This is a proof (draft) Hansard, not the final version.
The Parliament had not yet published the final text for this day when we fetched it, so the wording, who said what and the results of divisions may differ from the final text.
Senate debates Bills
Online Safety Amendment (Strengthening Enforcement for the Social Media Minimum Age) Bill 2026; In Committee
Slade Brockman Deputy-President
10:01 am
The committee is considering the Online Safety Amendment (Strengthening Enforcement for the Social Media Minimum Age) Bill 2026. I will need first to deal with the deferred vote on the government amendments. The question is that government amendments (1) and (2) on sheet ST132 be agreed to.
Slade Brockman Deputy-President
10:08 am
Last night's debate was interrupted during consideration of opposition amendments on sheet 4059. Are there any further contributions on these amendments?
Sarah Hanson-Young SA, Australian Greens
I wanted to come back to the issue that is currently before us, and that is the need to ensure that when implementing any rules and regulations around how big tech engages users and treats members of the public, their users, their customers—it's very hard to implement any of these rules if these companies can keep their tricks and their tactics locked down in secret. That's why we need proper transparency when it comes to exactly what is going on, what is happening under the hood of these toxic algorithms and the techniques that these industries use to keep people addicted.
We've heard testimony after testimony after testimony from whistleblowers who work within some of the biggest social media companies in the world about how deliberate their tactics are to undermine the very safety of their users. We also know whistleblowers have been very clear about the tactics that are used to undermine the very information that government agencies and authorities around the world can access. No only do these companies design products that are deliberately addictive and that they know harm people but they then find ways of keeping that exact harm and addiction and the deliberate nature of that as secret as possible. They manipulate their own libraries. They manipulate their own public release of data. In the social media big tech bro world, they write their own rules and they'll follow them if and when they choose to do so.
If we're going to introduce a whole new raft of regulations, we need to make sure that government agencies and independent experts and researchers actually have access to this information. I'm concerned that, unless we have proper commitments from the government to do this, big tech will just get to continue railroading not just civil society and not just the general public but also the very authorities and agencies that are meant to hold them to account. I'd like to ask the minister what commitments the government can give to ensure that independent researchers are going to be able to also get under the hood and have a good look at what's going on.
I'd like to seek leave to table a letter I received this morning from Minister Anika Wells that goes to some of these issues and a commitment to implementing proper transparency rules.
Leave granted.
I'll table that letter now so that everybody can see that the government has given a commitment to working with this place to implement proper transparency rules to ensure these big tech companies can't keep their dirty, nasty, dangerous tactics secret. In saying that, I want to say we will hold your feet to the fire on this. We are absolutely determined. The Greens' perspective is that the general public deserve to know what these companies are up to and the best way they can do that is by ensuring that independent researchers and experts have access to information and can interrogate it. I say that because it can't just be government agencies or authorities; you actually need the experts in the room. You need the experts and the researchers to be there for the public interest and to be able to predict the next step and predict what these companies are going to do to try and avoid sticking by these rules and regulations.
We know that, if you give big tech an inch, they'll take a mile. So you need tough laws and you need tough penalties. But you need transparency, because they get away with this only because, at the moment, it is so secret, kept in the dark, that no-one can really hold them to account. So you need sunlight, you need transparency, and you need the people who actually understand how these companies operate to be able to get their heads under the hood and give advice properly—not just to the government but to the community as well.
Nita Green Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Minister for Tourism
10:15 am
(): I think Senator Hanson-Young, in tabling that document, has provided an answer to her own question, which is that the government is committed to ensuring that the digital duty of care bill includes a commitment to ensuring transparency around processes and systems and ensuring access to this information by researchers. Of course, we are again talking about a piece of legislation that will be introduced after an exposure draft consultation period. All the caveats around different legal and constitutional advice will be required. But we've made that commitment after advocacy from Senator Hanson-Young, ensuring that the amendment that's been put forward the opposition is instead dealt with through the digital duty of care legislation, for which there will be the opportunity for a consultation period and, particularly, parliamentary scrutiny and submissions from the public so we can ensure that the digital duty of care legislation is carefully scrutinised.
Slade Brockman Deputy-President
The question is that opposition amendments (1) and (2) on sheet 4059 be agreed to.
Sarah Hanson-Young SA, Australian Greens
10:23 am
by leave—I move Australian Greens amendments (1) to (4) on sheet 4091 together:
(1) Schedule 1, page 3 (before line 4), before item 1, insert:
1A Section 5 (after the definition of age-restricted user )
Insert:
annual global turnover has the meaning given by section 21A.
1B After section 21
Insert:
21A Annual global turnover
(1) The annual global turnover of a body corporate, during a financial year, is the sum of the values of all the supplies that the body corporate, and any body corporate related to the body corporate, have made, or are likely to make, during that year, other than the following supplies:
(a) supplies made from any of those bodies corporate to any other of those bodies corporate;
(b) supplies that are input taxed;
(c) supplies that are not for consideration (and are not taxable supplies under section 72-5 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999);
(d) supplies that are not made in connection with an enterprise that the body corporate carries on.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), it is immaterial whether the supplies were made, or are likely to be made, within or outside Australia.
(3) Expressions used in subsections (1) and (2) that are also used in the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 have the same meaning in those subsections as they have in that Act.
(4) The question whether 2 bodies corporate are related to each other is to be determined for the purposes of subsection (1) in the same way as for the purposes of the Corporations Act 2001.
(2) Schedule 1, item 1, page 3 (line 5), omit "60,000", substitute "10% of the annual global turnover of the provider in the previous financial year."
(3) Schedule 1, item 2, page 3 (line 7), omit "60,000", substitute "10% of the annual global turnover of the provider in the previous financial year."
(4) Schedule 1, item 3, page 3 (line 9), omit "60,000", substitute "10% of the annual global turnover of the provider in the previous financial year."
These amendments are really important. This entire piece of legislation is about enforcement of the law and making sure big tech abides by what this parliament agrees to. If we want people to be safe online, big tech has to be held to account.
We, of course, know that the social media ban has been an absolute failure. It was destined to fail from the beginning. You don't need to take my word for it. The fact that the government is now having to introduce the duty of care bill, which actually goes to the need to protect people, to make their online experience safe, to force companies to provide safety for their users, proves that the social media ban for under-16s has been an utter failure.
However, what I am concerned about is that, unless we send a message to big tech that, when the parliament agrees to protect their citizens, when we agree that people should have the right to choose what is in their own feeds, when Australians have the right to be able to be online without being bombarded with harmful content and tricked and manipulated with addictive algorithms, if Big Tech flouts those rules, there will be consequences for them. In the current legislation, it's a slap on the wrist. It's 100 million bucks for these huge gorilla big tech companies who make billions and billions of dollars a year; 100 million bucks is nothing to them. It's not just the cost of doing business; it's like the morning coffee run for the office for big tech. It's nothing. So, if we're serious about holding big tech to account and putting in place penalties that will actually deter bad behaviour and force them to clean up their act, then we really need to increase these penalties.
The rest of the world, when they're looking at how they take on big tech and hold them to account, talk about the need to consider revenue and about how the penalties must be a percentage of their revenue because of course, otherwise, they just keep carrying on this bad behaviour. The difference between the fine and what their profits are just gets bigger and bigger. The only way to have a meaningful penalty on big tech and these huge, enormous companies that are manipulating, addicting and profiting off harm is to make the penalties a percentage of global revenue.
Australia wouldn't be the first country in the world to do this. The EU has introduced a similar percentage of global revenue for Meta. Other countries around the world are moving in that direction because everybody knows that the way these companies get away with this is that they country shop based on where they bank their business. You can't just have it. You can't even just have a percentage on domestic revenue, because they just put their bank account in Singapore. They do all their business through Ireland.
We know that Meta here in Australia is already flouting our tax rules because they don't pay their fair share of tax because they offshore their profits. Not only are they profiting off a product that is deliberately addictive, that is harmful, that is manipulating and using Australians; they then have the gall to offshore their profits overseas so that they don't even have to pay tax on their harmful product. So the only way to seriously hold these tech companies, these big global gorillas, to account is to make sure we have a percentage of global revenue as part of the penalty regime.
That's what this amendment does. It's a penalty of 10 per cent of global revenue. I think that's fair enough. These are the richest companies in the world. Elon Musk is the richest man in the world, a trillionaire, and he gets his kicks out of running a platform that is deliberately designed to be addictive and harmful. Mark Zuckerberg is one of the richest men in the world; he gets his kicks out of and makes profit off of a product that is deliberately designed to be addictive and harmful. If we're going to actually take a swing at that, if we're going to put Australians back in control of what we see in our social media feeds, if we want to be safe online, we've got to hit these buggers where it hurts. It's got to be a much bigger fine than 100 million bucks. That is peanuts to them. So let's get serious. Let's make it a percentage of global revenue, and let's hit them where it hurts.
Nita Green Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Minister for Tourism
10:30 am
I want to briefly respond on the amendments. The government is very keen to pass this bill today, and I can talk more about why that is. But to respond to the amendments, can I simply say that we agree with the principle that stronger penalties are a stronger deterrent. The penalties in this bill are consistent with recently increased penalties in the Competition and Consumer Act and are amongst the highest penalties available in the Commonwealth legislation. Tying penalties to revenue of the digital platforms was considered in the independent statutory review, and I can understand why that's an attractive proposition.
The setting of sufficiently high penalty amounts does deter noncompliance. There are significant challenges we must consider in determining the global annual revenue of companies based overseas, and this can be made even more difficult and intractable when revenue is generated across multiple jurisdictions. We believe this risks platforms avoiding penalties for failing to protect Australians online rather than increasing protections to deter poor behaviours. That is our goal today. That is why we won't be supporting these amendments.
Leah Blyth SA, Liberal Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Defence Infrastructure
The question is that the Australian Greens amendments (1) and (4) on sheet 4091 be agreed to.
James Paterson Victoria, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Defence
10:38 am
by leave—I move amendments (1) to (5) on sheet 4088 standing in the name of Senator Henderson:
(1) Schedule 1, item 4, page 3 (line 15), after "applies to a person", insert "mentioned in subsection (2A)".
(2) Schedule 1, item 4, page 3 (lines 17 and 18), omit "that is or may be", substitute "that is".
(3) Schedule 1, item 4, page 3 (line 20), after "applies to a person", insert "mentioned in subsection (2A)".
(4) Schedule 1, item 4, page 3 (after line 24), after subsection 63G(2), insert:
(2A) The following persons are mentioned for the purposes of this subsection:
(a) the provider of the electronic service;
(b) a related party of the provider of the electronic service.
(2B) For the purposes of paragraph (2A)(b), a person is a related party of a provider of an electronic service if the person:
(a) provides, or has provided, goods or services to the provider; or
(b) if the provider is a body corporate—is a related body corporate (within the meaning of the Corporations Act 2001) of the provider.
Note: For example, a person who provides age assurance services to a provider is a related party of the provider.
(5) Schedule 1, page 4 (before line 9), before item 6, insert:
5B After subsection 220(9)
Insert:
Notice to give information or provide documents
(9A) An application may be made to the Administrative Review Tribunal for a review of a decision of the Commissioner under subsection 63G(3) to give a notice.
Senator Henderson has already explained the rationale for the coalition's amendments, so I won't elaborate any further.
Slade Brockman Deputy-President
The question is that opposition amendments on sheet 4088 be agreed to.
James Paterson Victoria, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Defence
10:45 am
Deputy President, you are correct in your powers of anticipation. I seek leave to move amendments on page 4104, previously circulated by Senator Henderson, as was the previous amendment. Senator Henderson has articulated the coalition's rationale for these amendments, so I won't detain the chamber any longer.
Slade Brockman Deputy-President
You don't need leave. You're free to move the amendment.
James Paterson Victoria, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Defence
I move opposition amendment on sheet 4104 as circulated:
(1) Schedule 1, page 4 (after line 15), at the end of the bill, add:
Competition and Consumer Act 2010
7 After Part IV
Insert:
Part IVAA — Consumer choice of digital safety services
Division 1 — Preliminary
51AAB Object of this Part
The object of this Part is to promote competition, consumer choice and online safety by ensuring that Australian consumers are able to use third-party digital safety services on devices and operating systems.
51AAC Application
This Part applies to a provider of a device operating system if:
(a) the provider is a corporation to which paragraph 51(xx) of the Constitution applies; and
(b) the operating system is supplied or made available for use in Australia; and
(c) the provider has a substantial degree of market power in the supply of device operating systems in Australia.
Division 2 — Consumer choice of digital safety services
51AAD Consumer choice of digital safety services
Access to operating system functionality
(1) A provider must take reasonable steps to provide third-party digital safety services with access to the operating system functionality reasonably necessary to enable that service to perform its digital safety functions effectively.
(2) The requirement in subsection (1) to take reasonable steps to provide access may include steps in relation to the following:
(a) application programming interfaces;
(b) permissions and system privileges;
(c) device and application usage information;
(d) content filtering and access controls;
(e) application and website blocking or restriction functionality;
(f) screen-time and usage controls;
(g) account and device management functionality;
(h) any other operating system functionality or technical capability necessary for the effective operation of the digital safety service.
Prohibition on anti-competitive restrictions
(3) A provider must not unreasonably:
(a) prevent or materially restrict the installation, operation or use of a third-party digital safety service; or
(b) withhold, restrict, degrade or delay access to operating system functionality reasonably necessary for the effective operation of a third-party digital safety service; or
(c) impose a technical, contractual, commercial or other restriction on a third-party digital safety service that does not apply to an equivalent digital safety service supplied by the provider or a related body corporate; or
(d) design or operate the operating system in a manner that materially disadvantages a third-party digital safety service in favour of a digital safety service supplied by the provider or a related body corporate; or
(e) require an Australian consumer to use a digital safety service supplied by the provider or a related body corporate as a condition of accessing functionality necessary for digital safety; or
(f) otherwise prevent or materially impede an Australian consumer from effectively using a digital safety service of the consumer's choice.
Security and privacy exception
(4) A provider does not contravene this section by restricting access to operating system functionality if the provider establishes that the restriction is reasonably necessary and proportionate to address a material risk to:
(a) the security or integrity of the device or operating system; or
(b) the privacy or security of an end-user.
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to the extent that the provider, or a related body corporate, provides substantially equivalent access to that functionality for its own digital safety service.
Division 3 — Definitions
51AAE Definitions
In this Part:
digital safety service means software, an application or another digital service that has as a substantial purpose enabling an end-user, parent or guardian to protect or manage a person's use of a device or digital service, including by:
(a) filtering, restricting or monitoring content; or
(b) managing or restricting access to applications, websites or online services; or
(c) imposing screen-time or other usage limits; or
(d) managing communications or online interactions; or
(e) providing parental controls; or
(f) protecting against harmful or age-inappropriate content; or
(g) providing other online safety or digital wellbeing functionality.
device means a smartphone, tablet, personal computer or other prescribed consumer electronic device.
device operating system means software that controls the basic operation of a device and provides the principal interface between applications and the hardware or functionality of the device.
third-party digital safety service means a digital safety service that is not supplied by the provider of the relevant device operating system or a related body corporate.
Division 4 — Civil penalty
51AAF Civil penalty
(1) A person that contravenes subsection 51AAD(1) or (3) commits a contravention of a civil penalty provision.
(2) The maximum pecuniary penalty that may be imposed for a contravention under subsection (1) is the maximum pecuniary penalty applicable under section 76 in relation to a body corporate for a contravention of a section 45AJ.
Division 5 — Monitoring compliance
51AAG Regulations relating to compliance
(1) The regulations may prescribe a scheme relating to monitoring compliance with this Part.
(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the regulations may may confer on a person or body (including the Commission) functions and powers relating to monitoring compliance with this Part.
Nita Green Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Minister for Tourism
10:46 am
I also don't want to detain the chamber any longer. I just did want to make sure that the government's position was on the record on these particular amendments. We oppose the amendments because they will make things worse and not better. Forcing device manufacturers and platforms to open access in the way that this amendment requires would actually create a vulnerability on every device, and any bad actor could say they are a digital safety service and would have full access to system privileges and all device functionality. This could be used by companies to track and monetise deep data or by scammers to install spyware. It would create a backdoor for criminal groups to take control of phones or tablets, or even enable child predators who want to spy on children.
The social media minimum age legislation places an obligation squarely on social media platforms as these entities are primarily responsible for the harms caused on their services. However, the legislation does not prevent age-restricted platforms from working with other service providers such as app stores and device manufacturers to receive age signals that would assist them to assess whether the user is under 16.
The government has commenced consultation on the draft legislation for digital duty of care, and these new laws will put an onus on digital service providers to provide a safe online environment, setting minimum standards for features and tools that they use. This proposal requires online service providers to provide user empowerment tools, giving control back to users to determine the kind of content that is recommended for them.
Slade Brockman Deputy-President
The question is that the amendment on sheet 4104 be agreed to.