Alex Hawke (Mitchell, Liberal Party, Shadow Minister for Industry and Innovation) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak in support of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 2) 2025, which represents the next stage in the parliament's consideration of ASIO's compulsory questioning powers. This legislation follows the passage of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2025, which temporarily extended the compulsory questioning warrant framework under the ASIO Act for a further 18 months until 7 March 2027. The content of this bill adds further weight to that change. It is aimed at providing greater long-term certainty for Australia's intelligence agencies while strengthening safeguards and modernising the framework in light of the many national security challenges that confront us both here at home and around the world today.

At its core, the compulsory questioning warrant regime allows ASIO, with the approval of the Attorney-General and a prescribed authority, to compel a person to appear for questioning and provide information relevant to serious national security threats. In practice, these powers are used only where voluntary cooperation is insufficient and only where the intelligence at issue is of real consequence to the safety of Australians. If passed, this bill would give expression to three key changes. It would make ASIO's compulsory questioning powers permanent rather than subject to repeated sunset extensions—as has occurred in 2006, in 2014, in 2018, in 2019, in 2020 and again in 2025.

Additionally, it would expand the definition of 'adult questioning matters' to reflect contemporary threats. In addition to espionage, politically motivated violence or foreign interference, the framework would now also cover sabotage, the promotion of communal violence, attacks on Australia's defence system and serious threats to Australia's territorial and border integrity. The bill would also strengthen oversight, reporting and administrative safeguards, in particular, by tightening the eligibility and termination rules for prescribed authorities, increasing reporting obligations to the Attorney-General and requiring post-charge questioning to be conducted before a retired judge. These are not cosmetic changes. They go directly to the independence, impartiality and accountability of ASIO.

ASIO's compulsory questioning powers were created in the aftermath of September 11—that horrible terrorist attack where the global threat environment fundamentally changed forever—and were designed to address critical operational gaps in, namely, ASIO's inability to question individuals who refuse to cooperate voluntarily even where those individuals had intelligence of profound national security significance, and terrorism has always proved resistant to our standard mechanisms of justice. Regrettably, the gap hasn't disappeared in the years since. If anything, it has widened, and, in the aftermath of Bondi, I endorsed the government's approach and ASIO's request for these powers to be made permanent.

As we stand here, in 2026, Australia faces a much more complex, volatile and contested security environment than it did two decades ago. Arguably, since September 11, the intelligence framework has gotten even worse for agencies in the west. They are more difficult and more challenging. Intelligence threats are more diverse, more networked, more ideologically fragmented and more technologically enabled. In that context, it's essential that parliament give ASIO a lawful but carefully controlled capacity to compel information from individuals who are terrorists, who want to commit terrorist acts and who would otherwise withhold information for the purposes of terrorist acts—especially when we know that the acquisition of that information could prevent serious harm or danger to large amounts of Australians and Australia's national security.

There are legitimate concerns about overreach. I have to say, while we're here today, I regard the program on Four Corners last night as an example of undermining our national security agency. We should be careful about the legislative constructs for overreach. But, when we hear the ASIO director-general make an unprecedented intervention in the public domain, we should also know that it is not the role of journalists to undermine national security agencies without absolutely certifiable and trusted information that is reliable, and I think we have to take the director-general's public message about the protection of ASIO seriously. It is, in my experience as a former minister and as a member of this House, one of our best agencies. It works reliably and diligently in the national interest. It's careful, it's lawful, it's methodical, and it does its job.

When it comes to overreach, my colleague and the then shadow minister for home affairs, Mr Hastie, acknowledged that, in the second reading debate on the predecessor bill, there are people on both sides who approach powers with caution. The opposition has always been alive to these concerns. It's why we committed, in 2001 and after, to have these mechanisms sunsetted, to have them closely scrutinised and to go before the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. We've always believed in the proper construction and the proper oversight of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and inquiries into this bill.

Over the course of that inquiry, including through detailed questioning of ASIO and other witnesses, the concerns have been tested and, I believe, met. Some contributors to that inquiry argued compulsory questioning powers are inherently excessive and should not be broadened; other contributors suggested infrequent use demonstrates that they're unnecessary. Ultimately, while in a parliamentary democracy which is committed to the rule of law and freedom, we understand those arguments. We also understand that terrorism is a very thorny problem.

Agencies require special powers to be able to tackle ideological based terrorism—not just after the episodes happen but in advance and while they are happening. The fact that these powers are rarely used should give us confidence as a parliament that our ASIO is doing the right thing. But they must have the power available. It's the purpose of government and the purpose of ASIO to be available and ready to act to protect the lives and safety of law-abiding citizens at critical moments in time. So that's why we believe the evidence points in the other direction. These powers have been used only 20 times in more than 22 years. That's a reason for every member of this House to have confidence in ASIO. To us, that's not a sign of overreach. It's restraint, proportionality and the disciplined operational judgement of an agency dedicated to Australia's national security. They are in effect a last resort. Those numbers show that, and they've historically been used only where other intelligence gathering agencies and avenues of methods of interrogation have failed. Witnesses before the committee struggled to identify any evidence or abuse of these powers because there is none. They were given no concrete examples of systemic problems or that these powers are inappropriate at a moment of national crisis or when a person wants to commit serious harm against fellow Australians or against our country. These safeguards are working. They've always been firmly in place, and they would remain in place under this legislation.

In the first instance, the Attorney-General must be satisfied that a compulsory questioning warrant is necessary. The Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security also retains strong oversight powers, including the ability to be present during the questioning and provide real-time scrutiny—another protection, a very important protection. ASIO cannot arrest, charge or prosecute. It remains the case. It cannot gather evidence for criminal prosecution. Its activities remain subject to scrutiny by the IGIS, the Administrative Review Tribunal, the PJCIS and the Attorney-General. We have layers upon layers of oversight and scrutiny, as we should. They exist, they are robust and they work. This bill also strengthens the framework governing prescribed authorities, further reinforcing independence and oversight.

The opposition will be supporting the passage of this bill. We do so because the changes it encompasses are reasonable and responsive to the threats that Australia face. We've just seen the tragic attempt at Bondi to undermine national security, to directly threaten not just Australians of Jewish descent but the safety and order of our streets to strike fear and terror into our whole society. As a society, we stood up and resisted the terrorists at Bondi, and we have said to them that they will not strike fear and terror into our hearts or on our streets or divide us further. The country has come together.

But we would be naive not to understand that we are living through a period of increasingly dynamic and dangerous security risks. Our agencies need special powers to deal with that. They must be contemporary. The risks are more numerous and more acute than were under contemplation in 2001, when the first tranche of this legislation came through when we had 9/11. We now have the prospect of digital and cyber and radicalisation online almost every day all around the world. The critics who are arguing that this legislation is unjust because it could compel innocent people to undergo questioning are not thinking this through. I can say to this parliament that we support the government on this because the Labor Party, the Liberal Party and the National Party, the parties of government in this House and in the Senate, understand intelligence work and understand that our security agencies are dedicated to this country and our national security.

I want to take a moment today after a difficult 24 hours for ASIO, after an unwarranted assault on them through the media and after some unwarranted questioning by some parliamentarians over the past few months, to say to ASIO that we know the brave men and women who work there are as brave as every frontline responder in the police and in the other agencies of government that work for our country. We know that they're actually in there protecting our national security every single day, that they care deeply about the safety of every Australian and that their work is vital. Intelligence work in the modern era is as vital as any other part of the government's function, and we must have them supported. We must have them know that this parliament believes in their mission and understands that they are passionate Australians of all backgrounds, working together to prevent strikes and undermining of our country.

In short, the opposition—the Liberal Party and the National Party—and every single member of the Liberal and National parties supports ASIO. We support the work of the men and women who take on that cause every single day on behalf of our country. We know it is serious. We know that what they consider every day is actually a threat to our safety and security. We know that the pressure is high on an agency like ASIO. The capacity for error is high because it is intense, it is fast paced and it is serious. These are bad and evil actors all around the world—and, sadly, within our country—that want to do harm to other people. One of the protections we have is ASIO.

We'll be supporting this bill. We commend the government on keeping pace with national security measures. We especially commend them for keeping pace with those measures in the wake of our worst onshore domestic terrorist incident. We must reinforce our security agencies. We must support the work of our intelligence agencies. For that fundamental reason, we thank the government for the introduction of this bill.

Debate adjourned.