Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to move opposition amendment (1) on sheet 1117 revised:

(1) Clause 2, page 2 (table item 2), omit the table item, substitute:

Before I ask questions of the minister, in particular I want to flag to the chamber that this revised amendment would have the effect of splitting the bill. Effectively, it would allow the chamber to deal with aviation workers without delay but provide time for the government to address the big, gaping hole that sits in this legislation.

The government have provided legislation that purports to deal with the security risks posed by transport workers—not all transport workers of course but those who would seek to use their position to facilitate the importation of drugs and firearms and other illegal activities through our ports and airports. The government have proposed legislation that seeks to enhance security clearances for workers at ports and airports, but they have left a giant, gaping hole. That giant, gaping hole is that the bill does nothing to enhance or strengthen the security clearance process for foreign workers on flag-of-convenience vessels at our maritime ports. This is an issue that was raised previously by the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection and that has been ventilated through Senate inquiries. It is an issue that has been raised multiple times when the government have presented a bill purporting to deal with transport security and organised or serious crime. They did it in 2016, they did it again prior to 2019, and they've got a bill here today that again, for the third time, fails to deal with foreign crew who arrive on flag-of-convenience vessels.

We on this side of the chamber accept that there is a need to deal with the risks posed by organised criminal gangs who have infiltrated airlines and airports. We have seen the revelations in the media about the infiltration. We take with credibility the evidence provided by the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission that there are organised criminal gangs that are infiltrating Qantas and that have extraordinarily—from evidence of the ACIC boss, Michael Phelan, on 60 Minutesinfiltrated government agencies. Of course, the community rightly expects this chamber to act upon those reports, so what I make clear to the government and what I make clear to the community is that the Labor Party is seeking to facilitate passage through this parliament of enhanced security checks for aviation workers.

We think the Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2020 proposed by the government is not strong enough. We think the bill proposed by the government has some weaknesses, to be sure. It's a bill that has got the words 'serious crime' in its title, but there's no definition in the bill of 'serious crime'. We think there are issues with this bill because it doesn't have a legislative avenue of appeal. Nonetheless, we are willing to facilitate through the parliament this week the passage of this bill as it relates to aviation workers. Our invitation to the government is—and what this revised amendment represents is an invitation to the government, one I made to the Prime Minister last week, one that I make here today on the floor of the Senate to the government—let's take the time and get it right when it comes to our maritime ports.

What do we know about our maritime ports? We know that our maritime ports are where the great risk lies when it comes to the facilitation of drugs into Australia. We know that the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, as it was formerly called, now the Australian Border Force, shared those views with the Senate in 2017. We know that foreign workers on flag-of-convenience vessels can get a security clearance from an Australian maritime port within 24 to 48 hours, but it can take up to three months for an Australian worker to get that same clearance. Why are we putting such stringent requirements on Australian workers but failing to put them on foreign workers? As I outlined in my speech to the Senate when we last addressed this matter, some months ago now when the government last prioritised this bill for debate, we have had multiple incidences of maritime crew from foreign vessels, foreign workers, who have been responsible for or have facilitated the movement of drugs through our maritime ports. This is what this amendment represents, and I invite members of the chamber to have a very close look at it.

In particular, what this amendment does is seek to delay the commencement of the bill as it applies to maritime workers until we have got to a satisfactory proposal from the government or indeed the passage of a private member's bill that I have brought into the Senate to deal with foreign crew from flag-of-convenience vessels. The government may not like the private member's bill that Labor has moved to deal with foreign crew on flag-of convenience-vessels, so I invite the government to come up with their own solution. This is not a political game of 'I have to win, you have to lose'. I think the win that we need here is a win that is in the national interest, is a win that is in the name of stronger border security protection measures and is a win in terms of enhancing security arrangements at our maritime ports.

So I invite the government to consider this amendment. I invite other parties in this chamber to consider this amendment. Now, the government will argue back that the vast majority of maritime crew visa holders do not require unescorted access in maritime security zones. They will say that any seafarer is only required to hold an MSIC if they require unsupervised access to a maritime security zone. They will say that it would impose a significant financial burden on the administration of the scheme for no discernible benefits. But I have to say that if you had listened to the department of immigration in 2017 and if you had listened to the evidence from wharfies and the maritime unions in the Senate inquiries, you would know that foreign crew do not just have unescorted access to ports. They do have unescorted access; any wharfie will tell you that that is the case. The Morrison government have taken their eye off the ball, we contend, when it comes to our ports. We know that foreign crew are allowed to wander around secure areas. My first question to the minister concerns the Department of Immigration and Border Protection's finding in 2017:

… there are features of FOC registration, regulation and practice that organised crime syndicates or terrorist groups may seek to exploit.

…   …   …

Reduced transparency or secrecy surrounding complex financial and ownership arrangements are factors that can make FOC ships more attractive for use in illegal activity, including by organised crime or terrorist groups.

This means that FOC ships may be used in a range of illegal activities, including illegal exploitation of natural resources, illegal activity in protected areas, people smuggling, and facilitating prohibited imports or exports.

Minister, does the government agree with the Department of Immigration and Border Protection's finding?

The CHAIR: I advise the Senate that the revised amendment, on sheet 1117, has been circulated.

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In the first instance, what I propose to do is put on record the government's response to the amendment that has been moved by Senator Keneally on sheet 1117. I acknowledge, Senator Keneally, that there has been an amendment to that particular amendment. In the first instance, the government will not be supporting the amendments to the bill in sheet 1117, which I understand would make the commencement of the bill contingent on the passage and commencement of Senator Keneally's private senator's bill, the Migration Amendment (New Maritime Crew Visas) Bill 2020.

As the government does not support the opposition's bill, making the commencement of this bill contingent on the opposition's bill would mean the important measures in this bill would never commence. The government opposes the opposition's bill because it would be an unnecessary replication of processes already in place for maritime crew visas and lead to additional red tape. Before a person is granted a maritime crew visa, they are required under the current migration legislation to have their criminal history assessed and to undergo a security assessment. Requiring a holder of a maritime crew visa to also satisfy the elements of a maritime security identification card background check concerning criminal history and security would replicate requirements that are already considered in the visa application process. Requiring visa holders to comply with the elements of the MSIC scheme would pose a significant financial burden on the maritime crew visa scheme for no discernible benefit. Maritime crew visa holders who do not hold an MSIC are required to be escorted and monitored by an MSIC holder at all times whilst in a restricted zone of a seaport. Any maritime crew visa holder who requires unescorted access to a secure zone at a seaport would be required, like all individuals, to obtain an MSIC and undergo a full background check.

I will also address the calls by the opposition to split the aviation and maritime sections of the bill. I would say to those calls: serious crime is a major threat to the Australian way of life and causes enormous human suffering. Addressing serious crime only in the aviation sector does not address the wider problem. Of the 227 aviation security identification and maritime security identification cardholders of concern to the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, 73 per cent are in the maritime sector. By splitting the bill, the vast majority of the cardholders the ACIC has serious concerns over will continue to have unsupervised access to maritime secure areas.

Kilograms of illicit goods enter Australia through airports, but tonnes—I emphasise that—enter in shipping containers through seaports. We must close all entry points to trusted insiders and serious criminals, not just those in the aviation sector; otherwise, organised criminals will continue to exploit Australia's ports. It will also waste time and money by creating completely unnecessarily red tape. It will increase processing times and costs for cardholders. All the time Labor stalls implementing this legislation, more illicit goods are entering Australia and more people are being harmed. Separating the ASIC and MSIC schemes will also mean that those who require both an aviation security identification card and a maritime security identification card will in future have to apply for two separate background checks, increasing both costs and delays to cardholders.

The other issue that Senator Keneally raised when she was addressing the amendment put by the opposition on sheet 1117, as amended, was in relation to foreign maritime workers. Anyone seeking to have unescorted access to secure areas of our airports and seaports needs an aviation security identification card or a maritime security identification card, regardless of their nationality. In making the comments that Senator Keneally did, Labor are deliberately seeking to muddy the waters. There is no Australian government requirement for all Australian seafarers to hold a maritime security identification card. What this card does is ensure the holder has been background checked and allows the holder to be unescorted inside the maritime security zone.

Foreign ships and foreign seafarers must comply with the security measures of Australian ports and port facilities. Foreign seafarers who are employed on non-military ships on international voyages to Australia will hold a maritime crew visa, otherwise known as an MCV. Like all travellers to Australia, applicants for an MCV are subject to a range of character and security checking processes, and an MCV will not be issued to a person who fails the character test or who is identified as a security risk. If an MCV holder required unmonitored access to a maritime security zone, they would be required, like all individuals, to obtain a maritime security identification card and undergo the required background check. MCV holders are not exempt from MSIC requirements. I'm just seeking some further advice, Senator Keneally, in relation to the question that you posed about why foreign seafarers are excluded from this bill. As I've already stated, there is no Australian government requirement for all Australian seafarers to hold a maritime security identification card. Maritime industry participants have the discretion to establish maritime security zones to safeguard their operations. At all security regulated ports and on security regulated ships, any person who does not hold a valid MSIC must be continuously monitored by a current MSIC holder at all times while in maritime security zones.

The government has security arrangements in place to monitor all vessels and personnel entering Australia, and a clear protective security regime for ports and ships underpinned by legislation. The security requirements apply to all vessels which enter Australian waters and ports, irrespective of flag state. Foreign flagged vessels entering Australia must demonstrate compliance with international security standards. Foreign flagged vessels and foreign seafarers must also comply with the security measures of Australian ports and port facilities. Security requirements for maritime transport in Australia are separate from shipping registration and coastal trading licences. That is the information I have on me to date.

Pauline Hanson (Queensland, Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Let me start by saying, when it comes to national security and serious crime legislation, One Nation will always take a tough stance. So, from the outset, One Nation will support the Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill, which deals with serious crime, particularly inside secure areas of our ports and airports. Can I commend the former Minister for Home Affairs, Peter Dutton, and his senior adviser, Mark Dominic, for giving me a thorough understanding of this bill. What the member for Dickson has achieved as Minister for Home Affairs will never quite be understood or realised by many Australians, but I, for one, thank him, and it's worth passing on my gratitude to his wife, Kirilly, and young family for the work they also have allowed Mr Dutton to perform in his previous role as Home Affairs minister.

Now to the heart of this bill: Australia has a very serious issue with the importation of illicit drugs and illegal firearms. If you want to know why, it's because Australians pay a higher price for drugs than most other countries across the globe, so it's fair to say the risk of getting caught is worth the financial reward in far too many cases. To give you an example, here in Australia a gram of cocaine sells for at least $300, whereas in the Netherlands it's less than $60 a gram and, worse still, in South Africa they're paying $32. When drug dealers are buying it for $3.50 a gram in Colombia and selling it for $300 or more here in Australia, they are making enormous profits that unfortunately help buy illegal favours from people in trusted and secure positions within our ports and airports.

I have seen the volume of drugs coming into this country firsthand, thanks to the AFP. I have been in the belly of one of the Australian Federal Police drug vaults, which, that day, was carrying over $5 billion worth of illicit drugs seized by officers—drugs which would have otherwise have been up the noses and in the arms of someone's children here in Australia. You don't forget the pungent stench of chemicals when you walk into a police drug vault, nor do you forget the sight of plastic wrapped bricks of cocaine stacked in aisles similar to an Aldi store. Honestly, there was more white powder and ice in that vault than on the slopes of Thredbo. I can only paint the picture, but this is what's being broken down and peddled on streets by scumbags who don't give a damn about the carnage they're creating throughout society. Suicide, relationship and family breakdowns, mental illness, addiction, antisocial behaviour, sex crimes, unemployment—the list goes on and on. Drugs are a scourge on society whichever way you look at it. Anyone who advocates for the decriminalisation of illicit drugs needs to spend a night on the frontline with police, ambulance and nursing staff who are having to deal with the psychotic symptoms they bring out in users.

Most Australians, when they've taken a domestic or international flight, would have seen an ASIC card around the necks of pilots, crew members and airport workers. They're a red-dot photo ID card that provides access to all of the secure areas of an airport. An MSIC card provides the same level of security clearance for our ports; the only difference is that they're blue. What's happening is that, despite the assessment by ASIO and the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, who look at someone's criminal history, these cards are still being issued to people who police know have an extremely close affiliation with known or previously convicted drug dealers, terrorists and other serious criminals. As the law stands today, any Australian could have an El Chapo- or Osama bin Laden-type character renting a spare room in their home and still make an application for an MSIC or ASIC card, and there's nothing authorities can do to prevent the security access card being granted. It's a cosy loophole that criminals have exploited for far too long, and I'm pleased to say that it ends today. If you want to shack up with criminals, don't expect to maintain clearance to secure ports and airports across Australia. It's as simple as that.

For Labor to deny passage of this bill today tells me that Anthony Albanese and the Australian Labor Party prefer supporting organised crime gangs more than getting serious about cutting the supply of illicit drugs and illegal guns on our streets. I recognise the unions have concerns with this bill—I've listened to you—but we cannot continue protecting this very small cohort of union members. The vast majority of union members want this cleaned up as much as anyone in the public, so it's time to get rid of the one per cent or fewer who give unions a bad name. The unions talk a big game about the importance of safety on job sites—well, this is a safety mechanism we parliamentarians are implementing to better safeguard our nation's children, their members' children and broader society from the scourge of drugs and illegal firearms. Again, I reiterate One Nation's strong support for this bill.

On a side note, I congratulate the Federal Police on their more recent sting, which shocked the criminal world as much as the tech world, with their AN0M app. This was a stroke of genius that originated here in Australia and penetrated the heart of some of the worst criminal activity here at home and across the globe. Operation Ironside saw 224 people charged, 3,700 kilos of drugs taken off Australia's streets, $45 million in cash seized, 20 murder plots foiled and 72 firearms and weapons seized.

We have the advantage of being an island nation, which gives this parliament and authorities the upper hand in preventing illegal drugs and firearms flooding our streets, unlike many other countries across the globe. Today's Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2020 will go a step further in shutting down criminal activity within Australia. I commend the bill.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I thank the minister for her answer. I say to Senator Hanson, just to correct the record: Labor have not said they are opposing the Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2020. What we have said is we're actually here to facilitate the passage of the aviation portion, and that we are in fact seeking to strengthen the bill by providing appropriate security clearances for foreign crew on flag-of-convenience vessels. I don't know whether Senator Hanson heard me earlier, but those crew can get a clearance in less than 24 hours, whereas for an Australian worker it sometimes can take up to three months to get a clearance. We think there's a disparity there; a gaping hole that needs to be closed. That's what our amendments are seeking to do. I would hope that senators in the chamber would have a listen to the debate. It is an important one.

I thank the minister for her answers. She didn't particularly directly answer my question about the Department of Immigration and Border Protection's finding in 2017 that, in fact, foreign crew on flag-of-convenience vessels do pose a serious risk in terms of organised crime syndicates and terrorists, and that there are features of flag-of-convenience registration, regulation and practice that organised crime syndicates or terrorists may seek to exploit. Those aren't my words; those were the words of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection in 2017. Since 2017 I can see no change the government has made to security clearances for foreign crew.

So I come back to my original question. I thank the minister for all her previous answers, but my question was: does the government agree with the Department of Immigration and Border Protection's 2017 finding:

There are features of flag of convenience registration, regulation and practice that organized crime syndicates or terrorists may seek to exploit.

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The instructions that I have are as follows: 'All individuals accessing a secure area or zone of a regulated port must have a valid MSIC'—as it is known—'or must be escorted or continuously monitored by an MSIC holder whether they are foreign or Australian workers. Foreign ships entering Australia must demonstrate compliance with international security standards. Foreign ships and foreign seafarers must also comply with the security measures of Australian ports and port facilities. An MSIC ensures the holder has been background checked and allows the holder to be unescorted inside a maritime security zone. The schemes are designed to ensure persons, both Australians and foreigners, who require unescorted access to the secure areas of certain security controlled airports and security regulated ports are subject to an appropriate background check. The introduction of the bill will strengthen the ASIC and MSIC schemes to ensure that we prevent individuals who pose a high criminal risk, both Australians and foreigners, from holding a card, which is consistent with the findings of a range of parliamentary reviews.'

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I might raise a particular case and seek to see if the minister, in the context of that answer, can explain it. It's on the Sage Sagittarius and its master, Captain Salas. In 2012 he became a person of interest in the New South Wales coroner's investigation into three highly suspicious deaths aboard the Sage Sagittarius. Captain Salas admitted to the coroner that he was involved in gun trafficking and trading in alcohol. Despite that evidence in front of the New South Wales coroner, the Liberal government allowed Captain Salas back into Australian waters in December 2015 as master of the Kypros Sea. His ship travelled between a number of Australian ports, primarily Gladstone and Weipa, in early 2016. Can the minister explain in the context of the answers she's just given about the stringent controls and checking that's applied to foreign crew why Captain Salas was allowed back into Australian workers and Australian ports after the evidence he'd provided to the New South Wales coroner?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I can advise as follows: the MG Sage Sagittarius is a Panama flagged bulk carrier owned and operated by NYK Line. Venancio Salas Jr was the captain of the vessel. There were three suspicious deaths on board the vessel. There are also allegations that Captain Salas was involved in the illegal sale and transport of firearms.

At the time, there were no known character or security concerns in regard to Captain Salas. As the relevant authorities were not aware of the character or security concerns regarding Captain Salas, an MSIC application would not have picked these up. Now that the concerns regarding Captain Salas's behaviour have come to light, these will be taken into account on any future applications. The government cannot speculate about any application that may have been lodged or pre-empt any future decisions. However, the government can confirm that the testimony of Captain Salas during the coronial inquest, specifically any admissions to selling firearms to his crew as well as penal certificates from any country Captain Salas has resided in for longer than 12 months over the age of 16 years in the last 10 years, other adverse information and any character references supplied, can be considered. There is no disputing that Captain Salas was a genuine seafarer. He had a long history of travelling into and out of Australia as the captain or crew member of non-military vessels. Whilst we can't comment on individual cases, we can confirm that people with similar character concerns to Captain Salas may be prevented from being granted a visa due to these concerns.

Tony Sheldon (NSW, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

First, I want to lend my support to the comments made by Senator Kristina Keneally. But I also want to go to what the government should be considering with regard to the Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2020. The government pretends to be tough on borders and tough on crime, when in reality it's left a huge gaping hole in our national ports. Foreign seafarers are excluded entirely from security measures in this bill. Australians working at ports are forced to wait up to three months just to renew their maritime security identification card. But the crew of foreign vessels that use flag-of-convenience registration to flagrantly avoid tax and regulations can waltz into Australia with as little as 24 hours notice. That's correct: three months for checks for an Australian port worker; 24 hours for a foreign crew member on a ship registered in Liberia, Panama or Russia. How can the AFP or our intelligence agencies do a comprehensive background check on the entire crews of foreign vessels in 24 hours? As the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection told the Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport in 2017:

There are features of FOC registration, regulation and practice that organised crime syndicates or terrorists may seek to exploit.

… … …

Reduced transparency or secrecy surrounding complex financial and ownership arrangements are factors that can make FOC ships—

flag-of-convenience ships—

more attractive for use in illegal activity including by organised crime or terrorist groups.

This means that the FOC ships may be used in a range of illegal activities, including illegal exploitation of natural resources, illegal activity in protected areas, people smuggling, and facilitating prohibited imports or exports.

That quote is the government's own bureaucrats saying four years ago that foreign vessels are prime targets for organised crime and terrorist groups.

Foreign vessels are the express lane for trafficking people and people smugglers, and the Morrison government is keeping that express lane wide open. The Morrison government is also keeping that lane wide open for terrorists. The world was horrified by the explosion in Beirut, Lebanon, on 4 August last year. The blast caused 207 deaths, over 7,500 injuries and US$15 billion in property damage. It was one of the most powerful non-nuclear blasts in human history and was felt and heard hundreds of kilometres away. Lebanon's interior minister said the blast was a store of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate blowing up. The ammonium nitrate had been seized from a Russian ship, the MV Rhosus. In Australia, in 2020 alone, 18 voyages of foreign flagged ships carried that same material, ammonium nitrate, on domestic routes. They were mostly long voyages between Western Australia and our east coast ports. Those ships carried up to 6,500 tonnes of ammonium nitrate per voyage, more than double the volume which led to the tragedy of Beirut, and the foreign crews on those flag-of-convenience vessels carrying what is effectively 6,500 tonne bombs into our ports in Australia are waved through our borders on as little as 24 hours notice. At the same time an Australian port worker could be forced to wait three months for their MSIC to be renewed.

We've been fortunate in Australia that the Morrison government's negligence on national security matters has not resulted in disaster and tragedy. In 2014 a truck hauling just 50 tonnes of ammonium nitrate rolled on a highway 30 kilometres south of Charleville, Queensland. Thankfully no-one was killed, but a secondary explosion injured eight, 'disintegrated' the truck, destroyed two firefighting vehicles and caused catastrophic damage to the Mitchell Highway. That was just 50 tonnes. We've seen the grave consequences of 2,750 tonnes in Beirut, but we're talking about 6,500 tonnes, which is what flag-of-convenience vessels are carrying in our ports with just 24 hours notice. The consequences are unimaginable.

The Morrison government has been warned of this danger for years. The Maritime Union of Australia, the MUA, has been particularly vocal about the threat that this gaping hole in our national security poses. After Beirut, in August last year, MUA National Secretary Paddy Crumlin said:

The porous and substandard level of background checks on foreign workers through the Maritime Crew Visa—which is issued electronically without background checks—is completely inadequate and inappropriate for such high consequence cargoes.

Mr Crumlin went on to say:

Last year, 85,000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate moved through the Port of Newcastle alone—30 times the amount that devastated Beirut—posing a significant threat to safety.

The Australian Government must urgently tighten shipping regulations to ensure dangerous goods are carried on vessels that are registered in Australia and crewed by Australian seafarers who have undergone appropriate training and security checks.

That is correct; 85,000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate moved through the Port of Newcastle in 2019 alone. The Morrison government is fully aware of this. The Prime Minister was playing politics last week with national security at his press conference. In reality it's the Prime Minister who is playing fast and loose with our security. Ammonium nitrate has previously been used in terrorist attacks. The Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 demolished the Alfred P Murrah Federal Building with just 2,200 kilograms of ammonium nitrate.

There is a reason we have serious background checks and security qualifications for workers in the aviation and maritime industries. The Department of Immigration and Border Protection said that flag-of-convenience vessels are attractive for terrorists and organised crime. The opposition has put forward amendments that would ensure that foreign crews are subject to background checking similar to that of Australian workers, so why is the Morrison government persisting with a bill that discriminates against Australian workers and doesn't elevate everybody to the great security challenges? This leaves ports open to organised criminals operating through flag-of-convenience vessels and leaves Australia's borders wide open to terrorist attacks that could be of a scale similar to—or even larger than—the devastating accident in Beirut.

It was reported by the Geelong Advertiser this morning that two crew members of the Chinese ship Glorious Plumeria, registered in Panama,have snuck through security and are currently at large. These two crew members would have received their visas with as little as 24 hours notice, so the government doesn't know anything about their background. The most likely explanation is that these two are just ill-treated crew members, as exploitation is rampant through flag-of-convenience vessels, but the fact is that, if the crew members can waltz into Australia without security checks, so can terrorists and so can organised criminals. The Morrison government is tough on the Biloela family—two young girls have been locked up on Christmas Island—while being soft on flag-of-convenience vessels, soft on organised crime and soft on terrorists waltzing into Australia without background checks. Minister, why does the bill force Australian workers to wait up to three months to renew their MSIC while foreign crews remain able to waltz across our borders without background checks and with just 24 hours notice?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

There does appear to have been a conflation of two issues in the comments that have been made by those opposite. In the first instance I will deal with the comment that it takes 24 to 48 hours to process an MCV application but up to three months for an MSIC application. What I can say to you in that regard, Senator Sheldon, is as follows: while an MCV can be granted in 48 hours, it is important to note that the MSIC and MCV schemes operate for two different purposes and undertake different checks, hence my comment that there appear to be comments made that indicate there is not quite an understanding of what the two schemes are actually doing—a conflation of the issues.

The MSIC scheme operates for the purpose of access to security zones, whilst the MCV operates for the purpose of immigration entry and stay rights. Where a foreign seafarer requires unsupervised access to a maritime security zone, they must have an MCV and an MSIC. Any evidence of people accessing a maritime security zone without holding an MSIC, or being supervised by an MSIC holder, should obviously be reported to the department for investigation. What I can also say in relation to the processing times, though, is this: during the 2020 calendar year, AusCheck processed within 15 business days 85 per cent of ASIC and MSIC applications received.

Can I also address some of the comments made basically in relation to foreign seafarers being excluded from the bill. There is no Australian government requirement for all Australian seafarers to hold an MSIC. Maritime industry participants have the discretion to establish maritime security zones to safeguard their operations. At all security regulated ports and on security regulated ships, any person who does not hold a valid MSIC must be continuously monitored by a current MSIC holder at all times while in maritime security zones. The government has security arrangements in place to monitor all vessels and personnel entering Australia and has a clear protective security regime for ports and ships, underpinned by legislation. The security requirements apply to all vessels which enter Australian waters and ports, irrespective of flag state. Foreign flagged vessels entering Australia must demonstrate compliance with international security standards. Foreign flagged vessels and foreign seafarers must also comply with the security measures of Australian ports and port facilities. Security requirements for maritime transport in Australia are separate from shipping registration and coastal trading licences.

Senator Sheldon, you also raised in your comments that the new rules mean that we're treating Australian workers more harshly—I'm probably paraphrasing you here—than foreign workers on flag-of-convenience vessels, and why should Australian workers be under more scrutiny than foreign workers? What I can say to you is that I'm instructed as follows. All individuals accessing a secure area or zone of a regulated port must have a valid MSIC or must be escorted or continuously monitored by an MSIC holder, whether they are foreign or Australian workers. Foreign ships entering Australia must demonstrate compliance with international security standards. Foreign ships and foreign seafarers must also comply with the security measures of Australian ports and port facilities. An MSIC ensures that the holder has been background checked and allows the holder to be unescorted inside a maritime security zone.

The schemes are designed to ensure persons, both Australians and foreigners, who require unescorted access to the secure areas of certain security controlled airports and security regulated ports are subject to an appropriate background check. As I've stated in previous comments, the introduction of the bill will strengthen the ASIC and MSIC schemes to ensure that we prevent individuals who pose a high criminal risk, both Australians and foreigners—to go to the point you have raised in your comments—from holding a card, which is consistent with the findings of a range of parliamentary reviews.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I want to go back to Captain Salas. I thank the minister for her answer. I may be paraphrasing her, but it seemed to be that the government was unaware of the issues around Captain Salas when he returned in December 2015. I quote from News Corp papers on 11 April 2016, which reported that a Senate inquiry into foreign shipping heard, in response to a question from Queensland Nationals senator Barry O'Sullivan:

The Department of Border Protection confirmed it had "holdings" on Capt Salas since December 24, 1994 – 17 years and eight months before a spate of fatalities occurred on the Sagittarius, now known as the "Death Ship".

I also note that Captain Salas had been wanted for questioning by the coroner as a result of the 2012 murders. Is the minister really telling this parliament that the department had no information that said Captain Salas should not be given permission to come back into Australian ports?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Senator Keneally. I seek further instructions from you in relation to the comments you've put to me. I don't have them in front of me, unfortunately, to verify exactly what was being said. Again, all I can say to you is this, in terms of the instructions that I have been given: at the time, there were no known character or security concerns in regard to Captain Salas. As relevant authorities were not aware of the character or security concerns regarding Captain Salas, an MSIC application would not have picked these up. As I also said to you in my comments, now that the concerns regarding Captain Salas's behaviour have come to light, these will be taken into account on any future visa applications. As I've already said, obviously the government can't speculate about any application that may have been lodged or pre-empt any future decisions. Again, the government can confirm that the testimony of Captain Salas during the coronial inquest, specifically any admissions to selling firearms to his crew, as well as any penal certificates from any country Captain Salas has resided in for longer than 12 months, over the age of 16 years, in the last 10 years, other adverse information and any character references supplied can now be considered.

Again, just for the Hansard record: there is no disputing that Captain Salas was a genuine seafarer. He had a long history of travelling in and out of Australia as the captain or a crew member of non-military vessels. While we can't comment on individual cases, we can confirm that people with character concerns similar to those of Captain Salas may be prevented from being granted a visa due to these concerns. That's the information I have at this point in time.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm happy for us to get the transcript of the evidence provided by Border Force officials that they had holdings on Captain Salas going back to 1994 and that they had boarded his ship several times. I will quote LNP senator Barry O'Sullivan, who said in this same Senate hearing:

This is not going to end here for me … you have left me once more very concerned about the security arrangements in your agencies, if someone like Captain Salas does not qualify for a red flag. You might not want to know, but I suspect that ordinary Australians would want to know when the Salases of the world are in our ports … G-U-N-S—I do not give a rat's arse where they are coming from or where they are going. We need to know when these sort of people are in our company.

I apologise for the language, but that is the language used by former Senator O'Sullivan in relation to Captain Salas.

What I would say to people who may be watching at home is: this is not just about Captain Salas; he is but one example of the point that Senator Sheldon and I and others on this side of the chamber are trying to make, which is that, when the government says that there is some kind of thorough check of foreign crew, that there is some kind of process that flags the character issues or the other issues, I can't take that at face value. We have the Department of Immigration and Border Protection in 2017 telling this Senate that the regulation around flag-of-convenience vessels and foreign crew has holes and gaps in it that allow for the importation of drugs or for terrorist activities. We have an example—just one—in Captain Salas, who has been wanted by the New South Wales coroner for questioning for some time. According to the then Department of Immigration and Border Protection, this is someone whom they have had holdings on—those are their words—since 1994. They have boarded his ships multiple times. They indicated in this hearing that they had concerns about him, yet he gets to come back and go to Gladstone and Weipa.

These are the issues that we're flagging—that the maritime crew visa checking process is not thorough enough. If we couldn't take the word of the Department of Immigration and Border Protection in 2017, whose word are we going to take? We need to take the advice of our national security agencies closely. We need to take heed of it, and that is what this amendment seeks to do. Our view is that this bill is a good step, but it is not strong enough; hence, our invitation to the government to either accept our amendment or come up with one of their own, or a process of their own, to deal with foreign workers to strengthen the requirements. I've now heard the minister say several times that when foreign crew get off the ship they cannot access areas without being supervised, without someone with an MSIC. But the evidence we have now heard throughout multiple inquiries is that that is simply not the case. Talk to any wharfie; you will know that that is not how things work in practice.

Let's see if we can tackle it from another side. Minister, how many people would typically be in a crew on a foreign vessel? How are those crew supervised when they get off the vessel? How many would be doing the supervision while they're in a secure area?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I apologise, Senator Keneally; I was listening to your comments in relation to what I had put on the record and I want to make it clear that, if there is any evidence at all of people accessing areas that they shouldn't be accessing—that allegations are not just being made here in the Senate—I hope that reports are being provided to the relevant officials so that they can be properly investigated. I'm quite sure that you would've asked whoever has given you that information to pass it on to the relevant investigators so that they can actually undertake any investigations.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you; however, my question was: how many people would typically be in a foreign crew on a ship and accessing the ports, how are those crew supervised when they get off their vessel, and how many people would supervise crew when they're in a secure area?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am advised that it will actually depend on the circumstances of the particular vessel at a particular point in time.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Is there any mandated ratio—one to five, one to 20, one to fifty? Does the minister have any information she can provide along those lines?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am advised there is no mandated ratio.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Do they have to be physically supervised, or could that supervision occur via a security camera?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am advised that the regulations require the person to be constantly supervised.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Could this constant supervision happen via a security camera?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am advised that that would depend on the circumstances.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

So it could happen via a security camera. Could the security camera operator be located outside of Australia?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am instructed that the answer is no.

Janet Rice (Victoria, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I want to put on the record, given that we are back here talking about the Transport Security Amendment (Serious Crime) Bill 2020 again, that I don't know how many times since I've been in the Senate we have been discussing this bill, and basically nothing has changed. The Greens remain opposed to this bill. It is a flawed bill. It has been developed with a flawed process. People have been raising concerns about this bill for the last four years, and the government haven't listened to them.

Obviously, issues of organised crime in our ports and our airports are really, really serious. It's something that we need to get right. This bill, as my Labor colleagues have been pointing out, is incredibly flawed when it comes to our maritime ports, in that it's an overly onerous, overly restrictive process for Australian seafarers which does not apply to foreign seafarers, who are much more likely, because of the conditions that they work in, to be potentially part of organised crime networks. What the minister has been saying today is that things are fine because these seafarers are supervised and because there are maritime security zones which can be established. Clearly, this isn't what happens in reality. Clearly, we have massive gaps in our maritime security that are not being addressed by this bill. Yet, at the same time, there are overly onerous restrictions. It can be months before a seafarer manages to get their MSIC reviewed. And for what purpose? It is not solving the issue of the massive gaps in our port security processes.

With regard to the differences between our airports and our seaports, the Greens are happy to support Labor's proposal today to split the bill. There are different circumstances. But we think that, as far as aviation workers go, this bill is also flawed. There are also issues which have been raised by the Transport Workers Union with the totally opaque process as to whether somebody gets issued with an ASIC, the lack of review and the lack of accountability, if somebody is denied an ASIC, as to why that's the case.

These issues have not been addressed, and they have been on the table, as I said, for four years now. Yet the government just reckon that they are just going to push it through. They're just going to ride roughshod over the interests of workers. Basically you just raise the issue of security and that's meant to make us all say: 'Oh, okay. This is how it has to happen.' But no. You can have a difference between having a problem and what solution you apply to that problem. If we have a problem with our maritime security and our aviation security, with organised crime and drugs coming into the country, then, yes, we need to deal with it. But we do not need to deal with it in the way that has been outlined in this bill, which has many totally unwarranted impacts on workers.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Minister, with the greatest of respect, I know you're repping for the portfolio at the moment, but I think it's integral that we have a little bit of a history lesson for your good self so you can find out exactly what happened with the Sage Sagittarius and Captain Salas. I was the chair of the committee through the whole inquiry. I had the pleasure of sitting next to Senator Barry O'Sullivan when that evidence came out from border security. You don't have to apologise to me, Senator Keneally, about the language because I've worked closely with Barry O'Sullivan and I dearly miss Senator O'Sullivan.

But on that: what we do know is that the Sage Sagittarius is a Japanese owned vessel. We do know—and, forgive me, I can't give the dates because there's a bit going on up here in my brain cells at the moment—Minister Cash, that coming into Newcastle I think it was, one of the sailors on board the ship mysteriously fell overboard. He was missing when it came into port. So one had gone overboard on the way in and then just hours outside Newcastle or wherever it was, one fell down into the hull and was killed. So we had one sailor missing and one killed.

When it got to port, the Japanese owners—and this is all on the record—actually put an undercover detective from Japan onto the Sage Sagittarius before it sailed from our waters. This undercover detective mysteriously fell into the conveyor belt when the ship berthed in Japan to unload. So we have two deaths, as Senator Rice would remember—and as would those of us who were involved in this—and we have one missing overboard. Minister, with the of greatest respect—I'm not blaming you—but your colleague Minister Dutton know exactly every little detail around this sordid issue in our maritime history. Minister Dutton, his officers and advisers at the time know every single, miserable, sordid detail about this death ship.

I'm not pointing to the officers—the crew in the box—with you; I'm going back to Minister Dutton. I'm saying that there are so many mistruths and things which have not been owned up to. You're the poor devil who's carrying the can to get the legislation through. It's a shame that Minister Dutton doesn't reside in this house, because I'd love to see him turn the same colour as the walls in here when the truths are put to him—to see if he could wriggle out of them. I stand by every word I say in this chamber.

Also—and this is a very important part, Minister, which I feel so sorry for you for because your colleague has led you down a dead-end street here—we have to understand that Captain Salas was of interest. As Senator Keneally stated clearly, and as did Senator Sheldon, Captain Salas clearly owned up to gun running and alcohol running. There's no issue about that. Captain Salas sailed off into the sunset, and I know that when the New South Wales coroner's report was on, when they were actually in the courtroom—and, Minister Cash, you've been in courtrooms more than I have; probably me as the witness and you as the prosecutor. I'm saying that because I've always stood up for truckies, I don't care what happens! Where was I? Oh, yes: they couldn't lay charges on Captain Salas because nobody knew where Captain Salas was, except one person. The Australian Federal Police didn't know where Captain Salas was. The New South Wales police didn't know where Captain Salas was. Border protection and immigration didn't know where Captain Salas was. I don't know if they even asked ASIO—I have no idea! I'm saying who I know who didn't know. But there was one very, very sharp, intelligent person, a man by the name of Owen Jacques. He was a reporter for one of the News Corp rags on the Sunshine Coast. Owen rang me here in this building to tell me that he was in the New South Wales courtroom, listening to proceedings. They went to smoko on the proviso that they probably wouldn't come back because they couldn't find Captain Salas.

Owen Jacques went up to the prosecutor in New South Wales and said: 'Guess what, cobber, I know where he is! He's coming into Gladstone tomorrow.' I can't remember the name of the ship; Senator Keneally named it earlier. Captain Salas was coming—can you believe this stuff? You can't write a Hollywood series that goes this badly. He's sailing in, and it's not his first trip—he had come on other ones. But Owen Jacques had the register. It wasn't spooksville: it wasn't stolen from the headquarters up on Russell Street with ASIO. He had it off the internet. Here comes Captain Salas—oh! All of a sudden the place went into a whiz and they got Captain Salas. There you go.

So, Minister, while the advisers can only work on what they're being told, I think someone needs to take a back step really quickly and get back to the chameleon—and I'm not going to apologise for this, unless you pull me up—being Minister Dutton, who has managed to wriggle out of all responsibility here. They knew every single thing that went on exactly. I think there needs to be some real soul searching if you're going to be providing—not to the decent advisers in the box. You poor devils. You only got what you got from Dutton's office previously setting everyone up here. Be very careful what you say. Be very careful how you answer these questions. They're in Hansard. There are a lot of people who are going to follow this up. On saying that, I hope that has painted a far better picture for you, Minister. I can tell you now, when you have the information 24 hours, or if you're lucky 48 hours, offshore, when a captain sends an email to whoever it is to say, 'These are the people I've got on board'—it's actually the shipper that's supposed to be doing it but he's got to get it from somewhere—I can categorically guarantee that all the faces on the passports will match the face of the character that's holding the passport given. That's not a problem. The name will be the same. It will probably have something else that says that's who he or she is. I've got a couple of questions here. When that email comes through to the powers to be to say that we're doing our background checks, just walk me through what happens when whoever it is gets that list to say they can come in. Help me out there, Minister.

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Senator Sterle, for noting that I was not part of the inquiry et cetera. This was done some time ago. I can't add anything further to what you've put on the table. All I can say is the instructions that I have in front of me are at the time there were no known security or character concerns with regard to Captain Salas. As relevant authorities were not aware of character or security concerns regarding Captain Salas an MSIC application would not have picked those up. So I can't at this point in time add anything further to answers that I've previously given.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Minister Cash. So now the powers to be who are going to let these people come in on this ship—whatever it may be—have a list of names in front of them. What do they do with that list?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Again, Senator Sterle, there does seem to have be a conflation of two issues here. I understand that the people that you're referring to would actually go through the maritime crew visa as opposed to the MSIC. They operate as two separate schemes depending on the reason you're coming into the country.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Minister, there is no confliction here. We're talking about tightening up our border controls. We're talking about whatever we can do—which Labor fully supports. How can we stop the influx of illegal drugs coming into our nation? There's no argument. What's left for you to do, Senator Keneally? Would it be like a scene from Life of Brian where you have to paint it 100 times on the Parliament House walls—very clear what you've made there. What we are saying, with no confliction of getting our things mixed up here, is that it is not Australians who are bringing these drugs into our shores. If this government—and I accuse this government of all being smoke and mirrors. I accuse you of being half—I nearly said half arsed; that was lucky—interested in trying to pursue the sheriffs at the gate to stop drugs coming in. I go back to this: when you have a list, the powers to be, that says, 'These are the seafarers, this is the captain, these are the cooks and everything else on the ship', what and who does what with that list?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Senator Sterle, I can provide you with the following information: like all travellers to Australia applicants for an MCV are subject to a range of character and security checking processes and an MCV will not be issued to a person who fails the character test or who is identified as a security risk. I can also provide you with the following information: all crew departing a vessel are required to disembark at an appointed port where there is an Australian Border Force presence. The ABF will conduct an assessment against all vessels. Any risks identified will be treated appropriately. This includes physical checks and other compliance activities. Vessels may request permission to arrive at a non-appointed port without ABF presence. This will only be approved by the ABF if the risk can be managed or the ABF can attend in person. All appointed first ports of entry have facilities to conduct immigration clearance. Vessels are required to enter Australia at an appointed first port of entry where ABF and Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment biosecurity checks can be completed. In circumstances where the ABF or biosecurity grant permission to a vessel to attend a non-appointed port, both agencies will ensure appropriate arrangements or facilities are available to undertake required checks.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Minister. That was long and drawn out. I appreciate what you've just read into the Senate record, but I also remember what was put to the Senate inquiry, which contradicts a lot of those statements where that doesn't happen. But I'll come back to my original question. Sorry, my shorthand is not that good, but you did say, when this magical list of 'who's on my ship' comes to whoever it may be—ABF, I believe. Have ABF got that list? Okay. You said ABF go through a range of—what was the word you used? I'm sorry, I couldn't get it down.

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Assessment.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

What does that assessment involve?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

At this point in time, the department are getting me further information, but, in terms of the ABF's assessment, it is conducted against all vessels, and, as I've stated, any risks identified are treated appropriately. This includes the physical checks and also other compliance activities. Vessels, as I've said, may request permission to arrive at a non-appointed port without ABF presence, but this will only be approved by the ABF if the risks associated with that—which is what you seem to be going to—can be managed or the ABF can attend in person.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

What I am trying to go to is this—and please free feel to pull me up if I'm wrong. A list goes to the ABF, and the ABF run it through whatever they do. Am I right to believe that, if no red flags come up, it's business as usual?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm instructed that, on the basis of what you've said—that no red flags come up—the answer is yes, that would be correct.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm led to believe this is the process for every entry of every foreign vessel into our nation—is this correct?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm instructed that that would be correct.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

On saying that, Minister, I go back to when you said, through your notes there, that nobody had any interest in Captain Salas even though Captain Salas had lost one person overboard; two people had been mysteriously killed on his vessel, one an undercover Japanese detective engaged by the owners; and one person had confessed to him to gun running. I forget the time line; I think it was 2.15 or something like that. All that happened and yet Captain Salas continued to sail into Gladstone and Weipa, and no-one could find him. I don't know if I've missed something, but should there not have been one of these magical emails saying: 'Here I am. Here's the crew. In I come'?

Helen Polley (Tasmania, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Minister? Senator Sterle.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Minister, I find that bitterly disappointing. I find that the height of hypocrisy when we're discussing a bill that goes to 'clamping down on crims and drugs coming into our nation'. I asked a simple question of the minister and the department officials, or the ministerial officials sitting there. You're pushing a bill down the throat of this Senate on falsehoods. The minister can stand at the table and read her notes—I'm not blaming the minister; she's just parroting them—and tell me: 'Nothing gets past us. We would know. There was nothing on Captain Salas.' I have just laid out what I know, what the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport References Committee in the Senate knows, and what all of us who have sat there know—and, Senator Sheldon, thank goodness you've joined us in the last couple of years too. I asked a very simple question on national security, and I stand here gobsmacked that I'm now to be shut down, pushed off; that hopefully I'll go away; that maybe the tucker bell will ring and I forgot to pick up my pie and it will be all over by the time I get back.

I'm giving you the opportunity, Minister, to please either correct the record or put someone in a headlock in the adviser's box and send them upstairs. I cannot let go of the fact that I asked a very simple question. I outlined my concerns and you very clearly answered them: 'Every list that comes off that vessel, whether it be 48 hours or 24 hours, nothing gets past us.' The ABF have their assessments and their range of whatever it was that you said, yet Captain Salas had two years—or two voyages, or whatever it was—in which someone mysteriously fell overboard, two people were murdered on the vessel and there was a confession to gun running. Two years later, Owen Jacques, a reporter with News Corp, brings to my attention that it's not Salas's first trip and that he's coming into Gladstone, as Senator Keneally clearly outlined: Gladstone, Weipa, there are a couple of things. I ask a simple question and, Minister, you can't answer. You are far more intelligent than the persona you've just portrayed to me. You know I always give credit where credit is due. I said very clearly that the chameleon in this place is in another portfolio at the moment. That whole office knows darn well every secret—every dirty, filthy and sordid detail—of this shocking bit of our maritime history. Yet no-one can give me an honest answer.

I say to the people of Australia and I say to the crossbench—I don't have to say it to the Greens or Labor, because we've got it—please get me by the nose and take me in a direction that tells me I've got this wrong—'you' being the LNP Morrison government; we'll forget the dopey Nat half—that this is a massive plus to stop criminality and the influx of illicit drugs coming through our ports. I'm not even talking about aviation. There may be the odd stupid idiot who tries to smuggle something through in an envelope or their bags, but both you and I know, as does everyone in this building, that these drugs are coming on foreign flagged vessels crewed by foreign captains and exploited foreign seafarers.

There's a terrible exploitation of the temporary voyage permit in this nation. When Mr Howard was the Prime Minister and this nonsense first started: if you couldn't find an Australian flagged vessel, you'd go and find a foreign vessel, 'because we've got to move the freight'. We dopey ones thought, 'That sounds fair; we don't want to stop productivity in this nation,' when we should have realised that was the thin edge of the exploitation. We had 95 Australian flagged vessels when Mr Howard was the Prime Minister. Do you know how many we have now? 13.

I asked a very simple question: should every single Australian believe the Morrison LNP government says, 'Nothing gets past us; we know who's coming to these shores. We get a list'? How wrong could you be? 'We get a list, and not only that but it's an email list and it's come to us from 48 hours earlier. Guess what? There were no red flags.' No red flags? You couldn't even find a confessed gun runner who had been working on our shores, in and out, for two years. Who the hell's feet do I lay the blame at? Should I stand here and belittle the poor devils trying to make this crap ball work at the ABF or the Australian Federal Police? No. I think they do a magnificent job. But this government comes in here to pull the wool over the eyes of the Australian people, and you dare go out there and you attack Labor: that we're soft on drug importers because we want to do this properly. You bag us, because we're saying, 'If you're fair dinkum, go all the way.' How can you convince the Australian public that when you stand up there and say you're strong on drugs and you're strong on crime, and then this side of the parliament, Labor and the Greens, and some of the crossbenchers, say, 'Good. Flow that toughness on to the foreign seafarers, the foreign captains, the exploited ones and the ones who may not have had a red flag in 48 hours'?

After all the work I've done on this committee in 16 years—I've sat on eight inquiries into maritime—do you think I'm going to be fooled? Do you think the Australian people are going to be fooled because you people gave us a nod and a wink?

So I will ask one more time, Minister. I will give you the opportunity now that hopefully there's been a flurry of paperwork around. Can you please explain to the Senate and to the good people of Australia how the hell you could look us in the eye and tell us that there were no red flags on Captain Salas, two years after one of his crew went overboard, two years after two deaths on the same voyage, on the Sage Sagittariusthat he's coming to our shores and you don't know?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Senator Sterle, for those comments. Unfortunately, all I can say is that I have actually answered those questions. I don't have anything additional I can present to you that would build on my previous comments. What I would say is that I think this government has shown time and time again that we are committed to keeping Australia and Australians safe.

In terms of the particular bill that we have before us today, this is all about preventing—and you've referred to it—serious criminal influence and activity from occurring at our security controlled airports, seaports and offshore facilities. What we've seen, particularly just last week with Operation Ironside, which gained global media attention, is that organised criminals are taking advantage where they can, and the Morrison government is doing everything it can to stop them. Serious crime, as you've acknowledged, is a major threat to our way of life. In fact, the figure that I have been given is that it costs Australia more than $47 billion a year. Again, as you articulated, it causes enormous human suffering. Our airports and seaports are vectors for the importation of illicit substances and weapons, as you referred to in your contribution to the Senate. That is why the government has introduced this particular piece of legislation to ensure that Australia's transport security sector is no longer a safe haven for serious criminal activity.

We've had a number of years now to consider this legislation. What we are calling on Labor to do today is show that you will join with us to show the Australian people that you are also serious about stopping organised crime by supporting the timely passage of this bill through the Australian Senate. As Senator Pauline Hanson, on behalf of One Nation, stated, 'We need to stop organised criminals getting access to our wharfs and our airports.' The bill is a very simple bill, and it very much goes to the commitment that the Morrison government has to keeping Australia and Australians safe.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Minister, I just have a couple more before I cede to Senator Keneally. Let me ask you this, then, Minister. I went and spoke to the crossbench and the Greens, with the endorsement of the leadership, saying that we wanted to defer the passage of the legislation and go back to the committee because we had a lot more questions to ask, which we did ask—and there were a lot that were unanswered too, Senator Sheldon, which gave me no warmth, I can tell you. But I'll go back to this one. At the time—I can't give the exact date, Minister, because I don't have the copy here, but if I start looking for it I'll find it on Google—there was a large shipment of illicit drugs. I think it may have been heroin or cocaine. I can't remember. It just sort of fell off a ship off the Queensland coast around the same time that this was going through. I'm sure your officials will be well aware of that. What happened with the crew that were on that ship? Can you tell us how this bill has addressed that or will address that?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Senator Sterle. I have no information before me in relation to the example you've raised.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Ben, if you're listening, mate, could you get a copy, and I'll give it to the government. I'll come back to this one then. Minister, it is also a well-known fact, which we established during the inquiry through many witnesses, that the drugs that are flooding our nation and coming through on shipping are not coming in from transactions on the waterfront; they're going out in containers and being delivered to wherever it may be. Please tell me how this bill goes to address that concern of mine. How will making it harder for port employees to get MSICs stop illicit drugs being shipped through containers that are not screened through our ports? You haven't got the screening facility. You have a hit and run every now and again; you have a couple of dogs walking around having a bit of a sniff. Some of our waterside workers, our wharfies, have waited six months for their MSIC.

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Senator Sterle, for those comments. I'm instructed that currently the scope of background checks in the act is limited to only preventing unlawful interference with aviation and maritime infrastructure. To go to the issue that you have raised, the bill will provide for the strengthening of the ASIC and MSIC schemes by ensuring that those with serious criminal convictions or links to organised crime do not exploit the schemes to access the secure areas of our airports, seaports and offshore facilities.

Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Assistant Minister for Road Safety) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'll make this my last one. Minister Cash, I come back to this: drugs are flooding into this nation on ships or via shipping. What I've just said clearly and passed on to you and everyone listening is that the majority of this rubbish is sitting in containers. It may be in foreign languages. It may have a waybill that lies. It may be smuggled in tomato cans or it may be smuggled in car parts; I don't know. We're making it tougher and tougher for Australian waterside workers—wharfies, stevedores or anyone else that goes on a port—to get their MSIC, but we're not lifting one finger to make it any more rigid or harder for the captains and the crews who are bringing these ships in or to benefit our ability to know about them. There's nothing that's going to happen on the port. The containers will still be going out not scanned, and it goes to another part of the drug syndicates.

How does this bill tap that? How does this bill appease the Australian people, who are saying: 'You know what? The Morrison government's not all announcement and no follow-up; they're actually doing something'? How does this bill appease the majority of decent, hardworking men and women in this nation who hate illicit drugs? How can you con them into thinking, 'We're going to make it harder for an Aussie to get an MSIC, but we're not going to do anything to make it easier to know who is coming to our nation, and while they're here they can exploit the temporary voyage permit and cart between Brisbane, Sydney, Melbourne and Perth; they can do three runs, and if they do more than three runs, we'll make sure they pay Aussie wages, but we won't police it'? And, by the way, they've taken off after three. We're absolutely crucifying our rail industry because of this exploitation of the temporary voyage permits and maritime crew visas. Please tell Mr and Mrs Citizen how this bill will make them feel a lot safer with illicit drugs coming out of wherever they're coming from, going to warehouses and other points and being unloaded by crooks. How is this bill going to stop that?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I've answered much of that question in relation to questions that have been put to me by other senators. What I would say to you, in toto, is this: I've already placed on the record that we need to stop organised criminals getting access to our wharves and to our airports, and it is critical to ensure that criminals do not have security credentials to access secure areas of our ports, allowing drugs onto our streets and compromising Australia's supply chains.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'd like to go back to the questions I was asking earlier about security cameras. The minister seems to have indicated—although she hasn't made a declarative statement—that foreign crew can be supervised via a security camera, not by an actual person. When they are accessing unsupervised areas or areas where they should be supervised, they can be supervised via a security camera. The minister has said that it's her understanding that the security camera operator must be located in Australia. Can she confirm that is correct? Does the security camera operator need to have an MSIC?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In relation to the operation of the schemes themselves, both the ASIC scheme and the MSIC scheme, you'd be aware—but I say this for the Hansard record—that they are nationally consistent identification cards that show the holder has met the minimum security requirements to remain unmonitored within an aviation or maritime security zone. All individuals who require an ASIC or MSIC must have a valid background check. To enter an aviation or maritime security zone, an individual must have an operational need for entering the area, and they must display their valid ASIC or MSIC. People who have an operational need to enter a security area, but who do not have in this circumstance an ASIC or MSIC, must be escorted and continuously monitored by an ASIC holder in the secure areas of an airport or by an MSIC holder in the security zones of a port or offshore oil and gas facility.

I have some additional statistics that I can provide the Senate. As at 17 May 2021, there were 120,900 issued ASICs and 101,817 issued MSICs in circulation. In the 2019-20 financial year, AusCheck processed 80,155 ASICs and 40,947 MSIC applications. As I stated, Senator Keneally, those who have an operational need to enter a security area but do not have an ASIC or MSIC must be escorted and continuously monitored by an ASIC holder in the security area of an airport or, in relation to a MSIC, by an MSIC holder in the security zones of a port or offshore oil and gas facility.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Earlier, I asked the minister about that supervision that she has just referred to, and I asked if she could describe, in terms of the operation of the ASIC or the MSIC scheme, how crew are supervised. Is it a one-to-one supervision; is it a one-to-five, a one-to-20? She said there was no ratio. Then I asked if that supervision could occur via security camera. Is the minister saying that foreign crew who do not have an MSIC or ASIC, when they are accessing security zones, have to be both physically supervised and monitored, or can they just be monitored? Can that supervision and monitoring occur via a security camera?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Senator Keneally, it will very much depend on the circumstances. The example that the departmental official has just given me is that if they were in a locked room with another person, then what you may find is that security cameras—as long as the person is being monitored by an ASIC holder or an MSIC holder in the secure area, depending on whether we're talking about an airport or a maritime facility—could be adequate, but it will very much depend on the particular circumstances. To clarify again, for the Hansard record: people who have an operational need to enter a security area but who do not have an ASIC or MSIC, must be escorted and continuously monitored by the ASIC holder in the secure areas of an airport or by an MSIC holder in the security zones of a port or offshore oil and gas facility.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I appreciate the minister's answers, but I don't think I'm quite getting the answer that I'm looking for. Is there ever a circumstance where a foreign crew could be in a secure area monitored and supervised only by a security camera?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

If the person is free to move around, the answer will be no.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm sorry, but what did you just say? If the person is free to move around—

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

If they're not in a secure room.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

They're not in a secure room. If they are not in a secure room—I'm asking if they are in a secure facility, in a secure place, are they being physically supervised? Is there ever a circumstance where they're only being supervised by a security camera?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Senator Keneally, again, just to restate my previous answer: I've been instructed by the department that at all times the person must be escorted or continuously monitored—I think we've established that—by an ASIC holder in the secure areas of an airport or by an MSIC holder in the security zones of a port or offshore oil and gas facility. To put it very simply: depending on the circumstances, if a person is able to move around—if they are in a locked room by themselves and that is defined as the secure area, it may be that the person that is continuously monitoring them, as long as they are an ASIC holder or a MSIC holder, may not have to be physically present in the room with them.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Is it the minister's advice to this parliament, then, that every single member of a foreign crew—that is, people not required to have a MSIC at our maritime ports—is never left unattended in secure areas of maritime ports?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am advised that that is correct. If you have evidence that would support that there has been such a case, could you please provide it so that it can be provided to the relevant authorities?

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I think we've had some evidence provided in various Senate inquiries. I'm seeking to understand: when a foreign crew are walking through a maritime port, is it like an airport? Are the crew required to hand over their passports to immigration officials for inspection?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm instructed: yes.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

We might come back to that. Are there X-ray machines to check out what the crew are taking in and out of the port?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm advised that it'll depend on the port and the deployment of ABF resources, depending on risk et cetera.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Is it your evidence that crew are always required to hand over their passports to immigration officials for inspection?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I'm instructed by the department that the answer is: they should. If there is evidence that this is not occurring, please advise. I'm also instructed by the department that there is no legislative requirement for passengers and crew arriving in Australia, whether by sea or air, to be subjected to security screening—for example, going through a metal detector. All identified risks—this goes to my previous answer—are scrutinised and treated appropriately to prevent the importation of prohibited goods. The ABF deploys specialist capabilities, including detector dogs, to areas of greatest risk and identified need, as informed—this goes to my previous answer—through intelligence.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I think you gave evidence earlier similar to this point I'm about to make—that 72 per cent of amphetamines seized in 2018-19 came through our maritime ports. I was going to ask if there are drug detector dogs at maritime ports; you have said they will be in areas of most significant need or prioritised where there is need. If I were to ask you about foreign pilots of major commercial airlines landing, for example, at Sydney airport, could you tell me what proportion of those pilots would have walked through a metal detector before entering an Australian airport?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

This is something that the department would need to provide, if you're looking for the statistic.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Can you tell me what proportion of Australian pilots have their luggage X-rayed or examined when they enter or exit an airport? Surely you must have some idea.

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The department has said that, if you would like the information, they will seek to obtain it for you. As I previously stated, there is no legislative requirement for passengers and crew arriving in Australia, whether by sea or air, to be subjected to security screening. The example we gave, which you've picked up on, was that of going through a metal detector. All identified risks are scrutinised and treated appropriately to prevent the importation of prohibited goods. As you picked up on in my previous answer, the ABF deploys specialist capabilities, including detector dogs, to areas of greatest risk and identified need, as informed through intelligence.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Minister, I suspect the answer we will get from the department is that it was about aircraft pilots and that it would be close to 100 per cent. Are you able to tell me what proportion of foreign crew at our maritime ports hand over their passports for inspection, go through metal detectors or are assessed by drug detector dogs?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I am advised that they should all have their passports checked. But, in relation to the security screening that you are referring to, again I reaffirm for the record that there is no legislative requirement for passengers and crew arriving in Australia whether by sea or air—in this case, you were talking about by sea—to be subject to security screening and, for example, go through a metal detector. All identified risks are scrutinised and treated appropriately to prevent the importation of prohibited goods. Again, as you picked up on in relation to the detector dogs, the ABF deploys specialist capabilities, including detector dogs, to areas of greatest risk and identified need as informed through the intelligence that they are gathering.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you Minister. I think this goes to the heart of the matter. You've said twice now that there's no legislative requirement. I think if we get the answers we will find out that the practice at airports for foreign crew coming off aeroplanes is they go through metal detectors. They hand over their passports. They are assessed, quite frequently, by drug detector dogs. But when it comes to our maritime ports the practice is different. This is the point that was made by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection in 2017. It said:

There are features of flag of convenience registration, regulation and practice that organised crime syndicates or terrorists may seek to exploit.

…   …   …

This means that FOC ships may be used in a range of illegal activities, including illegal exploitation of natural resources, illegal activity in protected areas, people smuggling, and facilitating prohibited imports or exports …

We heard from Senator Sterle the sad, long saga of Captain Salas and the fact that, according to the minister, we should have known he was coming. We know heaps about him. All the character tests in the world didn't stop him from coming back to Australian ports.

Here we have a circumstance where the government cannot explain the practice that is in place in maritime ports versus airports. But the Australian people have eyes. They see foreign crew at our airports being checked. The government has yet in any forum or any time this has been through a Senate inquiry been able to demonstrate that it has rigorous policies, processes and practices in place. The minister has made reference to the fact—and I will repeat it—that 72 per cent of amphetamines seized in 2018-19 came through our maritime ports. Some 20,000 foreign flagged ships visit Australian ports every year, crewed by some 200,000 crew. Senator Sterle made the point about how few Australian vessels there are these days. We've seen that 83 per cent of cannabis seized in 2018-19 was seized via sea cargo, 24 per cent of MDMA seized in 2018-19 was seized via sea cargo and 11 per cent of heroin seized in 2018-19 was seized via sea cargo.

Minister, you made the point before about the difference between kilograms and tonnes. It was a rather dramatic point—that kilograms come through airports and tonnes come through our maritime ports. That is the point we're making here. Let me ask you this: given the evidence you've just provided, what's to stop a crew member getting off a ship with a couple of kilograms of crystal meth in their backpack and walking straight into an Australian port? What's stopping that?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Again, Senator Keneally, the majority of what the ABF are looking for is actually found in the containers, not necessarily on the particular person themselves. I go back to my previous evidence: there is no legislative requirement for passengers and crew arriving in Australia, whether by sea or air, to be subject to security screening. As we've discussed, in relation to, for example, a metal detector, all identified risks—this is what the benefit of intelligence is—are scrutinised and treated appropriately to prevent the importation of prohibited goods. So, depending on the level of intelligence that has been gained by the ABF themselves, they will then seek to deploy specialist capabilities, including—and we've referred to them—detector dogs, to areas of greatest risk and identified need as informed through intelligence. This is why the gathering of intelligence is such an important part of the Australian Border Force's functions.

Kristina Keneally (NSW, Australian Labor Party, Deputy Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

If I'm understanding the government correctly, they can't actually answer the questions that we're putting about why someone like Captain Salas—who is just one of many examples—has been able to access Australian maritime ports. They can't tell us how many foreign crew actually have their passports checked, are actually assessed by metal detectors and are actually subject to drug detector dogs. They can't really explain why it takes just 24 to 48 hours to get a maritime crew visa but some three months to get an MSIC for an Australian worker. Let me be clear again: Labor is all about supporting tougher border security controls. We maintain our concern, and I am disappointed that the government are indicating that they're not willing to take the opportunity either to provide their own solution to foreign crew problems, first identified by the former Department of Immigration and Border Protection, or to accept our amendment. So our position remains that, while this bill seeks to make some improvements, it doesn't go far enough. It is not tough enough. It does not take the appropriate security measures that are necessary at our maritime ports.

While the revelations on 60 Minutes from the head of the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, Mike Phelan, about the facilitation and importation of drugs into the country are quite concerning, they do go to show that the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission has made significant strides when it comes to airports, and we congratulate them and the AFP. What we are concerned about is that there has yet to be any action on the evidence provided by the department in terms of the risks posed by flag-of-convenience vessels. So I have to express my extreme disappointment that the government is leaving this gaping hole in our border security, and I flag that we in the Australian Labor Party continue to take this seriously. We will continue to look at other ways to address the gaping hole that the government seems intent on leaving in its legislation. I know that Senator Sheldon has some additional questions. I'm going to ask him, rather than ask another question myself. If we have some time before we move out of this amendment, I may come back to some additional questions.

Tony Sheldon (NSW, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I want to draw to the minister's attention an article from 12 March 2021 by Laura Chung in the Sydney Morning Herald. The heading of this particular story is 'Rough seas and dim light: Inside the fishing boat raid to nab 200kg of cocaine'. In what appears to have been an early morning raid, the article describes:

… on Thursday morning as authorities trailed a small fishing boat in Port Botany. Authorities spent two days training for the operation to seize hundreds of kilograms of cocaine, search two boats — including a 330-metre ship — and arrest a 27-year-old Australian man. Police will allege a small boat was launched from Port Botany, south of Sydney, to meet its 330-metre mother ship, the MSC Joanna, which originated in Antwerp, Belgium. Drugs, believed to have been stored on the larger ship, were transferred to the small fishing boat.

I have some other questions on this, but can the minister explain what the steps are for the assessment for a maritime crew visa? What are the actual checks that are done?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Thank you, Senator Sheldon. I'm sure you do know the answer, but I will advise as follows: the maritime crew visa—otherwise known as the MCV—allows a noncitizen to enter and temporarily remain in Australia as a member of a crew, or a non-military ship to undertake work that meets the normal operational requirements of that ship. Maritime crew visas are—again, you're probably aware—multiple entry visas which are valid for three years. A 'non-military ship' means a ship that is engaged in commercial trade or the carriage of passengers for reward; or that is owned and operated by a foreign government for the purposes of scientific research; or that has been accorded public vessel status by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. A non-military ship does not include a vessel which has been imported under the Customs Act 1901 and is not registered in the Australian International Shipping Register.

A licence issued under the Coastal Trading (Revitalising Australian Shipping) Act 2012 exempts international ships engaged in domestic trade from importation. The Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications is the authority responsible for (a) determining if the vessel has been imported and (b) licences issued under the Coastal Trading Act. Since 2012, foreign flagged ships have the ability to remain in Australian waters on 12-month temporary licences granted by the Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Communications and, currently, crew maintain their lawful visa status on their maritime crew visa for the duration of the ship's licensed temporary stay in Australian waters.

Tony Sheldon (NSW, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

So, Minister, from what you explained to me, there is no real check—because you haven't given us what the check is specifically of those MCV holders. It does raise deep concerns in light of this cocaine importation that there is not an appropriate check of these particular crew members. I want to just step through this. Minister, what are the MSIC and ASIC tests and what agencies carry out those tests?

Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Deputy Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In the first instance, I will take you through what the difference is in the background checks for what we were previously talking about, which was the maritime crew visa—or the MCV, as it is known—and the MSIC. In terms of the MSIC and the background check that is undertaken: an identity check, a security assessment by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation—otherwise known as ASIO—a criminal history check by the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission and an immigration check by the Department of Home Affairs. In terms of the MCV, the public interest criteria assessment is undertaken as follows, and I will refer to public interest criteria as 'PIC': PIC 4001 (character), which includes a criminality assessment; PIC 4002, which is the national security assessment; PIC 4003, which is the weapons of mass destruction; PIC 4004, debts to the Commonwealth; PIC 4013—

Progress reported.