Josh Wilson (Fremantle, Australian Labor Party) | Hansard source

I support the Defence Amendment (Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence) Bill 2024. It will make a significant change to the quality of scrutiny, oversight and, ultimately, decision-making when it comes to some of the gravest matters that the government has responsibility for, namely defence and military operations, particularly any decision that involves the commitment of Australian service people to conflict, which has generally been conflict overseas. It's a really welcome change that has been delivered through a characteristically thorough and substantial process. I'll talk a little bit about that, and I also want to acknowledge some of the people who have worked to get us to this point in the parliament and in the broader community. But, at the outset, I think in a week when there are lots of things going on—as is always the case here—it is important to say that, by creating a dedicated committee on defence which has the ability to receive classified information and briefings, the quality of parliamentary engagement on defence decision-making will be materially improved. As I said, when we think about that kind of decision-making, there aren't decisions that government makes which are more grave than the decision to involve this country in war or in warlike operations.

In her speech this morning, the new Governor-General, Sam Mostyn, spoke about the three big building blocks that are the foundation of Australian life: our First Nations heritage—we have the longest continuous civilisation on Earth; the British institutions that form the basis of our style of government and our way of life in other respects; and, of course, the waves of migrants that have produced the incredible multicultural dynamism and diversity that is such a strong part of Australian life today. But, if you take those institutions—we're fortunate to be the inheritors of the British democratic system, with a parliament and other features like free press and an independent judiciary and so on—it has always been the case that the decision to involve the country in war or warlike operations is the prerogative of the executive. In the early part of the life of this nation, that was subordinated to the decisions made in the United Kingdom but, certainly, going forward from the time of the World War II they have been decisions that have been wholly made by the Australian government. They are made through executive prerogative—through a Federal Executive Council process that results in a decision by the Governor-General.

The involvement of the parliament in that decision-making has been limited. The extent of parliamentary involvement has been provided through a range of parliamentary conventions and norms. One of them has been that, where Australia does make a decision to get involved in military conduct, the Prime Minister will bring a motion to the parliament that will allow the matter to be debated—that's something that has occurred. But there is no formal requirement that parliament be involved in sanctioning that kind of decision, and there are good reasons why that has not been the case—part of it has to do with timeliness; part of it has to do with the sensitive nature of the material that would be considered in making that decision. And there are some other factors too. I point out to those who advocate, quite reasonably, for the consideration of parliament being involved in deciding whether or not a country goes to war, that it's worth remembering that if that were to be the case then once that decision is taken, in effect, the parliament has given assent to that course of conduct rather than occupying a position where it can, rightly, scrutinise the course of that conduct as it goes forward.

But what has happened in this case is that we have recognised that the decision-making framework and processes in relation to defence, military and security matters—particularly when they involve war or warlike operations—should always be capable of improvement. We should never stop and take our democratic institutions, processes and culture for granted. We've seen around the world how those things can grow weaker over time and how they can become ill suited to the circumstances of a changing world. It's absolutely right that we're prepared to, from time to time, have a look at the institutions, the structures, the processes and the culture around that kind of decision-making and ask ourselves if they are fit for purpose and if they can be improved. That's what we were prepared to do in this case.

I want to recognise it's a conversation that has been carried by lots of people in civil society, particularly groups like Australians for War Powers Reform led by Alison Broinowski, the Independent and Peaceful Australia Network, the Medical Association for the Prevention of War and a number of other groups. It's a healthy part of our democracy that we have civil society groups like that, which address these kinds of serious matters, consider what's going on in other countries around the world and foster a lively and robust debate about how things sit in this country, whether they have drifted—which I think was the case with some of the conventions around the discussion of military engagement in this place—and how we might improve them.

The outcome we have here is the creation of a new committee dedicated to that purpose, covering all of the things the member for Wills and the member for Calare mentioned: reviewing administration expenditure, considering white paper reviews and other policy and strategy documents, scrutinising Australia's defence capability acquisitions and sustainment, looking into matters related to the broad wellbeing of defence personnel—and former defence personnel, in terms of Veterans' Affairs—and examining and being appraised of war or warlike operations.

The creation of this committee started with a resolution in the Labor platform. I can't remember at what particular conference it was moved in the past, but it was refreshed in 2021. I moved that motion, and the member for Bruce seconded that motion, which was to ensure, in the next term of parliament in which Labor formed government, that there was a committee inquiry on the question of war powers—that essentially a future Labor government would refer the issue of how Australia makes decisions to send service personnel into international armed conflict to an inquiry to be conducted by the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.

That's exactly what happened when we were elected. That referral came from the Minister for Defence to the Defence Subcommittee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. It was very ably chaired by the member for Bruce. It was a very interesting, thorough and substantial inquiry. We had public hearings and submissions and all of the things that inquiries should consider. I particularly acknowledge the evidence we heard from veterans Mr John Phillips and Mr Cameron Leckie. They said very clearly to us that they wanted to see greater parliamentary involvement. They wanted to see change occur that would sharpen up and deepen the way that the parliament is able to engage on these things in order to deliver scrutiny, oversight and contestability—all the things we know are hallmarks of quality decision-making in a democracy.

Then, through the inquiry and its report, one of the key recommendations—there were a number of them—was the creation of this committee. The Minister for Defence received the report and responded to the committee in quick time, and the best evidence of that is the fact that here we are, about to make a significant change to the parliamentary committee architecture in a very meaningful way. The member for Wills, with whom I serve on the Parliamentary Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence and Security, described how valuable and important that committee is and the way in which this new Parliamentary Joint Committee on Defence will in many ways mirror the way that committee is established, is structured and works.

I've covered the terms of reference, but, of the two further things that will be critical to the way this committee will do good work, one is its capacity to consider classified information briefings. It's in the nature of defence and security that a lot of the material is highly sensitive, and that makes it difficult to create an appropriate way in which parliamentarians can engage with that. But it's important that we do. It's vital we don't slip into a set of circumstances where those kinds of matters are regarded as so sensitive and so much the special preserve of some defence and security elite that they don't get tested by the broader engagement of those sent here as representatives of the people. I completely agree with the member for Calare when he says that it's quite right that the membership not be restricted in a way that would exclude one group of parliamentarians or another. Ultimately, the choice of the committee membership is a serious one, like with the PJCIS, and it's a matter for the Prime Minister to determine through the appropriate forms of consultation.

But, in addition to its ability to receive classified material and in addition to its terms of reference, the third most—or, as you could argue, the first most—important quality will be the culture of the committee. The culture of the PJCIS has a core of bipartisanship in the way that committee works. There is a commitment to the intensity and seriousness of the workload involved. And there's a genuine application by all members of the committee to give their best service in that committee membership, to take that work seriously and to try to deliver improvements and solutions to problems and issues that arise. I'm confident that this new defence committee will set off in that same vein and have those same qualities. If that is the case, it will make a really important difference to the quality of defence and security decision-making in Australia, and that's no small thing.

There were other recommendations from the inquiry report that led to the creation of this new committee. They're important too, and I'll cover a couple of them, because I think they flesh out the value of being able to look at this area and consider how we improve it as we go on. The other recommendations included seeking to formalise to a greater degree the expectation that, where there are major military operations, the responsible minister or the Prime Minister will table a written statement identifying the reasons for and objectives of those operations and the legal basis on which they've occurred. It will be a more formal recognition that it would make sense in those circumstances for parliament to sit as soon as it possibly can so that an appropriate motion can be moved and debate can occur. That has been one of the conventions in the past, but it has tended to be used, I think, in a less timely way than is desirable.

Those are some of the further changes that, along with the creation of this committee, will actually make a meaningful difference to how the parliament understands, comments on, scrutinises and debates some of these incredibly serious things. They're matters and endeavours that inevitably cost Australia a great deal not just in terms of the resources that go into them but, most importantly, in the lives that are affected by those comments. I do note that, to the extent that some opposite have queried whether this change is really valuable, there was the 2018 bipartisan committee report—Contestability and consensus: A bipartisan approach to more effective parliamentary engagement with Defence. It recommended we create a committee like this. The Morrison government said, 'No thanks,' which I think was a shame. This is one example of how the Albanese Labor government, while doing a whole bunch of really important, substantial things for people's broader wellbeing, are also making lasting changes to the quality of our parliamentary democracy.

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