Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal National Party, Shadow Cabinet Secretary) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The ability to list certain organisations as terrorist organisations, as provided for by division 102 of the Criminal Code, provides the Australian government with a valuable tool for publicly condemning those organisations as well as putting the public on notice that certain dealings with those organisations are criminal offences. However, the application of this framework does not currently extend to foreign state entities who engage in terrorist acts targeting Australia. A new framework designed to list state sponsors of terrorism would enable the government to inform the public of the risks posed by foreign state entities that seek to harm Australians or Australian interests and harden the domestic operating environment.

The Criminal Code Amendment (State Sponsors of Terrorism) Bill 2025 would amend the Criminal Code to allow the Commonwealth to list foreign state entities that have engaged in a state terrorist act or otherwise supported or advocated terrorist acts targeted at Australia. The bill would create a new parallel legislative framework that in many respects mirrors the existing framework for the listing of terrorist organisations. The bill would enable the Governor-General to list foreign state entities as state sponsors of terrorism on the advice of the Australian Federal Police minister with agreement from the foreign affairs minister. The bill would also create new offences which would criminalise conduct engaged in by these entities, as well as conduct engaged in by persons who would seek to assist or support these activities. It would also provide for appropriate defences—for example, for persons who are required by law to engage with a listed entity or engage with an entity for a legitimate purpose. The bill would also make amendments to various other Commonwealth acts to apply the law enforcement powers and other policy tools that are available in response to, or targeted at the prevention of, terrorist acts to the new provisions concerning state sponsored terrorism.

The threat of terrorism to Australians, both at home and abroad, is constantly evolving. No longer only the purview of religiously motivated extremist groups, terrorism today takes on many forms: from differing ideologies, political views and faith groups; from those on the political far left to those on the far right; and from fundamentalist Islamists to fundamentalist Christians. From individual lone actors to now state sponsored terrorism, the threat of terrorism in Australia and to Australians abroad is dynamic, real and significant.

The current national terrorism threat level is set at 'probable', meaning there is a greater than 50 per cent chance of a terrorist attack, or attack planning, occurring onshore within the next 12 months. This threat level was raised from 'possible' to 'probable' on 5 August 2024. The coalition has called for the listing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the IRGC, as a terrorist organisation for more than two years. The Labor government has resisted these calls at every turn, arguing that the current provisions enabling terrorist-organisation listing, in division 102 of the Criminal Code, do not permit the listing of foreign state entities. The coalition has consistently offered to support measures to amend the Criminal Code to enable the listing of the IRGC as a terrorist organisation.

On 26 August 2025 the Director-General of Security announced that the IRGC had been directly linked to terrorist activity on Australian soil in two confirmed incidents in 2024: the firebombing of a kosher restaurant in Sydney—Lewis' Continental Kitchen—on 20 October 2024 and the arson attack on the Adass Israel Synagogue in Melbourne on 6 December 2024, causing an estimated $45 million in damage and putting at risk the lives of people who were in the building at the time. The director-general, Mr Burgess, advised that the attacks were directed by the IRGC using a covert network of facilitators. There may be further announcements that additional attacks on Australian soil will be attributed to the IRGC. In response, the Australian government expelled the Iranian ambassador along with three Iranian diplomats, and the Australian embassy in Tehran was closed. It is noteworthy that this is the first time since the Second World War that an Australian government has expelled an ambassador. This bill does not seek to list the IRGC as a state sponsor of terrorism, but it will provide the legislative machinery for the government to do so.

Schedule 1 of the bill would create a new part 5.3A of the Criminal Code to deal with state sponsors of terrorism and state-sponsored terrorist acts. Specifically, schedule 1 would insert new division 110, which would provide relevant definitions for part 5.3A and its offences and provide a framework through which a state entity could be prescribed by regulation as a state sponsor of terrorism. New division 111 would provide for offences connected with state terrorist acts, covering the doing of such an act as well as steps in support or preparation of such an act. Division 111 would also capture instances where state entities are supporting non-state entities in the commission of terrorist acts, including steps in preparation of these acts. New division 112 would provide for offences in relation to dealings with a state sponsor of terrorism, including directing the activities of a state sponsor of terrorism, the provision of support and funding, membership, association and recruitment. New division 113 would provide for offences connected with the financing of a state terrorist act targeted at Australia, including the financing of a person involved in such an act. New division 114 would provide general provisions relating to the offences, including the application of extended geographical jurisdiction, availability of alternative verdicts and the requirement for the Attorney-General's consent to be obtained for prosecution.

Schedule 2 of the bill would amend part 5.3 of the Criminal Code to provide that part 5.3 orders available under divisions 104, control orders; division 105, preventative detention orders; and division 105A, post-sentence orders of the Criminal Code, which are used to respond to terrorism threats, are available in respect of state sponsors of terrorism and state terrorist acts in part 5.3A. Schedule 2 of the bill would also make amendments to the Crimes Act 1914, the Surveillance Devices Act 2004, and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to give effect to the extended application of part 5.3 orders to part 5.3A.

Schedule 3 of the bill would make consequential amendments to a series of Commonwealth legislation to ensure consistency in the treatment of terrorist organisations and terrorist acts under part 5.3 and state sponsors of terrorism and state terrorist acts in part 5.3A. Schedule 3 would also make consequential amendments to the Crimes Act, the Criminal Code, the Surveillance Devices Act and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act.

Schedule 4 of the bill would make further amendments to division 80 of the Criminal Code to ensure consistency in the way in which the prohibited terrorist organisation symbols offences operate. Additionally, schedule 4 would make technical amendments to the operation of sentencing provisions in the Crimes Act.

The new offences and the extended application of existing offences would not apply retrospectively, as they would not capture conduct that an individual engaged in before amendments commenced or before a state entity is listed as a state sponsor of terrorism. However, in listing a state entity such as the IRGC, the AFP minister is able to consider, and be satisfied of, acts that occurred prior to the commencement of the legislation. That is, it is not only prospective acts that can lead to a listing.

The membership offence in section 112.2 would include a defence where a person proves they took all reasonable steps to cease to be a member of the entity as soon as practicable after they knew the entity was a state sponsor of terrorism. The association offence in section 112.7 would include defences where the association was with a close family member and was related to a matter of family or domestic concern or takes place in the course of practising a religion in a place used for public religious worship or where the association is only for the purpose of providing humanitarian or legal advice or legal representation in connection with specified matters.

These offence-specific defences align with those currently available for the comparable membership and association offences for terrorist organisations. Additionally, new general defences in division 112 would be available, including where there is engagement with a state sponsor of terrorism which is not connected with terrorism and is otherwise legitimate or unavoidable. Importantly, the defence of mistake of fact remains available for an accused person for many of the offence provisions under section 9.2 of the Criminal Code.

A requirement to obtain consent from the foreign affairs minister and to brief the Leader of the Opposition prior to listing under clause 110.3(5) would require that, before the Governor-General makes regulations listing a foreign state entity as a state sponsor of terrorism, the AFP minister must:

Obtain the Foreign Affairs Minister's agreement in writing to the entity being specified—

as a state sponsor of terrorism, and—

arrange for the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives to be briefed in relation to the proposed regulation.

The Attorney-General must also consent to the prosecution. The bill also includes a safeguard that the Attorney-General must consent to commit a person to trial for all new offences and the existing violent extremist material offences. This provides an opportunity for the Attorney-General to consider the appropriateness of the proposed prosecution in all the circumstances of the case.

At the outset, it should be said that the coalition supports this bill. It has been a long time coming—too long. Whilst the coalition supports the bill, the process that this government has undertaken to get to this point is as regrettable as it is noteworthy. The bill has been referred to the PJCIS, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, which held a two-hour public hearing on 16 October 2025. The Attorney-General, when referring the bill to the PJCIS, requested that the PJCIS report back by 24 October 2025. The net effect of this request is that, in order to complete its report within this extremely truncated period, stakeholders were afforded just seven clear days in which to consider the bill and provide submissions before the public hearing.

As a result, the PJCIS only received submissions from the Attorney-General's Department, the Department of Home Affairs, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Save the Children, the Australian Council for International Development and two individuals. These were received prior to the public hearing, and then, just in the last few days, the committee received an additional submission from Chris Taylor, Dr John Coyne and Justin Bassi, from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. The committee received submissions from the Australian Federal Police, AusIran, Australian Red Cross Society, Alliance for Journalists' Freedom and a third individual.

This government's approach to this bill is emblematic of how it conducts national security policy: do nothing, delay and obfuscate for as long as possible, and only do the right thing once all other alternatives have been exhausted. The bill has not been, in my view, appropriately scrutinised by the PJCIS and was akin to a box-ticking exercise by the government. This is a concerning trend of this government. I've watched this government seek to ram important national security legislation through the PJCIS, and it must stop. My criticism of the government is not directly aimed at government members of the committee, although, regrettably, in my view, government members are not doing enough, at least publicly, to resist the government's utterly unrealistic expectations of workloads and the timeframes that it sets the committee.

Take, for example, the referral of the current bill to the PJCIS. I spoke earlier about the process—the Attorney-General wrote to the chair of the committee asking for an inquiry into the bill. That letter was dated 8 October. She asked for the committee to report back by 24 October, just 16 days later. In that time, the committee had to meet to accept the referral and set relevant timeframes for the conduct of the inquiry. Submissions had to be made; a public hearing needed to be conducted; a report needed to be drafted, considered by the chair, then by the committee and then vetted by security agencies; and then the report had to be tabled. All of this was supposed to have been done within 16 days. The net effect of this ridiculously truncated period was that submitters had only seven days to prepare their submission before the public hearing was set down on 16 October.

The PJCIS was once considered the most important committee in this parliament. Its members receive briefings on matters of national security by agencies within our national intelligence community. It has largely acted in a bipartisan manner since its inception with its members, coming from the parties of government, willing to leave their political guns at the door to ensure that the protection of the Australian public is its paramount consideration—as it should be. But the government continues to trash this legacy by virtue of its intent to nobble the ability of the PJCIS to appropriately and fulsomely conduct its vital work.

In the previous parliament, the PJCIS had such an incredibly heavy workload. At one point, it was conducting somewhere in the order of 14 inquiries at one time. That is not sustainable, and it is made worse by this government's insistence on setting totally unrealistic deadlines for reports to be tabled in the parliament. Some submitters have indicated to me that they simply will not and physically cannot provide submissions in the times often set by the government. Why does this matter? Because national security matters. Our laws that govern national security and security agencies matter. The lives, rights and liberties of Australians matter. But if this government continues to trash these conventions, we will have ill-considered laws that will have unintended consequences that cost the lives of Australians and/or trash the very principles of our Western liberal democracy.

The government's approach to rushing the PJCIS through its work is disrespectful of stakeholders, who are often experts in this complicated maze of national security laws and architecture. Those stakeholders want to be heard, but often can't. Members of the PJCIS rely heavily on the expertise of these stakeholders when considering the implications of national security legislation that comes before it. It is disrespectful of the committee's incredibly hardworking secretariat and puts them under totally unacceptable pressures and strains. So much for this government's often trumpeted principles of respect at work and the right to disconnect. It is a simple case of do as I say, not as I do. If every other employer in this country has to abide by these laws, it's about time this government started acting in the same manner.

Enough is enough. The government must allow the PJCIS the appropriate opportunity to do its work. The government sat on its hands and did absolutely nothing about progressing a bill which would enable the listing of the IRGC until the Director-General of Security announced publicly that the IRGC had been directing terrorist acts on the Australian mainland. That is despite the opposition calling for such a bill for more than two years.

I want to take this opportunity to acknowledge the good work of the former shadow Attorney-General, the member for Berowra, in calling this out. The member for Berowra, Senator Chandler and Senator Paterson have consistently called on this government to do whatever it can to list the IRGC. And then all of a sudden, the government, having been totally and utterly embarrassed by its inaction, wants to put the pedal to the metal. This government has never taken national security seriously while I have served as deputy chair of the PJCIS.

I turn now to the issue of what foreign entities could be listed under this bill. As drafted, the bill may enable the Australian government to list a foreign entity, such as the Israeli Defence Force or even the Israeli government, if an Australian citizen or permanent resident was killed or seriously injured in Gaza or the West Bank as a result of military actions the IDF, for example, may take. Whilst there would be competing diplomatic considerations in so doing and whilst the Foreign minister would have to consent to the listing, the theoretical possibility remains that the government or other entity of one or more democratically elected allies of Australia could be listed as a state sponsor of terrorism.

Pursuant to section 110.3(5) of the bill, in order for a foreign state actor to be listed by the AFP minister as a state sponsor of terrorism, the foreign affairs minister must agree. It is argued by the government that this two-step process establishes a check and balance on the scheme so that adverse decisions are not made contrary to the national interest. The coalition agrees with that. Unfortunately, however, the bill does not provide any legislative guidance to the foreign affairs minister about what factors the minister should take into consideration in deciding to agree to the listing. The coalition thinks that this is a misstep on the part of the government, but it will not prevent the coalition from supporting this important piece of legislation.

In its public hearing examining the bill on 16 October 2025 submissions were received by the PJCIS which identified an omission in paragraphs 29(1)(baa) and 29(1)(bab) of the Intelligence Services Act, as drafted, which would mean the PJCIS would not have the ability to monitor and review AFP counterterrorism functions in relation to the new part 5.3A to the same extent it currently monitors and reviews such functions in relation to part 5.3. This is an important omission in terms of both keeping the legislative schemes in part 5.3 and part 5.3A parallel and keeping them consistent with PJCIS oversight. I'll flag that I intend to move an amendment in consideration in detail, when this matter comes before the Federation Chamber later this afternoon.

In summary, the coalition supports this very important national security bill. It is long overdue. The federal government's primary responsibility is to keep Australians safe. This bill will assist in that aim. No foreign state entity should think that it can get away with perpetrating acts of terrorism on Australian soil or against Australians—not now; not ever. I commend the bill to the House.

Milton Dick (Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I will remind the member and all members that referring to correspondence that may be listed as confidential is not appropriate during the debate.

Andrew Wallace (Fisher, Liberal National Party, Shadow Cabinet Secretary) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

It was a public submission.

Milton Dick (Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In the earlier remarks you made around a letter. I just remind all members.

Debate adjourned.