Chris Evans (WA, Australian Labor Party, Leader of the Government in the Senate) Share this | Hansard source

The opposition seems to be confused on this issue. I do not think Senator Macdonald’s contribution will look good in Hansard, given the rather ranting contribution he made to what really should be treated as a much more serious issue. Aviation safety and security is certainly the government’s No. 1 priority and it should be a bipartisan issue. The terrorist attempt on the United States bound flight on Christmas Day last year showed that we cannot afford to be complacent. Australia’s aviation security regime is built upon a number of layers of security measures to ensure that Australia’s aviation industry is safeguarded and able to respond quickly to threats of unlawful interference with aviation.

Hardened cockpit doors and restricting cockpit access are the last lines of defence to stop terrorists taking control of a plane. Stringent rules must apply to who can open the hardened cockpit door and enter the cockpit. Aircraft operators have invested heavily to meet regulations requiring hardened cockpit doors in certain aircraft. As a parliament, we now need to ensure that there is no uncertainty as to who is responsible in different scenarios for ensuring that the cockpit remains secure.

The effectiveness of hardened cockpit doors as a security measure is compromised if there are not clear and consistent regulations governing cockpit access. Put simply, the government takes the view that if a person does not have an operational, safety, security or training reason to be in the cockpit they should not be there. Frankly, if a person does not have an operational reason to be in the cockpit, does not have a safety reason to be in the cockpit, does not have a security reason to be in the cockpit or does not have a training reason to be in the cockpit then why should they be allowed to be in there?

This is an important aviation security matter, and aviation security is an important part of national security. All aircraft operators, including Qantas, Virgin, Tiger and Jetstar should have consistent rules setting out when the cockpit doors should be locked and who can access the cockpit. There have been substantial consultations with pilot associations on this issue. Mr Albanese met personally with representatives of the pilot unions and there have been several meetings between pilot unions and the minister’s department.

The Aviation Transport Security Amendment Regulations 2010 (No. 1) commenced on 21 May 2010. The regulations restrict access to the cockpit to persons who have an operational, safety, security or training need to be there. Under the regulations that decision is made by the aircraft operator; in other words, the airline takes responsibility for determining who is in the cockpit. However, the act and the regulations permit the pilot in command to allow a person into the cockpit for a safety or security reason during flight.

Pilot unions have raised the issue of the potential safety benefits of allowing off-duty pilots and other aviation professionals to utilise the jump seat in the cockpit. We want to be clear about this: the regulations do not impact on the ability of the pilot in command to take whatever action may be necessary and reasonable to protect the safety or security of an aircraft. This may mean, for example, that a passenger who is a doctor, off-duty pilot or engineer is allowed by the pilot in command into the cockpit if there is a safety or security need to do so. Of course, off-duty pilots and other company employees can use the jump seat in the cockpit for repositioning of crew returning home after duty or other operational travel. The regulations mean it is a safe decision for the pilot in command as to whether an off-duty pilot who is travelling for recreation can enter the flight deck. The regulations place responsibility on the pilot in command of the aircraft to ensure that the cockpit door remains locked except for certain allowable circumstances such as to permit authorised persons to enter or leave the cockpit and for safety reasons.

A breach of the regulations is a strict liability offence. Strict liability offences are fairly common and are used where it is necessary to ensure the integrity of a regulatory regime, such as security or public health. Of course, there are many other strict liability offences that apply to pilots. For example, there is a strict liability offence requiring a pilot to comply with an aircraft’s flight manual, and under longstanding regulations a pilot will commit a strict liability offence if they commence a flight while there is outstanding maintenance required on the plane, if they fly an aircraft over a prohibited area or if they tow anything without approval.

These strict liability offences all relate to the operation of the aircraft and their fundamental purpose is to protect the safety and security of the aircraft and its passengers. The responsibility for maintaining the integrity of the cockpit is such a responsibility. If the person who is operationally in charge of the aircraft is not the person who should be operationally responsible for basic measures to protect the security of the flight deck it begs the question: who else could do it? In practical terms there is no other person who would be in a position to exercise control over the cockpit door and the associated access entitlements while the aircraft is operating.

The government has placed responsibility for this important measure on the pilot who is operationally in charge of the aircraft at the time. If the chief pilot is on a sleep break or on a long-haul flight then responsibility rests with the pilot who is in command of the aircraft at the time. And at all times, if the pilot is acting reasonably to protect the safety or security of the aircraft, its cargo, a person, other aircraft or an airport there can be no offence committed. Those absolute defences are set out in primary legislation in section 10A of the Aviation Transport Security Act 2004.

Should the disallowance motion be passed there will be no legal constraint on who can enter the cockpit. This is completely inconsistent with the policies of successive Australian governments that only people with a genuine safety, security, operational or training need may be permitted to enter and remain in the cockpit of an aircraft. Of course, aircraft operators can direct pilots as to who can enter the cockpit. But Qantas will have one set of rules, Jetstar another set, Virgin another and Tiger will have its own rules.