Dave Sharma (Wentworth, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

On behalf of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, I present the committee's report, incorporating a dissenting report, entitled Report 199:agreement for the exchange of naval nuclear propulsion information.

Report made a parliamentary paper in accordance with standing order 39(e).

by leave—This report details the committee's findings from its inquiry into the agreement between the governments of Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom regarding the exchange of naval nuclear propulsion information, or the ENNPIA. The ENNPIA relates to the proposed acquisition by Australia of nuclear powered submarines for the Royal Australian Navy. This is the first initiative of the AUKUS enhanced trilateral security partnership. With our security environment growing more challenging in the decades ahead, a regionally superior submarine capability is critical to safeguard Australia's security, and this is what this agreement will facilitate. We are finding in the waters to our north, and indeed to our west and east as well, a more contested maritime environment. The supremacy and/or the margin of supremacy, if you like, of the United States Navy is no longer what it was at the end of the Second World War, and we have rising naval powers, not the least of which is China, putting a significant amount of new tonnage and new capability into our oceans every year. It's important in this environment that Australia steps up its own efforts to safeguard our security.

The AUKUS partnership is a significant strategic development for Australia, as is the decision for Australia to seek an optimal pathway for the acquisition of nuclear powered submarines. What this agreement does is facilitate the first step in that. It allows for the United States and the United Kingdom to exchange sensitive and otherwise highly classified naval nuclear propulsion information with a third country for the first time, and it provides a mechanism for Australian personnel to access training and education from our UK and United States counterparts, which is essential for learning how to safely operate and support nuclear powered submarines.

The committee heard a range of views in the course of its inquiry into this agreement. It is important, however, to note that this is only the first step towards the potential acquisition of nuclear propulsion technology, and an 18-month consultation process, as foreshadowed by the defence minister, is already underway. The committee welcomed assurances provided by witnesses from the Australian government that the proposed agreement is intended to facilitate the sharing of naval nuclear propulsion information only—nothing to do with nuclear weapons—and that a subsequent agreement would be required to support transfers of equipment, materiel or technology. Any such agreement would of course be subject to Australia's domestic treaty-making requirements, including further consideration by this committee.

Given the early stage of the project, much concern about the proposed agreement expressed during the inquiry, whilst understandable and legitimate, was to some degree speculative or pre-emptive. It is the case that significant matters remain to be determined during the 18-month consultation process, and any further action will be subject to subsequent committee scrutiny. The committee notes the concerns expressed by some who made submissions about Australia's commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, but found no evidence to suggest that Australia's steadfast commitment to our nonproliferation obligations was wavering. The committee is of the view that the proposed agreement is in the national interest and accordingly recommends binding treaty action be taken.