George Brandis (Queensland, Liberal Party, Attorney-General) Share this | Hansard source

No, it would not be simpler. The way courts read statutes is that, where a statutory definition is given as we propose to give it here, the statutory definition prevails over the dictionary definition. If it be the case that there is no doubt that in ordinary speech 'harassment' means a multiplicity of acts then that ordinary-language meaning yields to the explicit statutory definition in proposed subsection 2C. In this case, as I have already said a couple of times now, the dictionaries themselves define the word 'harassment' in both senses and the case law is also divided on the question. Where the dictionaries are divided on the question and the case law is divided on the question, the sensible thing, it seems to me, is to put it beyond doubt by a very simple and clearly worded amendment which makes it plain that either a single act or a series of acts can constitute 'harassment', and that is the way the courts would read the provision.