Simon Birmingham (SA, Liberal Party) Share this | Hansard source

Senator Evans wants to talk about time. Tragically, since the national plan was first discussed by Mr Turnbull and Mr Howard we have seen two more seasons of record low inflows coming into the basin—two more seasons that could not have been foreseen as being as bad as they were. It has been tragic for the communities in the basin, the environment and the river itself. That means a demand for action that is even more urgent than was envisaged two years ago. If you—or anybody else—want to talk about time, Senator Evans, I say the time of urgency has only increased in the time since you have been in government.

What we needed back then was not a prolonged period of negotiation between the new federal Labor government and all of the states in the Murray-Darling Basin jurisdiction that have continued to exist as Labor states; they are all still Labor states. What we needed was not prolonged debate and argy-bargy between the government and those states; what we needed was an end to the blame game. We needed to see a rapid cessation of political hostilities. We needed to see Premier Brumby put down the fighting stick and actually come to the table and say: ‘We accept. We will have a referral and we will do so in the national interest. We will do so without needing to be bribed with a billion dollars of funding targeted specifically at Victoria. We will do so without the need to pillage the basin even further by taking out more resources for the north-south pipeline.’ We needed the type of political statesmanship that has been lacking in the management of this system for some 120 years. Sadly, the system we have got and the proposal that we have before us today have done nothing to improve the timeliness of things. We will now have a basin plan that will be developed over the next couple of years and then gradually implemented across the regional basins of the area depending upon when current plans expire.

What that means is that, in terms of timing, a plan that could, should and ideally would take effect more quickly will not take full effect across the basin until 2019. We will have to wait until 2019 to see a fully implemented national basin plan. Even with the adoption of the powers of the Murray-Darling Basin Commission into the new Murray-Darling Basin Authority, we are seeing not the unfettered national management that many of us had hoped for but management that maintains levels of state based vetoes. This maintains the capacity of the states to sit at the table and continue to play petty politics with this critically important issue.

We have seen the ugly compromises of things like the north-south pipeline. I know that my colleagues have indicated that amendments will be moved to this bill, and there is no more important amendment to be discussed in this place on a matter of principle than that associated with the north-south pipeline, or Sugarloaf Pipeline. At this time, when everybody agrees that the basin’s resources are stressed and that we need to be doing all we can to save more water in the system, it is beyond ridiculous to consider that we should be taking more water out of the system and, as my colleague Senator Fisher said, putting another major urban centre on the teat of the basin. It is quite preposterous that the government should stand idly by and consider this.

It is also quite preposterous that government seems to be willing to intervene and interfere in other places where it has not even been asked to do so. During the recent Senate estimates this year, I asked Senator Wong what discussions she had had with the South Australian government before the Prime Minister and she, in the midst of a community cabinet meeting, announced another $100 million for the doubling of Adelaide’s new desalination plant; what requests had been made by the South Australian government for that; and what commitments had been made that the desal plant could or would be doubled. It is safe to say that pretty much all of those questions drew blank stares. Obviously what had occurred was not that the South Australian government had sought the extra $100 million to double the desal plant but that the Prime Minister was in need of an announcement. So, whilst in Adelaide for a community cabinet meeting, he suddenly threw out an extra $100 million for the doubling of a desalination plant in Adelaide. But to this day we still do not know whether it will be doubled and the $100 million taken up.

Contrast that with the response of the Minister for Climate Change and Water to my question on whether she had had any discussions with Premier Brumby or any other ministers of the Victorian government about alternatives to building the north-south Sugarloaf Pipeline. There were no discussions there either. But, equally, there were no random offers of kindness coming from the Commonwealth. There were no random offers of kindness coming from the Prime Minister. I do not know whether the federal government need to hold a community cabinet meeting in Shepparton to get them thinking about offering some alternatives and putting some money on the table. Perhaps the federal government, out of the various funds available for water resources, could have made this offer to the Victorian government: ‘How about $100 million to increase the size of your desalination plant by, say, 75 gigalitres or 75,000 megalitres?’ or ‘How about $100 million to further progress water recycling?’ or ‘How about $100 million to further progress the capturing of stormwater?’ All these options could be pursued; instead, the government is building a pipeline to take more water out of the basin and is attaching another major urban population centre to the basin.

The major problem with attaching an urban centre to the basin is that it just does not relate to South Australia’s interests—far from it. The interests of those building the pipeline collide firstly with the interests of the communities of the Goulburn Valley. They will be the first to suffer. They will see a pipeline built that will take water out of their communities and piped down to Melbourne for its needs. Yes, the valley is getting some infrastructure works that will hopefully deliver water savings—and we trust that those water savings will be delivered. We certainly expect that at the end of this process there will be mechanisms in place to make sure those water savings are genuinely and truly accounted for. But we equally believe that those water savings could best be used for two purposes, not the three that they have been divided into. At present, they are divided between the needs of Melbourne, the irrigators and the environment with increased flows.

Frankly, things would be a whole lot better if the infrastructure works being undertaken in the Goulburn Valley area and in the Victorian food bowl with the modernisation program went to the environment and the irrigators. It would be better if it went to two sources, not to three—not to Melbourne. It would be much better for the nation, for the river and for all concerned if those water savings could simply be returned to those two sources. The irrigators, like irrigators throughout the entire river system, are feeling the enormous stress and pressure of the prolonged drought and, as a result, the prolonged cuts to their allocations. The environment and the stressed river system itself could happily do with another 35 or so gigalitres a year to support their causes rather than water being piped off in the direction that it is going in. This would be of great benefit to the nation’s food security and to the many different food bowl communities, particularly in the Goulburn Valley but also beyond that, further down the Murray-Darling Basin, to South Australia and our Riverland communities.

Madam Acting Deputy President Hurley, I know that you recognise the importance of these communities to our state’s economy. These communities are certainly suffering and feeling the pain. They are communities that have at times in recent months been too often overlooked for the immediate stresses that are felt at the bottom of the basin. It is a challenge for all of us who represent the diverse interests of the Lower Lakes and Coorong regions and the irrigation interests of the Riverland regions—those above and below lock 1—to make sure that we effectively advocate for their diverse interests, because their diverse interests are all equally important.

We need to hold the government accountable for the fact that those Riverland communities need a fairer system for how exit packages are worked out and provided to them. We need to ensure that there is a fairer system of support for people when they choose to take exit grants; that, when people choose to leave irrigation trusts, they are not burdened with undue fees to get out of their responsibilities and that there is support for the communities of the Riverland, as there should be for irrigation communities throughout the system, to deliver the structural adjustment required not only to do more with less water but also to adjust to increasing interests without irrigation.

Equally, at the bottom end of the river, in the Lower Lakes and Coorong communities, there is a crying need for certainty that governments are doing everything possible. That is where the failure of the north-south pipeline stands out greatest. The government is failing to do everything possible to assist the river and those at the tail end of the river system, in the Lower Lakes region. The Ngarrindjeri people, the traditional owners of the Lower Lakes region, talk about how all living things are connected. All parts of the river basin are connected. That is something we on this side recognise. We believe that the model put out for true national management and a mix of funding across infrastructure, buybacks and the range of areas required could deliver for the system. We urge the government to consider the amendments that I know we, the Greens and others will propose, because we are genuinely seeking to make this a better bill with a better outcome for all of the river’s communities and, in doing so, to fix the errors of 120-plus years of failed management of this river.