Jo Briskey (Maribyrnong, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It's a privilege to make my contribution to the debate on these two bills, the Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Repealing Offences) Bill 2026 and the Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Sunsetting Provision) Bill 2026. Together, these bills represent a landmark moment in the reform of Australia's Commonwealth secrecy framework—one that has been needed for a long time and one that this Albanese Labor government is proud to deliver.

Let me begin by acknowledging what these bills are fundamentally about. They are about the enduring tension at the heart of any democracy, the tension between a government's legitimate need to protect sensitive information and the public's fundamental right to know what is being done in their name. These are not competing values that can simply be traded off against each other. They are twin pillars of democratic governance, and both demand our serious attention.

For too long, the Commonwealth's secrecy framework has been a sprawling, inconsistent patchwork; a statute book cluttered with hundreds of secrecy provisions, many of which were never designed to carry the weight of criminal liability. The result has been a framework that is neither fair nor fit for purpose. It has created legal uncertainty, chilled legitimate public interest journalism and imposed disproportionate consequences on individuals who may have done nothing more than perform their job. This government was elected with a commitment to fix that, and that's exactly what these bills do.

The Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Repealing Offences) Bill is the centrepiece of this reform. It delivers comprehensively on our commitment to implement the recommendations of the 2023 review of secrecy provisions conducted by the Attorney-General's Department, as well as the government's response to the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor's 2024 review of secrecy offences under part 5.6 of the Criminal Code.

The scale of change is significant. The bill will remove criminal liability from more than 300 provisions, representing more than one-third of all Commonwealth secrecy provisions. The 2023 review identified 168 provisions that no longer required criminal liability. This bill goes further, almost doubling that number. No more tinkering around the edges; this is serious evidence based law reform.

What does this mean in practice? It means that the vast majority of non-disclosure duties across the Commonwealth statute book will no longer attract criminal sanctions. Instead, they will be subject to more proportionate civil and administrative consequences, consequences that are proportionate to the nature of the breach and appropriate to the context. It means that hundreds of Australians who work for or provide services to the Commonwealth will no longer face the spectre of criminal prosecution for conduct that does not genuinely threaten our national security or public safety.

Let me be clear about what this bill does not do. It does not leave Australia's most sensitive information unprotected. Where criminal liability is genuinely necessary—where the potential harm from unauthorised disclosure is serious and real—it remains. The bill preserves and strengthens the provisions that matter most. And it introduces a new targeted secrecy offence in the Criminal Code to address a specific gap identified when a former consulting firm partner allegedly shared confidential Commonwealth information for private gain. This new offence will capture improper use or communication of information by Commonwealth officers, persons engaged to perform work for a Commonwealth entity and persons providing paid or unpaid services to Commonwealth entities—capturing the full range of people who are entrusted with privileged access to sensitive government information. This is a proportionate and targeted response to a real problem, and it ensures our framework is comprehensive without being oppressive.

I want to turn now to what I believe is one of the most important elements of this bill—the protections it introduces for press freedom. The Albanese Labor government has been unequivocal in its commitment to a free press. A free press should never be considered an inconvenience to good government as it is a fundamental mechanism of our democratic accountability. Journalists who expose wrongdoing, who bring hidden information into the public domain, who hold power to account perform an essential public service, and our laws should reflect that.

Under this bill, the Attorney-General will be required to consent before a journalist or an administrative staff member of a news reporting organisation can be prosecuted for a secrecy offence. This is an important additional safeguard. It does not prevent legitimate prosecutions. It does not allow the Attorney-General to initiate prosecutions. What it does is ensure that, before any prosecution of a journalist proceeds, there is proper scrutiny at the highest level, scrutiny that complements the existing requirement that any prosecution must be in the public interest. This is exactly the kind of check that a mature democracy should have in place.

The bill also implements important recommendations of the INSLM's Secrecy Review. These amendments will repeal the proper-place-of-custody offences that are no longer required; ensure that the classification of information under the Protective Security Policy Framework does not form an element of any secrecy offences, a matter of significant legal clarity; ensure the harm threshold for certain offences is unambiguous and material; and strengthen protections for nonofficials by increasing the threshold for criminal liability, reducing penalties and repealing the offence for merely 'dealing' with information. These adjustments go to the heart of ensuring our secrecy laws are proportionate, consistent with the rule of law and respectful of individual rights.

I also want to acknowledge the Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Sunsetting Provision) Bill, the companion piece before us today. Section 122.4 of the Criminal Code currently makes it an offence for a Commonwealth officer, or a person engaged to perform work for a Commonwealth entity, to communicate information in breach of a duty arising elsewhere in Commonwealth law. Without the sunsetting provision bill, that section will lapse before parliament has had the chance to fully consider the broader reforms in the repealing offences bill. This is sensible, responsible legislative management. The limited extension to 29 December 2026 ensures there is no gap in protections for sensitive Commonwealth information while parliament does its job properly. It would be neither prudent nor responsible to allow section 122.4 to sunset prematurely. This bill ensures that does not happen while making clear that the extension is interim. Parliament's task is to pass the repealing offences bill and complete the reform. I am confident we will be able to do exactly that.

I want to close by reflecting briefly on what these reforms say about how we think about law in this country. Laws should not simply exist because they have always existed; they should be justified by the harm they prevent, the rights they protect and the values they uphold. For too long, too many of our secrecy provisions have failed that test. They are relics of a different era, carrying criminal consequences that are disproportionate, inconsistent and, in many cases, simply unnecessary. This government has done the hard work of reviewing those provisions carefully, consulting broadly and bringing forward legislation that reflects both the seriousness of protecting genuinely sensitive information and the importance of transparency and accountability in a democracy. That is what good government looks like, that is what Australians deserve, and I commend both bills to the House.

Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal National Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Repealing Offences) Bill 2026 and the Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Sunsetting Provision) Bill 2026 deal with an issue that sits right at the heart of responsible government and democratic accountability in this country. They are about how we protect sensitive information, uphold national security, preserve public trust and maintain confidence in our institutions. But they're also about ensuring governments remain accountable, transparent and respectful of democratic freedoms, including freedom of the press.

In the modern world, information is power. Governments hold enormous amounts of personal, commercial and national security information. Australians rightly expect that that information is to be protected—it is to be protected responsibly and securely. At the same time, Australians also rightly expect governments to be accountable and not hide behind secrecy unnecessarily. The challenge for this parliament is striking the right balance—especially under this Labor government—between those competing responsibilities.

Now, secrecy laws are not always the most headline-grabbing pieces of legislation debated in this chamber, but they are incredibly important to the functioning of good government and public confidence in our institutions, because, when governments fail to protect sensitive information, confidence in our institutions begins to erode. And, when confidence in institutions erodes, democracy itself is weakened. Equally, excessive secrecy can also damage democracy if governments overclassify information or overcriminalise disclosure. That's why these reforms matter and why they deserve the careful scrutiny of this place.

The government says these bills are intended to modernise and simplify the Commonwealth secrecy framework. To be fair, there is truth in that assessment. Over many decades, secrecy offences developed across the Commonwealth's statute book in an inconsistent and fragmented way. Different governments introduced different provisions at different times, often for very different purposes. The result has been a framework that became increasingly complex, patchwork, inconsistent and in some areas just simply outdated.

The government proposes removing criminal liability from more than 300 secrecy provisions across Commonwealth legislation. That is not a small administrative tidy up; it is a major restructuring of Commonwealth secrecy laws and how they operate across government. Because of that, this parliament has a responsibility to scrutinise these reforms carefully and responsibly. Let me say clearly that the coalition supports the principle that criminal sanctions should be proportionate to the seriousness of the conduct involved. Not every administrative mistake should attract criminal liability. That seems pretty axiomatic. Not every disclosure should result in imprisonment. Where protections can appropriately be maintained through administrative sanctions, disciplinary action or civil remedies, that should be considered by government. It should be considered by this place.

The explanatory memorandum itself acknowledges that many secrecy provisions no longer require criminal liability because alternative protections already exist. Some offences related to information that is now decades old; some related to agencies or frameworks that don't even exist anymore. Others duplicated protections already available elsewhere in the law. So there is genuine merit in modernising and simplifying parts of the framework.

But, while the coalition supports sensible reform, we also believe secrecy laws exist for a very important reason. That reason is protecting Australia's national interest and maintaining public confidence in government institutions because some information, if improperly disclosed, can cause significant harm—harm to national security, harm to law enforcement operations, harm to Australians' privacy, harm to commercial-in-confidence matters and harm to public trust in government itself. Australians expect their governments to handle sensitive information responsibly. That expectation is entirely reasonable. Once public confidence in the handling of sensitive information is lost, it is incredibly hard to get it back.

One of the most significant aspects of this legislation is the creation of a new targeted secrecy offence relating to the improper use or communication of Commonwealth information for personal gain or to cause detriment. Frankly, most Australians would assume this type of offence already existed. Australians expect that, if someone entrusted with sensitive information abuses that information for personal advantage, there should be serious consequences. The proposed offence specifically targets intentional misuse of information where somebody improperly uses or communicates information to obtain a benefit or cause detriment to another person or Commonwealth entity. Importantly, this offence is narrower and more targeted than the existing broader framework. It focuses on deliberate wrongdoing and genuinely harmful conduct rather than technical administrative mistakes. I think most Australians would see that as a reasonable and proportionate approach.

Australians were rightly angered by the revelations involving confidential Treasury information being misused by consultants and private firms. That conduct damaged confidence in government processes and raised serious concerns about integrity and accountability. Australians expect integrity from those entrusted with sensitive information, whether they are public servants, consultants, contractors or advisers, and Australians rightly expect governments to act when that trust is breached. This legislation attempts to address some of the gaps exposed by those events. If privileged Commonwealth information is exploited for private gain, confidence in our entire system of government is undermined. Public trust in institutions is something we should never take for granted in this country.

Another significant aspect of these reforms is the expansion of secrecy obligations to persons providing services to the Commonwealth, including unpaid service providers in some circumstances. This reflects the reality of modern government, where governments increasingly rely on contractors, consultants, advisory panels and external expertise. Many people outside what we would consider the traditional public service now have access to highly sensitive government information. Where individuals are entrusted with that information, obligations should follow that access. Equally, these laws must be applied carefully, proportionately and fairly. Australians should not fear criminal liability for innocent mistakes or technical administrative issues where there is no harmful intent. The focus should always remain on genuinely harmful conduct that undermines public trust or national security.

These reforms also deal extensively with journalists and press freedom. We're honoured to have some of the Attorney-General's public servants in the chamber with us today, who, I might say, work very hard for the Commonwealth, and I thank them for their service. This bill introduces a requirement that the Attorney-General approve prosecutions against journalists or media staff before proceedings can continue for secrecy offences. The coalition supports a strong and independent media because a free press is absolutely fundamental to a healthy democracy. Yes, they can be a pain in the backside at times, but journalists play an important role in exposing wrongdoing, scrutinising governments and informing the public about matters of public interest. Freedom of the press must also exist alongside national security responsibilities. There is a very important difference between legitimate public-interest journalism and the reckless disclosure of highly classified information that could endanger lives or compromise security operations. This parliament must always maintain that distinction carefully and responsibly.

While many offences are being removed, the legislation still preserves criminal liability for particularly sensitive categories of information, including census data, healthcare information, commercial information and patent information. That is entirely understandable, because Australians expect highly sensitive personal and commercial in confidence information to remain protected. Australians expect their medical information to remain confidential—that shouldn't come as any surprise. Businesses expect commercially sensitive information provided to government to remain secure. Australians completing the census expect that the information they provide will remain protected and confidential. Without public trust, participation declines, and without participation, governments lose access to reliable information needed for policymaking and service delivery.

These reforms must also be viewed in the context of the modern strategic environment and the increasingly complex threats facing Australia today. Cyberthreats have increased dramatically over the past decade. Foreign interference operations are more sophisticated than ever. Hostile state actors actively seek to obtain sensitive government information and exploit weaknesses in systems and institutions. Critical infrastructure is increasingly vulnerable to cyberattack and malicious interference. That is why secrecy laws cannot simply be viewed as dry administrative legislation. They form part of Australia's broader national resilience and national security framework. They should be part of a national security strategy, if this government ever gets around to implementing one. As somebody who has spent considerable time working on intelligence and national security matters through the PJCIS, I understand how serious these issues are.

National security is not theoretical. The threats facing Australia today are real. They are growing more complex by the day. More than 103,000 Australians have died in service of this country, wearing our uniform with our flag on their left shoulder. We honour their sacrifice by ensuring this parliament takes Australia's national security responsibilities seriously. One thing the coalition will always stand for is proportionality and balance. We believe governments must have the powers necessary to protect Australia and protect Australians.

The companion legislation before the House, the Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Sunsetting Provision) Bill 2026, is much narrower in scope but still important. Its purpose is to extend the operation of certain secrecy offences for a further six months, until 29 December 2026, while broader reforms are being implemented. Effectively, it acts as a transitional measure designed to prevent legal gaps or unintended consequences during this transitionary phase. Transitional arrangements are sometimes necessary in complex legislative reform, but Australians are entitled to ask why temporary extensions continue to be required instead of finalising a permanent framework more quickly.

Good governance requires certainty, clarity and confidence in the law. Governments should always aim to finalise permanent frameworks wherever possible as reasonably quickly as possible. These bills raise important questions about secrecy, transparency, accountability and national security in modern Australia. They are not simple questions and there are no perfect answers.

Tom French (Moore, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise in support of the Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Repealing Offences) Bill 2026 and the associated bill. The main bill is not the sort of bill likely to dominate the evening news. It is, however, the sort of bill that matters if we want Commonwealth law to be clear, proportionate and capable of being understood by the people who have to comply with it. That is not always the most glamourous work in parliament, but it is important work.

The Commonwealth's secrecy framework has become too complex, too scattered and, in some places, too blunt. The Attorney-General's Department identified more than 860 secrecy related provisions across Commonwealth law—295 nondisclosure duties, 569 specific offences and 11 general offences in the Criminal Code. That is a lot of secrecy law. Some of it is necessary. Some of it protects national security, sensitive personal information, commercial information, health information and the integrity of Commonwealth decision-making. But some of it is outdated, some of it is duplicated, some of it has not been reviewed properly for years and some of it imposes criminal liability in circumstances where criminal law is not the right tool—and that is the problem the main bill seeks to address.

At the centre of the current framework is section 122.4 of the Criminal Code. Section 122.4 makes it an offence for a Commonwealth officer or a person engaged to perform work for a Commonwealth entity to communicate information in breach of a duty arising under another Commonwealth law. That provision was never intended to be permanent. It was intended to operate while those non-disclosure duties were reviewed and a more settled framework was developed. In plain terms it was a temporary fix, and, as any electrician will tell you, temporary fixes have a habit of becoming permanent if nobody comes back to do the job properly. That's not a criticism of temporary fixes—sometimes you need them—but it does come to a point when you should stop pretending that a cable tie is part of the design, and this bill is part of doing the job properly.

The Australian Law Reform Commission identified the issue in its 2010 report Secrecy laws and open government in Australia. The principle was straightforward. Criminal sanctions should be reserved for conduct that warrants criminal punishment. Where civil, administrative or contractual remedies are sufficient the criminal law should not be used just because it happens to be available. That is a sensible principle. It's not soft on wrongdoing and it's not antisecrecy. It simply recognises that criminal law is the sharpest instrument available to the state and should be used with some care. The first major change by this bill is to replace section 122.4 of the Criminal Code with a new targeted general secrecy offence.

Under the existing approach, criminal liability can be enlivened by a breach of a non-disclosure duty, even where there is no real consideration of intent or harm, or whether the conduct is the sort of thing that should be criminalised. The new offence is more focused. It captures people who are using or communicating Commonwealth information with the intention of obtaining benefit for themselves or for someone else, or causing detriment to a Commonwealth entity or another person where a reasonable person would conclude that the conduct was improper. That is a better test. It targets the person who misuses confidential government information for advantage. It captures the sort of conduct alleged in the PricewaterhouseCoopers tax scandal: confidential Commonwealth information being used to help private clients avoid their obligations.

That is the kind of conduct that should attract serious consequences, but it does not treat every mistake, every misjudgement or every technical breach as though it belongs in criminal courts. That distinction matters, because most people who deal with Commonwealth information are not trying to game the system. They are public servants, contractors, advisers and officials trying to navigate a complex set of rules, and they should be held to proper standards. They should be subject to discipline when they breach their duties and they should face consequences when they do the wrong thing, but the consequence should fit the conduct. This bill keeps non-disclosure duties in place. It keeps civil remedies. It keeps administrative consequences. It keeps the capacity to protect genuinely sensitive information. What changes is the criminal liability reserved for the conduct that properly warrants it. That is not radical; it is basic proportionality.

The second major change is that this bill repeals or removes criminal liability from more than 300 Commonwealth secrecy provisions. Some of these provisions are simply no longer needed. Some of them relate to schemes that have long since passed into history. Others deal with information where civil or administrative consequences are sufficient. There is a certain charm, I suppose, in preserving secrecy obligations for institutions that no longer exist, but charm is usually not the best basis for criminal law. The bill also recognises that not every secrecy obligation should be treated the same way. A small number of duties relating to genuinely sensitive personal, commercial and healthcare information will continue to attract criminal liability, and that is appropriate. The point is not to abolish secrecy law; the point is to make it more coherent.

The third important reform concerns journalists and news organisations. The bill legislates the requirement that the Attorney-General's consent be sought before prosecuting a journalist, an editor, a producer or an administrative staff member of a news organisation for a secrecy offence. At present, that protection exists as a ministerial direction. A ministerial direction is better than nothing, but it is not the same as legislation. It can be changed and it can be revoked. It depends on the government of the day. This bill moves that protection into statute, and that matters, because journalism often involves uncomfortable information.

Good journalism does not only report what institutions would prefer to announce. It also reports what institutions would sometimes prefer to avoid. That is particularly important at the local level. In communities like Moore local and community media do not have the resources of major mastheads. They are often small teams, sometimes very small teams—one journalist, one editor, sometimes the same person doing both jobs while probably also trying to get the website to work and chasing, for a comment, someone who has decided that 4.55 pm is the right time to become unavailable. These outlets cover local councils, agencies, community organisations and decisions that affect people directly. They are part of the accountability framework, whether or not we always describe them that way.

Secrecy prosecution does not need to have a chilling effect. The threat can be enough. For a small newsroom, the risk of prosecution—or even the risk of a serious legal fight—can be enough to stop a story from being pursued, and that is not good for public accountability. This bill does not give journalists a blank cheque. It does not place them above the law. It creates a safeguard before the prosecution of a journalist or relevant news media staff can proceed. That is a sensible protection.

There has been debate about whether requiring the Attorney-General's consent risks politicising prosecutorial decisions, and that concern should not be dismissed. The Law Council and the Alliance for Journalists' Freedom have raised legitimate points about the role of executive discretion in this space. But the contrary position also has force. The Human Rights Law Centre, Transparency International Australia and others have recognised that, in the current framework, a legislated consent requirement is a pragmatic safeguard. The Australian Press Council has also argued that legislative entrenchment is stronger than reliance on ministerial direction. On balance, this bill takes the better course. It does not solve every question about press freedom, whistleblower protection or secrecy law, but it improves that position.

The fourth area of reform concerns part 5.6 of the Criminal Code and the government's response to the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. These amendments are targeted. They remove reliance on security classification alone as the basis for certain offences. That is important because a classification label should not, by itself, do all the work required for criminal law. The bill reduces the maximum penalty for offences by nonofficials from five years to three years. It repeals aggravated offence provisions, except in narrow circumstances. It requires the Attorney-General's consent for prosecutions, regardless of whether proceedings are committal or summary. These are not headline-grabbing amendments. They are the kinds of amendments that make the law more precise, and, in criminal law, precision matters. People should be able to understand what conduct is prohibited. Prosecutors should have clear thresholds. Courts should not be left with provisions broader than they need to be.

The bill sits alongside the Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Sunsetting Provision) Bill 2026. That bill extends the sunset date for section 122.4 from 29 June 2026 to 29 December 2026. That is a short extension. It allows the parliament to consider the broader reforms before the existing provision sunsets. That is sensible. There is no point pulling down the temporary structure before the permanent one is ready, and anyone who has spent time on a worksite understands that sequencing matters. Parliament, occasionally, is no different.

I also note that the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee is due to report on the repealing offences bill by 19 June 2026. That inquiry provides an opportunity for stakeholders to test the detail. That is appropriate. Secrecy laws sit at the intersection of public administration, national security, press freedom, privacy, accountability and criminal law. They should be scrutinised carefully.

This bill is not the final word on all of those questions. There is still work to do, particularly on whistleblower protections. Recent cases have shown these issues are not theoretical. They affect real people; they affect public servants, journalists, agencies and the public's confidence in the government. But this bill is a substantial step. It removes unnecessary criminal liability, it replaces a temporary and broad provision with a more targeted offence, it better protects public interest journalism, it implements important recommendations from recent reviews, and it makes the Commonwealth secrecy framework clearer than it is now. That is the point.

Government needs secrecy in some circumstances, and nobody seriously disputes that. There will always be information that must be protected—national security information, intelligence information, personal medical information, sensitive commercial information and material given to the government on a confidential basis. But secrecy laws should not be broader than necessary, they should not be scattered across the statute book in a way that makes compliance harder, and they should not use criminal liability where other remedies are sufficient.

The people of Moore expect government to protect sensitive information. They also expect the government to be accountable. Those expectations are not inconsistent. A mature legal framework should be able to do both. This bill moves us closer to that position. It is careful. It is practical. It is overdue. I commend the bill to the House.

Sitting suspended from 13:30 to 16:00

Zaneta Mascarenhas (Swan, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Before the debate is resumed on this bill, I remind the Federation Chamber that it has been agreed that a general debate be allowed covering the Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Repealing Offences) Bill 2026 and the Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Sunsetting Provision) Bill 2026.

Andrew Wilkie (Clark, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Minimising secrecy and maximising transparency are obviously building blocks of a healthy democracy and are to be applauded, so the Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Repealing Offences) Bill 2026 is a worthwhile bill and is obviously supportable. It's supportable not just because of what it does but also because of the way it reminds us of what the government isn't doing, which is why I move the amendment circulated in my name. I move:

That all words after "That" be omitted with a view to substituting the following words:

"whilst not declining to give the bill a second reading, the House:

(1) notes that:

(a) Australia has been described as 'the most secretive democracy in the world' due to the proliferation of national security, counter-terrorism and secrecy laws, and the lack of whistleblower and public interest journalism protections; and

(b) despite the Labor party promising in its 2021 platform to overhaul and improve Australia's whistleblower protections, only small changes have been introduced to date, and protections remain patchwork and inadequate; and

(2) calls on the government to:

(a) introduce comprehensive reforms to the Public Interest Disclosure Act and the Corporations Act to better protect whistleblowers;

(b) introduce comprehensive reforms to the Crimes Act and Criminal Code Act and Evidence Act to better protect public interest journalism and media sources;

(c) establish a Whistleblower Protection Authority to oversee public and private sector whistleblowing; and

(d) establish a federal whistleblower rewards scheme encouraging whistleblowers to come forward and expose wrongdoing".

I pursue this matter at this time because, frankly, whistleblowers matter. They're one of the most fundamental building blocks of our democracy and one of the fundamental ways that we bring genuine transparency to the way this country is run. Where would we be? Where would we be without someone like Toni Hoffman, who you'd recall was the nurse at Bundaberg Hospital who blew the whistle on Dr Patel and the tragic deaths that occurred there over a period of years? Where would we be without Alan Kessing? He was the Sydney Airport customs officer who blew the whistle on the security lapses at Sydney Airport. Where would we be without Jeff Morris? He blew the whistle on misconduct at CommBank and the incompetence in ASIC and was one of the reasons we ended up having a royal commission into the financial services sector. Where would we be without Richard Boyle? He blew the whistle on the egregious conduct at the Australian Tax Office in Adelaide. David McBride blew the whistle and provided the evidence of war crimes in Afghanistan.

In my own work, there have been a number of whistleblowers that I've helped facilitate the disclosure of their information. You might remember the information that was revealed about Crown Casino, and I'm mindful of the whistleblower who provided me with the video footage of a group of young men in a private gaming room laundering literally an Aldi freezer bag full of cash, estimated to contain about $2 million—all because of a whistleblower. Troy Stolz, a former ClubsNSW compliance officer, provided the evidence of non-compliance with money laundering and counter-terrorism legislation at up to 95 per cent of registered clubs in New South Wales. What about the AFL whistleblower, the doctor from Melbourne, who revealed the evidence of secret drug testing within the AFL? Where would we be without the very brave Hillsong Church whistleblower? I think it was in this chamber on her behalf that I tabled something like 17 folders of hard evidence of shocking financial misconduct by the leadership of Hillsong Church.

These people should be celebrated, but instead they're ridiculed, persecuted, charged and jailed. Just look at those examples I've given you. Toni Hoffmann was undermined and ridiculed. Alan Kessing was charged and convicted. Jeff Morris, the bank whistleblower, was sacked by the bank. Richard Boyle from the ATO was charged, and mercifully there was no conviction recorded. David McBride, of course, is in jail only several kilometres from where we meet today. Troy Stolz was taken to court by ClubsNSW. The AFL whistleblower was ridiculed within the AFL and beyond. The Hillsong whistleblower is before the court as we speak. In fact, there's an AAP story circulating today about what's going on there. In other words, the protections just don't work for these people, whether they are in the public sector and are relying or leaning on the Public Interest Disclosure Act or whether they are with the private sector, perhaps relying on the relevant sections of the Corporations Act. They're just not working.

There was in fact—this is very timely—no better evidence of this than the report in the Australian Financial Review just three days ago on 10 May regarding Neometals executive Christian Reiche, who thought he was a whistleblower when he flagged governance and strategic risks at the battery technology company. In fact, I met with Christian Reiche about a year ago, and, from memory, one of the issues was an allegation of theft of intellectual property when it came to whatever Neometals was pursuing. I'll read this from the FinReview, so I'll get it right:

In a major judgment, the Full Federal Court has backed the company's decision to make Reiche redundant, finding that because the board and CEO subjectively believed his complaints were unfounded, or it was simply "part of his job to raise such matters", he was not protected by whistleblower laws.

For those who are listening to me and who are struggling to understand what I just said, I don't understand it myself. I think, in other words, this whistleblower was witness to serious misconduct, he spoke up, he thought he had the protection of the relevant part of the Corporations Act, but, because the management didn't regard him as a whistleblower, he was not protected by the whistleblower protections.

This is not a criticism of the court in any way, because the court entirely appropriately applied the law as it stands. The issue is that the law is a crock. In fact, isn't it interesting that there has not been one successful whistleblower in a compensation claim under both the federal public sector and the private sector whistleblower laws—not one successful claim for financial compensation under any of those laws since they've existed. Surely that is all the evidence we need that they need to be improved.

I'm delighted to see the Attorney-General in the Federation Chamber, and I do note that the government has been working on reform for some time. In fact, for at least the last four years, the Labor government has been talking about reform and have acknowledged the need for reform. Consultations have come and gone. I think consultations are forthcoming on the Corporations Act. But we measure success by outcomes, and the Public Interest Disclosure Act has not been amended in any substantive way, except for a few technical changes—dotted a few i's and crossed a few t's. There hasn't been the deep reform of the Public Interest Disclosure Act that is needed. I don't think the Corporations Act has been touched since Senator Rex Patrick did fabulous work in the Senate some years ago to get those provisions put in. So, Deputy Speaker Mascarenhas, through you, I say to the Attorney-General: we've really got to get cracking on this, not just the PID but the Corporations Act as well. I find it unfathomable that Christian Reiche was witness to misconduct. I've spoken to this man personally. I am satisfied that he was witness to misconduct. But because the management at Neometals didn't regard him as a whistleblower—they thought it was just part of his normal job to observe things like intellectual property theft—the relevant part of the Corporations Act didn't apply. That's a very timely example that I'm able to bring to the Attorney-General's attention through you, Deputy Speaker Mascarenhas.

Of course, it's not just amending those acts; there is also the pressing need for an independent whistleblower protection authority, as exists in a number of countries around the world. The fact is that whistleblowing in this country is diabolically difficult; it's incredibly difficult. For a start, you've got to be able to safely collect evidence of your complaint. We saw with Richard Boyle, the ATO whistleblower, that although, from memory, the court understood he was a whistleblower they found he wasn't protected by the relevant act because his collection of evidence was not covered by the act. Well, how can you blow the whistle if you can't collect evidence? The legislation is complex. Frankly, unless you're a lawyer in this area or unless you can go to something like an independent whistleblower authority to get advice, you're behind the game right from the start. There's such a high likelihood that you're going to stumble and fall foul of the law, just like Richard Boyle did. Fortunately, there was no conviction recorded against Richard Boyle in the end.

Apart from understanding the law, you need someone to mentor you through the process. Take the Public Interest Disclosures Act; there is a convoluted process with a series of hoops you have to jump through, and you need someone figuratively hold your hand and guide you through all those hoops, otherwise you will run afoul of the law. That's something we need to turn our minds to. It's come up from time to time in public utterances by the government, it exists in a number of other countries and it's something that would be very worthwhile.

I won't detain the House any longer. I will just say in closing that, yes, minimising secrecy and maximising transparency are building blocks of a healthy democracy and are to be applauded. I say, through you, Deputy Speaker Mascarenhas, to the Attorney-General: this is a worthwhile bill, and I hope it has the unanimous support of everyone in this House and in the other place, but it's almost a clarion call to get moving on all the other stuff—the big stuff, the more important stuff, the more helpful stuff, the stuff that will show whether or not this government has real integrity and is committed to minimising secrecy and maximising transparency and to celebrating the people who speak up and speak truth to power. I rattled off about 10 examples here of particular individuals. We should also be mindful of the thousands of Australians who speak up in all sorts of ways, whether it be about the organisation they're a member of, about the business they're an employee of or maybe about their local council. There are any number of things where people speak up, and for many of those whistleblowers it ends in tears. They will be bullied in the workplace, they'll be managed out or they'll be blatantly sacked. They will be ridiculed and marginalised. It leads to financial troubles. It leads to relationship troubles. No wonder the suicide rate for whistleblowers is markedly higher than the baseline rate in our community.

Whistleblowing in this country is almost impossibly difficult. I'm pleased people like Toni Hoffman, Allan Kessing, Jeff Morris, Richard Boyle, David McBride and Troy Stolz have enjoyed the publicity and the public support they have, but spare a thought for the thousands of other Australians who speak up and the local paper won't even give them the time of day—let alone having a story on the news that night, let alone capturing the attention of the media for a protracted period of time to make their case and to sandbag their position and be in a stronger position publicly.

In closing, while all of the hullabaloo caused by whistleblowers might well be a bugbear for organisations, it is nonetheless grist to the mill of Australia's democracy. Whistleblowers must be supported, and indeed celebrated, and not be the tall poppies that some people make them out to be.

Zaneta Mascarenhas (Swan, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

Is the amendment seconded?

Rebekha Sharkie (Mayo, Centre Alliance) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I second the amendment and reserve my right to speak.

Claire Clutterham (Sturt, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise today to speak in support of the Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Sunsetting Provision) Bill and Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Repealing Offences) Bill. Before I do, I do acknowledge the contribution from the member for Clark. I share his view that the disclosable conduct regime in the Public Interest Disclosure Act, taxation assessments act and the Corporations Act are complex, but they are complex for very good reasons. I would put some of his concerns to rest that the legislation does, in fact, contain robust protections for whistleblowers and robust processes and procedures that organisations in receipt of disclosable conduct submissions must follow. Any reform to those powers and those processes must be done with significant degrees of care and consideration given the consequences and the magnitude of the making of disclosable conduct.

Turning to the bills currently before this chamber, what are secrecy provisions? These are provisions designed to prohibit the disclosure of sensitive information held by government, including some types of personal, commercial, national security and law enforcement information. Secrecy provisions exist not to hide, to obfuscate, to confuse or to concentrate power. They exist to prevent harm to essential public interests such as national security, and they provide assurance to people and entities who provide information to the Commonwealth that their information will be treated appropriately.

There is a need for secrecy laws, but of course these laws must be balanced against both the public interest and the fundamental democratic principle of open and accountable government. Secrecy provisions must be justified within that system of open and accountable government, and in a manner consistent with the right to freedom of expression. Now, this requires a balance between the desirability of open government and the legitimate public interest in protecting some information from disclosure for those important reasons, including national security, defence, international relations and privacy.

This balance must be clear and it must be appropriate. It's not easy. On one side of the coin, it is critical that Australia's law enforcement and security agencies have access to powers which may, in certain instances, have the effect of curtailing certain freedoms. This is in order to allow for the proper investigation of serious offending and the obtaining of intelligence regarding legitimate threats to essential public interests. The other side of the coin reflects Australia's democratic values, the rule of law and human rights considerations which dictate that official secrecy provisions must be tempered by a critical right, which is the public's right to accountable government.

Secrecy provisions need to be ring-fenced, and proportionately so, to the disclosure of information which would undermine national security or endanger citizens. It is simply a fact that some information held by the Commonwealth must have its integrity and security protected. This is not secrecy for secrecy's sake; this is a genuine purpose. Secrecy provisions must be frequently measured and performance tested to make sure that they reflect this genuine purpose and to make sure that the balance between the genuine purpose, the public interest and human rights is being appropriately and proportionately struck.

Drawing on the 2023 review of secrecy provisions conducted by the Attorney-General's Department and the government's response to the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor's 2024 Secrecy offences: review of part 5.6 of the Criminal Code Act 1995, this bill comprehensively tests and reforms Australia's secrecy provisions. By way of background, on 21 November 2023, the Albanese Labor government announced it would introduce reforms to Commonwealth secrecy offences to significantly reduce the number of secrecy offences, ensuring remaining offences were fit for purpose and improving protections for press freedom. The Independent National Security Legislation Monitor's 2024 review, which looked at part 5.6 of the Criminal Code, helped to shape this. Part 5.6 of the Criminal Code includes offences that apply to Commonwealth officials, including contractors, who disclose or otherwise deal with what is defined as 'inherently harmful information' or information that falls into a category defined as 'causing harm to Australia's interests'. These definitions of 'inherently harmful information' and 'causing harm to Australia's interests' are central to how these very serious offences operate, so they must, therefore, be clear and certain.

Part 5.6 also contains a general offence pertaining to officials who breach a duty imposed by another law not to disclose information and an offence that applies to any person, not just officials who disclose specified types of information, including information with a security classification of 'secret' or 'top secret', applied in accordance with the Commonwealth policy framework. For prosecutions in this regard to be effective, certainty and clarity about what this all means in practice is required. Asking whether part 5.6 is working effectively required a consideration of what can only be described as really complex questions, such as how potential breaches of secrecy obligations are actually handled in practice, what national security or other harms the criminal offences aim to address, as well as the threshold questions of when a deemed-harm offence is appropriate, what they should cover and who they should apply to.

These are complex issues, and multiple reviews of Australian laws relating to secrecy found that the provisions—probably in response—have become complicated, outdated, too broad and, in some cases, no longer essential. The latter finding of 'essential' cuts across the principle of the genuine purpose of secrecy provisions, creating a risk that justifiable information sharing can be compromised, which only undermines trust and creates suspicion that the genuine purpose is not appropriately reflected in the law. Scope creep, or death by a thousand cuts—whatever you call it when new baselines are constantly set—cannot be the way to legislate. This bill quite rightly makes comprehensive reforms to Australia's secrecy framework in response to these findings.

Now to turn to the bill itself and its practical impact—firstly, criminal liability. The 2023 review of secrecy provisions that I referred to earlier found that there existed 168 provisions that no longer required criminal liability but which still attracted it. Following a period of extensive stakeholder consultations led by the Attorney-General and involving contributions from multiple departments and agencies, criminal liability will be removed from more than 300 secrecy provisions, which will take place by repealing and amending specific legislation. Significantly, section 122.4 of the Criminal Code will also be repealed. Courtesy of section 122.4A, the offences in this section apply to people who are not Commonwealth officers in relation to information they communicate or deal with, or which was made or obtained by another person by reason of that other person being or having been a Commonwealth officer or otherwise engaged to perform work for a Commonwealth entity.

What this means is that section 122.4A offences would arise if the non-Commonwealth officer communicates or otherwise deals with information and, among other things, the information is security classified or communication of it interferes with or prejudices enforcement of Commonwealth criminal law, or harms the health or safety of the Australian public. These offences are extremely broad, and the repeal means that the vast majority of these non-disclosure duties will now be subject to more proportionate civil and administrative sanctions. This means criminal liability will only arise where strictly necessary to protect sensitive information, which again better reflects the genuine purpose of secrecy laws. This is significant reform.

To be clear, this bill will introduce a much more targeted and refined secrecy offence into the Criminal Code. This is not a broad, general secrecy offence that criminalises disclosures that are detrimental to the working of government, which is what the 2023 review recommended. That would be too broad and would undermine trust in the criminalised aspects of the secrecy framework. The bill instead seeks to close gaps that were previously identified following the much reported, unacceptable conduct of a former PwC partner, who allegedly shared confidential Commonwealth information for personal and professional gain. The targeted secrecy offence will address this type of conduct, which will apply to Commonwealth officers and persons connected to the Commonwealth where these persons improperly communicate or use Commonwealth information to obtain a benefit or cause a detriment.

Finally, press freedoms are contemplated and enhanced by the repealing offences bill. Appropriate protections that promote freedom of the press are growing in importance. We know that if there is an erosion of press freedoms it is a signal of the erosion of an efficient, effective and functioning democracy. In 2025, the World Press Freedom Index, which was compiled by Reporters Without Borders, was at its lowest point in the index's 25-year history. Journalism is being increasingly criminalised, and political hostility to the press is creating a very uneasy climate where speaking out can compromise one's personal safety. We see it time and time again across the globe, including increasingly in countries which we would traditionally have regarded as fully functioning democracies that have historically embraced freedom of the press.

In 2025, Norway topped the index, and we must all strive to meet them where they are at, which is a media market that is vibrant and features a strong public service broadcaster and diversified private sector services with extensive editorial independence. Fair and genuine public-interest journalism must never be endangered. Journalists and the press play an important role in providing information to the public, in holding governments to account, in investigating matters of national significance and, ultimately, in some cases, shaping policy decision. This work, when it is done fairly, must never be encumbered.

The bill therefore contains a new requirement that the Attorney-General consent to the prosecution of a journalist for any secrecy offence, with the goal of this being that it must be absolutely clear that any proposed prosecution is in the public interest before it proceeds while noting two things: firstly that protected matters—like providing information to the public, holding governments to account and investigating matters of national significance—are firmly part of the public interest, and secondly that certain information relevant to national security and law enforcement or highly sensitive commercial and personal information must also be protected from disclosure. So significant amendments will be made to the secrecy offences that apply to non-Commonwealth officials, including journalists. The practical effect of this is that non-officials will be subject to a higher threshold for criminal culpability than Commonwealth officials by increasing the thresholds to trigger criminal liability.

Achieving the genuine purpose of secrecy laws is challenging because it involves a combination of secrecy, transparency and accountability. But that purpose must always be achieved, because if it is not then public confidence in the secrecy framework is eroded, and once this is damaged or gone the challenge to try to regain that trust is almost insurmountable. The Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Repealing Offences) Bill seeks to strike that balance between secrecy, transparency and accountability, and I stand with the Attorney-General in bringing this bill before the parliament and in the work that she has done revisiting Australia's secrecy laws. I commend the bill to the Chamber.

Kate Chaney (Curtin, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to support the Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Repealing Offences) Bill 2026. Repealing more than 300 unnecessary secrecy offences is long overdue, and I commend the government for acting on years of careful review by the Australian Law Reform Commission, the Attorney-General's Department and the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, INSLM.

For too long, Commonwealth law has imposed criminal liability across a vast sprawl of nondisclosure obligations—provisions that have accumulated without coherent review and that sit far beyond what any principled framework of criminal law would endorse. That accumulation was not the product of deliberate policy, but rather legislative drift, and it has entrenched a culture of secrecy that weakens rather than strengthens accountable government. Repealing more than 300 of these provisions is a meaningful reform. It will make our laws clearer and more worthy of trust from the people they govern. But I'm concerned about the new general secrecy offence it introduces, the replacement for section 122.4. It gets the balance wrong in ways that matter.

The government's own independent reviewer, the INSLM, has been clear: any new general offence should be harm based and directed to essential public interests, with criminal sanctions reserved for disclosures that cannot be adequately addressed through administrative or contractual means. The bill does not do this. Instead, the new offence turns on whether it would be reasonable to conclude that a use or communication of information was improper—a concept that's undefined and dangerously vague. 'Improper' is not a harm but a broad, uncertain standard of conduct that no independent reviewer recommended. The government agreed in principle with the INSLM's harm based approach, but this provision does not reflect that agreement.

The uncertainty this offence creates is a problem. Consider a public servant who mentions to a former colleague that their agency is tendering for a particular contract, where that information hasn't yet been published. Is that improper? It may well be. Consider a peak legal body that receives a confidential exposure draft of legislation precisely so it can consult its specialist committees and provide informed feedback. A lawyer who circulates that draft internally is doing exactly what the consultation process requires, but are they exposed? Arguably, yes, if sharing the draft confers a benefit and the confidentiality terms were explicit.

Now, the government might say that none of these people would actually be prosecuted, and that may be true, but 'trust us' is not a principle of criminal law. People are entitled to know in advance whether their conduct is lawful. 'Improper' does not tell them, and it risks having a chilling effect on consultations, civil society and public interest journalism.

The first amendment that I'm going to move in consideration in detail will address this. It replaces the 'improper' test with a harm based threshold. The offence would only be committed where the communication harms, or the person intends or is reckless as to harming, an essential public interest. The amendment defines essential public interests as national security and defence, criminal justice, integrity, public health and safety, financial system stability and the privacy of personal information held by the Commonwealth, while making clear that the courts may recognise others as well. Critically, it also makes clear that a communication does not harm an essential public interest merely because it exposes wrongdoing, maladministration or a failure of public accountability, protecting the space for whistleblowing and public interest journalism without creating an unlimited defence.

The second amendment that I will propose addresses the Attorney-General's consent mechanism for journalist prosecutions. I support this mechanism, but not without reservation. Politicians should not, as a matter of principle, be final arbiters in the functions of our criminal justice system. But, in the absence of stronger protections, including a general public interest defence or effective whistleblower laws, this mechanism is desirable in practice and may safeguard against prosecutions that would otherwise proceed contrary to the public interest. Well-balanced secrecy laws would negate any need for the Attorney-General to act as a final safeguard at all. My second amendment will therefore require a mandatory independent review every five years to assess whether this mechanism is working as intended and whether it remains necessary, with findings reported to the parliament and a government response to any recommendations required.

Open government is a condition of democratic accountability. Secrecy is sometimes necessary, but it must be the exception, and it must be justified by reference to real harm to real public interests. While the bill makes important progress, the amendments that I'll be proposing in consideration in detail would ensure it goes further, anchoring the new general offence in the harm based framework that independent reviewers recommended, protecting journalists and civil society, and building in the accountability mechanism this reform deserves.

I really want to support this bill. Repealing more than 300 secrecy provisions and simplifying this would be a step in the right direction, towards more open and accountable government. But replacing them with an offence that turns on whether the use of information was improper is dangerously vague. It's not consistent with the harm based approach or the focus on essential public interests, advocated by the INSLM and the Law Council, which the government agreed with in principle.

I urge the government to consider my amendments in good faith—making the new test harm based and directed to essential public interests and including a five-yearly review to make sure that the Attorney-General's consent mechanism for journalist prosecutions is actually working as it should. These are reasonable changes, and, if the government agrees to them, I will happily support the bill.

Allegra Spender (Wentworth, Independent) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise in support of the Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Repealing Offences) Bill 2026. This is some of the most significant reform to Commonwealth secrecy law in decades. It draws on two major reviews: the Attorney-General's Department Review of Secrecy Provisions completed in 2023 and the subsequent independent statutory review by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. I commend the government for acting on these findings.

Secrecy provisions are necessary. They protect national security and intelligence and ensure that those trusted with sensitive information can be held to that trust. But, as the Human Rights Law Centre put in their submission, 'Secrecy laws which are disproportionate and not properly calibrated are bad for Australian democracy and the rule of law.' This bill moves meaningfully closer to that balance, though not all the way there. I understand the bill has been referred to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee. I hope the issues I raise today are considered carefully and that the government responds to the committee's recommendations before passage.

The 2023 AGD review had confronting findings. Commonwealth legislation had accumulated around 875 secrecy provisions, which was enough for the New York Times to describe Australia as 'possibly the most secretive democracy in the world'. Of these 875 provisions, 168 were identified as no longer warranting criminal liability at all. The review instead deemed that civil or administrative sanctions were more proportionate. The AGD review also recommended a new general secrecy offence to replace the sunsetting section 122.4 of the Criminal Code, which had long been the mechanism through which the non-disclosure duties across Commonwealth legislation attracted criminal liability.

In 2024, the INSLM reviewed the general secrecy offences in part 5.6. It found them uncertain, inconsistent with rule-of-law principles and, in some cases, disproportionate, particularly as they applied to nonofficials such as journalists, lawyers and human rights advocates.

This bill gives legislative effect to both reviews. It repeals more than 300 secrecy provisions. This is nearly double the number recommended for repeal by the AGD review and a reduction of more than a third of Commonwealth secrecy provisions. This is achieved primarily through the repeal of section 122.4 and targeted removal of criminal liability from non-disclosure duties across 13 portfolio areas. I am pleased to see this.

The bill also introduces a new targeted secrecy offence directed at those who improperly use or communicate Commonwealth information to obtain a benefit or cause detriment. This narrower formulation responds to the PwC tax confidentiality breach but does consciously reject the broader general offence proposed by the 2023 AGD review.

In response to the INSLM's recommendation, the bill repeals the security classification limbs of the deemed harm offences, removing reliance on administrative classification markings as a criminal offence element. It repeals the 'dealing with' offence for nonofficials under section 122.4A(2), ending the position where journalists face criminal liability merely for receiving sensitive information. It narrows deemed harm offences for officials, requiring a more direct connection to actual or likely harm. It nearly halves the maximum penalties for non-official disclosure offences. It legislates a requirement that the Attorney-General's written consent be obtained before any journalist can be prosecuted for a secrecy offence. And it clarifies that unsolicited receipt of information and other unwitting dealings with information do not constitute 'dealing with', for the purpose of part 5.6.

These are real reforms. They reduce criminal liability, raise thresholds and lower penalties. I do not want to diminish what this bill achieves. Reducing 875 secrecy provisions to fewer than 600 is a genuine accomplishment. Removing the absurdity of journalists facing prosecution for receiving unsolicited documents is a genuine improvement. But genuine improvement is not the same as adequate protection.

First, the new general secrecy offence does not adopt a harm based approach. The replacement offence under section 122.4 applies wherever a person improperly uses or communicates Commonwealth information with an intention to obtain a 'benefit' or cause a 'detriment', terms defined in the Criminal Code dictionary as any advantage or disadvantage whatsoever. But the Human Rights Law Centre and the Centre for Public Integrity note that this departs from what the AGD's own 2023 review recommended and from what the INSLM recommended. The concern is practical; much ordinary engagement with government could theoretically involve some advantage to one party or disadvantage to another. The HRLC gives the example of civil society organisations, including the very organisations who submitted to the inquiry for this legislation, being provided with confidential draft legislation and asked to provide feedback. This is ordinary democratic participation. Whether or not it could fall within the offence's reach is, on the current drafting, at least arguable. The word 'improper' provides some guard, but it is undefined. An undefined concept of impropriety is a thin protection in a provision that carries criminal liability. That is why I support the member for Curtin's amendment, which replaces the vague concept of 'improper' communication with a concrete, harm based threshold. It limits criminal liability to communications that harm—or where a person intends to harm or is reckless as to whether the communication harms—an essential public interest, such as national security, public health or financial stability. It also explicitly protects journalism and whistleblowing that expose wrongdoing.

Second, the journalist defence remains structured against journalists. The defence in section 122.5(6), which protects public-interest journalism, has not been amended. The Alliance for Journalists' Freedom puts the position plainly: the current provision requires journalists to bear an evidential burden to establish they reasonably believed their conduct was in the public interest. That is contrary to the presumption of innocence. It is the journalist, not the Crown, who must raise, substantiate and prove the public-interest claim, often in respect of conduct the journalist may not have known was covered by a secrecy offence at the time. The HRLC, the Centre for Public Integrity and the AJF all identify this as an unimplemented reform. The INSLM's recommendation 13, which I note was agreed to in principle by the government in November 2024, was that consideration be given to recasting the defence as an exception, shifting the burden to the prosecution. That recasting does not appear in this bill. That is deeply disappointing.

Third, the Attorney-General's consent mechanism has structural limitations. I acknowledge that this is an improvement on the current arrangement, but I hold concerns about its potential for politicisation. Journalists report on politicians. Whether a potential conflict of interest is real or simply perceived, the fact that a politician holds the power to authorise or block the prosecution of a journalist for a secrecy offence is significant and should raise concern. As the HRLC noted in their submission, this mechanism is unsatisfactory as a matter of principle but, given the absence of stronger protections, desirable in practice. It is disappointing that this must be our solution in the face of reforms which don't go quite far enough. Again, I support the member for Curtin's amendment, which requires an independent review of this provision every five years in consultation with media stakeholders.

Fourth, and following on from this point, the bill has not come alongside necessary reform of the Public Interest Disclosure Act. We are still without a whistleblower protection authority; we are still without a single, consolidated whistleblower act. A parliamentary committee first called for an independent protection body for whistleblowers in 1991. It was called for again in 1994 and, again, in 2017. We are still waiting. This reform is monumental, but it does not appear in a vacuum in our legislation. It comes as David McBride is still in jail and as whistleblower advocates still await certainty. Currently, under section 122.5(4) of the Criminal Code, compliance with the Public Interest Disclosure Act can operate as a defence to a secrecy offence, but the PID Act's requirements for a qualifying 'external' or 'emergency' disclosure are highly technical. This makes it harder for whistleblowers to have certainty about whether disclosures which are well within public interest will leave them criminally liable.

I will be moving a consideration in detail amendment to address this gap. My amendment would provide that, where a whistleblower does not satisfy every technical requirement but can demonstrate that the disclosure was both reasonable and genuinely in the public interest, they may have access to additional certainty. These disclosures will still not be permitted to be given to a foreign public official. It doesn't resolve all the problems with our whistleblower framework, but it is a meaningful first step towards protections that the public expects and whistleblowers deserve.

This bill's senate committee reports on 19 June. The government's response to those recommendations will be a test of whether its commitment to further reform is genuine. I commend the bill for inquiry, and I urge the government to address these issues I have raised before its passage. Reducing this body of law from 875 provisions to fewer than 600 matters. Ending the absurdity of journalists being prosecuted for receiving documents matters. But we should not mistake progress for completion. The people this framework most affects, whether they are journalists, those who represent whistleblowers or civil society organisations, are still telling us it falls short. We should listen.

Michelle Rowland (Greenway, Australian Labor Party, Attorney-General) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The Secrecy Provisions Amendment (Repealing Offences) Bill 2026 delivers on the government's commitment to comprehensive secrecy reform. The objective of these reforms is clear: protect information that genuinely needs protecting while removing unnecessary barriers to transparency and public trust. The bill modernises Australia's secrecy laws by removing criminal liability from more than 300 secrecy provisions, ensuring criminal sanctions apply only where essential to protect genuinely sensitive information. It introduces a new targeted offence to address the improper use or communication of Commonwealth information to obtain benefit or causing detriment, closing gaps in the Commonwealth's secrecy framework and strengthening safeguards for press freedom.

I note the member for Clark's second reading amendment. The Albanese government is delivering on our commitment to implement comprehensive reforms to Australia's public sector whistleblowing framework. That's why we commenced a public consultation process last year on exposure draft legislation on a second stage of reforms to the Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013. I thank all stakeholders who provided submissions as part of this consultation process. The government has been considering those submissions and will introduce legislation on the second stage of reforms. These reforms will build on the government's significant improvements to whistleblower laws implemented in 2023 and provide a comprehensive response to the 2016 independent review of the Public Interest Disclosure Act by Mr Philip Moss AM.

This bill to reform secrecy laws and the government's considered and methodical approach to whistleblower reform are critical to supporting integrity and the rule of law. For these reasons, the government will be opposing the amendment. Australia's secrecy laws are essential. Without them, sensitive information could be exposed in ways that could damage public trust in government, cause real harm to our national security or put lives at risk. But equally, transparency and accountability are vital features of our democracy. These comprehensive and considered reforms are about getting that balance right. I commend the bill to the House.

Zaneta Mascarenhas (Swan, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The question was that the bill now be read a second time. To this, the honourable member for Clark has moved an amendment that all words after that be omitted with a view to substituting other words. The immediate question is that the amendment be agreed to.

Question unresolved.

As it is necessary to resolve this question to enable further questions to be considered in relation to this bill in accordance with standing order 195, the bill will be returned to the House for further consideration.