Brendan O'Connor (Gorton, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

I too want to make some comments on this bill and I support the amendment moved by the member for Brisbane. Clearly the government is seeking in this bill to amend what some people would say are rather technical changes in order to improve upon a bill that was enacted some time ago.

The Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Security Plans and Other Measures) Bill 2006 is certainly a specific bill insofar as it relates to the time in which the Secretary of the Department of Transport and Regional Services would have to approve a maritime security plan. As I understand it, items 5 and 6 combine to reduce the 90-day approval time to 60 days, which would be defined as the ‘consideration period’. However, the secretary would also have the discretion of extending that time of 60 days by another 45 days where, in order to make a decision on the plan, additional information is requested from the person seeking approval of the plan. That is the nub of the bill, which is seeking to amend what was clearly a deficient piece of legislation that was introduced by the government and passed by the parliament some time ago.

But I think it is important to note the second reading amendment moved by the member for Brisbane which seeks to enunciate—and I think quite clearly enunciates—concerns the opposition has with respect to maritime security. It seems to me and others on this side that the government is big on rhetoric when it comes to national security but small on action. There really is an ever-increasing gap between what the government says it will do and what the government does in relation to national security. I think increasingly people are beginning to be made aware of this.

It is also clear that the government shows very little regard for national security in this place. It is important to note that again we have a situation where there are many opposition members getting up to discuss issues regarding national security—in this case, the maritime security bill. There has been one member of the government—you, Mr Deputy Speaker Somlyay—who has contributed, not for the full amount of time but certainly you contributed to this debate. Other than you in your capacity as the member for Fairfax, no government member—certainly not the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for  the Environment and Heritage—has spoken on this bill.

What you really see, time and time again, is that the government introduces bills in this place and then does not have either the respect for this place, the respect for its own constituents or the interest in the actual matters that it is putting forward to enact to actually speak to the bills. I understand this bill is relatively technical, as I said, but the second reading amendment that has been asserted by the member for Brisbane is significant and would need rebutting if the government concerned itself with debate in this place. But the government, of course, fails to have any regard for this chamber. Again, what you see is a list of opposition members seeking to engage the government in matters that it introduces into this place and the other place, and the government not even turning up to discuss these matters.

I refer to the amendment that has been moved by the member for Brisbane. I would like to go to at least certain parts of that amendment. The amendment criticises the Howard government’s failures in maritime security, including its failure to conduct security checks on foreign crews. We have heard concerns raised by a number of people and organisations with respect to this matter. The Maritime Union of Australia, I know, is a much-maligned organisation as far as the government is concerned, but it is indeed an organisation that represents workers in the industry. If the government had regard to what concerns the employees in the industry have then they would listen to that organisation with respect to security.

Clearly, with respect to the failure to conduct security checks on foreign crews, the government believes there is no security issue around not knowing the identity and the security risk or otherwise of foreign crews. The member for Brisbane enunciates that in the second reading amendment. The amendment also clearly outlines the failure of the government to ensure foreign ships provide manifestos of crews and cargo before arriving at an Australian port. So there is no regulation which would improve the security of these arrangements for crew and cargo arriving in this country. Further, there is criticism in the amendment of:

... the ready availability of single and multiple voyage permits for foreign flag of convenience ships including the ready availability of permits for foreign flag of convenience ships carrying dangerous materials in Australian waters and ports ...

Examples of such dangerous materials include ammonium nitrate, which can explode without being deliberately detonated, and was used, as was indicated earlier by a number of Labor speakers, in the terrorist attack upon the federal building in Oklahoma in the United States only 10 years ago. The amendment also criticises the failure of the Howard government to examine or X-ray 90 per cent of shipping containers, the failure to develop an adequate training regime and qualification level for maritime security guards, the failure to create a department of homeland security to remove dangerous gaps and to better coordinate security in Australia, and, indeed, the Howard government’s failure to establish an Australian coast guard to patrol our coastline.

The opposition have for some time been seeking to impress upon the government the need to fill these holes in our security. We have really had enough of the rhetoric and the fridge magnet. It is time for the government to seriously have regard to these deficiencies in national security.

I return to some of the concerns that have been expressed by people who work in the industry, and I include in that the Maritime Union of Australia. Some of the concerns they have raised are in relation to just the day-to-day activities that their members and companies of this country are engaged in and, as a result of a lack of security, could potentially lead to disaster.

Firstly, we would say that a strong maritime security regime is critically important in securing Australia’s growing liquid natural gas trade. We have an obligation to our trading partners when we send a ship from here to their ports that that ship is secure. That is not only a sensible thing to do and an economic thing to do; it is an ethical thing to do. The use of Australian shipping and the use of highly skilled, highly qualified Australian crews are important parts of the adoption of a strong maritime security regime. This has been demonstrated where Australian LNG tankers crewed by Australians have demonstrated a commitment to the highest levels of maritime security aimed at maintaining the security of both the LNG tankers and their valuable cargoes. Furthermore, this high-level Australian commitment to maritime security is important in maintaining our enviable reputation as a reliable and secure supplier of liquid natural gas to the world market.

The security of Australian liquid natural gas is one of Australia’s key marketing advantages in the global LNG market. I think it is fair to say that we are not the sole supplier in relation to that product. There are other places for those countries in need of liquid natural gas to go to if they seek this energy source. So one of the factors that would certainly weigh on the minds of decision makers in other nations when seeking to import an energy source like LNG is: will that import come into their ports—whether in China, Korea or Japan—in a manner that is safe for the particular port and safe for the country? We would argue that there is a clear nexus between highly trained domestic crews working on those ships and increased safety and security in relation to trade in such substances.

I would argue that one reason Australia has been able to maintain its global position as a reliable shipper of LNG is that the shipping contracts have been written on a delivered ex ship basis, meaning the seller controls the shipping. Indeed, people to whom I have spoken, and to whom I am sure others have spoken, would be concerned—and many in the industry are concerned—that any move away from ex ship contract terms to free on board shipping contracts, where the seller generally controls the shipping, weakens Australia’s involvement in the LNG transportation task, introduces more foreign and flag of convenience shipping into the LNG trade and creates potential security risks.

I refer to a 2004 report produced by Sandia National Laboratories, a division of the Sandia Corporation under contract to the United States Department of Energy, entitled Guidance on risk analysis and safety implications of a large liquefied natural gas spill over water. The report made mention of the fact that the Australian LNG risk management strategies were already adopting the risk treatments proposed by Sandia as world’s best practice. What is referred to in that report is the industry undertaking the transportation of such potentially dangerous energy sources at world’s best practice, and I would hate to think that the government, because of its ideological blindness, hatred and enmity towards unions and unionised workforces, would not only risk those contracts but endanger the lives of people here and abroad. The same level of risk assessment and commitment to high-level quality risk management strategies cannot be guaranteed if ships contracted to carry Australian LNG are drawn from FOC registries and even some of the second registers of non-FOC countries. Australia is strongly committed to the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code which, as you might know, Mr Deputy Speaker, came into effect only two years ago.

It is fair to say that, despite the conflicts that have occurred between the Commonwealth and the maritime unions, most infamously in the 1997 maritime dispute, as a result of the work that has been put in between the maritime unions, the maritime industry and the Commonwealth there has been some effort to ensure that the maritime security regime has been secured. However, notwithstanding the goodwill of the Maritime Union, the industry and, one would hope, the Commonwealth, this failure to see past the enmity towards MUA is a real problem for the Commonwealth. I can understand that the MUA may not be on the Prime Minister’s Christmas card list, but you must be pragmatic and work with all parties in matters that assist the security of this nation. You must consider and put at the forefront in your area of public policy the safety of the citizens of this country.

Therefore, I ask the government to genuinely engage with the maritime industry, which includes those organisations that represent employees, to find ways to minimise the likelihood of a national security risk, which has increased as a result of the threats of terrorism. It should be noted that we have far more to fear from terrorists than the government, we would hope, would fear from unionised workforces. Clearly, in the priority of things, you would hope that the government would not make a decision that would adversely affect the union and that that would be its priority, rather than working together with all parties in the maritime industry in order to secure improvements to the way the industry undertakes its job in securing safe shipping in both our ports and the ports of other nations.

As I said at the beginning of my contribution, this bill in itself is rather limited in its application. Its purpose is to amend a particular time threshold from 90 days to 60 days, enabling the Secretary of the Department of Transport and Regional Services to approve a maritime security plan. That change has reduced the days but it has provided that same secretary with the discretion to increase the days by an extra 45 if there is a requirement. It is fair to say that this bill is rather innocuous in the breadth of concerns people and indeed the opposition have with respect to maritime security, but this is a good opportunity—and the member for Brisbane took this opportunity—to raise some serious concerns about the failure of government to properly secure our ports, to properly scrutinise the cargo that comes into our ports and to properly screen crews on foreign vessels or indeed foreign crews on our own vessels. These are serious matters.

We are now only a week away from the fifth anniversary of those awful events in the United States. It is such a vivid memory for all of us—particularly the dreadful destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York by two planes that were deliberately piloted into both towers by terrorists. But I think it is fair to say that a breach of maritime security can be just as dangerous—indeed more so, because a vessel that enters a port could have far greater capacity for explosion than even the awful event a week from five years ago. Therefore, I think it is important that the government turn their collective minds to that issue and, instead of fighting and resisting engagement with the Maritime Union of Australia, sit down and talk with them because they are, along with the employers in the industry, experts in the field. They should be listened to; we would have a safer industry as a result.

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