Overall, the coalition supports the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026. We certainly support its most fundamental objectives, because Australia's laws must keep pace with the rapidly changing nature of financial crime. The dynamics of money laundering, scams, organised crime and terrorism financing are constantly evolving and, as part of that, criminal organisations readily and regularly adapt. They exploit new technologies, new payment systems, new financial products and new weaknesses in our regulatory framework, and, when those weaknesses emerge, governments and parliaments have an obligation to respond. That is especially important when we are dealing with technologies which allow money to move quickly, anonymously and through channels that are difficult for law enforcement agencies to trace.

Rightly and justifiably, the content of this bill seeks to address some of those emerging threats. Its most significant measure creates a new framework allowing the use of particularly high-risk financial mechanisms to be restricted or prohibited where they present an unacceptable risk of serious harm. It also updates Australia's terrorism financing laws to take account of offences relating to the financing of state sponsors of terrorism and makes a number of technical amendments to the broader anti-money-laundering and counterterrorism financing regime. These are important and worthwhile objectives.

However, as is so often the case when parliament considers legislation giving substantial new regulatory powers to government, supporting the objective does not mean we should be giving the government a blank cheque. The powers in this bill are significant. They have potentially very substantial consequences for businesses, financial institutions and consumers. Accordingly, they need to be carefully designed, appropriately targeted and accompanied by proper safeguards. That is why the coalition believed this bill warranted proper parliamentary scrutiny and supported its referral to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. The subsequent PJCIS inquiry demonstrated the value of that approach. The committee heard from government agencies, industry, consumer representatives and other stakeholders, and that process identified both a genuine need for reform and a number of more specific ways in which the bill could and should be improved.

At the core of this bill is the challenge posed by high-risk financial mechanisms. One of the clearest examples is cryptocurrency ATMs. The growth of these machines in Australia has been extraordinary. According to material considered in developing these reforms, Australia has gone from having just 23 cryptocurrency ATMs in 2019 to more than 2,000 today. AUSTRAC has also explored and identified a range of deeply concerning patterns in the way some of these machines are being used. The evidence is that a very high proportion of frequent cryptocurrency ATM transactions are associated with scams or money mule activity.

At the same time, Australian financial institutions are confronting money mule activity on an enormous scale more generally. To be more specific about that, banks across the country have collectively reported that they are now having to close tens of thousands of mule accounts annually. Behind these transactions, of course, are many everyday Australians who are losing their savings to scammers. There are organised criminal groups laundering the proceeds of crime and networks moving money for illicit purposes. Potentially there are funds being moved in support of terrorism and other threats to our national security.

The PJCIS ultimately concluded that there is a genuine gap in the existing law. AUSTRAC has powers directed towards individual reporting entities, but the existing framework is less capable of responding when the risk arises from a particular product, technology, service or delivery channel across an entire sector. That is the gap that schedule 1 seeks to fill. Under the bill as introduced, the AUSTRAC CEO would be empowered through legislative instrument to restrict or prohibit a reporting entity from using a particular product, service, delivery channel or other mechanism to provide a designated service.

The proposed power is broad and sweeping—in our view, too broad and sweeping, but I will return to that point shortly. The new power could restrict the volume or value of funds transferred, regulate the method by which funds or virtual assets are transferred, and could restrict particular destinations. It could also impose other requirements designed to mitigate an identified risk. The general intention behind all of that is understandable. If a new technology or financial product suddenly becomes a preferred vehicle for organised crime, governments should not necessarily have to wait years for the legislative framework to catch up. There needs to be an ability to respond, and to respond speedily.

However, that brings us directly to the question of accountability, because the broader and more flexible a power becomes, the more important the safeguards surrounding that power become as well. The bill, as introduced, would vest a significant power directly in the AUSTRAC CEO. The relevant threshold requires satisfaction that the high-risk mechanism has caused, will cause or is likely to cause significant harm to the Australian financial system or the Australian community, and that restricting or prohibiting it is necessary in the public interest. Those are substantial concepts. However, terms such as 'significant harm' and 'public interest' necessarily leave considerable room for discretion. There are also provisions allowing the normal consultation process to be bypassed in exceptional or urgent circumstances. Even more significantly, a failure to comply with the consultation requirement would not itself invalidate the resulting legislative instrument. That combination worried us from the outset, and it rightly attracted scrutiny from many external stakeholders as well.

The coalition strongly supports giving our law enforcement and financial intelligence agencies the tools they need to discharge their responsibilities effectively. AUSTRAC undertakes enormously important work. However, strong powers and strong accountability should not constitute competing objectives here. Indeed, properly designed accountability mechanisms would actually strengthen the legitimacy and durability of these powers. That is why one of the principal issues the coalition wanted to examine through the PJCIS process was whether a power of this magnitude should sit with the AUSTRAC CEO at all, or whether ultimate responsibility should rest with an elected minister who is directly answerable to this parliament.

The committee reached the same clear conclusion as our original one. Its first recommendation is that the bill be amended so that the proposed high-risk mechanism power is exercised by the responsible minister, acting on the advice of the AUSTRAC CEO. That represents a sensible improvement. AUSTRAC would continue to provide the specialist intelligence, expertise and risk assessment, but the final decision to impose potentially far-reaching restrictions on an entire financial mechanism would be made by a minister accountable to the parliament and, ultimately, the Australian people.

The committee also considered the consultation framework. Ordinarily, the bill requires at least 30 days of consultation with those reasonably likely to be affected, together with any relevant Commonwealth, state or territory regulator. There is good reason to retain an emergency capacity where circumstances demand immediate action. Nobody wants government rendered powerless while criminals exploit an obvious and rapidly developing vulnerability or loophole.

But emergency flexibility should not become an excuse for inadequate scrutiny. The PJCIS therefore recommended greater transparency around consultation. Under its recommendation, details of submissions, meetings and other consultation, and AUSTRAC's response to recommendations received through that process would be published. That means parliament, affected businesses and the public would have a clearer picture of the evidence behind these decisions and the competing considerations that were taken into account. Again, that is a practical safeguard rather than an impediment to effective regulation.

The committee also identified the need for greater clarity around terminology within the broader AML/CTF framework, and that is important. Businesses cannot comply with laws they cannot reasonably understand. Poorly defined obligations create costs, uncertainty and, ultimately, weaker compliance. The committee therefore recommended additional clarity around issues including the scope of professional services, the definition of senior managers, technology-neutral requirements concerning the passing on of information and further examples of the types of high-risk mechanisms intended to be captured. Those recommendations reflect evidence heard from stakeholders about potential unworkability and unintended consequences.

The objective must be a framework that is tough on criminal exploitation without imposing unnecessary or poorly targeted burdens upon legitimate businesses. In short, a well-designed AML/CTF regime concentrates regulatory effort where the risks are greatest, and a badly designed regime can drown legitimate business in compliance while sophisticated criminals simply adapt their practices. The parliament should always be striving for the former. Another significant issue raised through the inquiry was the proposed commencement date of the changes encompassed in the bill.

Affected industries are already dealing with considerable change arising from previous reforms to Australia's anti-money-laundering framework. Many entities need to build new systems, train staff, establish compliance arrangements and fundamentally change from their business processes. Those things are already proving challenging. The coalition therefore listened carefully to stakeholders who argue that additional implementation time was necessary, and the PJCIS agreed.

It recommended that commencement of the new or amended obligations rising from this legislation be delayed until 1 July 2027, giving affected entities a more reasonable opportunity to establish systems and the actions needed to comply. That does not weaken the legislation; it helps ensure the legislation actually works. There is little value in creating obligations on paper if regulated entities are simply not given a realistic opportunity to implement them properly. At the same time, the committee was very clear that the government should not use the implementation timetable as an excuse for inaction where an immediate threat is already apparent.

That is particularly relevant to cryptocurrency ATMs. The committee specifically recommended that, pending passage of this legislation, the minister and AUSTRAC consider as a priority the merits of restricting or prohibiting cryptocurrency ATMs. That reflects the seriousness of the evidence put before the inquiry and the potential need for further scrutiny and discussion about whether such bans would have any merit.

Schedule 2 of the bill is also important. It updates the definition of 'terrorism financing' to encompass offences relating to financing a state sponsor of terrorism and state terrorist acts. It also provides a mechanism for relevant sanctions offences under the Charter of the United Nations Act and Autonomous Sanctions Act to be incorporated into the framework. Those amendments are consistent with the need for Australia's financial intelligence regime to evolve alongside our national security laws.

Schedule 3 then makes a series of more technical changes. These include alterations to customer due diligence, politically exposed persons, legal professional privilege, international value transfers, registration requirements and information-gathering arrangements. Many of these changes arise from practical issues identified as earlier reforms have been implemented. Where those amendments simply compliance, clarify obligations and remove unintended regulatory burdens while maintaining the integrity of the system, they are welcome.

The broader principle underlying all of this is straightforward—Australia must have an anti-money-laundering and counterterrorism financing regime capable of dealing with the financial system we have today, not Australia's financial system of decades ago. Organised crime groups and scammers are more technologically sophisticated than they have ever been before, and those engaged in terrorism financing are constantly—and often successfully—searching for new methods of moving money outside conventional channels.

In our response to this, as lawmakers, we need to establish powers that are sufficiently strong to confront the threat but also well-enough structured to avoid unnecessary consequences. It would be remiss of us as a parliament not to continue asking searching and difficult questions about how those powers are exercised. That is why the PJCIS process has been worthwhile. The committee did not conclude that this bill should be abandoned, quite the opposite in fact. It concluded that there is a real problem here that requires legislative action, and it therefore recommended that the bill be passed. However, it also identified concrete ways to improve it, and the coalition welcomes that approach. We have engaged constructively with the government about the changes that should be made, and we welcome the recognition that the concerns raised through the committee process are legitimate and ought to be addressed.

The coalition will always support serious, genuine and practical measures to crack down on money laundering, to disrupt organised crime, to stop scammers exploiting Australians and to prevent money being moved in support of terrorism, but it will also continue to insist that such laws are properly designed, proportionate and subject to appropriate ministerial and parliamentary accountability. A very important part of making strong national security legislation is to make it endure.

The coalition does support the objectives of this bill. We support its passage, subject to the improvements identified through the parliamentary scrutiny process, and we'll work constructively. As part of that, we will allow passage of the bill through this House in the first instance; however, we will then move or support amendments designed to reflect the key PJCIS recommendations, namely the referral of the proposed new AUSTRAC CEO powers back to the minister and the deferral of the start date of some key measures to 1 July 2027. For all those reasons, I commend the bill to the House, and I look forward to the necessary revisions being made to it in the Senate.

I rise in support of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026. Technology has changed our lives. It's changed the way we work, it's changed the way we communicate with one another, and it's also led to tremendous productivity increases in organised crime. Organised crime today is now more borderless, more decentralised and more digitally enabled than could have even been imagined only a few years ago.

Traditional fault lines or distinctions between different groups have now evaporated. We are now seeing organised criminals using digital technology to diversify their enterprises in ways that we haven't seen in legitimate business in a very long time, and we're seeing harm caused all around the world. A significant portion—two to five per cent—of global GDP is in organised crime. It's a serious challenge. Even in Australia, we're losing billions a year to illicit activities.

We've realised that, sometimes, it is not just the individuals or the service providers that can pose a risk around the illegal movement of money. Sometimes services and products, by their very design, pose an unacceptable risk. A lot of speakers in this debate have spoken about crypto ATMs as an example, and it is a very useful one. These are systems where you put cash in, and it converts it into cryptocurrency, effectively making the entire transaction completely unable to be traced. It means it's all too easy to move illicit money all around the world, having converted it from cash.

We know that it's being adopted by scammers. Observations of some of these ATMs show that most of the users are older people, many of whom have, on further interrogation, been victims of scams. Some estimates say around 10 to 12 per cent of all transactions on these things are scam or organised crime related. While not everyone who uses these things is doing something wrong, there is a disturbing portion who are. It's like the old wisdom—it is perfectly legal to wear a long black trench coat and carry a big backpack while using a payphone in the middle of the night, and you might be calling your mother and asking her how she is, but there could also be something dodgy going on. Commonsense says something fishy is going on with these devices, and all of the stats prove it.

It's not just a challenge here in Australia. They're noticing it in different jurisdictions in the United States. But, as has just been pointed out by the member for Lindsay, we've gone from having just a few of these devices only a few years ago to now having proportionately some of the most in the world. There are thousands of these things all around. They're in my community. They're here in Canberra. Pretty much everywhere I go, I see these devices. You can almost call them money-laundering machines, because they don't have the safeguards and security measures necessary to ensure that these transactions are legitimate, and we've seen that play out. We've seen AUSTRAC already have to intervene with some providers simply because they haven't met simple reporting requirements or had the necessary integrity measures in there. These devices are bad news.

But we also know that criminal enterprises are innovative. If it's not this, they'll find something else. It was iTunes gift cards. It's all sorts of means. There are so many different ways that value is transferred digitally. You will see a diverse array of options taken through organised crime. So we do need to be agile, and that means not delaying things for no reason. It means getting on with the job and creating a system that can be as agile as the criminal enterprises themselves, because, if we don't keep up, people are going to continue losing money.

We have also seen the consequences of organised crime being able to thrive. We've also seen the blurring of the lines between state actors and non-state actors, and we've seen disastrous consequences here in Australia. I think of the Adass synagogue attack and other domestic security threats with links to organised crime as well. These are not the organisations of old. It's not simple to track and trace based on principle, ideology, background and things like that. It's all over the place. It's pay per service and, with means like cryptocurrency, that is becoming simpler than it ever has been before.

These devices are a facilitator. They make it all too easy to convert hard cash into cryptocurrency, enabling the profits from illicit gains to go all around the world without a trace, and that cannot be tolerated. You can get cryptocurrency. You can convert cash to cryptocurrency in perfectly legitimate and traceable ways. But we know from experience that these ATMs do not have sufficient safeguards. They are bad news.

So they are a good example of what this bill is about. It's about ensuring that we have the flexibility to identify products, services and devices that, by their very nature, pose unacceptable risks of financial crime in this space, and to enable the AUSTRAC CEO to intervene and make sure that service providers are unable to use those means of delivering regulated services. It is completely common sense, and it is essential, in this dynamic organised-crime environment, to make sure that our laws are consistently able to keep up with those changes in technology and keep up as they identify new pathways.

Also, we can't be naive. Not every transaction is through a crypto ATM. Sometimes they kick it old school. Sometimes they still launder money through cash-intensive businesses or sophisticated corporate and trust structures. Sometimes they use typical money-transfer organisations used around the world all of the time. There are lots of mechanisms they will adopt. They are incredibly sophisticated enterprises, so we need to be keeping our eyes all over the place to make sure we're keeping up with these actors.

But we've identified these particular devices as a key capability of organised criminals—particularly scammers, but we also know the transfer of large sums of illicit gains is going through these devices. There are legitimate concerns about these devices, and they provide the perfect example of the kind of mischief we're trying to resolve through this legislation.

It is important that we adopt these changes as soon as possible. They've long been called for. They were announced by Minister Burke back in October last year. They've been on the agenda for a very long time, and it is time that we got on with the job of passing these essential laws through. Gone are the days when the threats of terrorism, foreign interference, people smuggling and all sorts of sick crimes that we see happening online were happening in silos. We see people smuggling, espionage, movement of drugs and illicit tobacco all meshed together in different organisational structures and communication channels. So we have to keep up with that messy, dynamic structure by making sure that we have really flexible laws that enable our agencies to get on with the job of catching the criminals and trying to remove dangers posed to our communities as much as possible, reflecting the same level of sophistication we're seeing adopted by these actors all around the world.

We know it's not just scams; it's cybercrime, it's tax evasion and it's the covering of all sorts of illegal and corrupt practices. They've been identified all around the world as a danger point. We know that digital asset transfers have been identified globally as a key danger point that we need to address together. Different jurisdictions are trying different things, but this will be an important intervention.

We've already seen from AUSTRAC that they are a very capable entity. They are cracking down on these organisations. There were articles only a month ago about dozens of entities being identified and shut down as part of their work. But sometimes it is just these devices or products or services themselves that really do require intervention. I think that this is an incredibly important measure. I'm pleased to see that it has been welcomed across the board with some proposed amendments. The principle is important, and it's important that our parliament is united in tackling organised crime and making sure that that cost and risk ratio is always unfavourable to the negative actors.

These amendments obviously make key changes, giving new powers to the AUSTRAC CEO, as we've discussed in detail. They also include some technical amendments about the operation and service of some documents, particularly around claims of legal professional privilege so that documents don't have to be served directly on the CEO, which, as we know, is fairly impractical in most government organisations. There are a lot of common sense reforms, and also reforms that reflect updates to criminal legislation, reflecting recognition of state sponsored terrorism, so that the language of the legislation keeps up with that as well. As we know, that line between state sponsored and separate—it's all crime, and it has to be managed accordingly. So these are very, very commonsense changes.

The consultation periods embedded in there are an important opportunity for affected parties to say their piece. There will be urgent circumstances where things just have to be shut down like that. Those safeguards are there. The legislation also includes tests that need to be applied. This isn't the AUSTRAC CEO simply saying, 'I don't like that; let's get rid of it.' There are specific criteria that they need to consider as part of that decision-making process, like the nature of the harm, whether the proposed intervention of removing a service will actually do anything to reduce or get rid of that harm, or whether there are alternative channels for a legitimate service to be provided. Using the example of crypto ATMs, it could still be done as a legitimate bank user over the counter after identity checks, and there are many other ways. Obviously online through your bank account digital systems, you can completely legitimately buy crypto and do with it what you wish by traceable means, making sure that that integrity of the system remains intact. They've tried to regulate it, and there is regulation around it, but it simply hasn't been enough, so we have to make sure our laws can be as responsive as possible.

Organised crime is something that continues to erode societies around the world. In some parts of the world, it completely dominates it; it surpasses governments and other protective entities in really controlling certain territories. It has had negative influences all around the world. These global organisations are causing almost unimaginable levels of suffering all around the world, exploiting our most vulnerable people and peddling increasingly dangerous drugs into vulnerable communities. They have no conscience, they have no ethics, but they have a lot of resources and a lot of will, and they have become increasingly sophisticated.

We need to make sure that we have flexible laws that can be implemented quickly and efficiently so that we can deal with risks as they arise. If we consistently have to come back into this place and go through nine committee processes and departmental processes, getting reams of advice in addition to agencies identifying a problem, we will never get anything done. That is why these actors are hard to catch sometimes for systems like ours; the criminals are far more efficient and effective at making changes than we are as government. So we need to make sure that we are designing laws so they are as agile, so we can keep up and so we can minimise harm in our communities.

This isn't just the scale of submarines full of drugs. This is grandparents in our communities being scammed, being tricked into going to these crypto ATMs and giving up their hard earned funds. These are people in our communities who are suffering as a result of the disgusting practices of organised criminal organisations. This has become a key tool in the toolkit for those actors. We need to make sure that, as more tools arise, we are getting rid of them as quickly as possible. Again, it does need to be proportionate. We do need to make sure that services that are legitimately used 99.9 times out of 100 can continue to be used. But when you've got a scenario where a tool or a service is, to a very large extent, really just being used to facilitate organised crime and ill-gotten gains, then something's up. We need to intervene.

We need to take a practical approach to these things, and this is incredibly practical legislation. It's keeping an eye on the level of risk, assessing that risk and ensuring that we are responding in a reasonable and proportionate way. The AUSTRAC CEO has the track record. That organisation has a terrific track record of ensuring that they are monitoring trends and responding quickly. Our community can also be informed of risks and, when necessary, we can make legislation that responds to those risks as they emerge. The risks of today would not have even been imagined 10 years ago. The use of artificial intelligence, voice cloning and all sorts of technologies to scam our most vulnerable people are becoming more and more sophisticated all the time. Impersonating me or anyone in this House to call people who trust us and our voices is now all too easy for scammers.

Cloning phone calls, cloning the voices of loved ones—this isn't just the prince in another continent promising riches if you send lots of money. It's a lot more sophisticated than that now. They are making us panic. They are appealing to our emotions. They're not as easy to spot. It's not the dodgy language in the email where the English is wrong, where the logo is upside down and the wrong colour and where it's all too easy to spot. Smart people are being scammed all the time, and the stigma around that really does need to erode, because Australians—the role of us as potential victims is really to help us stand up to these scammers.

There is no shame in being scammed in this era. They are very sophisticated. It is what they do. I've spoken to a number of constituents who have been scammed, and it often begins with shame. Intelligent people are ashamed that they fell for it. I know many people who I care deeply about and respect highly who have been scammed. It's happening all the time. There is no shame in it. These actors are relying on that sense of shame to make sure that people aren't reporting it, but it's important that all Australians, whenever they see scam activity or fall victim to it, are reporting it, because we really do need to respond. It's something that we can only do if we do it together. We all need to stand up against these folks. If you have been scammed, it's not just about getting your own money back, although that's incredibly important. It's also about getting the intelligence so we can plan and respond and make sure that other Australians are not being caught as well, because this has become a very real threat in some communities. It's only increasing.

The barriers to entry for organised crime have never been lower with AI agents and other technologies making it all too easy to just remotely autoscam, and so we've really got to be very responsive. This bill is all about looking at the services themselves, making sure, when a service is inherently risky, that we can respond quickly and that there are safeguards embedded but, at the same time, that we are agile in an era where we need to be agile if we're going to keep up with the risks to our communities. We know that the acts facilitated through cryptocurrency and indeed through ATMs are the most atrocious you can think of. It's terrorism. It's the exploitation of children. It's the movement of dangerous drugs around the world, hurting our most vulnerable community members and undermining the social glue that holds communities together. It is tobacco. It is the topics we've been talking about in this House all day, often facilitated through these very vehicles that we are here to regulate and, where necessary, crush. I commend this bill to the House and hope that the coalition come to their senses and support it.

I think I'll just ignore that last comment from the member opposite. Somewhere in this country today, there's a machine bolted to a wall in a service station or in a shopping centre, and standing in front of it is a woman in her 70s, maybe a gentleman in his 70s, with an envelope of cash in her hands. She may have been on the phone for an hour to a man she's never met. That person will have told her that her account has been compromised or that he loves her or that her grandson is in trouble, and he's told her precisely which machine to go to, which buttons to press and which wallet address to type into the screen. She feeds the notes in. The cash becomes cryptocurrency in seconds. The cryptocurrency leaves the country, and then it is gone—not gone in the sense that a bank might be able to claw it back but gone in the sense that nobody on this earth is getting it back for her.

Last October, the Minister for Home Affairs told the National Press Club about a 77-year-old woman taken for $430,000 in exactly that way—$430,000, a lifetime of work, fed one bundle of notes at a time into a machine in a shopping centre. That's what this bill is all about. Let me put the scale of this problem on the record. In 2019, Australia had 23 cryptocurrency ATMs. Today, we have more than 2,000. That is the third-highest number of any country on the planet.

AUSTRAC estimates almost 150,000 transactions run through those machines each year, moving around $275 million. About 99 per cent of that activity is cash going in. When AUSTRAC's cryptocurrency taskforce examined the 90 most frequent users of these machines, it found that 85 per cent of the of that transaction value was linked to scams or money mule activity.

Australians over the age of 50 account for almost 72 per cent of the value moving through cryptocurrency ATMs. Those aged 60 to 70 alone account for 29 per cent. Read those findings together and the picture is unmistakeable. The heaviest users of these machines are overwhelmingly older Australians being talked through a transaction by a criminal on the other end of a phone line. But crypto ATMs are only one channel. Australian banks closed 22,000 mule accounts in a single financial year, and the Australian Institute of Criminology estimates that serious and organised crime cost this country between $35.5 billion—that's billion, with a B—and $82.3 billion in 2023-24.

Before my dad passed away, he wanted to buy a car. Dad was a motor mechanic by trade. He left school at 14. He'd never owned a new car in his life, and he wanted to buy himself a nice car. It was a 16-year-old car. It wasn't a new car, but he wanted to buy himself a nice car. He answered an ad—I don't know whether it was on Marketplace or whatever it was—and he went to the bank and tried to get the cash out or get a bank cheque for the purchase of this car. He must have had the bank details to buy this car. To their credit, the teller at his bank, seeing my dad, a man in his 90s, said, 'Mr Wallace, I'll be with you in a moment; I just want to check something.' She went out the back and typed in the details of this account number, and she came back out and she said, 'Mr Wallace, I think you're being scammed.'

So I want to give so a big shout-out to our banks. I don't often give a shout-out to our banks, but our banks are getting better at identifying these sorts of scam activities. It's not just cryptocurrency that organised crime gangs are involved in. It's not just tobacco, although that's front and centre at the moment. It's illegal alcohol. It's the purported sale of motor vehicles. I cannot begin to tell you how many of my constituents, how many people I bump into, tell me how much money they have lost. These are smart businesspeople who, ordinarily, you would think would be all over this stuff, but these scammers are so smart. Their systems are so clever that, even to savvy businesspeople, they present a real and present danger.

We do need to take away the stigma of scams, because I know that many Australians who get scammed feel such shame that they have been robbed, that they've been sucked in. I can think of two people, two close friends, who are in their late 80s, who were scammed and, thankfully, were able to get their money back from their bank, but they were the lucky ones. There are Australians across this country who are losing money hand over fist to organised crime gangs, and much of it is through these terrible cryptocurrency machines.

AUSTRAC is the agency in the National Intelligence Community that tracks money flows through this country. It is an organisation which is not powerless. It's imposed a $5,000 cash limit on crypto ATM transactions. It's refused to renew a registration. Last month, it suspended a crypto ATM operator's registration outright. But look at how it has to do that: operator by operator, one enforcement action at a time, against a sector that can stand up a new machine in a new suburb every day. That is the gap that this bill identifies, and the coalition accepts that the gap is real, it's significant and it's dangerous.

Schedule 1 creates a power to act on the mechanism itself—on the product, the service and the delivery channel. The United Kingdom has moved against these machines. So has New Zealand. The coalition is not prepared to accept Australia remaining the soft target of this region. So we support the objective of this bill. But supporting an objective has never meant handing any government a blank cheque, and it does not mean that today. The schedule 1 power is a very large one. It can restrict the volume and value of funds moved, the method and the destination. Used carelessly, it could reach beyond crypto ATMs into legitimate services that ordinary businesses rely upon. As the bill is drafted, this power sits with the AUSTRAC chief executive officer, triggered by two concepts carrying enormous discretion: significant harm and the public interest. Consultation can be bypassed in exceptional or urgent circumstances, and failing to consult would not invalidate the resulting instrument. Strong powers deserve strong scrutiny, so let me talk about the coalition's position. We say that this bill should be passed, but I would like the House to be clear about the four improvements that we will pursue. These improvements came about through the work of the PJCIS, on which I am the deputy chair.

First and foremost, this power should be exercised by the responsible minister acting on the advice of the AUSTRAC chief executive, rather than the chief executive officer alone. Under the bill's current drafting, this government has given that power to the chief executive alone, and that is commonplace for this government. This government doesn't want its ministers to have their feet on the sticky paper. That's why the PJCIS recommended the very amendment that we are seeking. AUSTRAC has the intelligence, the data and the expertise. Nobody disputes that. But a decision to shut down an entire financial channel across an entire economy is not merely a technical one. It carries consequences for consumers, for businesses and for competition. Decisions of that magnitude should be made by a minister who can be questioned in this chamber, hauled before an estimates committee and ultimately removed by the Australian people at an election. Accountability is not a brake on the power; it's what gives the power its legitimacy.

Second—and something those opposite struggle with—there should be real transparency around the consultation that precedes any restriction, with publication of the submissions received and the consultation undertaken, and AUSTRAC's response to the issues raised. If a mechanism is to be restricted or banned, affected businesses and this parliament are entitled to see the evidence and the arguments weighed against it.

Third, commencement should be deferred until 1 July 2027. That's not the coalition inventing a grievance for industry; it's what industry and the legal profession, including the Law Council of Australia, have said publicly for months. Industry have said they need more time to make these changes. Let me be clear about what that is not. It is not a softening. Industry is already absorbing an enormous body of change from the tranche 2 reforms—new systems, new training, new compliance arrangements in businesses never regulated this way before. Solicitors, accountants and real estate agents are all telling me that they are buckling under the pressure which this CTF/AML legislation is already putting them under. A regime that lands before anyone can realistically comply with it does not catch criminals; it buries honest operators in paperwork while sophisticated players move on to the next big thing. Getting the start date right is a crucial part of making this law work.

Fourth, a deferred start date is no excuse for inaction on a threat that is in front of us right now. The minister, in consultation with AUSTRAC, should be considering as a matter of priority whether restrictions or prohibitions on crypto ATMs are warranted in the public interest. The evidence is on the table. The victims are real. The government does not need to wait for this bill to start doing its job. While we're at it—criminals do not only exploit what is new; they exploit what is old and poorly watched, and the money laundering risks sitting inside our legacy payments infrastructure deserve the same hard look.

Schedule 2 also deserves support. It brings the financing of state sponsors of terrorism and state terrorist acts within the definition of terrorism financing and allows sanctions offences to be brought into that framework. Our financial intelligence laws should move in step with our national security laws, not trail years behind them.

Schedule 3 makes technical repairs to customer due diligence, politically exposed person definitions, legal professional privilege claims and registration requirements. Where those changes remove burden without weakening integrity, they are welcome.

Let me finish where I began. This is not a debate about cryptocurrency; it's a debate about whether the laws of this country can keep pace with people who steal from Australians for a living. The coalition will not be slow. We will allow the bill to pass the House. When it reaches the Senate, we will move or support amendments to put this power in the hands of the accountable minister and give affected entities until 1 July— (Time expired)

In May 2010, a computer programmer, a bloke named Laszlo, bought a couple of pizzas from a shop in Jacksonville, Florida. You might be thinking to yourself, 'Well, what's the big deal about that?' But it was a special purchase because it was the first real-world usage of bitcoin, now perhaps the most well-known cryptocurrency. The purchase became known as Bitcoin Pizza Day. Now people who have cryptocurrency tend to eat pizza on that day as it comes through every single year.

But things have changed a lot since that time. Of course the use of cryptocurrency has become far more commonplace. For early adopters and investors, it's been a bit of a wild ride, with extreme price volatility across the market. In Australia, cryptocurrencies are a recognised part of today's economy and many people use them as legitimate investment or financial tools. A March 2022 report from the Cyber Security Industry Advisory Committee estimated that at least three million Australians own a crypto asset. Often this is made possible by the ease and convenience of a crypto ATM. But the number of crypto ATMs in Australia has increased rapidly in recent years. There were 23 in 2019 and there are now 2,000. This makes Australia, as we've heard, the third in the world for the number of crypto ATMs. The Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre estimates about $275 million is being moved through these crypto ATMs in Australia year in and year out. Of that $275 million, 99 per cent of those transactions were deposits—people exchanging their hard-earned cash for cryptocurrency.

Volatility is not the only risk associated with accessing cryptocurrency through crypto ATMs. In June 2025, the Australian Federal Police warned about the increase of investment scams. They warned about the increase of romance scams. They warned about the increase of extortion emails involving crypto ATMs as the final step in fraudsters' attacks on everyday Australians, and they cited a loss of more than $3 million in a 12-month period. When AUSTRAC examined the 90 most active crypto ATM users in 2024, it determined that 85 per cent of those were either scam victims or money mules who had been deceived or coerced into moving money.

There aren't just potential negative impacts for individuals choosing to invest in cryptocurrencies via crypto ATMs, because they can be used anonymously and across borders. There are legitimate concerns about their usage for criminal activities as well. When cryptocurrency is purchased through conventional online platforms, it's linked to a bank account. When they're purchased through conventional online platforms, the transaction creates a clear, traceable record. These purchases typically involve verified identities and leave an audit trail that we can follow, that agencies can follow, that law enforcement can follow and that can be monitored by financial institutions and regulators.

By contrast, when cryptocurrency is bought using cash through crypto ATMs, the level of traceability is significantly reduced. Although some machines may require limited identification, such as a phone number or basic ID checks, these requirements vary and are generally less stringent than those applied to bank based transactions. As a result, the ability of authorities to track the source of funds and to follow the movement of money is far more limited when crypto is acquired through cash based ATMs than when it is purchased using a bank account.

This issue is what the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026 is all about. While this bill focuses on the use of crypto ATMs, I want to be very clear that it is not aimed at people who are legitimately using crypto ATMs for investment. It is aimed at cracking down on money laundering through high-risk mechanisms, such as crypto ATMs.

For some time, Australia's security and intelligence agencies have been warning about the growing convergence of threats to our national security. Traditional distinctions between different forms of risk and criminal behaviour have become increasingly blurred, and this is a government that knows that we need to do something about that. Threats that were once seen as separate and distinct now intersect. They reinforce each other. They're linked. In the past, criminal activities such as terrorism, foreign interference, organised crime, money laundering, people smuggling and espionage operated in isolation, in silos. Now, we're seeing that change. Today, these threats are frequently interconnected, with criminal networks and hostile actors exploiting the same systems, technologies and financial channels to pursue a range of illicit objectives.

Money laundering, in particular, is a common thread running through all of these threats. The ability to move and disguise illicit funds underpins criminal and hostile activities, enabling them to operate without detection and enabling them to expand their operations. That's why money laundering has become the focal point, the central point of focus, for Australia's national security policy. It's also why proposed reforms are specifically targeted at strengthening controls in this particular area.

Schedule 1 of this bill introduces targeted changes to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act to strengthen the government's ability to respond to serious financial crimes, and the amendments create a new power that allows for restrictions to be placed on products, services, delivery methods and other arrangements that are assessed as posing high risks of money laundering or terrorism financing. These products and these services are collectively referred to as the high-risk mechanism, which I mentioned earlier. The bill establishes a new regulatory framework that authorises the chief executive officer of AUSTRAC to oversee and control the use of such high-risk mechanisms.

Under this framework, the AUSTRAC CEO will be able to impose broad sector-wide restrictions or prohibitions, rather than relying solely on individual enforcement actions. This is intended to enable faster, more consistent and more proportionate regulatory responses where systemic risks are identified across an industry or a delivery channel. The AUSTRAC CEO will have to consider a range of elements when assessing a proposed restriction. This includes the kind of harm involved and how serious it is, because, if you are targeting some of the most vulnerable people in our community, we need to know. If you are targeting the most vulnerable people in our community, the CEO must have powers that allow them to deal with it appropriately.

The AUSTRAC CEO will also have to consider how effective the proposed restriction would be in reducing harm, whether the service could still be offered through other means and any other relevant factors set out in the regulations. The new power is designed to enable AUSTRAC's flexible and proportionate risk based response to addressing new and changing money-laundering and terrorism-financing operations. It enables regulators to respond effectively to changes in risk profiles, criminal methodologies and technological developments, but it also ensures that reporting entities retain the very important ability to operate efficiently and effectively.

Before the AUSTRAC CEO makes a decision to apply the power, the framework requires a minimum 30-day consultation period with the public and relevant government agencies unless urgent circumstances justify faster action. Importantly, the power is not intended to be used simply because a mechanism involves digital assets, involves speculative behaviour or carries financial or investment risks. We acknowledge that many people use crypto and technology in ways that are new and for legitimate purposes. These measures, though, are critical because the Australian Institute of Criminology estimates that serious and organised crime cost Australia as much as $82.3 billion in 2023-24, which has left many victims facing financial loss and absolutely devastating hardship.

Schedule 2 of the bill updates the definition of 'financing of terrorism' in section 5 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act so it reflects recent changes that have been made to the Criminal Code. In simple terms, it makes sure that the law clearly covers new offences created under the Criminal Code. This means that providing financial support to a state that sponsors terrorism is clearly captured under Australia's anti-money-laundering and counterterrorism-financing laws. The amendments enable new sanctions offences to be added to the bill in the future. They also have an international impact, which meets the nation's commitment to the Financial Action Task Force. This is the body which leads global action to tackle money laundering and terrorist and proliferation financing. The Financial Action Task Force researches how money is laundered and how terrorism is funded. It promotes global standards to mitigate the risks and assesses whether countries are taking effective action.

Schedule 3 of the bill focuses on technical amendments to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act. These amendments are in response to the 2024 amendments to this act which ensured Australia's compliance with international standards. The amendments in this bill work for Australian businesses which have obligations under these laws, making compliance more efficient while still operating within strengthened anti-money-laundering frameworks. As the minister has outlined, the strategic landscape and threats to our national security have changed, and are continuing to change, and, as a government, we must rise to those threats. We must tackle them head on. We must put legislation in place. We must put regulations in place, because tackling those threats is critical for our nation's security, for our economy's security and to assure that Australians remain safe.

Money laundering remains a consistent piece of this puzzle. Each year, billions of dollars are generated through serious criminal conduct such as drug trafficking, child exploitation, cybercrime, tax evasion and other illegal or corrupt practices. In addition, authoritarian regimes rely on money laundering to support corruption, destabilise democratic systems and weaken the rule of law both within their borders and internationally. These illicit funds are then laundered to conceal their origins and enable further harm. Transnational and organised crime groups continue to adapt their methods, and we need to adapt to those. They continue to develop new ways to exploit members of the Australian community and to target Australia's financial and economic systems for profit.

We know that crypto ATMs are a mechanism for such activity. Of course, not every usage of a crypto ATM is linked to money laundering and not every usage of a crypto ATM is linked to criminal activity. But, unfortunately, as we've learned from our law enforcement agencies, a substantial amount of the use of crypto ATMs is linked to generating profits from criminal activity. The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill addresses the growing risks associated with crypto ATMs and the modern financial crime environment, which can be exploited to commit serious offences and harm Australia's economy and our communities.

I rise in support of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026. Organised criminality is constantly evolving. It's exploiting weaknesses in our communities, our institutions and our financial systems, and all for the one purpose of generating illicit profits and concealing the proceeds of crime. More recently, this has been facilitated by technological advances and digital assets such as cryptocurrency and crypto ATMs.

Let's be clear, though, money laundering is not a victimless crime. Every year, billions of dollars generated through drug trafficking, cybercrime, child exploitation, tax evasion and other serious criminal offences are washed through financial systems to disguise the criminals' origins and to disguise their activities. Money laundering fuels criminal enterprise. It enables organised crime groups to expand their operations, entrench their influence and profit from the exploitation of others. It also empowers authoritarian regimes to perpetrate corruption to weaken democratic institutions and undermine the rule of law across the globe. This bill delivers on the reforms announced by the Minister for Home Affairs at the National Press Club almost a year ago. It provides the tools needed to tackle emerging money-laundering risks and to crack down on high-risk financial mechanisms, particularly crypto ATMs.

For years, Australia's security and law enforcement agencies have warned of the growing convergence of the threats to our national security. The days when terrorism, foreign interference, organised crime, money laundering, people smuggling and espionage operated in separate silos are over. Today these threats are increasingly interconnected. They reinforce one another, they share resources, they exploit similar vulnerabilities and they often rely on the same financial networks. And at the centre of this convergence is the movement of illicit money.

These crimes threaten Australia's physical security, economic security and social cohesion. They undermine public confidence, they damage our prosperity and they put Australians at risk. And they're not confined by borders. Serious and organised crime now operates through sophisticated global networks, and the individuals behind these operations are often highly organised, well resourced and financially powerful. It's estimated that more than 70 per cent of Australia's serious and organised crime threats either originate overseas or have serious international links.

The Australian Federal Police has identified that among the key threats facing our nation are outlawed motorcycle gangs, organised crime syndicates controlling large parts of Australia's drug trade, money-laundering networks and other criminal enablers. Again, the common thread running through almost all of these events is money and, particularly, money laundering—the hiding of the true source, the true ownership and the destination of the money.

Without the ability to move, disguise and legitimise criminal profits, organised crime cannot operate on the scale that we see today. But criminal methodologies are constantly evolving, as is our world. As technology advances, organised crime groups adapt. They exploit new platforms, they find new products and they find new vulnerabilities. If we are to stay ahead of these criminal networks, our laws must evolve as well.

Money laundering serves two key purposes. First, it disguises the criminal origin of the illegally obtained funds, giving them the appearance of legitimacy. Second, it enables money, whether illegal or legal, to be used for further criminal activity. It is the financial engine room of organised crime. Money laundering allows criminals to reinvest in future offences. It deprives governments of vital revenue, distorts legitimate markets and undermines confidence in our financial institutions. It threatens the integrity of Australia's financial system and risks damaging the reputation of our regulatory and law enforcement agencies.

The process of money laundering typically follows three stages: placement, layering and integration. Placement occurs when illicit funds are introduced into the financial system. This could be by using cash to purchase assets and make deposits into bank accounts. Layering involves moving those funds through complex transactions designed to obscure the true origin, multiple bank accounts or multiple transactions through various corporations and trusts. Usually it's quite a web of activity. Integration is the final stage, where the proceeds of the crime are reintroduced as legitimate money into our economy and made to appear lawful. This could be the purchase, for instance, of assets or property. By this point, it's dirty money that's been transformed into seemingly legitimate wealth.

You may recall Operation Taipan of 2021, one of Australia's most significant money-laundering operations of the time. It saw an unusually high volume of cash deposits flowing into ATMs across Melbourne in the dead of night. This operation dismantled a criminal network. According to AUSTRAC, it 'reshaped Australia's approach to financial crime and cemented the role of the Fintel Alliance in modern intelligence sharing'. That was only five years ago. Since then, organised crime networks have continued to search for new ways to move illicit funds,

One such mechanism attracting increasing concern is the use of crypto ATMs. Cryptocurrency has become an increasingly common tool and payment method. Approximately 150,000 transactions are conducted through crypto ATMs each year, and that totals around $275 million. What is notable is that unlike traditional ATMs, where customers primarily withdraw cash, crypto ATMs are overwhelmingly used for deposits. In fact, deposits account for—wait for it—99 per cent of all transactions. And with that growth comes risk.

A recent case involved a 77-year-old Australian widow who was targeted through an online romance scam. Over eight months, a man she met through a dating app convinced her that he had amassed significant wealth through cryptocurrency investments. Under his direction, she repeatedly deposited cash into crypto ATMs, often withdrawing money in small amounts from multiple locations to avoid attracting attention. At one point, she was carrying $20,000 in cash. But because these transactions were small, they didn't trigger the same safeguards and alerts that apply elsewhere in the banking system. The activity went undetected until she had lost almost $430,000. The financial loss was devastating. The emotional impact was profound. That case demonstrates exactly why these machines have become attractive to criminals. They provide a pathway to convert cash into digital assets in ways that are often more difficult to trace and to detect.

Just a few months ago, international authorities shut down a major cryptolaundering infrastructure, arresting administrators and seizing domains tied to a service that allegedly laundered over $389 million in unlawful digital assets. There was also very recently a report in the US of one of the largest cryptocurrency thefts in US history. A stranger was deceived out of bitcoin worth over $240 million, and the perpetrators tried to hide their digital fingerprints, carrying out a sophisticated scheme to launder the proceeds.

Australia now ranks third in the world for the number of crypto ATMs deployed, and the growth has been extraordinary. Just six years ago, there were 23 machines. Three years ago, there were around 200. Today there are approximately 2,000. AUSTRAC has identified these machines as being linked to a range of criminal activity, including money laundering, scams, frauds, illicit drug trafficking and child exploitation. When AUSTRAC examined the 90 most prolific users of crypto ATMs in 2024, it found that 85 per cent were either scam victims or money mules who had been manipulated, deceived or coerced into giving money on behalf of criminals. Not everyone who uses crypto ATMs is involved in unlawful activity. Let's be clear about that. But the evidence is clear that a significant proportion of transactions are being exploited for criminal processes. And that's why this action is necessary.

The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026 responds to these emerging threats and strengthens Australia's ability to combat modern financial crime. Schedule 1 establishes a new framework empowering the CEO of AUSTRAC to restrict or prohibit the use of products, services, delivery channels or other mechanisms that present an unacceptable money-laundering or terrorism-financing risk. This is important reform. Serious and organised crime cost Australia an estimated $82.3 billion back in 2023-24, and these costs are borne by everyday people—victims, families, communities and the taxpayer. Criminal groups re-invest illicit profits into further offending. They create this cycle of harm that extends across Australia, across our cities and across the region.

While technological innovation has delivered enormous economic and social benefits, it has also created these new opportunities for exploitation. Criminal organisations are increasingly using high-risk mechanisms to recruit, manipulate and coerce ordinary Australians into laundering the proceeds of scams, drug trafficking and other serious criminal activity. These mechanisms are attractive to criminals precisely because they obscure the movement of the money, and they make the detection more difficult.

The powers contained in this bill are designed to enable Australia to respond quickly and decisively to those threats. Importantly, safeguards are built into this framework. The AUSTRAC CEO has to be satisfied that a particular mechanism presents a significant risk, and that any restriction or prohibition is necessary and in the public interest. This provides AUSTRAC with a flexible, risk based approach that protects the community while still allowing legitimate businesses to innovate and grow. Schedules 2 and 3 make a series of important technical amendments to strengthen Australia's anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing framework so that our laws remain effective, practical and aligned with international standards. Together, these measures reinforce Australia's obligations as a member of the Financial Action Task Force, and they strengthen our ability to combat both domestic and transnational criminal threats.

The Albanese Labor government is committed to protecting the integrity of our economy and preventing criminal organisations from exploiting Australians for profit. We're about protecting Australians against corruption, terrorist funding, and the ripping off of vulnerable Australians. To those who believe crypto ATMs provide a new avenue to hide criminal proceeds from law enforcement, let this message be clear. We are closing the gap, we are strengthening the system and we are giving agencies the powers they need to stop illicit activity and bring an end to money laundering. If you seek to exploit these technologies, to launder criminal profits, to evade detection or to prey on Australians, you are not beyond reach. I commend this bill to the House.

It is said that a fool and their money are easily separated. But in this day and age, very intelligent people and their money can also be very quickly and easily separated, and this Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026 is important. I know and respect and acknowledge the input the member for Bruce has had into this particular legislation in the House of Representatives, and I acknowledge previous speakers.

The coalition is supportive. Although, that said, we're not going to give the government a blank cheque for this particular bill. But if it enables the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre, AUSTRAC, with the powers it needs to track, weed out and crack down upon nefarious actors and characters in this space, then all well and good. I know that scams are so prevalent, and the previous speaker made reference to the burgeoning number of crypto automatic teller machines. Cryptocurrency ATMs in the Riverina number four, as I understand, with three in Wagga Wagga and one in Junee.

What we need to absolutely do as a parliament is try to keep pace. In fact, we should try and get ahead of the criminal gangs and the criminal intent. But it's not always easy, particularly with technology moving as fast as it does in these times. We live in interesting and difficult times. I know that in Victoria there is a car being stolen every 43 minutes in Melbourne, and 79 per cent of those cars are never recovered. They are being used, I'm told, as a form of currency, as a form of ill-gotten gains, by groups that then fund their activities. And we don't need to be reminded, probably again, of what is happening in the space of legal tobacco outlets and illegal ones where every night, it seems, we're seeing Molotov cocktails thrown at and firebombings of these establishments, particularly in the Victorian capital.

The Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026 covers three very broad changes to Australia's existing anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing regime. I acknowledge the presence in the chamber of the member for Wide Bay, a former police officer, a distinguished one. He is somebody for whom this would also be a very worrying trend, because I know that the member fought the good fight against criminals and criminal gangs and criminal activities in Queensland. But our police forces are being overwhelmed and overrun by the technology being used and by the fact that courts don't always, I believe, uphold the arrests that are made. The work that goes into those arrests and bringing people before the courts on allegations sometimes, you would argue, on the face of it, should be sustained. I appreciate the work that our state police forces do throughout the country.

This bill creates a new power for the chief executive officer of AUSTRAC to restrict or indeed even prohibit high-risk financial mechanisms. It expands the statutory definition of 'terrorism financing' and introduces quite a number of technical changes that are aimed at improving the overall operation of the AML/CTF framework. If ever we needed to thwart terrorism financing, it is right now because not just in Australia but right throughout the world we are seeing the rise of terrorism activities that are worrying to a peace-loving democracy such as ours. The Bondi massacre showed us that Australians are living in a very heightened threat environment, and this legislation is very much a direct measure to disrupt terrorism financing, to stop criminal cash flows and to make Australia not only financially safer but, indeed, safer.

Crypto ATMs are, it is said, a scammer's best friend. We, as a coalition, are endeavouring to make sure that our security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies all have the flexibility to deal with a really fast-moving, changing threat landscape. It's not easy. I acknowledge the work that the government is doing as well. I acknowledge the experience that the member for Bruce brings to this task. I've worked with him on committees and I know that, when he puts his mind to something, it's always reasonably diligent. I respect his work in this regard. I say that in a very bipartisan way.

Locally—and, of course, all politics is local—in February this year, Murrumbidgee police warned of crypto fraud after an intended victim avoided a $20,000 loss. The intended victim almost lost that amount from their bank account. The local inspector, Glenn Smith, said the incident occurred back at the end of January. The victim was contacted by an unknown user on the messaging platform WhatsApp, which is encrypted. The targeted person was asked to provide their bank details so they could receive cryptocurrency to which they were entitled. The targeted victim then provided the unknown user with their bank account details, which is always a mistake, and a copy of their driver's licence.

It wasn't too many days later that the intended victim was contacted by their bank and informed that an unknown person was attempting to make a $20,000 transaction through their account. The intended victim told the bank person who contacted them that they did not intend to authorise this transaction, and no money was withdrawn from their account. That person was very lucky because $20,000 could've disappeared as quickly as I just snapped my fingers.

It's not just in capital cities that this is happening. This happened in and around the Riverina. It is affecting our regions, it is affecting our vulnerable, and we must as a parliament crack down on financial crime. We often hear and read dreadful stories about crime and violence, but white-collar crime has every much of an affect on people's lives, on people's mental health, on people's physical state and certainly on people's financial security as any other piece of criminal activity. We need to be aware of that. Legislation needs to try to get ahead of the explosion of cryptocurrency fraud and the people who would very quickly and adroitly separate people and their money. Money is too hard to earn to be giving it away to criminals, to thugs, to gangs that are then going to use it for—who knows what?—terrorism or any other activity.

Concerns have arisen as bitcoin portals pop up at petrol stations and convenience stores across the country. AUSTRAC CEO, Brendan Thomas, was quoted recently as saying:

Crypto ATMs provide a fast, irreversible way for victims to send money to scammers … They're easy to locate, often operating 24/7, and designed for quick cash transactions with no human intervention, making them highly attractive to criminals.

There are any number of long and sad stories that have been told and have been well enunciated by people who have been separated from their money, particularly older Australians. Often, as my late father, Lance, always used to tell me, if there's an offer too good to refuse, then usually you should refuse it. And these get-rich-quick schemes honestly lead a lot of otherwise sensible people down the wrong path, particularly people who may not have the superannuation or may not have the retirement savings. They may be in an older stage of their life and looking to invest their nest egg that they've worked hard to achieve, and through ill advice and through some of these people who advertise on social media platforms and the like, they see this cryptocurrency, they wonder what it's about and, the next thing you know, they are putting at risk their life savings.

AUSTRAC's cryptocurrency taskforce says data from nine cryptocurrency ATM providers shows most users are over the age of 50, while 60- to 70-year-olds alone account for 29 per cent of all transactions by value. That's a lot of people and, generally speaking, a lot of money. These demographics, which are in stark contrast to the generally much younger demographics of cryptocurrency traders, suggest that these machines may be being used by scam victims rather than crypto enthusiasts. That is of great concern.

In his capacity as the Minister for Home Affairs, the member for Watson initially publicly flagged the likely introduction of legislation of this kind as part of a speech at the National Press Club on 16 October 2025. We can't seem to get the member for Watson at the Press Club at the moment for other speeches that he might perhaps be well advised to give, but we'll look forward to that in the not-too-distant future. But, at the time, he framed the proposed new powers as a response to the increasing convergence of money laundering, scams, fraud, child exploitation—and all of us should just shake our heads; I said in a previous speech in this parliament today that people guilty of that sort of thing should never see the light of day and should be locked up for life, quite frankly, and the keys thrown away—but also organised crime, with particular emphasis on the role of crypto ATMs as a high-risk cash-to-crypto medium.

I do want to pay tribute to someone. I shouldn't go on too much about my Labor friends and colleagues, but Stephen Jones, who is now in Paris with the OECD and doing a good job for and on behalf of Australia, attended a very, very worthwhile and good scams conference in Wagga Wagga. It was at a forum that he and I held. The noticeable aspect of that forum was the number of people with hair colour the same as mine. Yes, that's grey—or white, as my daughter often reminds me—

Silver.

or silver, yes. Thank you, Member for Bruce. I have to say scams are something that are parting a lot of good and hardworking people from their money. Anything that the government can do—by way of information, by way of these sorts of forums or by cracking down on this in a legal sense—should be encouraged. Absolutely it should, because these scams are becoming more widespread, more targeted and more sophisticated. They are leading to people, particularly older people, losing their life savings. And it's simply not right.

This bill has, as I say, coalition support. We have said that we are not just going to give it a complete blank cheque. Obviously the Senate will have its say on this particular bill, various points and details about it, but it is a bill worthy of the House's support.

When this government was elected in 2022 and then re-elected in 2025, we made it clear that we wanted our financial systems and national security framework strengthened. The job of reform never ends. In these two important areas, this Labor government has continued to bring laws to this place to strengthen our national security framework and our financial systems because we need our laws to work better in practice to keep people safe. This bill, the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026, delivers directly on the critical security reforms announced by the Minister for Home Affairs over his time in government and, most recently, as we heard from the member for Riverina, at the National Press Club in October last year.

For some time now, our premier intelligence and security agencies have been warning about a dangerous, growing convergence of threats to our national security. The days when terrorism, foreign interference, organised crime, money laundering, people smuggling and espionage existed in isolated and predictable silos are completely gone. We are seeing these national threats constantly overlap, blur and feed into one another. We've seen the stark reality of this threat convergence play out right across our communities. From horrific terrorism attacks through to highly organised crime networks, these threats are real and they all have one thing in common. Money laundering is the single, corrosive element that runs through almost every single security threat we face. It's the grease and the gears of syndicated crime. These reforms are squarely aimed at breaking those networks down.

Across the country, keeping our economy clean and disrupting criminal syndicates has meant real, measurable protection. It's meant safeguarding economic infrastructure that families and small businesses rely on. It's meant stopping the flow of illicit wealth into our everyday economy. It's meant practical, direct protection delivered through modern regulatory tools that trust our legitimate business community while isolating bad faith actors.

Just as our healthcare and cheaper medicine reforms have eased cost-of-living pressures—directly in my electorate and across the country—our financial security reforms are aimed to protect the economic wellbeing and safety of exactly the same households. These protective frameworks, which we constantly need to look at, matter right across the economy. They matter to older residents, who are prime targets for highly sophisticated scams, identity theft and financial fraud. They matter to local families, who increasingly transact in a digital environment and whose hard earned savings must be protected from crooks.

Ask any local accountant, community banker or financial adviser. They'll tell you just how important robust modern financial protections are, and they'll probably tell you a story of one of their clients who has been scammed. These laws and their reforms matter directly to people who expect their government to keep an eye on this stuff, to make policies which protect them from criminals and from organised crime.

For this Labor government, strengthening our national security frameworks in this space is about reforming the system so it's fit for purpose and ready for the future. It's about making it easier for legitimate businesses to navigate their compliance requirements and how the safety net can work smoothly whilst encouraging innovation in the sector. Even with our strong existing frameworks, local businesses and reporting entities still tell me there's work to do. In situations where a highly professional, compliant local business is executing everyday services, it needs to make sure that it can deal with a financial system that avoids operational friction because of lack of updated regulation. That's what these bills and these ongoing reforms we've delivered in government are designed to do: remove that friction and make systems easier for legitimate businesses.

This bill builds directly on the methodical work that we've been doing to make our national security regime more responsive, more flexible and better aligned with how modern transactions occur on the ground right across our economy. Specifically, this bill makes a targeted and highly practical set of changes to disrupt serious crime networks under the AML/CTF Act, the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act, serving as the next piece in a sequence of essential reforms to make it harder for money launderers to succeed; it introduces a new framework enabling the AUSTRAC CEO to regulate high-risk products, services, delivery channels and things through general sector-wide restrictions or prohibitions; it amends the meaning of the financing of terrorism in section 5 of the act to explicitly capture new offences under the Criminal Code related to financing a state sponsor of terrorism; and it delivers critical technical amendments to better support businesses implementing their obligations under the AML/CTF regime, ensuring data travels with payments to meet obligations and directly supporting efforts to modernise the Australian payments system.

In Australia, we have incredible local payment networks. In hearings that I was happy to be a part of in my role in my committee work, it was great to hear AUSTRAC and the Australian Payments Network really tell the committee how important it was for government, and also for the private sector, to start transacting through our local modern payment networks, like the New Payments Platform. I look forward to working on that committee and with industry and government to go to this better platform so that more of our transactions travel with more data to protect Australians from further money laundering.

These reforms are not a chaotic rewriting of our banking laws. It's not heavy-handed overregulation of everyday financial activities. It's important reform that removes regulatory time lag, giving our regulators the power to act in a streamlined, agile and effective way to protect Australians from organised crime. And there's no area more desperately in need of reform than cryptocurrency ATMs. But we need to be clear here. Cryptocurrencies are a reality in the world we live in. Many people use them as a perfectly legitimate investment or economic tool, and these laws are absolutely not aimed at cryptocurrencies. But we must understand that in Australia right now there exists a systemic vulnerability. When a consumer buys crypto online through a bank account, it creates a clean and traceable transaction history. That doesn't happen when cash is thrown into a crypto ATM. When crypto is purchased using cash through these ATMs, the reality is that our law enforcement agencies' capacity to trace that transaction drops to near zero.

The data on the use of these crypto ATMs is staggering. Australia is now ranked third in the world for the number of crypto ATMs in our communities, and the growth has been explosive. Just six years ago, there were only 23 crypto ATMs across Australia; today, there are over 2,000. Every single year, approximately 150,000 transactions go through these machines, moving roughly $275 million. Unbelievably, 99 per cent of those transactions are deposits—people loading physical cash into a machine and retrieving an untraceable crypto in exchange. We're not saying that every person depositing cash into these terminals is a criminal, but advice is that this specific channel represents a massive blind spot that makes it incredibly easy for crime syndicates to wash illicit money.

This bill gives AUSTRAC the exact tools needed to intervene. It means that regulatory oversight can be delivered more efficiently without compromising safety standards or community confidence. For local business owners, it means fewer redundant compliance loops and clearer guidelines, and, for everyday consumers, it means a safer financial environment where criminal networks cannot easily exploit local technological infrastructure. The reform is highly careful, deliberate and bounded by a robust accountability framework. The power given to AUSTRAC's CEO is not arbitrary. It's an important power but one that will be within oversight. In considering a restriction or sector-wide prohibition, the CEO must take into account clear statutory factors: the nature and extent of the harm, the direct effect the proposed restriction will have on that harm, whether alternative financial channels exist to provide that service or any other specific matters prescribed by formal regulation. Except in urgent or exceptional circumstances, the framework mandates a minimum 30-day consultation period with the public, with industry and, of course, with affected stakeholders before a decision is finalised. This is a risk based, flexible response. The primary legislation explicitly states it's not intended to restrict a mechanism merely because it involves a digital asset, speculative activity or inherent financial risk. Importantly, every decision made by the AUSTRAC CEO will occur via legislative instrument, ensuring it is brought directly to parliament for full oversight, scrutiny and the very important accountability power of disallowance. Schedule 1 is slated to commence on 1 January 2027, giving reporting entities and legitimate industries a clear runway to adapt.

This bill is a next step in the work that this government has been doing to strengthen our economy, to support our small businesses and to protect communities from organised crime. In phase 1, we started by tackling economic fairness, cutting costs and building stable foundations for budgets. Phase 2 was us backing up and supporting local businesses to adapt to digital economic shifts, ensuring that compliance doesn't break the back of small businesses. Just as we've promised to deliver tangible local infrastructure everywhere, we're also delivering the invisible structural infrastructure needed to keep our local financial systems safe. That's what strengthening our nation is about. It's about making sure that our systems work for everyday consumers and compliant businesses and protecting communities from organised crime. Our combined efforts in safety and efficiency are making a difference, taking pressure off legitimate businesses and giving locals peace of mind that their financial environment is secure.

The reality of the future is that our digital economy is expanding rapidly. More and more people are interacting with our financial systems digitally, and increasingly in complex ways. The demands on our financial regulators will continue to increase as serious and organised crime try to exploit our growth and exploit these networks. Removing unnecessary administrative barriers for regulators and businesses is an important part as we sharpen our tools to crush money laundering and ensure that our financial system frameworks remain responsive and sustainable. This bill seeks to do exactly that and I commend it to the House.

The coalition supports the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026. We support the intent of this bill because the financial threats facing Australians are changing rapidly and our legislative framework needs to be able to keep pace. Money-laundering scams, organised crime and terrorism financing are becoming increasingly sophisticated. I know there are people on all sides of this chamber that recognise those threats and are keen in their intent to adequately address them. Criminals are adapting. They are exploiting new technologies, new financial products and new ways of doing business and moving money. The government cannot afford to be standing still while they do this.

One of the clearest examples of this is the rapid growth of cryptocurrency ATMs in Australia. Australia now has more than 2,000 crypto ATMs. By contrast, in 2019 there were just 23. So this is an extraordinary increase in a pretty short amount of time. While there are legitimate uses for these machines, the evidence about their exploitation by criminals and scammers and the illegal market is deeply concerning. AUSTRAC, for example, has found that 85 per cent of frequent crypto ATM transactions are linked to scams or money mule activity. We know that banks closed some 22,000 mule accounts in a single year. What these numbers show is the scale, pace and change of the challenge that we are facing and that our current system is struggling to keep pace. That is why reform is necessary. That is why the content of these reforms is important.

Organised crime does not operate in silos. That is a broader point we cannot ignore when discussing organised crime and the movement of criminal money. These criminal networks do not operate neatly, confined within one industry or type of crime or sector of business. We're seeing that very clearly with the illicit tobacco trade. Illicit tobacco is no longer simply a question of someone selling some cheap cigarettes under a counter. It has become a more lucrative market for serious and organised crime. I've made the point a number of times that the billions of dollars in profits from the illicit tobacco market in Australia don't just evaporate into thin air; they're not victimless crimes. The proceeds of these crimes domestically within Australia and internationally fund things like the illegal arms trade and sex trafficking. We've had Kaz Hamad, the AFP's No. 1 national security target, linked to, on behalf of Iran, the fire bombing of a synagogue in Melbourne in my home state of Victoria. They are funding bikie gangs and criminals. These people are clever and stealth-like and technology-savvy when it comes to moving the proceeds of these crimes around. Indeed, even within the illicit tobacco trade, these criminals are getting smarter about the way they seek to infiltrate other businesses to launder money and move those proceeds around. They adapt quickly. They exploit weaknesses in regulation and enforcement, and they move money through different channels to conceal the proceeds of their activities.

That is why there is a clear connection between what this bill seeks to address and what Australians are seeing in the illicit tobacco market on every street corner, in every city, in every suburb and in every regional town across Australia. No community, it seems, remains untouched by this illegal activity, the people that operate in it and the money that is moved back and forth and around.

The government tells us our laws must keep pace with a rapidly evolving financial crime sector, and we agree. But that same urgency also needs to be applied to illicit tobacco. You cannot acknowledge the sophistication of organised crime in this bill while continuing to see criminal tobacco networks operate in communities across Australia. We in this place all know that this is not a victimless crime. Just this week there have been arson attacks in my home state of Victoria and in South Australia. There have been victims who have been maimed and killed, and there are families who still live with the consequences. My thoughts go to Katie Tangey, the young woman who was housesitting for her brother in Melbourne. He had gone away, and that house was attacked, in a case of mistaken identity, by operators in the illicit tobacco trade. Ms Tangey lost her life, and her family are still living with that consequence every single day. We've seen some absolutely shockingly violent crimes linked to this just over the last week in New South Wales. People are in burns units in hospitals, retail workers have been terrorised and abused and people are living with the consequences well beyond the date of those crimes committed.

When criminal organisations can make enormous profits from illicit tobacco, that money doesn't just disappear, as I said. It can also strengthen those criminal networks and provide them with more resources to expand their activities. Over the summer in Inverloch, a coastal town in my electorate—beautiful Inverloch—there was a shipping container that was selling illegal vapes. The TGA seized about 150 vapes from that shipping container. Three weeks later, it was still operating, still selling vapes to children. I had a lot of parents contact me deeply concerned about that. But the other feedback attached to that is interesting to note in the context of my contribution to this debate: there were bikies riding into town every day to open up that illegal shop. They weren't locals. They were coming in from out of town. I want to pay tribute to the local Victoria Police officers in Bass Coast for doing everything they possibly could, but it was observed that there were illegal bikies coming in and out of town to operate that illegal business on a daily basis. So, if we're serious about following the money, disrupting organised crime and closing financial channels criminals exploit, illicit tobacco needs to be front and centre of this conversation.

There are important measures in this bill that the coalition support. This bill will give AUSTRAC greater capacity to act quickly against high-risk financial mechanisms. That is important. Michael Outram, the former head of Australian Border Force—and I want to acknowledge Mr Outram's service to our country. But I also want to acknowledge his thoughtful, evidence based and experienced contributions in a number of speeches recently. The illicit tobacco trade is something about which he's provided some really important contributions. In the context of this bill, some of the activities that it's seeking to address show that some of Mr Outram's comments and contributions to this broader national debate have been important.

The bill seeks to strengthen Australia's laws around terrorism financing and better align our frameworks with various international obligations as well. It seeks to make a number of technical and operational upgrades to Australia's broader anti-money-laundering and counter-terrorism-financing framework. These are important objectives. They're necessary objectives. Often, legislation and regulation can lag behind technology and business trends, including business trends in the illegal market, but these are important objectives that seek to keep pace with technology and other trends that criminals are adapting to quite smartly. Australians rightly expect their government and law enforcement agencies to have the tools that they need to disrupt organised crime. That includes seeking to stop money laundering and protect Australians from increasingly sophisticated scams.

Prior to my time in this place, I worked in the cybersecurity and technology field. I was really impressed looking at a number of really innovative businesses across Australia that work in those sectors and the way that they have innovated to provide consumers and also national security agencies with the best cover possible. Their work in seeking to constantly upgrade and innovate very clever ways of protecting consumers against scams is to be commended. Many of the Australian based businesses, indeed, are small-to-medium enterprises that invest a huge amount of work in that area to try and keep people safe.

I recently met—just a week ago—with Sam from IT Solutions. He's based in Leongatha. He's an IT expert. We sat down to discuss some of my work on the House of Representatives Select Committee on Cyber Security for Small to Medium Sized Businesses and Organisations. Sam does amazing work trying to assist small businesses to protect themselves from scams. So, to all those Australian small businesses that have a very important role to play, we value your expertise and your immense efforts in that regard.

But supporting stronger action does not mean giving the government a blank cheque. This bill gives significant new powers to the AUSTRAC CEO. These powers come with what should be regarded as considerable discretion, and that makes it particularly important that the parliament carefully consider how these powers will operate, how decisions will be made and what safeguards will surround them.

There are a number of key thresholds contained within the legislation, including concepts such as significant harm and public interest, which are loosely defined. There are also legitimate questions around the consultation requirements contained within the bill. There are circumstances in which consultation can be bypassed and failures in consultation may not necessarily invalidate a decision. These are not insignificant matters. They go directly to questions of oversight, accountability and proportionality. The coalition supports strong powers where strong powers are needed, but these powers must be targeted, proportionate and accompanied by appropriate safeguards and regular reviews.

That is why the coalition referred this bill to a committee inquiry, which was ultimately conducted by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. It was an important process. It was an important opportunity for review, and for checks and balances. It allowed concerns to be raised, aired and tested and potential improvements to be examined. Most importantly, it allowed stakeholders, including industry and consumer groups, to put their views directly before the parliament for due consideration.

The inquiry reinforced the coalition's view that there are areas of this bill that can and should be improved. In particular, the inquiry reinforced our view that at least two key sets of amendments are required. The first relates to the new powers proposed for the AUSTRAC CEO. We believe there needs to be a refinement of these powers and stronger oversight of how they are exercised. That is an important question of accountability.

The second issue relates to commencement dates. Numerous stakeholders told the committee that the start date for some of the measures contained within this legislation should be delayed. That is not about delaying necessary reform, but it is about making sure that the people and organisations affected by these changes have a reasonable period of time to understand their obligations, change their systems and ensure they can comply with the new requirements.

Good legislation should not simply impose new obligations; it should provide a workable pathway for those expected to comply with them.

I'm pleased to follow the contribution from the member for Monash. The member and I don't always agree on everything, but I respect the way she goes about her work in this place and the passion she shows for issues that are important to her. Like the member, I rise today to speak in support of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Bill 2026.

The past decade has seen huge advancements in technology, artificial intelligence and cybercapability. We have never been more digitally connected, and there have never been more ways to do business. Technology, artificial intelligence and cybercapability are often used to advance living standards, create efficiencies and improve productivity. These things make lives easier, make them better and make them more efficient. But the concept of what can go right, and what is going right, must of course be viewed in balance with what could go wrong and what is going wrong.

The role of government is to facilitate the things that create these efficiencies, enhance productivity and improve the lives of working Australian families. It's also the role of government to step in to mitigate the consequences when things do not go right. It's the role of government to prescribe appropriate authority and powers to relevant organisations and entities who act to protect Australians, and it's the role of government to ensure effective oversight of those powers and authorities.

Human nature means that there will always be those who seek to exploit new technologies for their own gain, regardless of the effect that may have on others. Serious and organised criminal actors will always change, adapt and find loopholes and new methods within the economic system to manipulate Australians for their own personal gain. Generating illicit profits and then laundering the proceeds of crime is the business model of many criminal actors who are well organised and dedicated to this pursuit.

I often wonder about the gains that might be made, the advancements that our society might enjoy and the benefits that others might experience if those who embark on criminal pursuits dedicated that energy to fruitful endeavours. Imagine if the choice those criminals made was not to dedicate their time and energy to exploitation and suffering but to dedicate it to lawful activity. Imagine the public resources that could be saved and redirected elsewhere; just imagine that. I ask this because the Australian Institute of Criminology estimates that serious and organised crime cost Australia up to $82.3 billion in the 2023-24 financial year, causing misery and financial hardship for victims. Illicit profits are then reinvested in further serious crimes that cause untold harm to the Australian community and to our region.

This estimate captures the direct and consequential costs of serious and organised crime in Australia, as well as the indirect costs of preventing and responding to serious and organised crime incurred by government entities, businesses and individuals. But, of course, the need to expend public resources fighting organised crime is not something organised criminal actors care about. They don't care about anything other than themselves. They lack anything even remotely resembling empathy for others.

They also know that, in this country, governments care deeply about law and order, procedural fairness, due process, integrity, the highest standards of ethical conduct and the need to ensure sustainable and unbreakable public trust and confidence in government institutions. They know that governments have to balance an enormously complex array of views and circumstances. Governments have to make repeated and difficult decisions about where resources are spent, because resources are not finite and are funded by the Australian taxpayer and so must be reasonable in amount and reasonably incurred.

These considerations just do not feature in the thinking of criminal actors. They don't care about any of these things, just their own personal gain. Their operations are underpinned by a complete disregard for the law, for public resources and for others. That's why this bill is so important in empowering the AUSTRAC CEO to fight organised and systemic financial crime, the proceeds of which total billions of dollars annually and always result from the causing of deliberate suffering to others. Those billions of dollars of illegitimate funds are generated from cybercrime, drug trafficking, tax evasion and child exploitation. Many of those proceeds are then channelled into other authoritarian regimes in order to deliberately and systematically drive corruption and undermine the rule of law across the world.

The rule of law is fundamental to democracy. As the Varieties of Democracy report for 2026 revealed recently, democracy is under pressure across the globe, going backwards at a rapid pace, with a reported mere seven per cent of the global population living in a liberal democracy.

The report found that 76 per cent of the world's population—or around six billion people—are living under autocratic rule with freedom of expression, freedom of association and free and fair elections either severely curtailed or denied to them. The illicit proceeds of crime and the criminal actors who generate them fund these autocracies, sustaining them, helping them grow and putting further pressure on liberal democracies.

I could never accept that this bill is just a technical bill with just a few minor amendments and a few additional powers. It is a critical bill. It is a statement of support for the rule of law, and it is a statement of support for liberal democracies—a statement that this government will do what it can to prevent the exploitation of Australians for criminal gain or to prop up autocratic and repressive regimes. It is a statement of intent to say that this government, too, will adapt to new technologies that allow exploitation; that this government will prosecute offenders; and that this government will protect Australians and protect our precious liberal democracy.

Crypto ATMs are a new mechanism that AUSTRAC has observed as being strongly linked to money-laundering scams, to fraud, to corruption, to illicit substances and to child exploitation. AUSTRAC has found that a high percentage of regular users of crypto ATMs were victims of scams or had been manipulated or pressured into moving money via these machines. Indeed, law enforcement agencies in Australia have observed that criminal gain is unfortunately a substantive purpose for which cryptocurrency ATMs are used. There are, of course, lawful, genuine investors who have invested in cryptocurrency and who use crypto ATMs for legitimate purposes. Those investors have nothing to worry about with respect to this bill. To the contrary, given the risks that are involved in investing of this nature, this bill is designed to protect those genuine investors as well as ordinary Australians who may find themselves victim of an illicit scam.

That is why this bill responds to crypto ATMs and the broader modern financial crime environment, which facilitates serious crimes and harms both Australia's financial systems, the community and our democracy. The bill does this in a number of ways. Firstly, schedule 1 to the bill will introduce a new framework in the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 to empower the AUSTRAC CEO to restrict or prohibit businesses regulated under the AML/CTF regime from using a high-risk product, service, delivery channel or thing to protect the Australian community.

When considering whether a restriction or prohibition is necessary and in the public interest, the AUSTRAC CEO will be required to take into account specific matters, including the nature and effect of the harm, the effect the proposed restriction will have on the harm and whether there are alternative channels to provide the service.

What businesses will be regulated? Australia's anti-money-laundering and counterterrorism financing regime uses a designated services model for regulation such that, if a business provides one or more designated services, it is covered by the AML/CTF regime which then requires a business to put in place measures to prevent exploitation by criminals, including early identification of criminality or potential criminal activity. It's important to note that not all of the services provided by a particular business will be a designated service. These include a range of business activities in a number of sectors including the financial services, gold bullion, remittance, virtual asset service providers, real estate, professional services and dealers in precious metals, stones and products sectors.

To ensure that the new power granted to the AUSTRAC CEO is appropriately targeted, the AUSTRAC CEO must be satisfied of the significant harm of the high-risk mechanism before exercising the power. They must also be satisfied that a restriction or prohibition is necessary in the public interest. Whilst this new power is intended to support AUSTRAC's flexible, risk based response to emerging and evolving money-laundering and terrorism-financing risks, it's also balanced against the need to ensure that innovation in technology and in business models is not paralysed and can grow and develop fairly.

Then we have schedule 2 of the bill, which amends the meaning of 'financing of terrorism' in section 5 of the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006, which currently outlines four types of conduct that qualify as financing of terrorism to cross-refer to new offences introduced into the Criminal Code Act for financing a state sponsor of terrorism. Updates reflecting developments in Australian sanctions laws on terrorism financing will also be included in that definition, with in-built flexibility to facilitate new sanctions offences to be prescribed in the future.

Schedule 3 of the bill is a nod to amendments to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 that were identified through the implementation of significant reforms enacted by the Albanese Labor government through the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Amendment Act 2024, which were directed at ensuring that Australia could not be used as an international back door for illicit funds. These amendments will make compliance easier for regulated Australian businesses who have obligations under these laws while still delivering strong anti-money-laundering outcomes.

The importance of this bill cannot be underestimated. Being very clear and appropriately expansive about what qualifies as the financing of terrorism is critical. A compliance regime that regulated businesses can meet is critical. Powers to prevent the criminal abuse of our economy and the suffering this causes to Australians, to communities, to our region and, indeed, across the globe are critical. There is much to lose if a crime generates illicit profits. The proceeds are used to destabilise and damage democracies. Governments know that criminals are looking for loopholes. This government will always work to shut them down in a manner that is consistent with the rule of law but with a determination that the Australian people expect and deserve. I commend the bill to the House.

When I spoke in this place about the 2024 reforms, I said that money laundering was not some abstract or victimless offence. I said that it was the fundamental underpinning and enabler of most serious and organised criminal activity. That remains true today. Money laundering is how criminals preserve the benefits of crime. It is how they disguise where their money comes from. It is how they reinvest those proceeds into further offending and how criminal enterprises grow stronger, more sophisticated and more harmful. Behind laundered money, we find drug trafficking, cybercrime, child exploitation, tax evasion, scams, fraud, corruption and terrorism. There is a person, a child, a family, a business or a community that is affected by every one of those offences. The money might move silently, but the harm it finances is real.

In 2024, this parliament acted to close longstanding gaps in Australia's anti-money-laundering and counterterrorism-financing regime. Those reforms brought lawyers, accountants, real estate professionals, dealers in precious stones and metals, and other previously unregulated service providers within the regime. They strengthened reporting arrangements, modernised the treatment of legal professional privilege and expanded the ability of AUSTRAC to obtain information required for enforcement.

At that time, I told the House that our laws had to keep pace with the increasingly digital nature of the global financial system. I said that we had to close the gaps professional criminal organisations seek to exploit and prepare Australia not only for the risk before us then but for the likely directions of future development. I think we can all agree that the future has arrived very quickly. The technology changes. The delivery channels change. The methods used to disguise criminal proceeds change. But the objective of organised crime remains the same: to find the weakest point in the system and exploit it before regulators and law enforcement can respond. This bill is therefore the next practical step in the work we began in 2024 to strengthen the system.

Schedule 1 establishes a framework under which high-risk mechanisms can be restricted or prohibited when their use has caused, will cause or is likely to cause significant harm to Australia's financial system, the Australian community or both, and when intervention is necessary in the public interest. One clear example of this is the use of cryptocurrency ATMs. Obviously, cryptocurrency itself is not inherently criminal—new technology can create opportunities and improve services—and nor should every person who uses a crypto ATM be presumed to be engaged in wrongdoing. But we can't ignore the evidence about how these machines are actually being exploited.

Australia reportedly had around 2,000 cryptocurrency ATMs by October 2025, the highest number in the Asia-Pacific region. I'm sure you've all seen them in your service station, in your shopping centres or in tobacco stores. They've just popped up everywhere, often alongside traditional banking teller machines. AUSTRAC estimated that almost 150,000 transactions, totalling more than $275 million, were occurring through crypto ATMs each year. Of these, 99 per cent were cash deposits used to purchase cryptocurrency, a transaction pattern that can make funds more difficult to trace and increase the risk of exploitation for money laundering, scams and money mule activity.

The evidence about victims is particularly disturbing. When AUSTRAC examined the 90 most prolific users of crypto ATMs during 2024, it found that 85 per cent were either scam victims or money mules who had been tricked or coerced into moving money—85 per cent. That's people we know. That's our nanna, our uncle or our auntie. These are everyday people who have been taken advantage of because they've been scammed or they've been money mules who have been tricked or coerced into moving money. Between 1 January 2024 and 1 January 2025, ReportCyber received 150 reports of scams involving these crypto ATMs, with reported losses of more than $3 million. The Australian Federal Police warned that this was likely a conservative figure because these scams, as we might imagine, are substantially underreported.

So the people actually standing in front of these machines, by and large, are not themselves the sophisticated criminals; they are Australians who have often been manipulated, frightened, deceived or coerced. You only need to look in your junk mail to see the type of emails that are going into homes every day, trying to do exactly that—to manipulate, frighten, deceive or coerce Australians out of their hard-earned money. They may believe they are protecting their savings. They may have been told they owe a debt, that their bank account has been compromised, that an investment opportunity is about to disappear or that someone they trust urgently needs money. They may be precisely following directions from a scammer who has kept them on the telephone and isolated them from anyone who might intervene. For those victims, the speed and irreversibility of the transaction can be devastating.

A financial system worthy of public confidence cannot simply watch this happen and say that nothing can be done because technology has moved too quickly. The law must keep up. This bill provides that capacity. It enables restrictions concerning the volume or value of funds transferred, the method or destination of a transfer, or requirements for reporting entities to provide information or take action to mitigate risk. Where proportionate safeguards are enough, restrictions can be used. Where a mechanism is producing serious harm that cannot otherwise be controlled, prohibition may be available.

Importantly, this is not an arbitrary power. The decision-maker must consider the nature and the extent of the harm, whether the proposed action is likely to address that harm, whether alternative mechanisms are available and any other relevant considerations. Consultation with affected persons and the relevant Commonwealth, state or territory regulator is ordinarily required for at least 30 days. Urgent action without prior consultation is reserved for exceptional circumstances, including where a mechanism is primarily being used for illicit financing and no other control can urgently mitigate the risk. The framework also puts limits on how long these measures may operate. An instrument made without prior consultation can operate for no more than six months. Where consultation has occurred, an instrument may operate for up to three years. Any extension must again satisfy the statutory tests and consultation requirements.

Because these decisions are made by legislative instrument, they are subject to the framework for parliamentary oversight and scrutiny—most likely to the committee which I'm on, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. We do closely examine these kinds of powers. Our report called for urgent action on cryptocurrency ATMs, finding that they are a significant channel for scams and financial crime, and the committee recommended that the restrictions or prohibitions affecting high-risk mechanisms be exercised by the responsible minister on the advice of the AUSTRAC CEO, strengthening that accountability and public confidence. It also recommended greater transparency in consultation before restrictions are imposed. That is the proper role of parliamentary scrutiny—to ensure that the legislative response is effective, accountable and proportionate.

In my speech on the 2024 amendments, I also said that we did not want legitimate business to be abused by criminals and that we understood different businesses faced different risks. That principle remains today. Good regulation distinguishes between businesses that are deliberately facilitating wrongdoing, businesses that are failing to manage known risks and businesses that are trying in good faith to meet their obligations. We should target the harm without imposing unnecessary burdens on people doing the right thing. The government consulted publicly on these reforms. Submissions were received from banking, accounting, legal, financial advice, payments and digital economy organisations.

The bill also updates the definition of 'financing of terrorism'. The Criminal Code Amendment (State Sponsors of Terrorism) Act 2025 creates offences relating to financing of state sponsors of terrorism and financing state terrorist acts. This bill brings those offences within the anti-money-laundering and counterterrorism financing framework. It also establishes regulation-making powers concerning relevant offences under the Charter of the United Nations Act and the Autonomous Sanctions Act. That is necessary because terrorism financing does not stand still. Hostile actors can exploit financial systems, intermediaries, emerging technologies and international networks. Definitions across Commonwealth law must operate coherently so that new offences do not sit outside the financial intelligence and reporting framework intended to detect them.

The third schedule makes technical and clarifying amendments arising from the implementation of the 2020 reforms. These concern customer due diligence, politically exposed persons, reporting details, international value transfers, services and legal professional privilege.

I have a lot more I want to say, but I appreciate I'm running down the clock, so I'll wrap up. Two years ago, I did say that money laundering allowed organised crime groups to go on doing whatever they were doing without being disturbed. This bill is another step towards disturbing them. It is about intervening before a high-risk technology becomes an entrenched criminal channel. It is about giving regulators the capacity to respond to the evidence of significant harm. And it is about stopping criminals from exploiting legitimate businesses and stopping scammers from exploiting vulnerable Australians. Our laws must keep pace with the criminals, our safeguards must keep pace with technology and our institutions must have the authority to act when new risks emerge. This is what this bill provides, and I commend it to the House.

Debate interrupted.