David Leyonhjelm (NSW, Liberal Democratic Party) Share this | Hansard source

This amendment is very important. It is essentially about whether or not the government is to have the opportunity to call a double dissolution. There are a couple of other amendments along similar lines—one from Senator Day and one from Senator Muir—and they essentially have the same objective. So I will only speak to this one. I think probably the date on this one is the most appropriate date.

The question is: who wants a double dissolution? I am not entirely sure that anybody does. If you take each of the characters, each of the players, in this debate, probably the Labor Party has the least to fear from a double dissolution. They say that the coalition might get a majority in the Senate. That would require winning six seats in all six states—not possible, not least because of South Australia and the Nick Xenophon Team. It is just not going to happen, even if they win all those six seats in the other states, and that is very unlikely. I think the Labor Party's concerns are legitimate—they do not want to be dragged to an election early and they do not want to face the prospect of the possible consequences in the Senate that might emerge from a double dissolution—but I think overall they have less than anybody else to be concerned about.

From the crossbench point of view, this argument that a double dissolution will wipe out the crossbench is false, and I am delighted to see that finally some in the media have started to realise that. There is a very good chance that some of the existing crossbench will survive and some new crossbench senators will arrive. There is a good chance, in fact, that at least one per state will be elected. There will still be a crossbench. I would not be at all surprised if the crossbench comprised some of the current crossbench that the government would dearly love to see the back of—but let's not go there.

The government's perspective on a double dissolution is twofold. One aspect is that if they have a double dissolution, win the election and call a joint sitting they might as well make it worthwhile. What have they got? There is the abolition of the Clean Energy Finance Corporation. I supported that bill but I read in the media that they have taken that off the table as part of the deal with the Greens. They do not intend to proceed with that. The registered organisations bill is another one, but the government actually have a new one coming, a better one which reflects the recommendations of the Dyson Heydon royal commission. So their hearts are not in it and, in any case, the truth is that if it were not for the penalties in it Labor probably would have supported it. It is no big deal. So that leaves the ABCC. The ABCC bill is the only legislative trigger that makes any sense whatsoever. That is opposed by the Labor Party, the Greens and the entire union movement, so unless the government get a double dissolution the ABCC legislation is unlikely to pass in the next parliament, because the government will not control the Senate. If they get a double dissolution and win, they look likely to have the numbers in a joint sitting and it will pass. That, at least, makes some sense. Clearing out the crossbench makes no sense.

From the government's point of view it also makes no sense to go to an early election, because they might lose. An election in September or October would give the government an opportunity to introduce their economic plan, their economic narrative—to tell us how they are going to lower taxes and balance the budget, convince the Australian people that they know what they are doing with the economy, and win the election. From where I am standing, I think delay, rather than an early election, is in the government's interests.

As I started to say, the crossbench will not be wiped out. Some of us might lose our seats, and for those of us who are used to not being in parliament that holds no fears whatsoever. I had quite an interesting life before I became a senator; it all went downhill when I got elected. The thing, though, is that even if I am re-elected I will only get three years. I am unlikely to be in the top six in a double dissolution, so I would get three years. If there were no double dissolution, just a standard election, then theoretically—subject to an earlier election—I would be here for four years. So I have the prospect of four years in the hand or three years in the bush. Which would you choose? So, from the crossbench point of view, a double dissolution is not a huge fear but it is of no great advantage either.

Let us look at it from the point of view of the Greens. Why would they want a double dissolution? Why would they even facilitate a double dissolution? They will lose seats, in South Australia if nowhere else. Even in the other states, where they have two senators, it will be a struggle. Western Australia comes to mind

They will struggle to hold their seats. Why would you sacrifice members for a double dissolution? They will lose money. The ETU and CFMEU, which, from memory, combined donate about $300,000 a year, will withdraw funding. They have said so, privately and publicly. Why would you give up a major donor of that order to allow a double dissolution?