Kerry O'Brien (Tasmania, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Transport) Share this | Hansard source

At last we have the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006 and the Inspector of Transport Security (Consequential Provisions) Bill 2006 before the Senate chamber. It was in fact on 4 December 2003—quite a long time ago now—that the government announced its intention to create the position of the Inspector of Transport Security. In spite of repeated statements from various Howard government ministers seeking to score political points out of the current security situation, they in fact did precious little about actually filling this crucial role.

It was not until 23 November 2004 that former Australian Federal Police Commissioner Mick Palmer was appointed as the Inspector of Transport Security. It took a full three years after 9-11 for this government to actually get someone to work on this very important task. As with so many other areas of policy, this government has been obsessed with putting a political spin on issues such as this rather than taking the sensible, practical measures necessary to make travel as safe as possible in a new climate of threat. But even here, with this appointment, the Howard government were really concealing their inadequacy. They were using this appointment—quite a smoke and mirrors appointment—to cloak the propaganda that they had been using to heighten the fear about threat in the community.

What did they do with this appointment? The Inspector of Transport Security was engaged for an average of one day a week. We had a part-time Inspector of Transport Security at the same time as the world was experiencing terrorist attacks on mass transport systems on an increasing basis. On 7 July 2005 terrorist attacks on mass urban rail and bus systems in London occurred. Fifty-six people died, including one Australian, and hundreds were injured in quite a cowardly attack. On 21 July, four terrorists attempted bomb attacks and disrupted part of London’s public transport system. Only two weeks after the first successful attack, stations were closed and evacuated. Apparently, the terrorists’ intention was to cause large-scale loss of life. Luckily only the detonators of the bombs exploded, so the public were fortunate. Going back to 2004, terrorists successfully attacked a commuter train in Madrid. We saw, earlier this year, a terrorist bomb kill innocent people on a train in Mumbai in India. On 11 August this year, the United Kingdom went to its highest threat level after authorities arrested 24 suspects in what was described as a plot to blow up as many as 10 passenger jets leaving Britain for the United States.

What have we seen here in Australia? We have seen repeated breaches of security in the Australian transport industry—and those are only the ones that have been drawn to the public’s attention. Some may seem trivial but what they demonstrated was the inadequacy of our security preparation. For example, in March 2005 at Perth airport, three men under the influence of alcohol jumped the fence at Perth International Airport and boarded an empty Qantas passenger plane. If they can do that, how good is the security? You would think that, if security were being well managed, one place in Australia where it would be at its strongest would be the busiest airport in the nation. But it is not so.

In July this year a Sydney airport tailgating incident saw two vehicles tailgate a van through a security gate. That gate was set up to allow one car to pass through with a security pass. Two other vehicles followed it through. We were lucky in this case it was not terrorism: it was road rage. But what might have happened if it were not an accident, if it were planned for some improper, perhaps terrorist, purpose? We have security by good luck and good fortune but certainly not by good management. The simple fact is that the incidence of tailgating vehicles was drawn to the attention of the government well before this incident occurred, but nothing was done.

Who could forget the incident of a public side doorway giving access to Sydney airport runways being held open with a timber chock without any security? Even though I believe the Minister for Transport and Regional Services at the time, Mr Truss, denied the incident occurred, we have photos. We saw the notorious camel suit incident in April last year, when a baggage handler stole a camel costume out of a man’s bag and wore it onto the tarmac.

In incidents related to other modes of transport, when the ship the Pancaldo entered Gladstone in September 2005, Kim Beazley and the shadow minister for homeland security, Arch Bevis, were there waiting for it so as to point out that the Pancaldo was carrying 3,000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, an explosives component. The vessel was registered in Antigua, its crew came mainly from the Ukraine and, under the Howard government’s so-called maritime security, the crew had not been the subject of any credible background checks, as is the case for other foreign vessels sailing into our ports. This vessel was carrying enough ammonium nitrate to cause a major explosion in the port—affecting not just the port but also coastal communities and cities around the port.

One other issue that has been drawn to the minister’s attention is that of graffiti on rail stock. It sounds innocuous, doesn’t it? But every night trains are vandalised in rail yards. I think it takes some time for the elaborate graffiti that appears on those trains to be put in place. Some might suggest it would take hours to vandalise some of these trains. But how long would it take to plant a bomb on a train that was available for vandalism? If you compare the time, it would obviously take a lot less time to plant a bomb than it would to vandalise the trains in the way that they are. Labor drew this to the attention of the government on the anniversary of the Madrid attacks and on the anniversary of the London train attacks, but we cannot see any evidence of action.

We have seen a number of regional airports with lax security—gates open, for example, at Dubbo and Ballina airports in September this year. Similarly, at Taree airport there have been security gates hanging wide open and no security in place. That is the airport from which the minister for transport is regularly picked up by an Air Force jet. Two weeks ago, Sydney airport was evacuated because a flight from Wagga arrived and passengers had not been screened prior to boarding. Those are just some of the examples of the failures in transport security.

Going back to Mr Palmer, after his appointment the inspector had no legal powers to do anything. At that time, Labor called for and have continued to call for urgent legislation to underpin his important job. Finally, on 23 May 2005, the government announced its intention to underpin the inspector’s role with legislation. That was on 23 May 2005. We have been consistently arguing for that legislative underpinning. So we are here now—17 months later—and we finally have these bills in the parliament. Five years after 9-11, the Howard government has finally managed to complete the process of establishing the Inspector of Transport Security position with real powers. However, we do believe there are some flaws in the legislation and we will come to that in the committee stage.

On 18 October this year the government finally tabled these bills in the House of Representatives, after the delays and after all of those incidents that I have spoken about. As I said, we think the bills have some flaws. Clause 80 of the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006 states that the inspector is to minimise disruption to transport. Under clause 80 the inspector has that responsibility, and that is fair. We do not want to unnecessarily delay commuters going to and from their daily duties, but we do want commuters be safe as well as on time.

Clause 81 of the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006 calls on the inspector to act consistently with Australia’s international obligations. The inspector, and each delegate of the inspector, must exercise the inspector’s power in a manner that is consistent with Australia’s obligations under international arrangements. From time to time it may be appropriate for states and territories to confer powers and functions on the inspector. Clause 83 of the bill allows that temporary passing of power from the states to the inspector to occur.

As I said, there are some problems with the bills. Firstly, the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006 claims to provide a framework for independent inquiry and recommendations in relation to transport security matters and offshore security matters upon the minister authorising an inquiry—that is, the inspector has no independent power to initiate an inquiry. It has to be approved by the minister. We think that is a limitation which should not be there and we will be moving to empower the inspector to initiate an inquiry of his or her own volition.

We say that the second deficiency is the provision in clause 25(3) of the Inspector of Transport Security Bill 2006, which states that the inspector may be appointed on a part-time basis. We do not think it is sufficient, in this important post, for a concession to be made that, if someone cannot devote themselves full-time to the job, they be appointed on a part-time basis. Indeed, we do not believe it is proper that Mr Palmer’s role has been effectively a day a week. We think this is an important post; it should be filled on a full-time basis. We will move an amendment to that effect.

We also believe that this bill should be brought into line with the principles enunciated in the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act—that is, before a recommendation is made to the Governor-General for the appointment of a person as the Inspector of Transport Security, the relevant minister should consult with the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives. We say that is similar to section 6 of the Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security Act 1986. We also say that the relevant minister should give a copy of the report furnished under subsection (1) of that provision to the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives, provided of course that it is the obligation of the Leader of the Opposition to treat as secret any part of the report not tabled in a house of the parliament. We think those are changes which will improve this bill.

The other change which we think should be made is to section 64 of this bill, which states that the minister is permitted, but not required, to table a copy of a final report, or part of a final report, in parliament. We think that there should be a compulsion to table reports, although there can be the ability to withhold any matter which is sensitive at that time. I now move Labor’s second reading amendment, which I believe has been circulated:

        At the end of the motion, add:

               “but the Senate:

             (a)    notes the failure of the Howard government to appoint a person as Inspector of Transport Security until one year after the announcement of the position;

             (b)    notes that the Howard government finally committed to underpin this important job with appropriate laws in May of 2005 but has only now introduced legislation into the House for that purpose;

             (c)    condemns the slowness with which the Howard government dealt with the important role of Inspector of Transport Security,

             (d)    condemns the Howard government’s dismissive use of the Inspector of Transport Security who has been engaged on an average of just one day a week in spite of repeated failures in security in the Australian transport sector at the same time as terrorists have targeted aviation and rail transport over recent years, and

             (e)    condemns the Howard government for its failure to engage the Inspector of the Transport Security in a full time capacity”.

Having moved that amendment, I indicate that the opposition will be supporting the second reading of this bill.