Gavin Marshall (Victoria, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

On behalf of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, I present the report of the committee, Review of administration and expenditure: No. 8––Australian intelligence agencies, and seek leave to move a motion in relation to the report.

Leave granted.

I move:

That the Senate take note of the report.

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security’s oversight of the Australian intelligence community, the AIC, is a key element of our national security architecture. I am therefore pleased to present the eighth review of the administration and expenditure of the Australian intelligence community by the PJCIS.

This review examined a wide range of aspects of the administration and expenditure of the six intelligence and security agencies, including the financial statements for each agency and their human resource management, training, recruitment and accommodation. The committee made a total of eight recommendations as a result of this review which cover a number of important issues that arose during the course of the inquiry. I will now refer to four of the committee’s recommendations in more detail.

During this review the committee found that a significant inconsistency exists in the committee’s oversight of the Australian intelligence community. The committee took evidence from a number of the agencies that they have attachments or secondments within the AFP. Since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States and terrorist attacks in Bali, the AFP has been increasingly involved in counterterrorist activities and there are sections of the AFP that have been created to address significant counterterrorism and national security functions. It is clear to the committee that the AFP has evolved to include a significant intelligence function and that sections of the AFP have deep operational and intelligence linkages with the Australian intelligence community. The committee therefore recommends that the Intelligence Services Act 2001 be amended to include AFP counterterrorism elements in the list of organisations that the committee reviews.

The committee takes the view that, in considering parliamentary oversight of the AIC, it is essential that all of the agencies with a significant role in intelligence come before the same committee of the parliament. In order for parliamentary oversight to be effective all agencies need to report to the one committee. Without this oversight, it is inevitable that black spots in knowledge and supervision will dramatically impair the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight. ASIO, ASIS, DIO, DSD, DIGO and ONA all currently report to the intelligence and security committee. Requiring the AFP counterterrorism elements to appear before the PJCIS would reflect normal oversight practice as applied to all other Commonwealth departments and agencies.

The committee also examined the issue of access to information beyond administration and expenditure. In the committee’s view, it is clearly impossible to conduct any meaningful review of the administration and expenditure of the Australian intelligence community without knowledge of their activities, operations, skills, methods and the product they create all being made available to the committee. This has been acknowledged by previous committees and by the Australian intelligence community.

The committee therefore recommends that the government agree to amend the Intelligence Services Act to enable specific material which does not affect current operational activity to be provided to the committee. A small working group drawn from relevant departments, agencies and the committee should be set up to prepare this amendment for consideration by the government.

The review also examined archival practices as a result of the government’s proposal to reduce the open access period specified in the Archives Act 1983 from 30 to 20 years. The committee took evidence from all the agencies that moving from a 30-year archiving regime to a 20-year regime would result in an increased workload and increased redactions. On the evidence available to the committee the committee concludes that a document released at 20 years would be more redacted than one released at 30 years. This would have the unintended consequence of providing less information to the public than at present although providing it 10 years earlier. The committee recommends that, should the proposal to amend the open access period of the Archives Act 1983 proceed, consideration should be given to special provisions for the AIC documents to be exempted, on a case-by-case basis, from release at 20 years.

The committee took the opportunity afforded by this review to look at the budget of the Office of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, the OIGIS. The OIGIS’s budget has not grown in line with ASIO’s budget growth. In light of the increases in the number of personnel and activities of the AIC as well as an expansion in the IGIS’s role, the committee recommends that the budget of the OIGIS be increased.

Overall, the committee is satisfied that the administration and expenditure of the six intelligence and security agencies is sound, and it thanks the heads of the Australian intelligence community agencies and all those who contributed to this review. Lastly, I would like to thank the secretariat. I commend the report to the Senate.

Question agreed to.