Mark Dreyfus (Isaacs, Australian Labor Party, Shadow Attorney General) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The federal opposition is determined to ensure our law enforcement and national security agencies have the powers necessary to keep Australians safe. Labor also believes strongly in the importance of upholding the rights and freedoms that define us as a democratic nation. Australia is a nation under the rule of law. It is essential that, in designing legislation to protect our way of life, we do not compromise those very rights and freedoms that define us as a democratic nation and foster harmony and diversity. Ensuring that we view national security through the lens of the society we are seeking to protect and create is a fundamental duty of all parliamentarians. Labor shares in common with other Australian political parties the key objective of keeping the Australian people safe, which means approaching questions of national security in a bipartisan spirit. However, bipartisanship does not mean Labor will simply agree with every measure the government proposes; bipartisanship means Labor will engage constructively with the proposals put forward by the government with a view to testing and, where possible, improving those measures.

It was in this spirit of constructive bipartisanship that, through the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security's statutory review process, Labor worked hard over 2017 and 2018 to improve several security and law enforcement powers on the Commonwealth statute books. The important work of the bipartisan Intelligence and Security Committee has seen a significant review into police stop, search and seizure powers, the control orders regime and the preventive detention order regime in division 3A of part IAA of the Crimes Act 1914. And, as well, there has been a review by the intelligence committee of sections 119.2 and 119.3 of the Criminal Code, the declared areas provisions. There was also a further and important review by the PJCIS which resulted in its report ASIO's questioning and detention powers: review of the operation, effectiveness and implications of division 3 of part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979.

This bill responds in part to these three reviews. The Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2018 was introduced into the House of Representatives on 24 May 2018. The Attorney-General referred the bill to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security for review on the same day. The government's complete adoption of the PJCIS's recommendations is a welcome continuance of the longstanding convention that the government of the day implements without reservation the bipartisan recommendations of the committee. The Intelligence and Security Committee's review of the police stop, search and seizure powers provided for under division 3A of part IAA of the Crimes Act 1914 recommended that those powers be continued.

The bill inserts a new subdivision CA into division 3 of part IAA of the Crimes Act 1914 to require reporting to the minister, the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and the committee on the use of the stop, search and seizure powers under division 3 of part IAA as soon as practicable after exercise of a power or powers, and an annual report from the minister. This recommendation is entirely in keeping with Labor's abiding commitment that our law enforcement and security agency officers should have the powers needed to keep Australians safe. However, the report also recommended that these powers, which are extraordinary, also should be the subject of future review by the parliament and not be allowed to simply fall into permanence on the Commonwealth statute book. Similarly, the Intelligence and Security Committee also recommended that the control order regime provided for under division 104 of the Criminal Code be continued with the provisions sunsetting after three years. The bill adopts this recommendation. These powers—that is, the control order powers—have, of course, only rarely been used. The small number of occasions on which they have been used is something that is commented upon by the intelligence committee in its report.

One feature of the bill is that it introduces a new section 104.11A in the new subdivision CA of the Criminal Code, which would enable a court to vary the terms of an interim control order where there is written agreement between a senior Australian Federal Police member and a controlee. The explanatory memorandum states that this new section is designed to facilitate 'minor and uncontroversial' variations to an interim control order such as a changed mobile telephone number, change of residential addresses or change in educational or employment arrangements of a controlee. It's obviously desirable there should be a speedy and, as far as possible, informal mechanism leading to the variation of a control order which deals, as the explanatory memorandum suggests, with minor matters of this nature.

The bill inserts a new section 104.28AA into the Criminal Code to set out limitations on the issuing court's ability to make costs orders in control order proceedings. Under proposed subsection 104.28AA(1), the issuing court must not make an order for costs against the controlee. However, if the issuing court is satisfied that the controlee has acted unreasonably in the conduct of proceedings, it may order costs against the controlee to the extent of the unreasonable conduct.

Labor considers it essential that all the powers considered by this review be available to our agencies for as long as they are necessary to ensure the peace, safety and security of the Australian community. However, Labor also considers powers such as these must continue to be seen and understood as extraordinary. These powers were brought into our criminal law and law enforcement framework to meet the complex circumstances which have faced security and law enforcement agencies over the last two decades. Because these powers are extraordinary, it's essential that they're subject to sunsetting and continued parliamentary oversight through regular review by the committee on intelligence and security.

It was in this light that the committee made the recommendations—and which I'm glad to say the government has adopted—to amend the Intelligence Services Act for the purpose of providing greater parliamentary scrutiny of these powers. This is something that the committee, in its report on this bill, has welcomed in these terms. At paragraph 1.34 of the committee's report, the committee said:

The Committee also welcomes extension of its oversight to include Division 3A of Part IAA of the Crimes Act 1914 together with the additional reporting requirements that will be imposed. As the Committee noted in its earlier report, Committee oversight of the stop, search and seizure powers is in line with other review and oversight functions exercised by the Committee in relation to counter-terrorism.

It's worth noting that the bill also extends the sunset periods for the declared areas provisions contained in the Criminal Code. The bill inserts a new exception to the declared area offence in subsection 119.2(1) for individuals performing official duties for the International Committee of the Red Cross. This is a welcome protection for people and organisations carrying out humanitarian work in some of the most dangerous conflict zones in the world.

The bill also amends schedule 1 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 to provide that decisions of senior Australian Federal Police members to provide or refuse consent to vary interim control orders under new section 104.11A of the Criminal Code will not be reviewable under the AD(JR) Act.

The bill extends the sunset date for ASIO's questioning and detention powers in division 3 of part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 by 12 months to 7 September 2019. In its report into the bill, the committee commented on this particular provision in the bill in these terms—and I'm quoting from paragraph 1.32 of the intelligence committee's report:

The Committee notes that while the Bill implements one recommendation from the Committee's report into ASIO's questioning and detention powers, the remainder of that report (including the Committee's recommendation for repeal of the questioning and detention warrant power) is still being considered by the Government. As noted above, the intent of this recommendation was that there be sufficient time for a reformed ASIO compulsory questioning framework to be developed and then reviewed by this Committee.

This bill, then, is somewhat unusual in that it responds to a single recommendation of the Intelligence and Security Committee's report on ASIO's questioning and detention warrant power. While it's the case that the report did recommend the extension of the powers in division 3 of part III of the ASIO Act, which includes the powers providing for questioning and detention warrants, I would like to put on the record very clearly that the report also made the recommendation that the ASIO questioning and detention warrants regime should be repealed. This is a power that has never been used by ASIO. In light of the fact that ASIO is an intelligence agency and not a law enforcement agency, it's a power that I think is fairly clearly unnecessary because of the collaboration that exists between ASIO and the Australian Federal Police. It's also worth noting that two previous independent national security legislation monitors had recommended, before this earlier report of the intelligence committee, that this power be repealed.

I say again: the bill does not repeal the ASIO questioning and detention warrants power. Indeed, the effect of this bill is to extend for a year a power that the PJCIS has recommended should be repealed. It's understood, and the committee has noted that it understands, that in extending both ASIO's powers—the questioning and detention warrant power and the questioning warrant power—the government simply is seeking to leave the whole regime in place for a period of 12 months while the government works through what is to replace that regime. It's not entirely clear why the government has chosen to retain the questioning and detention warrants power at all, given that it has never been used, but Labor accepts that that short extension of the whole regime is appropriate, as did the intelligence committee, in order to allow time for a reformed compulsory questioning framework to be developed.

It is worth noting that the government has accepted all of the Intelligence and Security Committee's recommendations in respect of the approximately 10 national security bills that have been brought to this parliament since 2014. This is the first occasion that I can think of that the government has seen fit to extend a power that is the subject of a repeal recommendation. Notwithstanding that, we in Labor, and I as a member of the committee, thank the government for continued implementation of PJCIS report recommendations and I look forward to the government bringing forward legislation that gives effect to the particular recommendation of the committee that the questioning and detention warrants power be repealed, as was recommended by the committee. The recommendation for this repeal of an extraordinary power does reflect a matter of which the House is already well aware—the fact that our enforcement of security laws must be regularly reviewed is not a reason in any way for them to be expanded, let alone made permanent. As I've said of the powers recently reviewed by the intelligence committee, extraordinary powers introduced to meet an extraordinary threat should be periodically reviewed and repealed, if it is clear that those powers are no longer needed.

There is no doubt that Australians could perhaps always be made safer by stricter security arrangements. Australians, perhaps, could be made safer by stricter laws, but Australia is a democracy and we value our freedoms as well as we value our security. It's Labor's view that finding the right balance between our security and our rights and freedoms is a critical ongoing task that all parliamentarians must engage in. Because new threats to our national security may suddenly arise or diminish as a consequence of events unfolding overseas, or indeed in our country, it is particularly important that our national security laws and capabilities are, to some extent at least, never taken for granted as a set-and-forget proposition.

It was in recognition of the need for ongoing review of our national security laws that Labor established the Office of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor and it was in recognition of the ongoing nature of this function that Labor fought hard for the retention of the monitor, even as the Abbott government announced in 2014 that the office would be abolished, in the misguided belief that its purpose was somehow complete. I'm pleased that the then Abbott government backed down on its proposal to abolish the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor. The continued worth of the monitor has been shown in this bill, which picked up, in a very real sense, on the 2017 review of the stop, search and seizure powers by the then Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, the Hon. Roger Giles AO.

Similarly, the government's own independent intelligence review, conducted by Michael L'Estrange and Stephen Merchant, which reported in the middle of last year, recommended that the Intelligence and Security Committee should be given much broader powers of oversight. I think that there would be general support in this place for the expansion of the Intelligence and Security Committee's oversight role in the light of that recommendation of the government's Independent Intelligence Review report.

On 13 June 2017, shortly before the report of the Independent Intelligence Review was received by government, the Prime Minister, in a national security statement, said:

… I will … soon receive the review of the Australian Intelligence Community that I tasked last year. This is a regular review, and it is a critical look at how our world-class intelligence agencies and structures must adapt to stay ahead of the threat, anticipate evolving challenges and continue to reassure us of our future security, freedom and opportunities. I will report back to the House with the government's response to these initiatives …

It's a little over 12 months since the Prime Minister made this commitment, and it appears that there may be some roadblock to the implementation of the recommendations.

I can refer to the fact that on 23 October 2017, during supplementary budget estimates, Labor senator Jenny McAllister asked Mr Allan McKinnon, from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, whether a response of the government to the L'Estrange and Merchant report was to be forthcoming. At that hearing, Mr McKinnon, a deputy secretary of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, stated that all the L'Estrange and Merchant recommendations were being implemented, saying 'almost all of them in their original form; a couple in slightly amended form'. On 7 May this year, after Senator McAllister had written to the Attorney-General on 4 April 2018 seeking an update on the implementation of the recommendations, the deputy secretary of the department Mr McKinnon wrote to Senator McAllister withdrawing his evidence given during estimates in October 2017. There is as a consequence no longer any government response to the essential recommendations regarding greater oversight of the Australian intelligence community by the Intelligence and Security Committee of this parliament. This House is still waiting for the fulfilment of the government's commitment to respond to its own review.

Crucially, while the government has responded positively to the limited review powers recommended by now several PJCIS inquiries, the broader oversight responsibilities for the PJCIS recommended by the government's own review have yet to be responded to, let alone introduced as legislation to the parliament. We await the formal response and look forward to the PJCIS being given the recommended oversight powers necessary to ensure that the powers of our agencies and law enforcement bodies are proportionate and balanced by the need to protect the rights and freedoms that all Australians value.

Finally, I should in this context mention what have been described as the Faulkner reforms, some of which have been realised in other ways but which nevertheless provide a useful framework which the parliament should commit to. Senator John Faulkner, who retired from the parliament in February 2015, was a fierce advocate for improved governmental transparency and accountability in our nation. He argued that in recent years Australia has benefited from professional and well-run intelligence and security agencies that have respected the parliament, the government of the day and our laws. But Senator Faulkner also argued that effective safeguards against the abuse of security powers cannot depend on the personal integrity and quality of the leaders of our agencies. Rather, it is the responsibility of the federal parliament to prescribe safeguards that keep pace with the expansion of security powers.

I agree entirely. While I personally have great respect for the law enforcement and national security officers who are currently serving our nation, it is the laws of the nation that must safeguard our rights and freedoms, and it is these laws that we are now debating. Members of the federal parliamentary Labor Party recognise that in Australia, as in many other similar democracies, the powers of intelligence and security agencies have been strengthened and expanded significantly in recent years as a consequence of the increasingly complex and unpredictable security environment. Labor agrees that the maintenance of public safety in the current security environment requires enhanced powers for the agencies charged with this critical responsibility. However, with legislative changes extending those powers, the requirement for reliable, effective external oversight and other safeguards becomes critical to maintaining an essential level of trust in the community about agency operations.

It was Senator Faulkner's view that it is the parliament to which agencies are accountable and it is the parliament's responsibility to oversee their priorities and effectiveness and to ensure that agencies meet the requirements and standards it sets. I agree. Senator Faulkner developed a set of reforms designed to ensure that the effectiveness of parliamentary oversight of intelligence and security agencies keeps pace with any enhanced powers being given to the agencies. Labor brought forward legislation in 2015 to give affect to these important reforms. One key reform proposed by Senator Faulkner was for the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security to have oversight of some operational matters of the security agencies. He came to this view before the government's own review into the intelligence committee, which I've already discussed, recommended similar powers of review.

Labor continues to press for the significant changes to the role of the intelligence and security committee that were recommended by Senator John Faulkner in reforms which subsequently have been taken up in a private senator's bill by Senator Penny Wong and by the independent intelligence review of 2017. These powers of oversight go beyond the expanded powers provided for in this bill, because necessarily the reviews which are reflected in this legislation are limited to the powers that are reviewed. We look forward to the government positively responding to its own review and assisting Labor with the implementation of the Faulkner reforms.

Labor will always work to keep Australians safe and, at the same time, we will ensure that the rights and freedoms enjoyed by all Australians are upheld. Getting this balance right can be a challenging task, but we always approach the work of the intelligence and security committee in a bipartisan and constructive manner, which should leave the Australian community in no doubt that Labor will always seek to ensure that the needs of safety and security are proportionate and balanced against fundamental rights and freedoms. I commend the bill to the House.

Anne Aly (Cowan, Australian Labor Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2018. This bill was introduced to the House in May of this year, at which point the Attorney-General referred the bill to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security for review. The PJCIS reported on the bill in June of this year, and its single recommendation was that the bill be passed. Now, this bill implements the recommendations of two reports by the PJCIS, which were tabled in March 2018. The first report considered the control order and preventative detention order provisions of the Crimes Act and the Criminal Code. The second report considered the declared area provisions of the Criminal Code. The bill extends the sunset date for the control order, preventative detention order and declared area regimes by three years to 7 September 2021.

It also implements, with some minor exceptions, the recommendations of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, the INSLM—I don't know if that's an acronym that we could make into any kind of spoken word. Those recommendations about these regimes were made in October 2017. Those recommendations respond to some reports by the PJCIS, as well as a few other things, in its entirety. As the shadow Attorney-General mentioned, Labor continues to demonstrate its longstanding commitment to working with the government in a constructive and bipartisan manner on issues of national security. We are, of course, dedicated to keeping Australians safe. For that reason, we welcome the government's implementation of the bipartisan recommendations of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security and the implementation of the recommendations of the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor.

We note that, while the government has implemented the PJCIS recommendations, the powers contained in division 3 of part III of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 are to be extended. The government has not implemented the very significant PJCIS recommendation to repeal the questioning and detention warrants power. We also note that the government has not implemented the INSLM's recommendation that the subject of a control order should not have to pay costs for seeking to vary a control order. Rather, the subject of the control order could still potentially be ordered to pay the costs of a variation application if found to have unreasonably contributed to those costs.

This is at odds with the fundamental principle of the criminal law that a defendant will not be required to pay the costs of the prosecution. As these are quasi-criminal powers, that same principle ought to apply, and the shadow Attorney-General made that point quite eloquently in his previous speech. But, as I mentioned, bipartisan support is extremely important, particularly for national security. Early identification and the capacity and ability to deal with people who are at an operational level and who present a clear and present threat to the safety and security of Australians should be an utmost priority not just of government but of all of us here in parliament. However, there is a need for us to work more, to have more programs and to perhaps pay more attention to those at other levels—at the engagement level and the influence level—who are not yet operational but may well be on their way to being operational to committing an act of violent extremism.

It is important not just that we know—and indeed we do know; our security agencies and our law enforcement agencies are to be commended—but also that we understand terrorism in all its forms, whether it is a threat presented by violent jihadist actors or a threat presented by violent right-wing, violent left-wing or any other form of terrorist actor. Australia has a very comprehensive and robust framework of legislation for doing that, as well as comprehensive powers given to our law enforcement agencies so that we can know, so that we do have information and intelligence that allows us to proactively identify people who may be at that operational level. But we also need to focus on our understanding of the environments in which radicalising influences emerge and how we deal with those environments, how we mitigate those environments and how we mitigate the threats to Australians' safety and security that those environments present. The law and the suite of legislative amendments that Australia has installed around terrorism and terrorism-related laws since 2002 can deal only with the pointy end of terrorism and radicalisation. At that broad-base level, where young people are being influenced by negative propaganda from ISIS on the internet and in their social lives, as well as negative propaganda coming out of other extremist groups, the law can't deal with that. Legislative amendments will not be able to address that, because legislative amendments deal only with that pointy end. We need to also have a balance and focus on that broad base in the prevention of radicalisation and the early intervention of those early stages of radicalisation, influence and engagement before individuals become operational and present a clear and present threat.

Labor has a longstanding commitment to working with this government and, in doing so, also ensuring that everything possible can be done to help keep Australians safe. As the shadow Attorney-General mentioned in his address before I spoke, it is also important that we have balance, proportionality and rationality in how we deal with this. It is very easy for us to lose sight of rationality, balance and proportionality and for that to actually have a negative or counterproductive impact on what we do in the counterterrorism space.

We support this bill. We support the consideration that this bill provides, in terms of extending up to 2021 the sunset date for control orders, preventative detention orders and declared areas. However, if we are to put in every possible effort to keep Australians safe, we need to look at everything that helps us to implement those laws, that strengthens those laws and that strengthens our society to become the kind of society that is resilient to and resists the influence of terrorist actors and terrorist propaganda.

Jason Wood (La Trobe, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

I rise to speak on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No.1) 2018. First of all, I fully concur that the control order sunset clause be extended. As part of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I thank all the members, and in particular the chair of the committee, Andrew Hastie, for the work they have done. The committee works in a bipartisan manner and actually gets excellent results.

One issue I've always been greatly concerned about is the preventative detention legislation, in regard to law enforcement or police never having the ability to question a person under what we call a PDO. The way this would work if a person were under a preventative detention order is that they would need to be released and arrested under part 1C of the Crimes Act. The difficulty with this—and I've always had this as a former counterterrorism officer—is that if you have a person in preventative detention you can't ask them any questions, and anything they say can't be used in evidence. So, potentially, you could have a person in preventative detention who the police have put there because quite often there's not enough evidence to arrest and interview. That's part of the reason the PDOs were set up in the first place—to prevent that person from potentially going on to commit a terrorist attack. But, as they are in the holding cell under the PDO and not being asked any questions, they may have information. It could be, as you see in the criminal or terrorist world, that the code is, 'If I get picked up and I'm in custody, you go and commit the attack.' That's of great concern to me. The person in there may have information that could help law enforcement to prevent a terrorist attack. Law enforcement cannot give that guarantee and they never will be able to give that guarantee. A person who's in custody may have that information, but since they'll never be asked questions, law enforcement can never get the answers. The only way law enforcement can get that is to release and re-arrest.

In the UK they have what's called pre-arrest or pre-charge detention. It doesn't need the same threshold to actually make an arrest for a criminal investigation and to charge. The reason they do this is that, when it comes to terrorism, law enforcement does not have the luxury it has when it comes to, say, an armed robbery, where you can allow the offenders to buy the masks, receive or steal the firearms, get a stolen vehicle and case out the joint, and then have the police pick them up pretty much on the morning they're about to commit an attack or commit an armed robbery. When it comes to terrorism, they don't have that luxury. As soon as they believe something is going to occur, even though they don't have enough evidence to charge, they will go in and make that arrest to ensure that public safety comes first. This makes it very difficult when it comes to the PDO.

The UK have had so many terrorist attacks. There were the attacks in Manchester and also the attacks on the bridge outside parliament house last year—the anniversary of which has just occurred—where, sadly, two young Australians lost their lives. They've realised in the UK that they need every resource they can get, especially when they have 20,000 people of interest over there and 3,000 of them are extremists of great interest. In Australia—and this has been publicly stated before—we would probably have in the vicinity of 500. I acknowledge that the Attorney-General is looking into this. In fact, I and the Attorney-General, when he was in another role, put in a submission to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, explaining why the police need the ability to question a person under a PDO. I would say that's a good sign, because the Attorney-General knows how important this change to the legislation is to protect Australians from terrorist attacks.

I have another concern—and the member for Cowan has also raised this issue. Legislation is obviously very important at the pointy end, as are more resources for the Australian Federal Police. If we go back to the Howard days, the coalition was always putting in an amazing amount of funding when it came to counterterrorism measures and the Australian Federal Police. I congratulate the Minister for Home Affairs, Peter Dutton, for recommending funding for the criminal intelligence security system in this recent budget. I've been calling for such a system for a number of years; it's a national database. This database will help law enforcement. One of the biggest issues is—and we saw this with September 11—the lack of data exchange and information between agencies. We saw this when the FBI were not able to receive information about those people who were undertaking pilot training and who ended up using commercial planes to commit those awful attacks on the Twin Towers in America.

The criminal intelligence security database in Australia, which I know all law enforcement agencies across the country are very keen to have, will have the ability to have included on it people of interest who may, for example, be buying or possessing dangerous goods or chemicals. Quite often, the people involved in terrorist activities haven't got a licence themselves to buy such things, but they may have an associate who does. So it would help law enforcement to have that connection. For example, if they are watching a terrorist suspect and all of a sudden they realise an associate is buying high-consequence dangerous goods or undergoing pilot training, it doesn't necessarily mean any terrorist attack is being planned, but it gives a bit of reassurance. In the very worst case scenario, where something is being planned, it gives what we call a red flag alert to law enforcement, which is really important.

When it comes to extremism, all the programs in Australia through the Attorney-General's Department—and I understand it is the same in the UK and other countries—rely on the person who is engaged in extremist activity to get involved by simply volunteering to undertake what is called a deradicalisation program. I think it's great if a person wants to put up their hand to have counselling and have it explained to them why their beliefs are totally wrong and that they won't go to heaven after killing the infidels and all of those awful things, which, sadly, have been preached to them. But the problem I have is that we have so many young people who don't volunteer.

We go back to the incident outside the Endeavour Hills police station with Numan Haider, who met up with two police officers, one from the AFP and one from VicPol. I have met the police, and it should've been a low-key meeting. They were concerned about Numan Haider. He had been at the Dandenong shopping centre carrying an IS flag, which would obviously greatly concern law enforcement and suggest that this person is radicalised. When they met him at Endeavour Hills Police Station, he was friendly. He went to greet them but in actual fact started to stab them. The police members concerned ended up shooting him, and subsequently he lost his life. Numan Haider was a classic example of someone who had shown signs of being radicalised, and yet there was no mechanism in place to have a young person like that, or even an older person, with those views be compelled to change their behaviour or their views.

One aspect I've been pushing for is what's called a community protection intervention order, which works the same way as a family violence order. With a family violence order, if an aggrieved family member makes a complaint to the police or directly to the courts, the magistrate will put conditions in place, including not allowing that person to associate with the aggrieved family member, be within 500 metres of that person's work place or make contact with them through social media or telephone calls. But, when it comes to an extremist at that low level, basically, sadly, we're waiting, as we saw in the Brighton attack, for a person to commit the terrorist act. To me, we need something at a lower level, such as this community protection intervention order. Quite often you hear the parents are very concerned about their child, normally a son, who's watching beheading videos, talking on social media with other extremists and being coaxed by extremist clerics. These clerics don't actually say, 'Go commit a terrorist attack,' but they imply that September 11 was good, the embassy attacks in Indonesia against Australia were a good thing and those who give their life for a terrorist attack go to heaven, planting the seed of evil in a young person's mind. And, eventually, in so many cases, the young person goes and commits these awful attacks.

The way this could work is the police or a family member would go before a court. The magistrate would hear the evidence and would first of all decide whether the person's actions are extremist behaviour. The magistrate would then put conditions in place, such as that the person can no longer associate with other people with the same or similar views, watch beheadings or other IS propaganda videos or associate with people like the preacher who's trying to convert them. Benbrika is a really good example of someone who was forced out of a number of mosques, including the Preston mosque. Other Muslims regarded him as basically a crazy person who no-one would ever listen to, yet he would stand outside the mosques and go and convert young people. In total, I think he converted 17 young people to follow him to plan terrorist attacks, including at Federation Square, the MCG and other significant places. But he was allowed to coax these young people in. This is where straightaway an intervention order could be put on someone like that to keep away from the mosque and the young people he's trying to radicalise to ensure they don't go down the same path.

I know Victoria Police is very keen on this, and it's something I'm very keen to pursue. Otherwise we're waiting for something bad to happen, because young people, in particular, who've been brainwashed and don't want to go on a voluntary program will eventually, sadly, if they don't change their view, commit a terrorist attack. All those people that say it is a bit of hype just have to look at the last couple of years, with the planned attack on Federation Square on Christmas Eve, the planned Mother's Day attack, the planned Anzac Day attacks where they planned to behead police officers and also the recent planned attack on a commercial aircraft going from Sydney to Dubai which, if it hadn't been intercepted by police, would have seen hundreds of people killed.

I congratulate law enforcement members for what they've done. They have the full support of the Turnbull government. I acknowledge the bipartisan manner in which the report of this Intelligence and Security Committee and other reports have been produced. In closing, we must have preventative detention orders, the ability to question and also community protection intervention orders to really focus on those young people who've been radicalised to go down the wrong path, because waiting to see them commit a terrorist attack is not the way we should go.

Mark Coulton (Parkes, Deputy-Speaker) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

In summing up, I'd like to thank honourable members for their contributions to the debate on the Counter-Terrorism Legislation Amendment Bill (No. 1) 2018. Since September 2014 Australia's national terrorism threat level has been at 'probable'. This means that there is credible intelligence assessed by our security agencies indicating that individuals or groups continue to possess the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia. In this prevailing threat environment it is critical that our law enforcement and security agencies have the powers that they need to protect the community from the threat of a terrorist act.

Consistent with the recommendations of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, the PJCIS, and the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, the INSLM, this bill extends the operation of the control order regime, the preventative detention order regime, the declared areas provisions and the terrorism stop, search and seizure powers beyond their sunset day of 7 September 2018. These powers will operate for a further three years until 7 September 2021.

Each of these powers plays an important role in equipping our agencies with the capabilities they need to address the threat of terrorism. The control order and PDO regimes are vital preventive powers that enable law enforcement agencies to take proactive steps to mitigate the threat of a terrorism act when traditional law enforcement powers are not available. The declared areas offence forms an important element of managing the risk posed by the return of Australians who have participated in conflicts overseas with listed terrorist organisations. It equips our law enforcement and prosecution agencies with the tools to arrest, charge and prosecute returning foreign fighters. Terrorism stop, search and seizure powers under the Crimes Act enable law enforcement agencies to act immediately in the event of a terrorist threat to or a terrorism incident within Commonwealth places, such as airports and defence establishments.

The bill will also continue the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation's questioning and detention powers in relation to terrorism offences for a further 12 months. This will enable the continuation of these important intelligence-gathering powers while the government considers the PJCIS's recommendations and other recommendations in relation to ASIO's powers. In accordance with the recommendations of the PJCIS and the INSLM, the bill also makes other amendments to these counterterrorism provisions to ensure they continue to meet the operational needs of law enforcement agencies while also ensuring the proportionality of these regimes.

The bill also increases independent oversight of these counterterrorism provisions to promote greater accountability and transparency around their use. Enhanced oversight provides confidence that these extraordinary powers are being exercised judiciously and in appropriate circumstances by Commonwealth agencies.

In conclusion, I would like to thank the PJCIS and the INSLM for their detailed consideration of each of the sunsetting counterterrorism powers and offences. The work of the PJCIS and the INSLM was invaluable in informing the deliberations of government on the necessity and effectiveness of these critical counterterrorism provisions and ways to improve their operation. I also thank colleagues across all sides of the chamber for recognising the need for these important measures. This bill reflects the government's ongoing commitment to ensuring Australia's counterterrorism legislative framework remains robust and that our law enforcement and security agencies have the powers that they need to respond to the evolving threat of terrorism.

Ross Vasta (Bonner, Liberal Party) Share this | Link to this | Hansard source

The question is that this bill be now read a second time.

A division having been called and the bells having been rung—

Order! As there are fewer than five members on the side of the noes in this division, I declare the question resolved in the affirmative in accordance with standing order 127. The names of those members who are in the minority will be recorded in the Votes and Proceedings.

Question agreed to, Mr Bandt and Mr Wilkie voting no.

Bill read a second time.