Mr Tony Burke (Watson, Australian Labor Party, Leader of the House) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I move:

That this bill be now read a second time.

A dynamic and uncertain geopolitical outlook requires that Australia update its electronic surveillance and law enforcement frameworks to meet new challenges. Our government's commitment to create a nation where everyone can be safe and feel safe must include cyber and telecommunications systems. The changes in the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2025 are technical, but provide essential clarifications to ensure that the agencies that keep our nation safe, can continue do so in an era of rapid technological development.

Schedule 1 to the bill contains amendments to the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 and Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. These changes will ensure that the Commonwealth is able to comply with its duty of disclosure owed to the courts in relation to network activity warrant information. The disclosure of network activity warrants information will remain rightly very limited and subject to strict safeguards; however, clarity is required so that the Commonwealth can provide information as necessary to ensure the defensible prosecution of serious criminal activity.

Schedule 2 to the bill also amends the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to transfer the regulatory role of the Communications Access Coordinator from the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department to the Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs. This is in line with machinery-of-government changes related to both departments.

Schedule 3 to the bill contains technical amendments to the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to ensure that the framework for testing and developing technologies and interception capabilities can operate in the manner that parliament intended.

The amendments will enable the Attorney-General to authorise access to stored communications under developing and testing authorisations, in circumstances where the authorisation would have authorised the interception of the same communication if it were still passing over a telecommunications system.

These amendments are necessary as technological advancements have resulted in a situation where stored communications may pass over the telecommunications system alongside and become indistinguishable from live communications. Agencies therefore need to be able to access both stored communications and live communications for development and testing purposes, to ensure that they can continue to keep pace with technological advancements.

Strict controls will continue to apply to the collection, use and destruction of all information obtained under testing authorisations. In particular, agencies will only be permitted to use the information for testing and development and will not be able to use it for investigative purposes.

Schedule 4 to the bill contains amendments to the international production order framework in the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 to give effect to the original intent of that framework. The amendments will provide certainty that interception orders issued to Australian law enforcement and national security agencies may be used to obtain prospective content data from communications providers in a country with which Australia has a designated international agreement, regardless of the technical method by which that prospective data is sent to the agency.

Schedule 5 to the bill contains amendments to the Crimes Act 1914to clarify and strengthen safeguards in the controlled operations provisions framework. Crimes committed or facilitated online are becoming more prevalent, organised and extreme. The anonymous nature of the internet means there may be a lack of information available to law enforcement to assess potential risks when deciding whether to authorise or vary a controlled operation.

Currently, the legislation does not clearly express the extent to which an authorising officer is expected to foresee potential risks and not authorise or vary a controlled operation on the basis of these risks. The amendments will clarify that authorising officers must consider the direct and reasonably foreseeable consequences of controlled conduct when authorising or varying a controlled operation.

The amendments also provide clearer legal protections for officers involved in undercover operations targeted at taking down sexual abuse syndicates. The framework will retain appropriate carve-outs for liability protections where officers engage in illegal behaviour not pursuant to an approved controlled operation, where their conduct would be likely to cause the death or serious injury of a person or where their conduct would involve the commission of a sexual offence against a person.

In the 2023-24 financial year alone, reports of online child exploitation to the Australian Centre to Counter Child Exploitation increased by 45 per cent from the previous year. The amendments will better enable law enforcement to investigate and take down abhorrent criminal offenders who operate with sophisticated levels of anonymity online and target the most vulnerable in our community.

The Australian government will always ensure that our law enforcement and intelligence agencies have the capabilities they need to keep us safe. This bill will ensure that our agencies can adapt to the rapid evolution of technology used to conduct criminal activity.

In dealing with this legislation, I have been referring to some extraordinary work that is performed by people who work for our security agencies. I want to take this opportunity to honour the work that they do, acknowledge how horrifically complex and challenging some of what they face in the course of that work is and, from the parliament, send our deepest appreciation and respect to those workers. I commend the bill to the House.

Debate adjourned.