Tanya Plibersek (Sydney, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition) Share this | Hansard source

The referendum held in Crimea this weekend marked a heightening of an age-old tension. The east-versus-west tug of war over Ukraine and Crimea stretches back long before the Maidan protests made headlines. So I am pleased to get up and speak today in support of the motion that is before the House.

In the 18th century Crimea was one of the regions fought over by Catherine the Great's Russia and the Ottoman Empire. In the mid-19th century imperial Russia and imperial Britain's ongoing tussle for Central Asia manifested in the Crimean War. And in the early 20th century, following the Russian Revolution and civil war, the defeated and once Western-backed White Army was evacuated through Crimea. In 1954, under Soviet Premier Khrushchev, himself a Ukrainian, Crimea was passed from Russia to Ukraine—a purely symbolic gesture, given that at that stage it was all a part of the USSR.

In 2004-05 the Orange Revolution saw a Western-backed government come to power, and then in 2010 the pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych was elected. Although at that stage the elections were described as fair, President Yanukovych subsequently imprisoned opposition figures and changed the constitution to give the office of president greater power. This history of conflict is fed by Ukraine's own demographic polarisation. Ukrainian-speaking parts in the west of the country and largely Russian-speaking parts in the east are described as having contrasting architecture, political views and even historical heroes. And election results from the past decade reveal a clear dividing line between the voting patterns in the east and the west. Last year when President Yanukovych rejected a deal for closer integration with the European Union, protests broke out in Kiev. As we know, this resulted in the government's overthrow and Russia's attempts to annex Crimea.

Half a world away in Australia some people ask what difference it makes to us here. Of course, members of the House know that we have very strong Russian and Ukrainian populations here in Australia. Both countries have been sources of migration to Australia, and many Australians of Ukrainian or Russian background have enormous concern for their friends and family who are in Ukraine at the moment.

More broadly, the dangerous stand-off in the Ukraine has serious implications for the global security environment. That means Australia should have a view, and should express its view internationally. Russia's behaviour highlights the danger of countries adopting a zero-sum game world view. President Vladimir Putin's move suggests a belief that Ukraine must choose between close ties with Europe and a good relationship with Russia. I believe that a majority of the members of this House certainly would not accept the view that Ukraine must choose between closer integration with Europe and a good relationship with Russia. The justifications offered by Russia do not match their actions. The massive troop movements, takeover of important sites, the referendum in Crimea, and the incursion into the mainland—particularly over the weekend—are clearly an excessive response to what Russia states is their concern for ethnic Russians in the Ukraine.

Unfortunately, throughout the years we have seen previous examples of this, where ordinary citizens expressing a desire for a greater say in the running of their country have their movement highjacked, so one great power can achieve a strategic victory against another. Zero-sum foreign policy thinking threatens international peace and prosperity. This includes the disregard for international law. The G7 issued a statement saying:

The annexation of Crimea could have grave implications for the legal order that protects the unity and sovereignty of all states.

The G7 added that it would be:

A clear violation of the United Nations Charter; Russia's commitments under the Helsinki Final Act; its obligations to Ukraine under its 1997 Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership; the Russian-Ukraine 1997 basing agreement; and its commitments in the Budapest Memorandum of 1994.

I have mentioned in the past the concern regarding the disregard of the Budapest Memorandum. This was a deal that involved Ukraine giving up nuclear weapons that were left on Ukrainian soil after the dispersal of the USSR. In return for giving up those Soviet era nuclear weapons to Russia there were commitments from the US and the UK, and of course Russia itself, that Ukraine's sovereignty and independence would be respected—and that there would be no use of force, or threat of the use of force, and that there would be no economic coercion of the Ukraine. It is very difficult to see or understand how a country can be encouraged to give up nuclear weapons, or not build them, if assurances made for the security and integrity of that country are not kept. It begs the question of why any country would give up nuclear weapons, or not build them, if those assurances are not kept.

The crisis may also have economic implications, with the repatriation of billions of dollars between the West and Russia following the threat of western sanctions. While Australia's ability to influence events in the Ukraine is somewhat limited, we can and should do a number of things. We can utilise the diplomatic leverage we have at the United Nations Security Council, to add our voice to the global calls for a diplomatic solution that adheres to international law—voting at gunpoint is not true democracy. Australia can support international efforts to apply economic means to resolve the crisis peacefully, and we can contribute to the international financial support for Ukraine.

We can, and should, and must argue very clearly that the sort of zero-sum thinking we have seen recently in the Ukraine is not the way to see foreign relations. These sentiments were echoed by Secretary of State Kerry earlier in the conflict. Win-win solutions are possible, particularly for Russia and the Ukraine.

We hope that during her recent meetings in Britain the Minister for Foreign Affairs has used the opportunity to inject Australia's longstanding principles of multilateralism, and peace and respect for international law, when it comes to talks on Ukraine.

On the ground level, I can say that I have spoken personally to our honorary consul in Kiev, offering Labor's support to him at this very difficult time. We must ensure that we are providing adequate consular assistance to Australians in Ukraine. It is obviously a very difficult role at the moment, and the honorary consul should be offered any assistance that we can offer him in making sure that any Australians or dual nationals who are in the Ukraine at the moment are well looked after, and the connections between us are strong and immediate.

I am also very pleased that, in the last parliamentary sitting week, the Minister for Foreign Affairs accepted my suggestion to allow Ukrainians in Australia to apply onshore for an extension of their current visa. There is of course precedent for this happening in the past. When a country is in conflict, when there are difficulties being experienced at home, and Ukrainians are visiting Australia, it makes perfect sense that they should be able to go to the Department of Immigration and Border Protection and talk through their circumstances and receive a generous hearing.

Despite being half a world away, what happens in the Ukraine will likely have economic and strategic ripples that effect the entire world. Certainly those economic and strategic effects will be felt in Australia, and that is why it is so important that Australia speaks up at every opportunity to urge a peaceful resolution to the current conflict. Recent tensions in our own region underline the importance of Australia working to support a rules based international system, and looking for opportunities to emphasise that zero-sum approaches to international relations hurt us all.

See this speech in context