David Coleman (Banks, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

On behalf of the Standing Committee on Economics, I present the committee's report, incorporating dissenting reports, entitled Review of the four major banks: first report, together with the minutes of proceedings and evidence received by the committee.

Report made a parliamentary paper in accordance with standing order 39(e).

by leave—I am pleased to present the first report of the House Standing Committee on Economics as part of its review into the major banks.

In September, the Treasurer referred this inquiry to the committee, asking us to review the operations of the major banks. In October, we held public hearings with the chief executives of the banks over three days in Canberra. We now present our first report.

Banking regulation should have two key goals: promoting financial stability and achieving strong outcomes for consumers. Financial stability is critical—but so is ensuring that consumers get a fair deal.

Due to Australia's strong regulatory framework and the banking sector's management of financial risk, no Australian bank regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority has failed. We need only consider the economic impact of bank failures in other nations to understand the importance of a stable banking system.

However, while Australia's major banks have remained financially strong, they have let Australians down too frequently in too many other ways. There have been too many failures and too many scandals. In this report we focus on practical, concrete recommendations that will give consumers better outcomes from the banking system.

The committee makes 10 recommendations in this report. Each is designed to make the banking system work more effectively for the Australian community.

First, we should establish a banking tribunal. A banking tribunal will be a one-stop shop that allows individuals and small businesses to gain recompense when they are wronged by a bank. The current system does not provide consumers with a simple means of redress, often leading to individuals having to pursue banks through the courts. This must change. A banking tribunal will provide practical relief to people with legitimate cases against banks. We should establish a banking tribunal, and it should be in place by July next year.

Second, we need to shine a bright and public light on senior executives when banks breach the trust of consumers. The inquiry hearings and the written answers to the committee's questions provided by the banks made it clear that senior executives are not suffering the consequences of poor consumer treatment. Simply put, when customers are continually let down, bank executives should be fired. This is not occurring at present. The committee recommends that banks are required to publicly name senior executives who are responsible for divisions that breach bank licence conditions, and also publicly state the consequences for those executives. Breach reports are not currently made public: they should be, and the responsible senior executives should be named, along with the personal consequences for those executives. If a senior executive is not terminated following a breach of a licence condition, the bank should be required to justify this decision. In the committee's view this reporting regime is likely to lead to a substantial change in the level of focus of senior executives on these matters, to the substantial benefit of consumers.

Thirdly, the committee recommends that ongoing monitoring of competition in the banking sector be introduced. In the committee's view, it is remarkable that no entity is currently focused on making recommendations to government about how to improve competition in the banking sector. This is particularly the case given the fact that the chairmen of both the ACCC and ASIC have stated that there are clear problems with competition in the banking sector. While the ACCC looks for breaches of competition law, it acknowledged to our committee that it does not monitor the banking sector to address systemic competition issues. Effectively, the ACCC says, 'There is a systemic problem with competition in the banking sector, but we are not doing anything about it.' This must change. The committee recommends that the ACCC, or the proposed Australian Council for Competition Policy, be required to continually monitor competition in the banking sector, and provide recommendations to the Treasurer on regulatory measures to improve competition every six months. While the upcoming Productivity Commission review into financial sector competition is welcome, it is critical in the committee's view that a permanent, ongoing function is established in this area.

Fourthly, we need to force banks to open up access to data to give consumers more power. Through access to their own customer data using open APIs, consumers will be able to get better deals from banks. Banks and smaller financial services providers will be on an equal footing in offering products to consumers, as they will be able to look at the same data. This means more and better competition in the provision of banking services. Banks should be forced to open up access to data by July 2018. This process must be backed by the force of law, with substantial penalties for noncompliance. While the banks say that they are open to allowing open access to consumer data, this process is unlikely to be positive for their business models, as it will make public data which is currently proprietary to them. As a consequence, the regulator must be vigilant in ensuring the compliance of banks with this process. Motherhood statements about supporting open data are meaningless—what is required is open APIs by July 2018. The UK are already on this path—we must join them.

Our fifth recommendation is that the government monitor the impact of the New Payments Platform over 2017, and if necessary introduce further measures to make it easier for consumers to switch accounts. The current government account-switching service is an abject failure, as indicated by evidence provided to our committee about the tiny numbers of people who are using it. The committee is optimistic that the combination of the New Payments Platform and open data will have a substantial positive impact on the ability of consumers to easily switch accounts. However, government should assess the situation after the introduction of the national payments platform to see if more needs to be done.

Our sixth recommendation is about making it easier for Australian start-ups to get into the banking sector. More bank start-ups means more competition, and better deals for consumers. During our inquiry, the committee became aware of a troubling fact: in the last decade, only one Australian entity has obtained a licence to become a bank. While some subsidiaries of foreign banks have been licensed, our local start-up sector in banking is effectively non-existent. This is deeply concerning. While some of the reasons for this relate to commercial matters, the committee believes that it is probable that regulatory matters play a role also. APRA has done an outstanding job in protecting the stability of the Australian banking sector. But it is impossible to say that our regulatory system has encouraged domestic competitors to enter the banking market: it has not. The committee believes that APRA's rules related to the establishment of a new bank may be unduly restrictive, and should be thoroughly reviewed by government. Rules such as the requirement that no one entity owns 15 per cent of a bank may be having the impact of stopping new start-ups from setting up, as typically one investor will own more than 15 per cent of an early stage company. In addition, the committee believes that APRA should improve the transparency of its processes in assessing banking licence applications.

The committee's seventh and eighth recommendations relate to putting more steel into internal bank processes that are meant to protect consumers. There are two main ways in which banks should protect consumers before a dispute becomes public: firstly, they should have good internal risk management systems, so that problems are identified before they hurt customers; and, secondly, they should have good internal dispute resolution processes, so that when a dispute does arise, customers get a fair and speedy outcome.

It is very clear from the many examples of serious problems affecting bank customers that both risk management and internal dispute resolution processes are not working as they should. To address this, the committee recommends two actions. Firstly, banks should be required to commission a full, independent external review of their risk management systems. These reviews should be completed by July 2017, with the reports provided to ASIC. ASIC should then monitor the implementation of the recommendations of these reviews. Better risk management will mean less problems for customers.

The rules related to internal risk management processes are clearly flawed in the committee's view. At present, there are broad principles provided by ASIC about how internal dispute resolution processes should be run by banks. But ASIC does not have any power to find out how banks are actually running their internal dispute resolution schemes. So nobody is really clear on what the banks are doing in this important area. What we do know is that these schemes are far from perfect, given the number of matters that are not resolved by internal processes, and end up in the courts or other bodies. In the committee's view it is clear that ASIC should be given the power to require the banks to report to it on what they are doing in their internal dispute resolution schemes. This increased scrutiny should mean more rigorous internal processes at banks, and better outcomes for consumers.

Our ninth and 10th recommendations relate to wealth management. One of the notable features of the inquiry was the high proportion of customer issues within the banks that relate to wealth management. All of the banks have poorly treated substantial numbers of customers in wealth management. This is completely unacceptable. To help address this issue, the committee recommends that ASIC publish an annual public report on the wealth management industry, which details misconduct and names the companies and individuals involved. The report should also contain details of the consequences for those companies and individuals. At present, these matters are not made public, and public scrutiny is likely to lead to better behaviour by banks.

The committee's 10th and final recommendation is that whenever a financial advisor has breached their legal obligations, their employer is required to inform that advisor's clients. This often does not occur at present. In the committee's view it is clear that clients should have a right to know when their advisor has been guilty of misconduct.

The recommendations contained in this report will substantially improve the banking sector if implemented. Banks must be much more accountable to consumers than they are today, and these recommendations will achieve that goal.

This first report will be added to in the future. The committee has an ongoing mandate to review the banking sector, and will continue to work on the issues in this report and other matters. To that end, the committee expects to hold further public hearings with the major bank chief executives in the first quarter of next year, soon after its next public hearing with the Reserve Bank on 24 February.

I would like to thank the committee, and the committee secretariat led by Stephen Boyd, for all of their work on this report.

The recommendations contained in this report will substantially benefit bank customers if implemented. The committee looks forward to the government's response to these recommendations.

I commend the report to the House.

Matt Thistlethwaite (Kingsford Smith, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Parliamentary Secretary for Foreign Affairs) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

by leave—I speak on behalf of the Labor members of the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Economics in saying that we reject the government members' report and we have submitted a dissenting Labor members' report. Australians need and Australians want a royal commission into the banking and financial services industry. This report of the government members represents the Turnbull government siding with the big banks. Labor has been listening to the victims, the Australian people, who are fed up with the actions of the banks and want something done about it. They want greater scrutiny of banking practices, they want the bank rip-offs to stop, they want the bank culture to change and they want redress for victims when they fall foul of this insidious banking culture. The Australian people want a royal commission into the banking industry. It is the Australian people that have been calling for the royal commission, and Labor is listening, and this is reflected in the Labor members' single recommendation as a result of this inquiry, which calls on the government to immediately establish a royal commission into the banking and financial services sector in Australia.

The Labor members' report goes in some detail into our views of the purposes of this House of Representatives economics committee inquiry, and it is our view that this inquiry into the banking industry through the House of Representatives economics committee has been established for one purpose and one purpose alone by this government—and that is to avoid a royal commission into the banks in this country. Mr Brian Hartzer, the CEO of Westpac, admitted in his evidence to the committee that this issue was discussed with the Treasurer prior to the committee even being established. Under questioning from me, Mr Hartzer admitted that the issue of a royal commission and this inquiry was discussed with the Treasurer's office prior to the inquiry even being established. It is evident that the banks were aware of the dates that this committee would be hearing the evidence in Canberra before the Labor members were even appointed to the committee. When the Labor members tried to alter the dates of the committee hearings here in Canberra to take evidence from the banks to allow more time for preparation for the committee and a greater amount of time to question the banks, the Liberal members used their majority on the committee to deny that request. It is evident that the dates for this banking inquiry were predetermined with the banks before the committee was even established. Again, this represents the government doing the bidding of the big banks in this country.

The Labor members' report goes into some detail of the banks' unethical behaviour and customer rip-offs. It is not just the Labor Party that holds a dim view of what has been going on in the banking industry over recent years. No doubt the Australian people have a similar view, but even the new Reserve Bank governor, Philip Lowe, admitted recently during a hearing of the House of Representatives economics committee that he holds such a view. When asked about the culture of the big banks at the moment, his reply was:

I cannot help but agree with you that there have been too many examples of poor outcomes, particularly in the wealth management and insurance industries. That is disappointing to us all.

That is the view of the Reserve Bank governor in Australia, the principal economist appointed to oversee the stability of our monetary system and our banking system. When the CEOs of the banks appeared before us, they all began with apologies. They admitted that all the scandals and all of the rip-offs represented their organisations doing the wrong thing by the Australian public.

We then look at some of the actions of ASIC and the number of planners and financial advisers who have been banned because of poor behaviour in the banking industry. The Commonwealth Bank has had 20 advisers banned, the NAB has had 21 planners banned, the ANZ has had three planners banned and Westpac have had two planners banned. We talk about the Commonwealth Bank's open advice review, which led to a thorough review of all of the files and all of the clients who have been wronged by the Commonwealth Bank's financial planning arm and the fact that there are still many clients and former clients who remain unhappy with this process. We look at the scandals in CommInsure and the fact that ASIC has recently reviewed the life insurance market and found that, on average, there is a decline rate for life insurance claims of 16 per cent, with some organisations with average rates as high as 37 per cent. We look at the 2016 ASIC matters that have been inquired into by that organisation in respect of the banks.

We make some very detailed comments about the Reserve Bank cash rate and the fact that all of the bank executives gave evidence to the inquiry that the RBA cash rate was not the major determinant of the way in which they set their mortgage rates for customers. Yet a mere number of days after the bank executives had given this evidence to the House of Representatives economics committee, Greg Medcraft, Chairman of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission—himself a former banker—said in evidence to the House of Representatives economics committee and tabled a briefing note showing that bank funding costs 'completely tracked' the cash rate, which he said reflected the fact that '60 per cent or more of their funding comes from deposits which are based on the cash rate'. So there you have completely conflicting evidence from the bank executives and from the head of the regulatory body entrusted with the job of overseeing their operations. Is it any wonder that Australians are fed up with the actions of the banks? They are entitled to ask why there is little or no competition in this particular market in the banking and mortgage sector industry in Australia.

We then look at some of the bank structures and the poor outcomes that are incentivised in their organisations. I am speaking here of the cross-selling of products to customers, particularly insurance and credit products, when they may not be in the customer's best interests. We have all experienced this. You go into your local bank branch to do some banking and, no sooner have you mentioned your name to the teller, they are trying to sell you a credit card or they are trying to sell you some form of insurance. What most Australians would not know is that it is not the teller's fault, it is not the employee's fault; it is almost part of their job description. They are incentivised to try to cross-sell these products to their customers, and the incentives are in the form of bonuses that are reflected in their pay structures.

Although we have recently had the Future of Financial Advice reforms, which detail that, in such occurrences, the teller should always act in the best interests of the customer, FoFA does not apply to a lot of products that are being sold by these organisations, particularly credit products. Many of the representatives and employees will have sales targets that are linked to their pay. Most of the banks denied that this was a big issue with their employees. They said that they all operated what they call 'balanced scorecards' and that there are other factors like customer satisfaction, safety and other issues that go into the make-up of this balanced scorecard. But, when we look at all of the banks' so-called balanced scorecard approach, up to 30 per cent of that scorecard is made up of sales.

Sales typically appear to be the only issue that is discussed between the employee and their management when it comes to looking at that balanced scorecard. The National Australia Bank chief executive admitted that if an employee is not achieving their required sales target through that balanced scorecard approach then that may result in them being put on a performance improvement program and that may ultimately lead to them being dismissed for not meeting those targets. That is ingrained in our banking sector. All of them do it. Admittedly, Westpac appear to be moving away from it. They have admitted that they are moving away from this type of approach to setting pay in their latest round of enterprise bargaining negotiations. But that only applies to the Westpac core banking group; it does not apply to some of their subsidiaries like St George.

All of the banks operate what they call leader boards, which are basically league tables of where your branch sits within the network on how you are performing with sales. Many of the employees and union members that we spoke to told us that this is the key issue. 'Every day the managers are pushing. We've got to increase our position on the leader board by selling more products to customers.' That is the culture in which the banks are operating in Australia and that is why we are getting these poor outcomes for consumers.

The evidence that has been given also is that the current regulatory environment is simply inadequate to deal with some of these scandals and these issues. It is evident in the number of rip-offs and scandals that we have seen in the banking industry over recent years. It is evident in the fact that a number of whistleblowers said that when they took cases of unethical behaviour or wrong behaviour to their immediate managers, they were told, 'Don't worry about it; we'll have a look into it' and nothing was done.

In the Nguyen case in respect of the Commonwealth financial planning arm, it took the whistleblowers actually walking into the office of ASIC to get someone to take notice of what they were saying and get some action taken. These people had written emails, they had written faxes to ASIC and no-one took any notice. They had to blow their cover and walk into the ASIC offices and say, 'You need to have a look at this.' It led to ASIC having a look at it and, of course, this led to the Commonwealth financial planning scandal, which has already been the subject of two Senate inquiries in this place and led to, literally, thousands of files having to be reviewed, many people having their financial licences banned and many Australians losing quite a bit of money.

The other point that was made through these inquiries is, unfortunately, it takes an individual going to the media to get the banks to look at their issues and to get redress; indeed, for the financial services ombudsman to look at some of the issues. The other point is that the regulators have made the case that they are simply not properly funded to adequately oversee what is going on in the banking industry. The government members on the committee have made a number of recommendations in the report about additional responsibilities for FOS, for the ACCC, for ASIC and for APRA. They want them to take on additional responsibilities—it is evident in all of their recommendations. But there is no additional funding recommended at all by the government members in their report to ensure that the regulators have the wherewithal to undertake those additional inquiries. This is evident in the committee evidence that was received from Rod Sims, the chairman of the ACCC, who made the point that the agency cannot even look into competition in the banking industry of its own initiative. Here you have the competition regulator and they cannot even have a look at what is going on in terms of competition in the banking industry without a referral from the minister, from the government—and they have not received that. This is a clear difference in the way that the UK competition operator does its work. I then put the question to Mr Sims, 'If you did have that power, do you think you would be able to do that work?' He said, 'We're not properly funded to do that work anyway at the moment.' This is an issue that is not dealt with by the government members in their report.

We then go on to talk about the lack of executive accountability. Of all of the scandals, of all of the wrongdoing, of all of the victims in the banking sector over the course of the last few years, not one banking executive has lost their job or been punished because of what has gone on.

The greatest irony in all of this is that the person that blew the whistle on what was happening in CommInsure in the Commonwealth Bank, Dr Benjamin Koh, had to go to an executive independent member before he got any action on highlighting the fact that planners were asking him, as a doctor, to amend his medical reports to deny insurance claims. When he blew the whistle on this, he was investigated by the Commonwealth Bank and, ultimately, dismissed. He is now the subject of an unfair dismissal claim before the Fair Work Commission. It should not have to come to that.

No executive faced any accountability for the actions of the banks over the course of the last few years. We make the point that the UK Financial Conduct Authority has strengthened their accountability framework to make bank executives more accountable. All of this evidence highlights the point that we need a banking royal commission in Australia.

I want to finish with a couple of comments regarding the government members' recommendations. To try an avoid a royal commission, their principle recommendation is to establish a tribunal that replaces the Credit and Investments Ombudsman, the Financial Ombudsman Service and the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal. Let me tell you, this proposal is half-baked. It raises more questions than it answers. The member for Burt, in his questioning of the bank executives, was able to elicit from Brian Hartzer, the CEO of Westpac, that this issue of a tribunal was discussed between himself, the Treasurer and other banking executives at a meeting prior to the House of Representatives Economics Committee inquiry even being established. It is clear that the fix was on and that, prior to the inquiry even being established, this tribunal was discussed between banking representatives and members of the government as a way to avoid a royal commission in Australia.

Consumer advocates have raised deep concerns about the tribunal and many believe that it will result in worse outcomes for consumers. In their report, the government members are unable to state how this tribunal will work, particularly in its structure. Will it be based on a member-based mediation service, similar to the FOS, or will it be a statutory body with judicial qualities, like the SCT? Who will preside over it? What will be the jurisdictional limits? What will be the scope of matters to be dealt with? What procedures and rules will this tribunal operate by? Will the rules of evidence apply? What will be the role of lawyers? What will be the rights for appeal?

In all of these issues, the government members point to the fact that there are two further inquiries going on: the Ramsay inquiry into external dispute resolution and reviews being conducted by ASIC and FOS into FOS's small business operations. Their answer to those questions is to refer them to a further inquiry. Again, it is half-baked, it is underdone and it just reflects, in my view, that this whole process has been rushed. The whole process of this inquiry has been rushed, and these recommendations have been rushed, with one view in mind from the government: to avoid the establishment of a royal commission.

The Labor members and the Australian public are sick and tired of this avoidance of scrutiny of the actions of the banks. They want a royal commission. That is why Labor has recommended, in its submission to this inquiry, that a royal commission be established into the banking sector.

In conclusion, I thank the secretariat for their very hard work. I look forward to working with them in future to hold these banks to account.

Adam Bandt (Melbourne, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

by leave—This report is the government turning a blind eye to bad behaviour in the big banks. As a member of the committee, I will not be agreeing with the majority recommendations. The Greens will be issuing a dissenting report.

The big four banks suckle at the government's teat and receive billions of dollars in implicit subsidies. That helps them make world-leading record profits because they know that, if they ever get into trouble, the government will step in and help them out. That gives them a leg up over their smaller competitors, and it gives them the kind of advantage that any struggling manufacturer in this country would love, or that a tourism operator dealing with the high Australian dollar at times would dream of—namely, to know that the government will underwrite you if you ever get into trouble—because it allows you to go to overseas markets and borrow much, much more cheaply.

The Reserve Bank has called this out; the IMF has called this out and said that something needs to be done about the fact that these big four banks are receiving billions of dollars in implicit subsidies. The big four banks came along to this inquiry and admitted it. They did not disagree with what the Reserve Bank or the IMF had said, and accepted that any other payments they might make probably do not offset the advantage they get because the government treats them as being too big to fail. But when we asked them at the inquiry, 'Would you be prepared to pay a bit for that advantage—to give something back to the public purse for the leg up that you, the big four, get?' they said no. They said, 'We are not prepared to do that.' They are leaners, not lifters.

It is time that this parliament stopped the cosy relationship that government has with the big four banks, where it is giving them a leg up at the expense of their smaller competitors and other businesses, and took some action. Any reading of the evidence from this inquiry suggests that the government is simply willing to turn a blind eye to the cosy subsidies that are given to the big four banks. And, sadly, there is absolutely nothing in the government members' report about that evidence given by the big four banks to us, which is one of the reasons that the Greens will be dissenting and suggesting that it is about time that we imposed a public support levy on the big four in recognition of this implicit public support they get that any other struggling business in this country would love.

But what was also alarming about the evidence that came to us during this committee hearing was: the exposure of the big banks to a growing and overpriced housing market in this country, because we learnt through this inquiry that the world-leading record profits that the banks are making are, in large part—and in growing part—dependent on writing more and more loans for more and more expensive housing. We heard some distressing evidence from some—there are claims, and these claims have been made on ABC television—that, in some instances, people's incomes have been inflated in order to allow for higher loans to be written.

There is something fundamentally wrong in the Australian financial apparatus when we have huge amounts of money going into unproductive areas—like increasing the cost of existing housing, which puts housing out of reach of many young people and everyday Australians—and only serves to increase the banks' bottom line. And that is what is happening. The money that is being lent out increasingly by the big four banks is not going into productive infrastructure. It is not helping businesses expand. It is going into pushing up the cost of housing. And what we learnt from the inquiry is that the banks' CEOs make money out of this. Their bonuses are, in part, dependent on growth and return on equity to their shareholders, which is, in turn, dependent on writing more and more loans for housing.

So there is a very worrying vicious circle developing in the Australian economy that means it is in no-one's interest to step back and say: 'Hang on—is it right that housing prices keep going up in this way; that record low interest rates fuel the growth in housing prices, fuel the profits for the banks and fuel the CEOs' salaries, all the time putting housing out of the reach of younger Australians?' But the government has turned a blind eye to that evidence in its report as well.

What we need—if you sat down and listened to the evidence that we have heard, including what the committee has heard in other evidence that has been given by other regulators—is to step in and stop this vicious circle. That means taking action on negative gearing, and it means taking action on the capital gains tax discount. But, sadly, that is missing from the government's report as well because the government knows that to take action on that might actually hurt the big banks, and heaven forbid that the government would want to do anything that involves standing up to the big banks.

Lastly, one of the key reasons for the two Senate inquiries that we have had and for the holding of this committee inquiry is what is called the question of vertical integration—the fact that banks in Australia also have big wealth management arms, and those wealth management arms make a lot of money out of selling financial products to people and then returning the profits back up the line to their owners, the banks. So, when they sell those products, the people selling them have a perceived conflict of interest because they have to make money to kick back up to the banks, their ultimate shareholders at the top, but they also have the customer coming to them, saying, 'Hang on, I would actually hope that what you're doing is in my best interest.' It is because of that perception of conflict that we have seen so many scandals where people have been sold products that ultimately get them into trouble that can mean that they lose their house.

We learnt throughout this hearing that no-one had lost their job as a result of this. It seems that there is a very, very clear pattern in the Australian banking industry. People get sold products that get them into trouble. Things go wrong, and it is everyday people who suffer. It is not the banks that expose it. That is left up to whistleblowers or journalists. It is then exposed. The CEO then fronts up, wrings their hands and says, 'I'm sorry; we made a mistake.' But, when you lift the lid on that so-called apology, you find that, back at the ranch, the same people are still in charge of the wealth management divisions within those banks. It seems that the problem all comes from the same source, an inherent conflict, and yet at this inquiry the big banks denied that there was any problem. They denied that there was any problem and suggested that the best answer was continued self-regulation.

The government's only solution is to say, 'Well, we'll put in a new body that might or might not have the powers to deal with problems after they arise,' instead of cutting off the problems before they even arise in the first place. We have an opportunity with this committee and in this parliament to stop the problems from occurring in the first place and to turn off the tap. We have the opportunity in this parliament to say: we need to look at whether vertical integration is the right way to go, or perhaps we need to look at the overseas models where they are breaking up the big banks and saying it is time to separate the deposit and lending arms from the wealth management arms because of that conflict and that perception of conflict. So we recommend in our dissenting report that there be a royal commission and that the royal commission look very, very closely at that question of vertical integration.

Lastly, can I say that it is clearer after this committee report than it was beforehand that a royal commission is needed, because, when committee members have all of 15 minutes to ask questions of bank CEOs, and the bank CEOs then disappear and come back again half a year later, that is nothing like the kind of forensic and intensive investigation that can be done by a body that is charged with getting to the bottom of this problem. We need to see beyond the veneer. We need to see beyond the apology that happens when a CEO fronts up to the committee. We need to look at the practices in the bank, because, if we are hearing that the same people are still in charge, that should send the alarm bells ringing for everyone. I think the decision to refer this matter to a committee rather than holding an investigation has backfired, because we will now have the opportunity every six months or every year, when these big bank CEOs front up, to be reminded that the same people are running the show and that nothing much has changed at all.

I want to thank the committee secretariat for all of their assistance, and I look forward to continuing as a member of this committee.

David Coleman (Banks, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I move:

That the House take note of the report.

Rob Mitchell (McEwen, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In accordance with standing order 39(c), the debate is adjourned. The resumption of the debate will be made an order of the day for the next day of sitting, and the member will have leave to continue speaking when the debate is resumed.