Glenn Sterle (WA, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Hansard source

Hear, hear? Well, listen to this. Why weren’t any of you down there except Senator Back? Where were the rest of them? They could not be bothered. Were they too busy? Are they not interested in biosecurity or Australian animal health? It is absolutely disgraceful. And you stand up there and lecture us.

The good work being done down at the Animal Health Laboratory in Geelong should not go underestimated. It was opportune, because at the time we were there—and I think Senator Back would recall this, as would Senator O’Brien—there was a sample being analysed that was taken from a horse from Queensland. It was a suspected hendra virus case. We were only there for about four hours. It is a shame that we can turn it into a political argument. This shocking disease is something that we should not politicise. That it claims the lives of vets and horse workers is concerning.

It is completely wrong to think that the biosecurity CRC is the only way that the government addresses critical national biosecurity issues. Research into the hendra virus has for years been primarily the responsibility of the CSIRO, the nation’s premier public research agency—and no-one would argue with that—as the CSIRO does conduct most of the hendra related research in Australia. It does this through the Australian Animal Health Laboratory, as we were saying, which also attracts competitive grants, which Senator Back did mention, from other research agencies, including the US National Institutes of Health. I would reiterate Senator Back’s comments that it is world’s best practice down there. That is something that we should be very, very proud of. Not only the Americans but also the Brits hold highly favourable views of it. This facility is world class. There is no argument about that. It has the highest possible security rating, allowing top-level research on highly infectious diseases.

The Animal Health Laboratory’s capacity has been strengthened over the last 18 months with a new $5.5 million diagnostic emergency response laboratory, which was announced in July 2008, and a new research partnership with Deakin, which was announced in August 2008. The management of emerging infectious diseases, such as the hendra virus, in the long term is also being addressed as part of the government’s response to the Beale review of Australia’s quarantine and biosecurity arrangements. The government is now considering its detailed response to the review, including working more closely with state and territory governments, which is very, very important. We have to work with state and territory governments—there is no argument about that—and we have to establish a national biosecurity agreement and establish a national biosecurity commission.

The CSIRO will continue its biosecurity research and estimates that its total annual expenditure on research into bat-borne diseases, including hendra, is approximately $2 million per annum. I must bring to the attention of the Senate that it was actually a Labor government that created the CRCs. By June 2010 the Australian Biosecurity CRC for Emerging Infectious Disease will have received $17½ million of funding over seven years. The CRC applied for an extension of this funding in the 11th round of the program. (Time expired)