Jim Molan (NSW, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

( Australia faces what is without doubt the most uncertain strategic environment it has faced since 1945. For the last 75 years Australia has achieved prosperity and security to a degree almost unheard of in human history.Much of that security and prosperity is due to the stabilising presence of the United States. I acknowledge, as someone who has worked with, trained and fought beside the United States, that the United States is far from a perfect power but it is a far better world power than many others. Australia has benefited from the relationship with the United States. But the world is changing and Australia is trying to change to accommodate the new world. The new world has characteristics of the old world. The new world is still based on power politics. The new world has nations and leaders who do not have as much of an interest in the world order as Australia does. The new world has powers like China who look back on the appalling way that the old world treated them and want to take that out on the new world—on our world.

For 75 years, when most of our critical infrastructure was built, Australia knew that, because of our geographical location and because of our alliances, we faced no direct threat in this country. This was a luxury that we are only now really coming to appreciate. We now find that our region, the Indo-Pacific or the western pacific or whatever you want to call it, is pretty well the centre of the world's strategic environment and certainly the world's interest. Several things are happening in our region which make the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill 2021 and the government amendments in 2021 very important indeed.

The first is that the military power of the United States to stabilise our region has fallen by 30 to 50 per cent since the end of the Cold War. This is admitted by the United States in how they express their national defence strategy. For a long period of time many of us have thought that the United States' power was infinite. It's not and we might find ourselves on our own.

The second is that we've seen an increase in the military power of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea. China has the largest army, navy, maritime militia, integrated air defence and what are called substrategic rocket and missile forces in the world. Qualitatively they are approaching the standard of the United States. Let's not forget that Russia is a Pacific power with close military and economic links to China. Let's not forget that Iran is the source of just about every problem in the Middle East at the moment and is supposedly a month away from getting the bomb. Of course North Korea is an unpredictable nuclear power with an unpredictable leader.

The third thing that is relevant to Australia's situation and this bill is that we in Australia have seen over the last two COVID years how vulnerable Australia is to outside influence, in terms of not just supply chain issues, which are terrifyingly real, but also an ability by external actors to reach into any country through cyberspace and impact on our day-to-day life.

Much of our prosperity is due to our interconnected world. Much of the efficiency of how our country functions is due to that interconnectedness. Much of the way our security—internal and external—functions relies on cyberspace. The use of actual space, where satellites fly, depends on cyberspace for the transmission of data. The crossover between cyberspace and the real world is now what is important. At present we are probed in cyberspace thousands of times per day. Many of those probes are successful. Some are from criminals, some are from countries and some are malign actors that exist between criminals and nations. What we see today is nothing compared to what we might see in the lead-up to conflict or to war. We have not seen one country, such as China or Russia, apply their full cyber-resources to attacking another country through cyberspace. We have not seen it yet. We've seen small examples in the Baltic countries, probably by Russia. We have seen impacts on parts of India's electricity sector, probably by China. But we will only see the full cybercapability of certain nations applied to other countries in the lead-up to, or actually in, war. And the prospect of war in our region is real. China says it will reincorporate Taiwan, even if it has to use force. President Biden has reaffirmed US support for Taiwan, which makes the US policy of ambiguity even more ambiguous. These are worrying times.

Australia, as a nation, is vulnerable, and this bill is one step in addressing our vulnerabilities. The level of cyberattacks on Australia's critical infrastructure is bad enough now, but in certain circumstances it could be much worse. Most of us are aware of the reliance of our hospitals, transport, financial systems and military systems on the internet, but what many don't realise is that many of our military systems rely on exactly the same civilian systems to pass data as do hospitals, transport and banks. Our infrastructure has never been more important than it is now, and we need this bill.

Amendments to this bill will ensure that the government is well placed to assist entities and those responsible for critical infrastructure assets to respond to serious cyberattacks as the first step in strengthening Australia's critical infrastructure security. The reforms outlined in the amended bill will strengthen Australia's ability to respond to serious cyberattacks on critical infrastructure. This bill expands the definition of critical infrastructure to include energy; communications; financial services; the defence industry; higher education and research; data storage or processing; food and groceries; health care and medical; space technology; transport; and water and sewage sectors. It introduces a cyberincident reporting regime for critical infrastructure assets. It makes government assistance available to industry as a last resort, subject to appropriate limitations. Under this bill, government will be able to provide assistance immediately prior to, during or following a significant cybersecurity incident to ensure the continued provision of essential services.

The Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 strengthened the Australian government's capacity to identify and manage the national security risk of espionage, sabotage and coercion resulting from foreign involvement in Australia's critical infrastructure. The government amendment to this bill amends the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018, and is the first phase. The second phase of these reforms will be implemented by further amending the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018, capturing the remaining elements from the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill, and the risk management programs, systems of national significance and enhanced cybersecurity obligations of industry. Recommendations six to 14 of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security are currently being considered by the government. I recommend this bill to the Senate.