Kim Carr (Victoria, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

If the senator had actually listened, the whole point of this was to do with the fact that this is a bill to go over six years. It's to do with the future of this country's economic position—if you had been listening, Senator, you would have appreciated the fundamental problem of dealing with a global downturn rather than trying to play these games with a six-year delay in a tax measure—which is a much more serious question for us to deal with. Instead of playing, what I might say are, semantic procedural points, I suggest you might pay a little more attention to what's actually said.

I might also draw your attention to the inconsistency between saying that one of our major electronics companies is, on the one hand, a security threat and, on the other hand, that concessions can be made if the right trade deal can be made in the interests of the United States, irrespective of the consequences for everyone else, and is a matter that does require attention.

What we have are, of course, dual messages that are being presented to us. What we have is the American President saying that it's possible Huawei would be included in a trade deal, and it was said 'a vital deal'. And he told CNBC in May of this year:

I could imagine Huawei being included in some form or some part of it.

He also said:

Huawei is something that is very dangerous.

You look at what they've done from a security standpoint, a military standpoint. Very dangerous.

The claims that are being made about the American trade interests and the security interests are quite incompatible. They make no sense at all. Mr Trump, of course, would know that it can't be credible for the Chinese to stop spying any more than it's credible for the United States to promise that they won't do the same. The President's remarks make sense only if they're interpreted in an entirely different way. If this security threat is a bluff, it's an attempt to put pressure on the Chinese to relent in what is an escalating trade war. And it's important to understand what the consequence would be.

What we now have is a situation where the Chinese are developing independent operating systems for their technologies, and we know that the consequence of that may well be profound. This is because the goods that are being produced by American companies may well be excluded. What we saw last weekend in Osaka—Mr Trump's announcement of a partial relaxation on these issues—suggests to me that if we are to talk about a global tech trade war we need to not get that confused with the bluff and bluster that's been presented as party-political advantage by the United States, particularly when it has such enormous consequences for our national interests.

What we have, of course, is a rules based international order, which has traditionally been guaranteed by the United States. That's now being abandoned. What we now have to face is the fact that Australia has to develop a much more independent position on these matters.

We also have to face the fact that, when we're talking about the long-term interests of this country, there has to be a serious public debate about what the options include. We have to have a much deeper understanding of the implications of this dispute, this antagonism, between our principal strategic ally and our principal trading partner. It's something that far too many people in this country have shied away from. In the election campaign this issue surfaced only once, with some colourful language from the former Prime Minister Paul Keating. I think Mr Keating himself has now said that the language he used to describe our intelligence chief was a bit unfortunate. But the deeper point he made, I think, was absolutely correct. What is the consequence of us permanently alienating the Chinese? What happens in a trade war between China and Australia? What happens in terms of the international economic position? What are the consequences for the living standards of the people of this country? That's something that we need to consider and have a proper discussion about.

Our position is not to be subservient to any country, whether it be the People's Republic of China or the United States. Certainly it's not our position to be subservient to the demands of the United States President, who is seeking re-election and acting in a manner consistent with a politician seeking re-election rather than developing the strategic interests of his own country. I'm not suggesting that we don't pursue the banning of Huawei. What I am saying is that we are entitled to know what the reasons are. We're entitled to know what the consequences are in terms of that engagement. If we're going to argue—as I see happening too often in this country—that we can't deal with any particular Chinese company because the senior members of that company are members of the Chinese Communist Party or they have some former military connection, then I think we have to have a deeper understanding of the way in which the economy and government work. I am not calling for the ban on Huawei to be withdrawn. I am calling for it to be properly explained. This is a matter that ought to be the subject of proper national debate.

There's a delicate line for Australia to walk between the two global economic superpowers, the United States and the People's Republic of China. The views taken in this region are not the views taken in Europe. That has to be explained. The views taken by the United States President at one forum are not the views taken at all forums. That has to be explained. We have to understand the consequences of ignoring the Chinese understanding of their historic memory, the memory of the humiliation imposed by Western powers, particularly with regard to trading matters and the trading concessions of the 19th century. We have to understand that the Chinese leaders are determined not to repeat the humiliation of that period. Their demands in regard to lifting people out of poverty have to be appreciated, and we have to understand the motivations behind the development of the Belt and Road Initiative and the Made in China 2025 initiative.

If President Trump's rhetoric is any guide, Made in China 2025 is more about keeping American interests at the forefront in that regard than it is about understanding Chinese attitudes about the economic development of their country. That's not to say the United States hasn't had its own 'made in the USA' policy for some time. Our question is: if we are talking about the long-term interests of this country, what do we say about 'made in Australia'? The United States has many trade restrictive policies which actually prevent Australians from participating fully in a rules based global order. Take, for instance, the Jones Act, which requires that ships procured by the US Navy must be built in the United States, and the situation we had with Austal, which has had to establish its own enterprise in the United States—and the extraordinary capacity that has led to, I might say. It's a pity we weren't able to use them much more effectively here.

The economic policies of previous empires—and I think here about the way in which the British and the Dutch behaved—appear to me to be what President Trump's drawing on for what he's doing. Policies include high tariffs, particularly on manufactured goods; a sort of mercantilism, constraining trade choices for various colonies and associated entities; seeking to monopolise access to certain markets; forbidding trade to be carried out on foreign ships: these are characteristics we're seeing re-emerging in the current international debate. The dispute we're seeing, which has profound consequences for the future development of this country, is exactly what's emerging in the US-China trade dispute.

There are variations, of course. In 2019, we don't ban goods being carried on foreign ships as the British imperial navigation acts used to. You do try to ban exchanges in the cybereconomy, exchanges between your own tech firms and the tech firms of your rivals. Except in 2019, in an interdependent global economy, it's much harder to do that than in the past. In 2019, consequences of miscalculations can be catastrophic, because what our principal ally might want us to do and what our best interests require are not the same thing. A debate on a taxation bill that looks forward six years needs to be seen in the context of what's actually going on in the world at the moment.