Matthew Canavan (Queensland, Liberal National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

On behalf of Senator Fawcett, I present the 151st report of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Treaty tabled on 28 October 2014, and I seek leave to incorporate the tabling statement in Hansard.

Leave granted.

The document read as follows—

Report 151: Treaty tabled on 28 October 2014

Joint Standing Committee on Treaties

For tabling on 8 September 2015

Mr President, today I present Report 151 for the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties.

Mr President, Report 151 deals with the Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of India on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy.

The Agreement offers the potential for Australia to become one of the world leaders in supplying fuel for low-carbon emission electrical power in expanding economies.

While there are considerable benefits for Australia and India, the Agreement is not without risk. The Committee has taken the time to consider those risks carefully, and has made a number of recommendations.

But first, Mr President, I will discuss the benefits. The Agreement has the potential to double the size of the Australian uranium mining industry, adding $1.75bn to the Australian economy and doubling employment in uranium mining and export.

These benefits will occur mostly in rural and regional areas of Australia.

For India, the Agreement will help with the goal of growing electricity generation from a base of 408kWh per capita per year in 2001 to 5,300kWh per capita per year in 2052.

It will also provide a reliable supply of fuel, which is important to India's energy security.

Mr President, India is one of a small number of nuclear armed countries that have not signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is a barrier to nuclear cooperation, as the NPT has effectively limited nuclear proliferation.

However, given India's strategic situation, it is not realistic to expect India to dismantle its nuclear arsenal.

The Agreement represents a new, and not uncontroversial, approach to non-proliferation - treating India as if it were a party to the NPT. That is, India can obtain uranium if it meets the nuclear safety and security standards expected of other nuclear armed states.

Mr President, the Committee heard in evidence that many NPT countries object to this new approach.

If the new approach is going to work, India needs to make concrete non-proliferation advances to calm the fears of NPT countries.

To that end, the Committee recommends that Australia commit significant diplomatic resources to encouraging India to become a party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty.

The Committee also recommends the Australian Government consider facilitating the negotiation of a nuclear arms limitation treaty for the Indian subcontinent region.

Mr President, the Committee is concerned about flaws in India's nuclear regulatory arrangements identified by the Indian Auditor General and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The regulatory flaws are enough of a concern to the Committee for it to recommend that no Australian nuclear fuel be sold to India until they are addressed.

Mr President, the Committee also examined a number of concerns with the Agreement itself.

Many inquiry participants are concerned that Australian nuclear material in India may not be properly accounted for.

The accounting mechanisms for exported Australian nuclear materials are part of confidential Administrative Arrangements.

To ensure proper accounting of Australian nuclear material in India, the Committee held a private briefing with the Director-General of the Australian Safety and Non-Proliferation Office to discuss the matter.

The Director-General was able to say that the Administrative Arrangement negotiated with India would allow him to report the disposition of Australian nuclear material in India, as required by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation (Safeguards) Act of 1987.

Based on this advice, the Committee trusts that Australian nuclear material can be tracked and accounted for.

Finally, experienced legal practitioners who participated in the inquiry appear to have differing interpretations of a couple of aspects of the Agreement, leaving the Committee unable to determine which interpretation was correct.

The Committee has recommended in each case that the Australian Government outline the legal advice it has received.

Mr President, having regard to these recommendations, the Committee considers that binding treaty action can be taken.

Mr President, I would like to thank the Australian Government for its patience while the Committee undertook the inquiry, and I would also like to thank the engaged and experienced participants to this inquiry.

Mr President, on behalf of the Committee, I commend the Report to the Senate.

I move:

That the Senate take note of the report.

Rachel Siewert (WA, Australian Greens) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I take note of the report and I seek leave to continue my remarks later.

Leave granted; debate adjourned.