Michaelia Cash (WA, Liberal Party, Leader of the Opposition in the Senate) Share this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Commonwealth Entities Legislation Amendment Bill 2026. At first glance, this bill is presented as routine—in fact, as a technical exercise in what the government calls 'governance modernisation'. Sadly, though, when you look closely at the bill and when you actually examine what it does, a very different picture emerges. The bill increases ministerial influence over statutory officeholders. It introduces new grounds for suspension and termination. It allows ministers to set performance standards that are not subject to disallowance or automatic tabling. And it gives the Attorney-General an express statutory power to issue general directions to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel, the body that is actually responsible for the drafting of Commonwealth laws. These are not minor changes. They go to the heart of how statutory offices operate and the balance between independence and executive oversight. And that is exactly why the bill requires proper scrutiny.

On 5 March 2026, which is nearly three weeks ago now, the coalition sought to refer this bill to a Senate committee, not to block it, not to delay it for the sake of delay but to test it. We are the house of review. We wanted to hear from the experts. We wanted to hear from the affected agencies to understand the rationale and to identify any unintended consequences. This is how this place, the Australian Senate, is supposed to work. What did the government do? Well, this was three weeks ago, and we're only starting to address the bill tonight. They refused scrutiny.

Let's be very clear about what happened. The government introduced legislation that expands executive influence and then prevented that expansion from being examined through the usual committee process. There have been no hearings, no evidence, no expert input, no structured scrutiny. That is, quite frankly, not how good legislation is made. And, when a government declines scrutiny, particularly on a bill of this nature, the Senate is entitled to ask why.

The government calls this 'modernisation'. But, quite frankly, slogans are not substitutes for substance. The bill applies to four bodies: the Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research, Austrade, the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office and the Office of Parliamentary Counsel. And it does five key things. First, it extends appointment terms to five years. Second, it introduces additional termination grounds, including serious misconduct and unsatisfactory performance. Third, it allows ministers to issue written performance standards. Fourth, it issues suspension powers. And, fifth, it gives the Attorney-General the power to issue general written directions to the Office of Parliamentary Counsel.

Individually, each of these measures may be presented as incremental, but the issue is the framework they create when taken together, because, under this model, the minister may set performance expectations, the minister may assess performance against those expectations, and, subject to any statutory grounds and processes, the minister may suspend or terminate. The practical effect is a system in which the executive plays a central role at each stage. This effectively represents a shift in the balance of power towards greater executive control.

The most basic question in any reform is this: What is the problem this bill is designed to fix? Where is the evidence of systemic governance failure? Where is the review identifying deficiencies across these bodies? But, more importantly, where is the policy case explaining why these additional powers unnecessary? The government quite deliberately has yet again not provided the parliament with a clear evidence based justification. Because, yet again, a committee inquiry was refused, the Senate has not had the opportunity to properly test whether such a justification exists. Instead, the parliament is being asked to accept these changes, accept that they are appropriate, without, yet again—this is a pattern of behaviour with this government—the benefit of scrutiny. It is not a sound basis for reform.

If this bill reflects a broader approach to governance, another obvious question arises: Why only these four entities? Why not ASIC? Why not the ACCC? Why not APRA? Why not other statutory officeholders with comparable responsibilities? If this is part of a broader reform agenda, the parliament should actually be told. If it's not and these entities have been selected for particular treatment, then the rationale should be clearly explained. Selective reform without a clear and transparent justification raises legitimate questions and consistency about principle.

One of the significant features of the bill is the introduction of ministerial performance standards. These standards are not incidental. They may form the basis against which performance is assessed, and a finding of unsatisfactory performance may in turn support termination. This is a significant mechanism, but these standards are not legislative instruments. They are not subject to disallowance. They are not subject to automatic tabling, which means that the parliament may not have visibility over the standards used to assess performance. So the parliament is being asked to accept a framework in which performance expectations may be set by the executive, these expectations may be used to assess an officeholder and action may follow without a guaranteed mechanism for parliamentary oversight of those standards. This significantly reduces transparency and limits the parliament's ability to scrutinise how these powers are exercised.

The bill also introduces or clarifies suspension powers. Suspension, as we all know, is a serious step. It removes an officeholder from their functions. It can affect reputation. It can disrupt the operation of an agency. And yet the transparency arrangements are not consistent across the entities. For ASNO, there's no provision for public notification. For others, there is no equivalent uniform requirement for visibility. This raises a simple question. If suspension is a serious step in every case, why is transparency not applied consistently? Where parliament creates statutory officers, it is reasonable that significant actions affecting those officers are visible to the parliament.

These issues are particularly important in relation to the Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office. ASNO plays a critical role in Australia's international obligations, including engagement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and treaty partners. Its independence is essential both in fact and in perception. The bill does not apply unsatisfactory performance as a termination ground for the director. That reflects an acknowledgement of the importance of independence, but the bill does introduce a suspension power. While not equivalent to termination, a suspension can have comparable practical consequences, particularly if exercised at a sensitive time. It is therefore important that the operation of that power and its safeguards are clearly justified and understood. For ASNO, there is no provision for public notification. For others, there is no equivalent uniform requirement for visibility, and, again, this raises a very simple question. If suspension is a serious step, why is transparency not applied consistently?

The bill also amends the framework for the Office of Parliamentary Counsel. OPC is central to the Commonwealth's legislative process. Its work depends on professional independence, technical integrity and trust in its neutrality. The bill provides that the Attorney-General may issue general written directions to OPC. Even confined to general directions, this is a significant development. Such directions may inference policy priorities, process or operations and therefore shape how legislative drafting is undertaken. Importantly, these directions again are not legislative instruments. They are not subject to disallowance and they are not subject to automatic tabling, which means that there is no guaranteed mechanism for parliamentary visibility over how this power is exercised. This is a matter of institutional importance for the parliament.

The coalition supports sound governance and appropriate accountability, but accountability must be accompanied by transparency. An increase to executive power must be matched by appropriate oversight. This bill expands executive influence. It limits guaranteed parliamentary visibility in key areas, and it does so without having been subject to the level of scrutiny that legislation of this nature warrants. When the coalition sought to refer this bill for examination, that scrutiny was refused. That is not consistent with a government confident in its own legislation, and for this reason the coalition will now oppose the bill. We continue to make this simple point: where legislation expands executive power, the parliament should be given the opportunity to properly examine it. This did not occur here. That is why this bill should not proceed in its current form. It requires scrutiny. As I said, we're seeking to delay it not for the sake of delay but to actually ensure that the Senate does the job that we are sent here to do, and that is to properly scrutinise the legislation that is before us.

Debate interrupted.