Andrew Bartlett (Queensland, Australian Democrats) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

by leave—I move:

That the Senate take note of the documents.

Again I note that it is reasonable to guess that next Thursday we may not get the opportunity to speak to these types of documents, and this may well be the last opportunity for the Senate to have any debate on these responses. These are government responses to reports of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties tabled on 6 December 2006 and 8 December 2006. The first is the response to the treaties committee report that examined the intent of the federal government to enable the sale of uranium to China, and the second deals with the adoption of the Lombok Treaty, which is the security treaty between Australia and Indonesia. I think that was actually tabled more recently than is indicated here.

As a member of the treaties committee, I simply want to re-emphasise that on both occasions all members, except for me, of the treaties committee—that is, the Labor and Liberal members of the committee—supported the federal government in establishing a treaty to enable the sale of uranium to China and to establish a security treaty with Indonesia. I dissented on both occasions, but on both occasions the committee also brought down extra recommendations. With regard to the transfer of nuclear material to China there were seven recommendations, two of which were to adopt the various treaties. There were five other recommendations to try to address some of the flaws, risks or shortcomings that the committee identified in the broader process of the transfer of nuclear material between Australia and the communist regime running the People’s Republic of China.

It is, therefore, appropriate to examine the government responses. They are not just saying, ‘Yes, we agreed with the committee agreeing with us.’ These recommendations were ones the committee put forward as mitigating factors or as ways to ameliorate the risks that were identified in the course of the inquiry. The committee’s first recommendation in this area was that the Australian government provide funding for intensive research and development in the area of energy generation using thorium reactors, with the purpose of comparing its waste and energy generation capacity to conventional nuclear reactors. In effect, the government rejected this recommendation. It says the government has no plans to fund intensive R&D in thorium power reactors. There is a rationale given from the government, but it is disappointing.

The second recommendation was that the Australian government, through its membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency, call for an urgent review of the atomic energy agency’s funding requirements and that Australia sets a lead by increasing its voluntary contributions and lobbies other governments to do likewise. Whilst, again, the federal government gives a response to this, the response is a bunch of bureaucratic hot air that basically says no. Again, that is very disappointing. It is just some mealy-mouthed foreign affairs bureaucratic speak that says that the government will continue to monitor the International Atomic Energy Agency’s funding requirements and details how much support has been provided through the Australian safeguard support program. It totally rejects the committee’s recommendations. This is serious. Even though the committee said, ‘We will accept the adoption of an agreement to transfer nuclear material between Australia and China,’ as part of that they clearly identified that the International Atomic Energy Agency is struggling enormously to adequately perform its role of monitoring these sorts of transfers of nuclear material, that it needed more funding and that Australia should lead by increasing our contributions—and the government has said no. I think that is actually a very serious problem.

The third recommendation was that the Australian government lobby the International Atomic Energy Agency and the five declared nuclear weapons states under the non-proliferation treaty to make the safeguarding of all conversion facilities mandatory. The federal government does not accept this recommendation. These were recommendations put forward by the Democrats in our antinuclear position. My position was not to have a nuclear transfer with China at all. This is a majority recommendation by the rest of the committee, the unanimous agreement between the Liberal and Labor members of the committee that we should make the safeguarding of all conversion facilities mandatory under the non-proliferation treaty, and the federal government says no. It is actually a serious problem. The committee clearly recognised that there are real shortcomings in the adequacy of the monitoring process even under existing arrangements under the non-proliferation treaty and of the role and ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The last couple of recommendations dealt with increasing the funding allocation to the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office. The federal government response does not actually say, ‘We don’t agree’; it just gives a bit of bureaucratic hot air that it does not agree. It certainly does not indicate any intention of following that recommendation. The fifth recommendation is:

The Committee recommends that the Australian government continue its dialogue with the Chinese Government about governance and transparency issues with a view to the Australian Government offering practical support where appropriate.

Again the government does not even say it accepts that recommendation; it just gives a bit of nice bureaucratic-speak in general after that. That is particularly concerning, particularly as we are moving towards the lead-up to the Olympics, less than a year away. In communist China, particularly in Beijing, human rights abuses are, according to many reports, as bad as ever. The lack of interest in improving governance and transparency is as bad as ever and, whatever the Australian government has been doing with regard to its dialogue on this matter, it is not working terribly well. Even with the recommendations put forward by both major parties in this report to ameliorate the reality of Australia adopting a nuclear transfer treaty with China, in effect those concerns have been swept to one side by the federal government. It is a very poor response.

With respect to the responses to report No. 84 of the Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, the report into the security cooperation agreement with Indonesia, my view was that we should not adopt that treaty, but the Labor and Liberal members of the committee agreed that we should and put forward four other recommendations to address some of the serious concerns that were raised during the process. The first recommendation is:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government continue to address widely expressed concerns about human rights in Indonesia with the Indonesian Government and in appropriate international fora.

The Australian government does not actually say it agrees with that; it just talks about what its record is. The second recommendation is:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government increase transparency in defence cooperation agreements to provide assurance that Australian resources do not directly or indirectly support human rights abuses in Indonesia.

The Australian government’s response is basically, ‘The things we do at the moment are satisfactory.’ I do not think that meets the concerns that the committee identified, although it is not for me to speak on their behalf. The third recommendation is:

The Committee recommends that the Australian Government encourage the Indonesian Government to allow greater access for the media and human rights monitors in Papua.

We had the absurd situation where we continually got assurances that the human rights situation in West Papua was not all that bad and that we should not be that worried that any cooperation between Australia and Indonesian military officials might involve skilling up Indonesian military officials who would then be involved in human rights abuses in West Papua. In between all of those assurances, we still had the absurdity of being made aware that people cannot get in there to see what is happening. Frankly, it does not fill me with a lot of confidence to be told that the human rights situation in West Papua is not too bad, but it is almost impossible for people to get in there and see for themselves or to get any sort of independent verification of that. There was a recent visit to Papua by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative on the situation of human rights defenders, as the government notes, and that is a welcome step. I support that. I am certainly not taking a blind Indonesian-bashing approach on this, as my comments in the report and in this chamber have indicated. But I do not think the Australian government’s response provides enough recognition of the sense of seriousness of the concerns that were raised through the treaties committee process and through the inquiry. I note the fourth recommendation about engaging in a campaign to increase public awareness of the Australia-Indonesia relationship. That is something that I think is very important. The Australia-Indonesia Institute, which is funded through the Australian government, does play a positive role and it is important that we do explore further opportunities to enhance a domestic awareness of the relationship between Australia and Indonesia.

Whilst these responses are much quicker than the government’s response to other reports, I do not think they show sufficient recognition or respect for the cross-party concerns expressed in the reports. I seek leave to continue my remarks later.

Leave granted; debate adjourned.