that the Labor Party has put forward, I would ask the minister, in the national interest, in the interests of the security of Australia, to stop playing petty politics and actually adopt Labor’s recommendations to make our country safer and to make our country securer.

Warren Truss (Wide Bay, National Party, Minister for Transport and Regional Services) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank all of those members who have contributed to the debate on the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006. Some of them strayed somewhat from the precise nature of the legislation but I know that there is that privilege in second reading debates. Certainly a number of people from the opposition side have spoken about the issue of port security in relation to the reporting of crews and cargoes on arrival and also in relation to the carrying of dangerous goods such as ammonium nitrate.

Generally, they also threw in the political comment about a department of homeland security. Anyone who believes that the creation of new government department will somehow or other magically deliver a utopian solution to all these issues, and that that department should be called the department of homeland security, must have forgotten that this week is the anniversary of the New Orleans disaster—a disaster which surely must have put to bed for all time the notion that a department of homeland security can somehow or other deliver worthwhile responses to a crisis when it occurs. This New Orleans incident was a huge embarrassment to the United States and it was an embarrassment to the local authorities. But more particularly over recent times the real attention has been drawn to the failings of a homeland security department, and the very concept is clearly fundamentally flawed. Therefore I would have thought that the Labor Party, with the benefit of this experience and with having actually seen their utopian policy in action and fail dismally, would have rewritten that element of their party policy as well.

Can I refer to the issues raised by the honourable member for Brisbane, and I think the honourable member for Holt and others also mentioned the question of pre-entry security assessments for vessels that are coming to Australia. Let me make the point very clear that every ship seeking entry to Australia is subject to a comprehensive risk assessment regardless of the flag that it flies. The risk assessment takes all relevant factors into account, including information about the ship, its crew and its cargo. Security measures are implemented to address the identified risks. These may include ordering the ship to leave Australian waters or holding the ship in a particular position until particular actions are taken to address identified risks.

Australia requires security regulated ships to report prescribed pre-arrival information 96 hours before entry into an Australian port. There are cascading provisions to account for voyages that may be shorter than the prescribed 96 hours—that is, requirements to report at 72, 48, 24 or 12 hours depending on the voyage length. If this information is not reported to the Australian Customs Service within a certain time frame contact is made with customs, the vessel’s agent or the ship. If a vessel is within 24 hours of its intended Australian port and the relevant pre-arrival information has not been received, or if there are security concerns with the ship, we have the capability to prevent the ship from entering a port.

Under the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act 2003 information that must be provided includes: confirmation that a valid international ship security certificate or equivalent is on board the ship, including its issuing authority and the date of expiry; the security level at which the ship is operating; the last 10 ports of call where the ship conducted a ship-port interface; whether the ship has operated at a security level higher than its current level, engaged in any ship-to-ship activity or undertaken any other special security measure; and the next four ports of call of the ship, if known. All foreign crew are checked as they enter Australia. Foreign crew go through stringent immigration processes with their names then checked against the various alert lists. The government has also announced the introduction of a mandatory maritime crew visa from July 2007 which will further enhance the screening of foreign seafarers seeking to enter Australia.

Reports of import cargo are made to the Australian Customs Service. The period within which the cargo report must be made is dependent on the length of the voyage or flight on which the cargo is carried. In most cases of sea cargo, cargo reporters are required to report cargo no later than 48 hours prior to the ship’s estimated arrival in its first port of call in Australia. The time frame reduces to 24 or 12 hours for voyages of less than 48 or 24 hours respectively. So there is a strategy in place to identify and check the crews and the cargoes coming into Australia. Opposition members who spoke on this bill should spend a little more time checking the facts and a little less time listening to their mates in the Maritime Union whose primary roles are industrial rather than having any real concern about security.

There have been frequent references to the transport of ammonium nitrate and other dangerous goods around Australia. I wonder what the opposition is actually proposing in this regard. Are they seriously suggesting that we do not allow ammonium nitrate to come to Australia? The reality is that it is an essential element in primary production and, in particular, in the mining industry. If we were to require that it could only be transported on ships that have an Australian flag or are Australian registered then our capacity to bring this product from the far side of the globe, in many instances, would be seriously limited. If we would not allow a single voyage permit or international vessel to carry ammonium nitrate from port to port in Australia then the alternative is to carry it by road. Do the opposition want semitrailer after semitrailer of explosives to travel through our capital cities, or would they prefer the safer option which is, clearly, to carry it on ships? Day after day the opposition raised the same very rare examples of where they considered there have been incidents and issues of concern.

In particular, there is reference to the storage of ammonium nitrate with other volatile products as occurred on the Grandcamp. The Grandcamp incident occurred 60 years ago. We have made a bit of progress since that time and I think it is not unreasonable that the industry recognise that. The shipping of ammonium nitrate is now regulated internationally by the International Maritime Organisation, and Australia is fully compliant with the international regulatory regime, which has a comprehensive range of measures to ensure that the transport of these products, even though they may be inherently dangerous, is done in a safe and effective way. The reality is that whenever issues of concern have been identified the government seeks ways to effectively address those problems and ensure that transport around Australia is effective and secure.

As I have said on numerous occasions, I have a great deal of confidence in the important role the maritime sector will play in Australia’s future transport task. Clearly, as a country that is critically dependent on exports, shipping has a key role to play and it is important that our maritime sector be as good, efficient and competitive as any in the world. There is also an important role for the maritime sector and shipping in transporting freight domestically between one capital city and another. It is already cheaper to bring containers from Darwin to Melbourne by ship than it is to take them by rail or by road. With the growth in pressure on our major road networks, particularly between our east coast capital cities, shipping could play an important role in moving vital freight between our capital cities. We need to have efficient ports and appropriate networks to lead in and out of those ports to make that happen, and we also need quality ships and quality shipping systems to ensure that maritime transport is competitive with rail and road and can take an increasing share of our freight burden, which is going to double over the next 25 years. For that reason, we are going to need ships to do a lot better and to take a bigger share of the load in moving freight around the country.

Security is of great importance to the confidence Australian people have in their transport system. So this bill, which strengthens the Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Act, is also important. The bill simplifies the procedures for making changes to maritime, ship and offshore facility security plans. It clarifies the processes in place with the establishment of security zones. It shortens the time allowed for the Secretary of the Department of Transport and Regional Services to approve security plans and it clarifies when the security plan approval period commences.

There are a number of other technical amendments to a wide range of legislation administered within the Transport and Regional Services portfolio. With a handful of exceptions, they are unrelated to transport security matters. The bill does not propose to vary any of the policy settings underpinning Australia’s maritime security regime; it is a procedural bill. The passage of this bill will assist the maritime industry by providing for a simpler process for making minor variations to security plans without undergoing the full plan revision process. The government also wishes to simplify the administrative process for establishing maritime security zones. Consultation undertaken by the Department of Transport and Regional Services with the maritime industry has assisted in developing these amendments, and this bill has the support of industry.

The Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee has conducted an inquiry into the bill and in its report tabled on 15 June 2006 recommended that the bill be passed without amendment. The government looks forward to the passage of this bill within the current sitting of parliament to enable maritime industry participants to focus on implementing and maintaining the security measures outlined in the security plans, thus contributing to the strengthening of Australia’s maritime security arrangements. I commend the bill to the House.

Barry Haase (Kalgoorlie, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The original question was that the bill be now read a second time. To this the honourable member for Brisbane has moved as an amendment that all words after ‘That’ be omitted with a view to substituting other words. The question now is that the words proposed to be omitted stand part of the question.

Question agreed to.

Original question agreed to.

Bill read a second time.