Chris Ketter (Queensland, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Green's National Integrity Commission Bill 2013. The bill seeks to establish a National Integrity Commissioner who would seek to address corruption in relation to public officials and Commonwealth agencies. I note Senator Rhiannon has said that a lobbying code of conduct should apply to all members and senators, including minor parties. Labor will consider the Greens' proposal in this bill in detail to create a National Integrity Commissioner. However, the jury is still out as to whether this particular initiative is either necessary or desirable. I say that because I believe that there are, today, several agencies with strong investigative powers that seek to promote accountability and integrity at the Commonwealth level.

Labor has never objected in principle to a federal ICAC—if I could use that term—and our concern is that there is no clear case for the necessity of such a body. The last Labor government was serious about tackling corruption at the federal level and took proposals to the last election for a comprehensive suite of measures to deal with corruption. The agencies we have, as they currently exist, perform many of the functions that would be performed by a standalone integrity and anti-corruption commission. For example, where biased conduct may amount to an offence under Commonwealth law, powers such as those the Australian Federal Police have are available to prompt an investigation and, in doing so, to act independently. Under current provisions, the Australian Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity can investigate any potential conduct that it deems to be corrupt in Australian government agencies and with law enforcement functions. I note from the annual report of the Commission for Law Enforcement Integrity that the agency is working effectively in cooperation with other agencies within its jurisdiction and other state and territory law enforcement agencies and the annual report looks at some of the measures of ACLEI's performance on criminal prosecution outcomes. It would appear that ACLEI has had some outstanding successes in recent years.

In 2012-13, 2013-14 and in the early months of 2014-15, Operation Heritage Marker resulted in 19 convictions for criminal offences with sentences ranging from 8½ years imprisonment, to suspended sentences and convictions resulting in good behaviour bonds. Operation Pentax led to a conviction for abuse of office in 2014-15. On 19 December 2014, the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions had another eight matters listed for hearing or sentence during this financial year and at the time of the annual report of 2013-14, current operations were confidently expected to result in further arrests, charges and prosecutions as the year progressed.

On the issue of strengthening integrity systems, I note from the annual report that, as part of the commitment to detecting corruption-enabled border crime, ACLEI worked with the ACBPS on Task Force Pharos, which Senator Canavan has referred to, which was using the ACCs National Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability to identify indicators of corrupt conduct in the ACBPS. ACLEI contributed to Australian government threat assessments and policy development relating to fraud control, infiltration risk, personal security, the border environment and organised crime, managing conflicts of interest, professional reporting mechanisms (public interest disclosures) and the value and use of information gained using covert investigation methods. It has also developed seven model integrity policies and a new type of fraud and corruption control plan to capture and apply lessons learned from its anticorruption investigations and corruption prevention theory, in particular the connection between organisational integrity and performance.

This is an organisation that is currently charged with looking at this particular issue. I note that it is not without criticism in terms of its jurisdiction; however, it is an agency that does seem to be performing a useful function. In addition, the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security provides independent assurances for the Prime Minister and other senior ministers regarding whether or not Australia's intelligence and security agencies act legally by way of inspection and inquiry into their activities. Furthermore, we have the Auditor-General, who is an independent officer of the parliament. He may review and/or examine any given realm concerning the operations of the federal public sector. The Auditor is empowered to examine cabinet decisions and related documents—something that goes right to the core of government.

It appears that there are existing safeguards in place to address possible corrupt activity. In addition, any possible breaches of the APS Code of Conduct by a public servant can be investigated by the relevant agency head. The Public Service Commissioner has very similar roles in respect of agency heads. So at this point in time, whilst not closing off the option—and it is quite possible there may be some model that would be acceptable to us—in terms of the model proposed by the Greens at this time we do not see any merit in going down that track.

There is another argument that could be advanced at this point in time against the proposal. The specialist agencies that I have referred to are closer to the bodies which they regulate and so it could well be argued that they have greater expert knowledge concerning those agencies than a single generic, stand-alone agency may have over the bodies which it is seeking to regulate. Of course, whenever one makes significant changes of this nature—taking away powers in different areas and consolidating them in other areas—there is always the potential for unintended consequences out of that, quite separate to the loss of the expert knowledge. It could well be that as a result of this we are more vulnerable to cuts in that particular area that may impact on the overall effectiveness. I think Senator Ludwig made the argument that it may not be wise to put all one's eggs in the same basket.

I would like to point out that the federal government operates very differently to state governments and therefore we ought to be seeking to look at a model that suits the needs at the federal level. There may well be sound motives behind the Greens' proposal to create a national integrity commissioner—and I certainly do not disagree with that—but for the reasons I have advanced I argue that it is unnecessary and undesirable. That is despite the fact that what gives rise to this bill is potentially the fact that politicians have not performed as well as we could have in the public sphere which has led to politicians of all political persuasions not being held in high regard by the general public. One of the unfortunate consequences of that—and I pointed to this in my first speech—is today young people do not believe that democracy is the best form of government. We saw a Lowy poll last year that came up with that very concerning finding.

I think collectively we all need to work harder to lift our standards. I accept that my own party has had some issues in the past that we have had to look at, but I am extremely proud of the record that the Labor Party has had not only in my home state of Queensland but at the federal level at addressing these issues of corruption. What causes the general public some concern is political donations. Questions arise in people's minds about that. At the federal level Labor has adopted a very responsible approach. We know that Labor voluntarily discloses all donations greater than $1,000, despite the fact that the current legislation requires disclosure only of amounts greater than $13,000.

I previously spoke on this concept of a national ICAC last year. It was a separate bill. On that occasion I did also point to the very proud history of Labor in Queensland in dealing with official corruption—and Senator Canavan has made reference to the Fitzgerald inquiry, which was a seminal event in the history of my state. Institutionalised corruption was addressed. To its credit, it was the National Party which, at that time in government, instituted the Fitzgerald inquiry. There was found to be quite a great deal of corruption. Rising out of that we had the Criminal Justice Commission and a process was set up. In contrast to the responsible approach that Labor has had in my home state of Queensland, under the previous Newman government, we saw unfortunately a reversion to type where we saw the parliamentary oversight committee of the Crime and Misconduct Commission, the subsequent body which evolved from the CJC, sacked overnight by the state's then Attorney-General. So that was a most unfortunate reversion to previous conduct in Queensland, but that issue has now been addressed with the Queensland election.

In closing, once again I state that perhaps the Greens' proposal is done with the right motives, and no-one would disagree with the fact that on the surface a national anticorruption body does have some superficial attraction, but I would be concerned about any unintended consequences which arise from that. The model which is before us at the moment is not one that I can support but I would not rule out support for such a similar organisation if it was set up differently. Perhaps what is necessary is a more wide-ranging inquiry into this issue to give the matter some detailed scrutiny. If we had some report in relation to that, it might be something we could have a look at down the track.