Senate debates

Wednesday, 10 May 2006

Maritime Transport and Offshore Facilities Security Amendment (Maritime Security Guards and Other Measures) Bill 2005 [2006]

Second Reading

6:00 pm

Photo of Kerry O'BrienKerry O'Brien (Tasmania, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Minister for Transport) Share this | Hansard source

As I was saying, firstly, the bill empowers a maritime security guard to request that a person found within a maritime security zone provide identification and a reason for being in the zone. Secondly, it empowers a maritime security guard to request that an unauthorised person in a maritime security zone move out of that zone and, if that request is not complied with, to remove the person from the zone. Thirdly, it empowers a maritime security guard to remove or have removed unauthorised vehicles and vessels found in maritime security zones. The Australian Labor Party supports this bill. It is important that the exercise of these powers, however, is balanced with safeguards. Accordingly, the bill requires maritime security guards to identify themselves when confronting a person to exercise their authority. They must advise the person of their authority and tell the person that noncompliance is an offence. When removing a person from a maritime security zone, a maritime security guard may not use greater force or subject the person to greater indignity than is necessary and, in removing a vehicle or vessel, a guard must not cause unreasonable damage and must notify the owner.

The operation of this bill relies upon regulations. Typically, the government did not provide draft regulations to the Senate Rural and Regional Affairs and Transport Legislation Committee for its consideration when it examined this bill. As I have noted before, this has been an ongoing issue with legislation before this committee. It is unreasonable to expect the Australian parliament to pass important legislation with no reference to regulations. It was therefore difficult for the committee to assess legislation in isolation from the regulations. For example, regulations will be critical to the removal, storage and disposal of vehicles and vessels from maritime security zones. These regulations need to be developed in consultation with industry, with unions and with state governments. The successful day-to-day work of maritime security guards will be heavily influenced by the standard of training they undertake. Evidence presented to the Senate committee suggests that the current mandatory qualification level for maritime security guards is not sufficient. The qualification standard and training regime should be developed as a matter of priority in consultation with industry, unions and state governments, and should allow for portability of qualifications between jurisdictions.

While Labor welcome this bill, we remain critical of the Howard government’s failure to adequately address the issue of maritime security. Hundreds of thousands of apparently empty cargo containers are shipped into Australian ports without being screened and in some cases, as is the case in Sydney, stored adjacent to a major international airport. What is worse, 90 per cent of containers are still not X-rayed or inspected. The careless and widespread use of single and continuing voyage permits with foreign vessels and foreign crew who do not undergo appropriate security checks is also a huge problem. The use of these permits becomes more serious when foreign flag of convenience ships carry dangerous goods in Australian waters. These crews do not have their crew security vetted.

I asked a question of the Minister for Transport and Regional Services on 27 February this year about the foreign vessels which are granted permits under Australian laws for single and continuing voyage purposes. I asked which of those ships carry ammonium nitrate, and I was given the information that one of the ships in the period I requested since 1 September last year carried ammonium nitrate but that it was too hard—or perhaps the department might not even have the information, from all I can tell from the answer—to identify which ships were carrying high-consequence dangerous goods, as identified in UN model regulations. The minister believed it was too hard to supply that information. If the information is not clearly available, one wonders how our maritime security task can be adequately conducted, with vessels carrying crews who are not properly security checked visiting our ports in circumstances where perhaps the nature of the cargo is not fully known. Certainly, if the government is not prepared to supply that to the parliament, how can the parliament know the nature of the problem that we are trying to remedy with the legislation the government is putting before the parliament?

I make the point that if we are to properly assess the government’s legislation then the government should be prepared to properly answer questions put to the executive about the nature of the cargoes carried in these foreign vessels with crews that are not properly security checked, so we can understand the nature of the problem. Because of the nature of the checks on foreign crews—and I understand that 200,000 foreign seamen come into Australian ports each year—it is a major problem, and the Howard government does appear to be lax in this area.

In September last year I joined Labor’s homeland security spokesperson, Mr Arch Bevis, in putting the spotlight on a particular flag of convenience vessel, the Thor Hawk, which travelled between Newcastle and Gladstone carrying more than 1,000 tonnes of ammonium nitrate. Ammonium nitrate has been the explosive of choice for some terrorists. It was clear that the minister for transport had no idea that this unsafe foreign ship had been in Australian waters carrying such a dangerous cargo. The government was forced to acknowledge that its background checking of the crews is done simply by checking the names of the crew supplied to the government by the ship’s master. But the Howard government has no way of being sure that the names provided match the real identities of the crew members concerned on the ships coming into Australian ports.

In the case of this voyage of the Thor Hawk, the threat to the Australian people was more from the unseaworthy state of the vessel and ineffective inspection by the minister’s department than from terrorist intent. When the potentially explosive ammonium nitrate was being loaded in Newcastle, the crane broke and this volatile cargo fell into the ship’s hatch and, by the nature of the fall, endangered the lives of seamen working on the vessel. This is despite the fact that the vessel was inspected three times by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority during its presence in Australia. No action was taken until the ship arrived in its last Australian port. It will not always be the case that unseaworthiness is the main danger. A dedicated single national security command structure under a homeland security department is long overdue. Despite the government’s endless talk, in its arrogance it continues to resist the adoption of best practice in national security reform.

What should the parliament do in these circumstances? Labor believes that the Senate should condemn the government for its failure to provide necessary maritime security and protect Australians, including its careless and widespread use of single and continuing voyage permits for foreign vessels with foreign crew who do not undergo appropriate security checks; for permitting foreign flag of convenience ships to carry dangerous good on coastal shipping routes; for failing to ensure that ships provide details of crew and cargo 48 hours before arrival; for failing to X-ray or inspect 90 per cent of containers; for failing to establish and properly fund an Australian coastguard; and for failing to establish a department of homeland security to better coordinate security. To that effect, I move:

At the end of the motion, add “but the Senate condemns the Government for its failure to provide necessary maritime security and protect Australians, including:

     (a)     its careless and widespread use of single and continuing voyage permits for foreign vessels with foreign crew who do not undergo appropriate security checks;

     (b)     permitting foreign flag of convenience ships to carry dangerous goods on coastal shipping routes; and

     (c)     failing to:

                   (i)    ensure ships provide details of crew and cargo 48 hours before arrival,

                  (ii)    x-ray or inspect 90 per cent of containers,

                 (iii)    establish and properly fund an Australian coastguard, and

                 (iv)    establish a Department of Homeland Security to better coordinate security in Australia”.

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