Rex Patrick (SA, Centre Alliance) Share this | Hansard source

I am in continuation, but I would like to draw your attention to the state of the chamber, Acting Deputy President Kitching. (Quorum formed)

Sitting suspended from 18:29 to 19:30

The Senate last discussed the Crimes Legislation Amendment (Police Powers at Airports) Bill 2019 on 29 September. Given the passage of time, I'll briefly reiterate some of the remarks I was making.

As originally drafted, this bill was certainly flawed. That was rather unfortunate, because this law has the potential to have a direct impact on more Australians than any other piece of national security legislation, noting that most Australians will at some stage, and often regularly, go to airports. Soon, however, as a consequence of this legislation, visitors to our major airports will be well advised to check that they are carrying photographic identification, because they could be stopped by the Australian Federal Police and asked to identify themselves. If a person's not prepared to do so, they'll face significant fines. If considered to be a problem for aviation security, they'll also be at risk of being banned from their flight or being ejected from the airport—banned for up to 24 hours.

Minister Dutton has said that people won't be randomly checked. However, police officers will certainly enjoy significant discretion to demand identity checks and to expel people on security grounds. Missing a flight may involve significant costs for a person who has broken no law but, by virtue of background or association, falls within the intelligence risk profile. And of course we know that while police do a good job they don't always get the intelligence right 100 per cent of the time. Moreover, these new powers may easily be focused on particular ethnic and religious groups, so de facto ethnic and cultural profiling is a significant risk.

This bill has been amended since it was first introduced by the government. The government agreed to a number of recommendations by the PJCIS, and one presumes that therefore it will soon pass through. I'd just like to make a couple of points in conclusion. The first is that, beyond the specific powers contained in the legislation, a great deal will depend on the operational practices, the culture and the use of intelligence by the Federal Police. While the annual reporting requirements will provide us with some general statistics on the use of these powers, the parliament needs to keep a close eye on just how the AFP goes about exercising these powers. This legislation, as I said before, has the potential to impact on a large number of people. And most young people don't carry IDs anymore; they don't carry wallets, because their iPhone or their Samsung can do much of their credit card transactions and they may not feel the need to have ID upon them.

In times of terrorist threat or international tension, the legislation could be used to help the public, but it could also be applied with disproportionate focus on particular groups and communities within our diverse society. The operational impacts of this legislation will need to be subject to review, both through the Senate estimates process and, given the sensitive security and intelligence background, through the PJCIS. This will be essential so that the parliament and the travelling public can be assured that the operational use of these new powers is proportionate and effective. Consequently, to provide appropriate parliamentary review, Centre Alliance will move an amendment to the bill to insert a four-year sunset clause on the operation of these new powers and a second amendment requiring that within no longer than three years the PJCIS must undertake a review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of these new powers as well as security matters at major airports more generally. That review would be required to be completed within nine months—that is, before the sunset clause would take effect. The parliament has included similar review and sunset clauses in other major counterterrorism and security legislation. Such measures are appropriate in relation to this bill given its potential impact on the travelling public.

My other concluding observation arises from the inevitability that the Department of Home Affairs, the Federal Police and other law enforcement agencies will, in due course, say, 'Why stop at airports?' Similar security considerations may apply to other places where large numbers of people gather—railway stations, bus interchanges, sporting matches, music festivals or, indeed, any crowded shopping mall. No-one would be surprised if this federal legislation sent a signal to state police to do similar sorts of things, just as we saw with the very, very narrow application of intercept powers when they originally came in. Now, they are commonplace across every jurisdiction. We may all be safe, but with each successive tranche of security legislation there is an incremental but significant change in the relationship between citizens and government operatives. Privacy and freedom of movement will no longer be rights, but they are incrementally subject to even greater discretion on the part of law enforcement, security and intelligence agencies. So we do need to consider the big picture, and we must make sure we do our job in respect of accountability.