Jonathon Duniam (Tasmania, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Environment, Fisheries and Forestry) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to make a contribution to the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Bill 2025. This bill amends the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 and also the Surveillance Devices Act 2004, along with the Crimes Act 1914, to ensure key provisions operate as intended and makes technical amendments following the government's decision to reconstitute the Home Affairs portfolio following the federal election.

Schedule 1 of the bill permits a protected network activity warrant and warrant intercept information to be used, communicated and recorded to meet disclosure obligations. It also allows the information to be admitted in evidence where necessary to ensure the defensible prosecution of criminal activity while retaining the intelligence-only purpose of network activity warrants.

Schedule 2 of the bill amends the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to transfer the statutory function of the Communications Access Coordinator, otherwise known as the CAC, from the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department to the Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs. This change is only necessary because this government prioritised party politics over the protection of Australians by dismantling the Home Affairs portfolio after the 2022 election.

Following the last election, this year, the Albanese Labor government restored the Home Affairs portfolio to its original structure, established under the coalition, by returning the Australian Federal Police, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre to Home Affairs from the Attorney-General's portfolio. This came after the coalition took this commitment to the election while Labor made no such commitment. The decision to reconstitute the Home Affairs portfolio following the election and the Prime Minister's acknowledgement that there were issues with information-sharing during the Dural caravan incident are admissions that the national security architecture that he put in place by dismantling Home Affairs had failed at a critical time. The government should, frankly, apologise to Australians for putting party politics over Australia's national security by changing the Home Affairs portfolio three times in three years in a pointless factional tug of war.

Schedule 3 amends the Telecommunication (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to permit limited access to stored communications to allow agencies to undertake development and testing activities in circumstances where they would otherwise have been authorised to intercept the same communication if it were still passing over a telecommunications system. These changes will ensure the framework remains fit for purpose in the modern operating environment where stored communications may pass over the telecoms system and become indistinguishable from live communications.

Schedule 4 corrects a technical issue with the operation of interception international production orders in the T(IA) Act that was preventing international production orders from being given to US based prescribed communications providers in certain circumstances, under the agreement between the government of Australia and the government of the United States of America on access to electronic data for the purpose of countering serious crime. The amendments clarify that interception orders issued to Australian law enforcement and national security agencies may be used to obtain prospective content data from communications providers in a country with which Australia has a designated international agreement, regardless of the technical method by which that prospective data is sent to the agency.

Schedule 5 amends the Crimes Act to clarify the threshold for authorising varying controlled operations and the circumstances in which a participant is protected from criminal responsibility and indemnified against civil liability. The anonymous nature of online crime means law enforcement may lack information to assess potential risks when deciding whether to authorise or vary a controlled operation. The amendments will clarify that authorising officers must consider the direct and reasonably foreseeable consequences of controlled conduct when authorising or varying a controlled operation. Schedule 5 also provides clarity around legal protections for officers involved in undercover operations targeted at taking down sexual abuse syndicates. In the 2024-25 financial year, the ACCCE Child Protection Triage Unit received 82,764 reports of online child exploitation. This equated to an average of 226 reports per day. The need for strong action against these predators has never ever been more acute. These amendments ensure that the law is fit for purpose in addressing the most abhorrent online crimes where the persons under investigation are anonymised, including on the dark web and encrypted communications platforms.

The changes in the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2025 provide essential clarifications to ensure that the agencies that keep our nation safe can continue to do so in an era of rapid technological development. The coalition will always support sensible reforms which ensure that the men and women serving in intelligence and law enforcement roles have the tools they need to take down criminals no matter where they're hiding. The opposition will be supporting this legislation without amendment.

David Shoebridge (NSW, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise on behalf of the Greens to indicate our opposition to the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2025. The minister, in the second reading speech, and also the opposition described these as 'technical amendments', but I think we should be clear that the bill massively expands surveillance powers without any consideration of adequate safeguards or any adequate consideration of accountability. Whenever Home Affairs or parts of the security agencies talk about technical amendments, it always pays to look closer. In my experience, when Home Affairs say 'technical amendments', normally, it's anything but. That's a deeply concerning pattern of behaviour from this government and from Home Affairs.

The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, the INSLM, tabled, barely a month ago on 1 September, a report on the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021. It would have been essential to properly consider that report from the INSLM before passing yet another bill granting yet more extended surveillance powers and the extended use of information obtained under existing surveillance powers to the parliament. Of course, parliament hasn't properly considered the INSLM report, nor would Home Affairs have been able to adequately consider the INSLM report before bringing forward this legislation. Indeed, it gets better. As we're pushing to rapidly adopt this bill, without reference to the INSLM report even, we also know that Home Affairs is conducting a major review of the entire electronic surveillance framework.

We're being asked on the one hand to expand surveillance powers before any consideration of the INSLM's report—which had many critical concerns about the lack of proportionality between powers that have been given to security agencies over the last two decades and basic expectations of due process and rights—and it's in the middle of Home Affairs undertaking a major review of the entire electronic surveillance framework that it's responsible for. Of particular concern for my party, the Australian Greens, is schedule 1, which expands network activity warrant disclosure powers. In that regard—and I'll reference it shortly—I really am grateful for the considered submission that went to this bill from the Internet Association of Australia—not what you'd call a radical group. It is a very carefully reasoned and considered submission from the primary industry association responsible for managing the core infrastructure of the internet in Australia.

I will deal with their concerns about the bill shortly, but their concerns in relation to schedule 1, the expanded disclosure of the existing information obtained under warrant and the absence of robust safeguards—they are right to raise very real concerns and to ask the parliament to press pause on that. Schedule 3 also lets agencies access stored communications while testing and developing interception tech. That means real people's private messages are going to be accessed not for a security purpose or a public interest purpose but just so that they can be guinea pigs and have their information used for testing. The government promises this information can't be used for investigations, but there's almost no oversight of this. It all happens in the dark. This is another part of the function creep that the Internet Association of Australia points out in relation to this entire bill.

Schedule 4, another so-called 'technical amendment', significantly expands the IPO scheme, which currently only exists between Australia and the United States. When you look at what the impact of that will be, it's quite clear we are talking about a potentially significantly expanded flow of Australians' data going to US law enforcement just at a time when the United States judiciary is being weaponised for political purposes. As we're literally watching the Trump administration politically weaponise the US criminal justice system, the Albanese government, with barely a blink, without a pause, is proposing a radically increased amount of information that can be given directly to the United States law enforcement agencies, directly impacting Australians' privacy. It's almost as though this government hasn't realised there is a change happening in the United States—a change that is harmful to basic principles of human rights, harmful to due process at law and, indeed, harmful to what the Greens think is a democratic and prosperous future for the planet. Putting that all to one side, the Albanese government, without really telling the public, has decided, with this bill, to massively increase the amounted of information going to the United States on the request of the Trump administration.

The Greens are joining with the Internet Association of Australia to say this bill should be paused. It should be pulled at the moment. There should be proper consultation before this legislation is passed. The Home Affairs comprehensive electronic surveillance review should be finished before we grant extended powers. Someone should probably read the INSLM report before they bring in fresh legislation that seems directly contrary to the concerns raised by the INSLM as recently as 1 September. Perhaps even do a regulatory impact analysis because the industry says none of that has happened with them. Instead, what are we seeing? We're seeing the coalition and Labor join together, as they always do, to remove rights, to increase the surveillance state, to hand yet more of our information over to the Trump administration in the United States, and to do it without even a blink. That's what's probably going to happen today.

I want to put on the record the concerns of the Internet Association of Australia. Again I want to credit them for being one of the few organisations that really came to terms with this bill—a complex, difficult, technical bill—and I want to read their concerns from their communication to the PJCIS. Of course, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security operates in secret and deliberates in secret, and sometimes we can only find out what happens because of the occasional public submission that is published by the PJCIS. The Internet Association of Australia said:

We reject the framing of the TOLA Bill as being primarily technical or administrative corrections in nature as suggested in the Explanatory Memorandum. As will be further detailed below, in particular, Schedules 1 and 3 represent a function creep by expanding the admissibility of information gained via extraordinary electronic surveillance powers, and expanding the scope of stored communications access.

…   …   …

IAA strongly recommends … that the TOLA Bill not be passed until a full public consultation process and Regulatory Impact Statement has been completed. At the least, the TOLA Bill should be split so that only the administrative adjustments proposed under Schedule 2 are passed, while Schedules 1-3 and 4-5 to the TOLA Bill are delayed for further consultation and scrutiny.

We further note that the electronic surveillance legislative framework is currently subject to a major review by the Department of Home Affairs. It is thus concerning that there are changes being proposed by the TOLA Bill seemingly without reference to the ongoing work.

Of course they are right in doing that. Part of the departmental review is looking at some of the human rights and privacy issues that are obviously at play in this TOLA bill. According to the department's website, the department review is looking to develop a single electronic surveillance act that:

…   …   …

You would think all of that would be necessary before you massively expand the use of information obtained under already quite extraordinary surveillance powers. But no—this government presses on regardless.

The IAA point out the importance of the INSLM's most recent report under the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act, the SLAID Act. The IAA submission says:

The INSLM report made many recommendations to ensure the use of powers under the SLAID Act is fit-for-purpose and better balances providing agencies with the legal authority to combat serious crimes while also upholding core democratic principles. With many of the recommendations pertaining to bolstering the safeguard and oversight mechanisms, we are highly concerned that the TOLA Bill seeks to increase powers without regard to the INSLM's call for corresponding safeguard measures.

IAA strongly recommends that the Committee recommends the TOLA Bill not be passed until the INSLM report has been thoroughly reviewed and considered by Parliament, and the Department.

It's interesting—isn't it?—to watch the debate between the government and what goes for a opposition. Of course, when it comes to national security, it's not an opposition; it's a bunch of people in suits acting as a cheer squad for the government. It's interesting to watch what goes for debate on this. There's no reference to the INSLM report. There's no reference to the review being undertaken by Home Affairs. There's no reference to privacy. There's no reference to core democratic principles. There's no reference to any restraint. Instead there's just a big fat rubber stamp from the so-called parties of government, who have never seen a demand or a grasp for power by executive government that they haven't been willing to cheer through this parliament. It goes to show why there are so many concerns about the way this place operates and why there are so many concerns about the creep of surveillance powers, the expanding reach of surveillance powers and the diminishing spaces in which citizens can act without the intrusive hand of the state reaching in, surveilling without notice and impacting upon our privacy. The core reason this happens is because there's a culture in this place of never questioning the next executive power grab that comes, particularly from agencies like Home Affairs and ASIO. It is dangerous to civil liberties, and, in the long term, it's dangerous for democracy. For those reasons, we oppose this bill.

I move:

Omit all words after "That", substitute "further consideration of the bill be postponed until the day after the Senate passes a resolution that it is of the opinion that each of the following conditions has been met:

(a) a full public consultation process and regulatory impact analysis of the bill has been conducted;

(b) parliamentarians have had the opportunity to thoroughly review and consider the recommendations in the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor's report of the review of the extraordinary powers for the Australian Federal Police and Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission under the Surveillance Legislation Amendment (Identify and Disrupt) Act 2021, published on 1 September 2025; and

(c) the bill aligns with the wider electronic surveillance reform agenda, including the Department of Home Affairs' review of the electronic surveillance legislative framework".

I commend it to the house because it's excellent.

Anthony Chisholm (Queensland, Australian Labor Party, Assistant Minister for Regional Development) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank honourable members for their contributions to the debate on this bill. The Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2025 remedies defects preventing agencies from exercising powers in the manner that parliament intended. The bill makes five key amendments across the Telecommunications Act 1979, the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 and the Crimes Act 1914.

Schedule 1 of the bill contains amendments to ensure the Commonwealth is able to comply with its duty of disclosure owed to courts while preserving the intelligence-only nature of network activity warrants. The bill will also permit the admission into evidence of information obtained under a network activity warrant where necessary to support a fair trial, operate with sophisticated levels of anonymity online and target those most vulnerable in our community.

In conclusion the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2025 will address defects preventing agencies from exercising powers consistent with parliament's intent when enacting the relevant provisions of the Telecommunications Act 1979, the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 and the Crimes Act 1914. I commend the bill to the Senate.

Varun Ghosh (WA, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The question is that the second reading amendment moved by Senator Shoebridge be agreed to.

Varun Ghosh (WA, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The question is that the bill be now read a second time.