Kerry Nettle (NSW, Australian Greens) Share this | Hansard source

The primary concern that the Australian Greens had with the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment Bill 2008 was with the ability to add new devices that could be intercepted without the need to get a warrant for that particular device. The reason we had that concern was that we can envisage a whole range of different circumstances where this might be problematic. One example that particularly comes to mind for me is the idea of somebody who is having some form of their telecommunications monitored and who might use a library computer. There are a whole range of other people who could also use that library computer. It is a problem if you are able to add additional devices that people use for communication and expand the interception that occurs without having to get a warrant to say, ‘This is why we think we need to be able to intercept the communications that this person has when they use that library computer.’ It is fair enough if you have a legitimate reason to monitor them while they are using that computer but not, potentially, if everyone who is using that computer has their communications monitored. We are not saying that that was necessarily going to occur, but it is one of the scenarios that could have occurred. That was the primary concern that we had in relation to this bill.

I appreciate the work of organisations such as the Law Council, Electronic Frontiers Australia, who was mentioned, and also the New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties in pointing out the difficulties with what was originally proposed in relation to this bill and the expansion of interception powers. The New South Wales Council for Civil Liberties in particular gathered together some really useful information for the Senate inquiry and for general discussion on this issue on the number of interceptions of telephone communications that currently occur in Australia. They made international comparisons that showed that a telephone in Australia is 23 times more likely to be bugged than a telephone in the United States. It is perhaps quite stark for the public to hear about and to understand that in the United States you only get your telephone communications intercepted if a judge approves it. That is not the case in Australia. I think those international comparisons are important for the public debate and the public understanding about what we have seen, particularly since September 2001, with incremental increases—not always incremental either—in the security powers that we give to intelligence organisations in relation to monitoring the activities of Australian citizens and others living in Australia. I think that has been a really helpful contribution. I want to acknowledge, as everyone has said, that it is pleasing to see the government amendments that address this particular issue, which was the central concern that the Greens had in relation to this bill.

I want to particularly acknowledge those organisations like the Law Council and the Council for Civil Liberties that have been part of the community pressure and that have been campaigning on this issue. We have certainly been hearing from them for a long time and have been involved in discussions with them for some time. I think it is worth acknowledging the contributions that they make to the public debate, whether it be through those figures and statistics about the way that telecommunication interception happens in Australia in a far more frequent way than it does in many other countries, including the United States, or in other areas. It is important to understand those differences as well as the potential consequences for people using a public library and the other people who will have their communications monitored if we simply add on more and more devices without having to get a warrant in each instance. These are the potential areas of difficulty that you get. That is what we need to be dealing with here. We have all seen instances of enthusiastic intelligence operatives gathering a whole range of different pieces of information. We may have different views—I am sure we do have different views in here!—about what is appropriate and at what level, but it is a concern that the community has and that the government has. That is why it is pleasing to see these amendments, as I understand them. Perhaps the minister can outline some more detail for us in relation to these amendments and the fact that now we are not going to see the situation where you can just add on more devices without having to get a warrant. That was our particular concern.

The whole reason we have the telecommunications interception issue that we have is that people’s communication is an issue of privacy—it is a significant issue around people’s liberties and freedoms—and should only be intervened in in extraordinary circumstances where that is deemed to be appropriate. That is why we have the system that we have. When you make exemptions to that and say, ‘We can monitor your communications without a warrant,’ it has got to be in extraordinary circumstances. Our view was that, in the previous form of this bill and how we originally saw it, it was not extraordinary circumstances at all but allowed for there to be extra things. That is why, as I understand these amendments, it is pleasing for them to indicate that you will need a warrant if you are going to add another device onto the monitoring system. That is why we have the monitoring system—it is something people are concerned about.

People think they can have a conversation with their friend and it is a conversation precisely of that nature: with their friend, not with a whole range of other organisations that might happen to be listening in. It is a fundamental principle that people hold dear in this country and all around the world. We need to be careful. We have a responsibility to ensure that those exemptions are in extraordinary circumstances. That is why I am pleased to see this set of government amendments that—I think I understand them correctly—address that central concern that we had. You should not be just adding on devices where interception can occur without needing a warrant. That has the potential to spread the net far wider in terms of the number of people and the innocent communications and citizens who are caught up in this—whether they be family members, other people using the computer in the public library, other people using that email address, other people using that mobile or whatever it may be.

Let’s target our communications, let’s target any interception that occurs to those people of whom there genuinely needs to be interception and let’s ensure that we have stringent safeguards in place to ensure that that occurs. There are other examples, as I say. The judges are the people who approve them in the United States. That is not the case here in Australia. The figures from the Council for Civil Liberties say that, of the 3,287 warrants sought in the year to June 2007, only seven were rejected. I think that is useful information for the public to be aware of to get an understanding of how the existing telecommunications interception system operates in this country. Where governments are making arguments to expand that system, I think it is fundamentally important that the public understand how the system currently operates and the potential for the expansion to occur. I want to acknowledge the work of those organisations involved in the Senate committee process, involved in highlighting this issue so that the bill was sent to a committee, so that we have got it to the point it is at now in relation to these government amendments.