Ursula Stephens (NSW, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I present the second report of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee on equity and diversity health checks in the Royal Australian Navy.

Ordered that the report be printed.

I move:

That the Senate take note of the report.

During the HMAS Success's deployment between March and May 2009, the commanding officer of the ship became aware of reports of a number of incidents of unacceptable behaviour that eventually caused him to contact fleet headquarters for support and advice. The response from fleet command set in motion a series of events that eventually culminated in the landing of three senior sailors in Singapore on 9 May 2009. Rather than resolve the problems, this action attracted widespread and sensational publicity, damaged the good standing and character of certain crew members, cast doubt on the reputation of the ship's company and more broadly damaged Navy's image.

In part 1 of its report the committee looked at the circumstances that caused the CO to seek outside help to deal with the problems that had been brought to his attention. It considered the equity and diversity team that was sent to assist the CO, the veracity of its damning report and the conduct of some crew members and the subsequent landing of three senior sailors in Singapore.

In the second part of its report the committee focuses on the administrative and disciplinary processes that followed the removal of the sailors from Success. The committee finds that both processes were deficient.

David Johnston (WA, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Defence) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

by leave—In speaking to this report tabling today—this was a very important inquiry—I want to begin by saying that, in my nine years as a senator, with all of those years spent on the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee and the past three years as the shadow minister for defence, I have never been so frustrated, disappointed and angry as I have been with the way that Navy, Defence, its political leaders and sections of the media have treated the three sailors landed from HMAS Successin May 2009. I am standing here more than two years after these men were landed and they still have not been cleared or charged with anything after countless reviews, inquiries, investigations—some 11, I believe—and then the Gyles reports parts 1 and 2 and now the tabling of this Senate report, and these three men are none the wiser about what will happen to their careers.

I put it to every senator to imagine for a moment that someone in their family was stood down from their job, without being told why—asked to put their career on hold for two years and have unfounded, hurtful and completely untruthful allegations reported in the national and international media, unchallenged by anyone. How would we all cope with that? There would be an absolute outcry, I guarantee. These sailors, who have a combined 40 years of service to the Navy, have had their reputations irrevocably smeared, and their families have gone through this nightmare along with them. We are talking about Navy families here—families that we ask as a nation to move around the country for us, uprooting their kids from school; to send their loved ones overseas for months on end, sometimes on short notice; to miss birthdays and other family events. They are already made of strong stuff, but I know the anguish they have gone through during this whole sorry saga. It has had a dreadful effect on their physical and mental wellbeing and there has been little or no support from Navy or from this government.

What most people most remember when you mention HMAS Successis a 'sex scandal' or a 'sex ledger' and media articles with headlines spouting, 'Navy sex ship of shame'. The word 'sex' is mentioned and it is on for young and old—and don't let the boring truth get in the way of a good story. This story went around the world. The then Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, said that the alleged behaviours were 'disturbing'. His deputy at the time, now our Prime Minister, said she feared that such alleged behaviour would stop women joining the Navy. And so on and so forth.

The Gyles report was rightly damning of the Navy for its inept management of these claims. The Gyles report, which was an independent report, said in its recommendations that an ex gratia payment to compensate these three petty officers should be paid. To this point in time, the minister has done nothing and the Navy has done nothing—this is a disgraceful episode in the annals of what is a very proud and heroic institution in Australia: the Royal Australian Navy.

I do not have enough time to continue my remarks, but I should say the minister has an opportunity to put a U-turn into what has unfolded with respect to these three men. It is unique. It is absolutely astounding that we have three sailors who have been recommended to be compensated for their treatment and nothing is happening. The minister has an opportunity to rectify and repair this unholy mess, this unjust, unfair treatment of these three men—and I think he should so something urgently.

Mark Bishop (WA, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The ADF, but Navy in particular, has been the subject of numerous inquiries, reviews and investigations reaching back to 1994 and the inquiry into HMAS Swan and sexual harassment in the ADF. Since then there has been a steady stream of other significant parliamentary, coronial and quasi-judicial inquiries into matters relating to unacceptable behaviour in the ADF. All have produced recommendations that the ADF, by and large, has accepted and then pledged to implement. Despite the efforts of successive service chiefs to make lasting reforms, nothing seems to change. This seemingly endless cycle of reports of incidents of unacceptable behaviour followed by inquiry followed by reform programs must stop.

The overriding message coming out of this most recent Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee inquiry is that Defence must take responsibility for identifying its problems and managing them. The ADF prides itself on producing leaders, and rightly so. However, it is an important part of leadership to step forward and take responsibility. Nevertheless, in part 1 of its report, the committee found that the management of unacceptable behaviour aboard Success demonstrated an absence of leadership; serious errors of judgment, starting with a lack of proper attention given to early warning signals of alcohol abuse in Darwin; a failure to exercise duty of care, especially towards young female sailors, who did not receive the protection or mentoring that was required; and scant regard for, or, at best, ignorance of, Defence's legal procedures. The committee was firmly of the view that, although evident at all levels through the chain of command, those in the position of highest authority must accept that their inattention, poor judgment and lack of courage meant that the safety and wellbeing of those under their charge was put at risk. The committee found this situation intolerable.

It also noted that in HMAS Success things started to go wrong from the moment an incident occurred. Rather than minimise any initial damage, each measure taken or not taken on board the ship appeared to compound the problem. In the second part of its report, the committee found that the mistakes and shortcomings in procedures continued in both the disciplinary and the administrative systems. Major problems were identified in the investigations undertaken by the Australian Defence Force Investigative Service. Overwhelming evidence from the investigator on the ground through to the director of operations showed that the investigations were unsatisfactory. Indeed, the director of operations referred to them as 'an aberration in terms of how the service should be doing business'. A subsequent inquiry into the performance of the investigative service in respect of HMAS Success revealed a raft of significant deficiencies. These ranged from serious allegations not being investigated or not properly investigated—for example, important witnesses were not interviewed, key documents were not considered, and signed statements were not taken—to inadequate documentation, in some cases an absence of records, and a breakdown in communication.

The committee notes that for a number of years it has raised concerns about the standard of investigations undertaken by the investigative service. The recent revelation about shortcomings in this investigative service is most disturbing. The committee suggests to ADFIS that the problems identified in the investigations that took place relating to incidents on board Success in 2009 should not be treated as an aberration. Indeed, they should be considered in the light of the committee's 2005 findings and ADFIS's continuing attempts to improve its investigations. The committee found in 2005 that the ADF had proven itself manifestly incapable of adequately performing its investigatory function. The committee has requested that the investigative service incorporate in its next report to the committee an account of the lessons to be learned from its performance in respect of HMAS Success.

There were also major flaws in the management of the three sailors removed from the ship in Singapore following allegations of unacceptable conduct. Two matters in particular should be mentioned. Firstly, for many months after their landing in Singapore, the sailors were left completely in the dark about the reasons for their removal from Success. There is no satisfactory explanation for this prolonged and unnecessary suspension of procedural fairness.

Secondly, Navy failed to correct errors and highly sensational media reports. The reports publicly pilloried the sailors for doing something that they did not do—that is, their involvement in the so-called 'sex ledger'. Those in Defence managing the media reports at that time should have made it their business at the very least to acquaint themselves with the facts as best they could. The responsibility for correcting the errors also resided with those who knew the reports were incorrect. Apparently no-one bothered. The detachment from and lack of concern for the sailors' wellbeing in the glare of adverse publicity was a continuation of the attitude shown toward them during their removal from Success and return to Sydney. Even after the distress caused by the false reports of their involvement in a sex scandal, they still, despite repeated requests, could not obtain information on why they were landed and returned to Sydney.

The inquiries and investigations into the allegations levelled against them and their treatment for many months after their landing are a sorry example of what can go wrong when things are not properly managed. There has been huge expenditure of resources on the myriad inquiries and investigations, but it is clear that the damage inflicted on the reputation of Navy and some of its personnel might have been avoided or contained if close attention had been paid to proper process and to the advice and guidance provided in the relevant manuals.

In the light of the multiple breakdowns in procedure and breaches of standard practice in the management of reports of unacceptable behaviour at Success through the mishandling of media reports, the committee recommended that Defence look carefully at its internal control mechanisms, including those for handling media requests and reports. I seek leave to continue my remarks later.

Leave granted; debate adjourned.